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ABSTRACT 
 
Relations between India and Pakistan have received much attention since their formal 
constitution as independent states over 72 years ago. Existing literature has focused 
predominantly on security relations rather than economic relations or bilateral 
cooperation. Analysed were the discourses of key political and military leaders in New 
Delhi and Islamabad and Rawalpindi rather than everyday practices. This thesis 
proposes an alternative approach to analysing relations between India and Pakistan 
that is grounded in practices and focuses on the Punjab borderland.  
Building on Pierre Bourdieu’s practice theory, I argued that relations between 
India and Pakistan are best understood as produced and reproduced through everyday 
security and economic practices, that are historically constituted and shaped through 
field, capital and habitus. I argue that borderlands are well suited to study international 
practices because they may appear there in sharper relief as borders are central to states 
and to interstate relations. While Bourdieu did not pay much attention to borders and 
even less to international boundaries, one of the main contributions to existing 
literature on practice theory is the development of a practice-based analytical 
framework for studying international relations in borderlands. 
Drawing on nine months of ethnographically informed fieldwork in Amritsar 
and Lahore, New Delhi and Islamabad, I show how Bourdieu’s conceptual framework 
allows to gain a deeper understanding of relations between India and Pakistan through 
four case studies: (1) bilateral wars and crises, (2) the Khalistan movement, (3) 
everyday life in the Punjab borderland, and (4) bilateral trade through the Attari-
Wagah border crossing point. I relate everyday practices in the Punjab borderland to 
joint statements issued and agreements reached by India and Pakistan in the framework 
of the government-led Composite Dialogue Process (2004-2012), to show the close 
relationship between everyday practices in the Punjab borderland and foreign 
policymaking in New Delhi and Islamabad. This dissertation contributes to a better 
understanding of the relationship between everyday practices and foreign 
policymaking and between border states and central governments, to International 
Relations and to Pierre Bourdieu’s practice theory. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Every evening border security forces of India and Pakistan lower their flags at the 
Attari - Wagah border crossing point that connects the Indian state of Punjab with the 
Pakistani Punjab Province in a ceremony that attracts many curious onlookers on both 
sides of the international boundary separating Pakistan and India.1 Decorated with 
turbans topped with big colourful fans, ceremonial uniforms and shiny black boots, 
members of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and the Pakistan Rangers 
(Rangers) stride towards each other swinging their arms, stomping and high-kicking. 
As the gates on each side of the line are opened, the soldiers march towards each other, 
slamming their heels to the ground. They lift their hands and it looks like they might 
hit each other, but then they are off to lower the flags in perfect synchrony. Before the 
gates are slammed closed, representatives from the Rangers and the BSF briskly shake 
hands, each standing on their side of the borderline. Then the soldiers retreat to their 
sides. Meanwhile, the crowds enthusiastically cheer for their soldiers and shout in 
praise of their country, trying to drown each other out (own observations).  
On the surface, this border closing ceremony is a performance of antagonistic 
nationalisms, which have shaped relations between India and Pakistan since their 
formal establishment as states in 1947. People on each side attempt to outperform the 
other by kicking higher, shouting louder, building larger theatres for spectators of the 
ceremony and constructing higher flagpoles. At the same time, members of the 
Pakistan Rangers and the Indian Border Security Force are constrained in their actions 
by a meticulously choreographed ceremony which requires cooperation. Outside the 
view of spectators, members of the border guarding forces of India and Pakistan jointly 
rehearse the ceremony to achieve perfect synchrony. Cooperation frequently escapes 
public and scholarly attention as it takes place in the everyday, highlighting the need 
to look beyond an event to understand India-Pakistan relations.2 
As in this retreat ceremony, relations between India and Pakistan have been 
shaped through various conflicts, attempts to outperform each other militarily and 
economically, or at least to achieve a balance of power, and through cooperation. 
 
1 Flag lowering ceremonies are also performed at the Ganda Singh Wala / Hussainiwala and the 
Sulemanki / Fazilka border crossing points, also in Punjab (Pakistan Rangers Punjab n.d.). 
2 On the retreat ceremony see also Goeury (2008), Jeychandran (2016), Menon (2012), Parciack 
(2018) and Schendel (2006). 
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While wars and crises between India and Pakistan have received considerable attention 
in public debates and in academic literature (see e.g. Ganguly 1986; 2002; 2016; 
Ganguly and Hagerty 2006; Ganguly and Kapur 2010; Paul 2005b), much less has 
been said and written about cooperation between these two states. The resumption of 
the government-led Composite Dialogue Process in 2004, which was set up in 1997 to 
address all issues shaping relations between India and Pakistan, brought attention to 
cooperation (see e.g. Akhtar 2015; Dasgupta 2015; Gul 2008; Misra 2010; Padder 
2012; 2015; Wojczewski 2014) and economic relations between these two neighbours 
(see e.g. Kugelman and Hathaway 2013; Sridharan 2000; 2005; Taneja and Dayal 
2017; Taneja and Pohit 2015). There has thus been a shift from analysing relations 
between India and Pakistan through a security lens towards studying these from the 
perspective of cooperation and economic relations. 
While the literature on cooperation between India and Pakistan remained largely 
focused on the outcome of central government-led processes, scholars working on 
trade relations between these two states have placed more attention to processes and 
practices outside national capitals. For instance, they have studied trade practices at 
the Attari-Wagah border crossing point (see e.g. Gill and Madaan 2015; Sharma et al. 
2016; Sinha et al. 2016; Taneja, Dayal, and Bimal 2016), the only land route through 
which business people from India and Pakistan can formally trade through rail and 
road. While providing greater insights into trade through Attari and Wagah, these 
studies are largely descriptive and overlook the social history shaping everyday trade 
practices. There is limited reference to the international dimension of trade through 
Attari and Wagah. However, authors like Trividesh Singh Maini (2007; 2011; 2018; 
Jain and Maini 2017) and Sucha Singh Gill et al. (2010) have noted the potential for 
cooperation between the two Punjabs and suggested that they could contribute to 
relations between India and Pakistan by creating a positive environment for bilateral 
negotiations.  
The potential role of Indian (border) states in foreign policymaking has 
increasingly been discussed in academic literature (see e.g. Asthana and Jacob 2017; 
Blarel 2017; Blarel and van Willigen 2017; Dossani and Vijaykumar 2005; Hazarika 
2014; Jacob 2016; Jaganathan 2019). However, this literature has often been selective 
in the cases analysed and remains descriptive. It falls under what Neumann (2002, 628) 
has described as an ‘armchair analysis.’ This study contributes to and departs from this 
literature by focusing on everyday practices while drawing on semi-structured 
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interviews and observations made during nine months of fieldwork in India and 
Pakistan. This thesis explores: 
How are relations between India and Pakistan produced and reproduced 
through everyday economic and security practices in the Punjab 
borderland?  
How are everyday practices in the Punjab borderland related to processes 
in and between the central governments in New Delhi and Islamabad? 
Economic and security practices were chosen due to the literature’s predominant focus 
on these aspects of relations between India and Pakistan. A practice-centred approach 
enhances our understanding of relations between these two states by illuminating how 
international relations are perceived, experienced and reproduced in the everyday 
(Neumann 2002, 628).  
Everyday practices are analysed through the framework of Pierre Bourdieu's 
(1977) theory of practice. For Bourdieu, practices are not fully conscious ways of 
doing things that are shaped by our social history, objectified in fields and incorporated 
in the habitus of actors. The field represents the structural constraints imposed on 
actions, whereas habitus represents their embodiment. Different forms of resources 
(capitals) shape the positions occupied by actors in a field, and together with the 
habitus, determine their position-taking, that is their points of view and actions in a 
particular situation. The situation functions as a ‘trigger’ for practices, which vary 
greatly from one moment to another while following a certain logic that is developed 
over time, rendering a socio-historical analysis central to a Bourdieusian study. History 
varies greatly from one actor and place to another, while also exhibiting similarities. 
This highlights the need to understand field, capital and habitus as analytical concepts 
that need to be assigned meaning through empirical research. 
This study analyses international relations through everyday practices in the 
Punjab borderland. A borderland can be a microcosm for studying international 
relations because everyday economic and security practices may appear there in 
sharper relief (Wilson and Donnan 2012, 1), as manifest in my interpretation of the 
retreat ceremony. This is because borders are central to the modern system of states 
(Weber 2007 [1919]), and thus to relations between them. However, physical borders 
do not necessarily coincide with the borders of the social spaces of states (Reed-
Danahay 2017, 10). Therefore, we need to move beyond understanding states as 
geographically bound and fixed entities (Reed-Danahay 2017, 17), without 
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disregarding the image of the state as a singular actor bound by a clearly delineated 
boundary. Taking inspiration from Deborah Reed-Danahay's (2017) and George 
Steinmetz' (2008; 2016) work, I conceptualise borderlands as social spaces that can 
expand or contract and transcend state borders. They are spaces in which actors occupy 
positions in both physical and social space, which together with the social trajectory 
of actors shape their position-takings (Bourdieu 2018) and through them international 
relations. By taking Bourdieu to the borderland, I contribute to literature on practices 
in international relations (see e.g. Adler 2005; Adler and Pouliot 2011b; Bueger and 
Gadinger 2018; Pouliot 2010a), and specifically on literature drawing on Bourdieu’s 
practice theory (see e.g. Bigo 2011; Bigo and Madsen 2011; Cohen 2018; Berling 
2012; 2015; Leander 2011; Mérand and Pouliot 2008), which has paid scant attention 
to borders and borderlands.  
The empirical focus is on the Punjab borderland because it has been important 
historically and remains central to relations between India and Pakistan to date. Punjab 
was home to the Sikh Empire and later became central to British Colonial rule in the 
subcontinent. Following the independence of India and Pakistan and the partition of 
the British Punjab Province in 1947, many Pakistani Punjabis have been influential in 
national politics, the bureaucracy, security and economy, leading some to speak of the 
‘Punjabisation’ of Pakistan (Talbot 2002). Indian Punjabis, by contrast, lost much of 
their influence in the military, the bureaucracy, politics and the economy since 
partition. However, a change in centre-state relations and the liberalisation of the 
economy in the 1990s and the opening of the Attari-Wagah road route for trade 
between India and Pakistan in 2005 afforded Indian Punjab a greater role in shaping 
relations between these two neighbours.  
The focus on Punjab in an analysis of relations between India and Pakistan 
contrasts with and adds to existing literature on relations between these two states, 
which has predominantly concentrated on Kashmir. Kashmir has been central to 
scholarly and public debates due to the contested status of state borders in this area 
and the violence that India and Pakistan have used in struggles over the borders of their 
state territories since their formal establishment in 1947. There are many links and 
parallels – but also important differences – between developments in Kashmir and in 
Punjab due to which practices in the Punjab borderland can add to our understanding 
of contemporary developments in Kashmir (i.e. from the 1990s), and vice versa. 
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Throughout the thesis I will highlight some of these connections, but the focus is on 
Punjab.  
Everyday practices in the Punjab borderland need to be understood in relation to 
the broader context in which they are embedded. I study this relationship by linking 
them to state-making processes in India and Pakistan and bilateral discussions held 
and agreements reached in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process. The 
Composite Dialogue Process was launched by the heads of government of India and 
Pakistan in 1997, but only really took place between 2004 and 2012. It focused on all 
issues of mutual concern and sought to address them in a comprehensive manner. Eight 
points of discussion were identified by bureaucrats from India and Pakistan, not all of 
which are relevant to the present study. The empirical analysis showed that 
negotiations over confidence building measures, cultural exchanges, cooperation on 
terrorism and drug trafficking and on economic and commercial relations were directly 
related to everyday practices in the Punjab borderland. The joint initiatives launched, 
agreements reached, and statements produced in the framework of this dialogue 
process build an important source of information for this research. They are understood 
to represent the joint position of the Indian and Pakistani governments on bilateral 
relations. This joint point of view can diverge from the positions taken by the Indian 
and the Pakistani governments respectively, which themselves do not constitute 
unitary fields but are composed of a variety of actors whose position-taking may 
overlap, diverge and conflict.  
1.1 THESIS STRUCTURE 
To provide a better understanding of the current state of knowledge on India-Pakistan 
relations, the thesis starts with an overview and discussion of the literature on interstate 
relations in Chapter 2. Our understanding of India-Pakistan relations is limited through 
the literature’s predominant focus on realist explanations, power and balancing 
behaviour and national interests. Attention to the way in which international relations 
are produced and reproduced through everyday practices could enhance our 
understanding. Pierre Bourdieu’s practice theory provides a useful conceptual 
framework to study everyday practices because it allows us to relate the broader 
context in which these practices take place to the social trajectories of those 
reproducing them every day.  
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Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s practice theory, a framework for studying 
relations between states through everyday practices in borderlands is developed in 
Chapter 3. First, Bourdieu’s core concepts field, capital and habitus are outlined and 
their relationship to everyday practices is explained. While everyday practices tend to 
reproduce the social world, moments in time when field and habitus are misaligned 
can lead to changes. Bourdieu (1990, 159–93) conceptualised these moments as crises, 
suggested that his theory of practice may not apply and that rational choice may take 
its place. By contrast, literature on intractable conflicts implies that the repetition of 
crises may lead to reproduction rather than change. This needs to be explored in 
relation to Bourdieu’s work on the state, as state-making and interstate relations are 
part of the same process. The state is conceptualised as an ensemble of fields that is 
structured through a field of power and a unified social space. A borderland is 
conceptualised as a social space related to an international boundary that transcends 
state borders, where the external borders of the state-space are negotiated every day.  
The formation of the Punjab borderland as a social space and its relevance to 
relations between India and Pakistan is historically traced in Chapter 4. First, the 
history of the Punjab region is outlined from the Sikh Empire (1799-1849) to the 
partition of British India in 1947. It is demonstrated how Punjab was constituted as a 
social space structured around a common sense. Attention then turns to the post-
partition period and traces the development of the two Punjabs to date. The division 
of the British Punjab Province and the incorporation of its two parts into India and 
Pakistan turned Punjab into a borderland. While this led to the multiplication and the 
hardening of borders between the two Punjabs, Indian and Pakistani Punjab remained 
part of a shared social space that was reproduced through cross-border initiatives 
between the state governments, businesspeople, musicians, literati and others, some of 
which took place under the banner of the Punjabiyat. This shared social space rendered 
state-making in the Punjab borderland a difficult process that was associated with 
violence, starting with partition, followed by India-Pakistan wars and the Khalistan 
separatist movement in Indian Punjab, amongst others. These violent engagements, 
conceptualised as crises, have shaped relations between India and Pakistan since their 
formal establishment. In 1997, they led to the institutionalisation of a Composite 
Dialogue Process aimed at addressing all issues in interstate relations, which is 
analysed in relation to everyday practices in the Punjab borderland in subsequent 
chapters. 
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Chapter 5 explores how India and Pakistan differentiated themselves from each 
other and constituted themselves externally through military confrontations. It 
uncovers the logic shaping practices by borderlanders during interstate wars and the 
threat thereof. It starts by describing peoples’ responses to and experiences of the 
evacuation of the Punjab borderland following so-called ‘surgical strikes’ in 
September 2016. In line with Bourdieu’s historical-sociological approach, it then 
traces borderlanders’ practices across time – from the second India-Pakistan war in 
1965 to this crisis in 2016. Many people were temporarily displaced from their homes 
and the Punjab borderland was constructed as a masculine crisis space. Changes in 
borderlanders’ practices are related to changes in the security environment in the late 
1990s and people’s reflections on past experiences. The mobility of borderlanders 
during crises was shaped by kinship networks and related economic resources. It 
concludes that the repetition of military confrontations has led to the development of 
a crisis habitus among borderlanders which links crises to everyday life. The chapter 
develops Bourdieu’s model for the analysis of a crisis by highlighting continuities 
between different crises across time and outlining the relationship between crises and 
the everyday. This relationship is further explored in the next chapter, which moves 
from analysing external challenges to the state to internal challenges.  
Chapter 6 investigates how the state of India was defended against internal 
challenges to its authority through the Khalistan separatist movement in Indian Punjab 
from the late-1970s to the mid-1990s. It draws attention to the use of violence by 
India’s armed forces, borderlanders’ perceptions thereof and the blurring of borders 
between external and internal security. The chapter shows how Pakistan participated 
in this conflict through the cross-border movement of people, arms, ammunition and 
drugs, which the Indian government perceived and constructed as threats and Pakistan 
as a supporter of felonious activities. At the same time, the Indian government sought 
cooperation with Pakistan to eliminate this menace. This cooperation was extended 
during the Composite Dialogue Process. It was not sustained nor particularly 
successful, as cross-border terrorism, the Khalistan movement and smuggling and drug 
trafficking continue to be presented as threats by India. The Khalistan movement 
presents yet another historical event through which the Punjab borderland was 
constituted as crisis space. Through the Khalistan movement, the differences between 
times of crises and the everyday became increasingly blurred, as is explored in more 
detail in the following chapter. 
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Out of the Khalistan movement emerged some of India’s core border security 
challenges – cross-border terrorism, infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants 
and insurgents, narcotics and arms smuggling and separatist movements aided by 
external powers – which India began fighting unilaterally through the construction of 
a fence and changes in border guarding practices in the late 1980s. Chapter 7 explores 
how relations between India and Pakistan reflected on and shaped everyday practices 
in the Indian Punjab borderland, with a specific focus on those owning and working 
on land beyond the fence. The chapter begins by outlining how the border between 
India and Pakistan was materialised through the construction of a fence and how this 
shaped cross-border movement. The chapter then turns to border guarding practices 
by the Indian Border Security Force and shows how people owning and working on 
land trapped between the de jure border and the fence and their agricultural work were 
securitised. This had negative effects on life in the Punjab borderland, which the Indian 
government sought to remedy by introducing a Border Area Development Programme 
in 1986. However, the programme is flawed due to the primacy of security concerns 
over development goals, thereby contributing to the reproduction of the Punjab 
borderland as crisis space. Crises have become part of everyday life, which is 
amenable to an analysis of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. 
The borderland crisis space not only shaped practices of people living in the 
Indian borderland and working on fields beyond the fence, but also of people seeking 
to cross and/or send goods across the Attari-Wagah border crossing point. Chapter 8 
explores how India and Pakistan sought to transcend this crisis space by creating rules 
and regulations to facilitate trade. Trade increased substantially with the resumption 
of the Composite Dialogue Process in 2004, and economic cooperation was among the 
topics on which most progress was made through bilateral negotiations led by 
Commerce Secretaries from India and Pakistan. The latter were shaped through 
businesspeople, who were able to influence discussions through sector-specific 
business associations and chambers of commerce and industry. This points to the 
increasing influence of economic actors in the state of Pakistan, which has traditionally 
been described as dominated by the military. The chapter shows how bilateral relations 
materialised in rules and regulations and infrastructure developments and how they 
were mediated by street-level bureaucrats at Attari and Wagah.  
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1.2 METHODS 
To fit the explorative nature of the research questions, an ethnographically informed 
approach to empirical research is employed. Ethnographic research typically involves 
the researcher’s immersion in the everyday life of the people they study for a prolonged 
period of time. In this process, data is gathered by listening to what is said, conducting 
informal and formal interviews and collecting documents and artefacts. This process 
is relatively unstructured, meaning that no detailed research design is specified before 
the empirical research starts and that the different categories used for the interpretation 
of the date emerge out of the data analysis process (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 
3). In the words of Wilkinson (2013, 129), ethnographic research makes use of a 
variety of methods that are  
naturalistic, meaning that they involve studying people or phenomena in 
their ‘natural’ setting or context, and produce accounts of research that 
are experience-near, meaning that they are based on people’s experiences 
of events, actions and phenomena in the setting or context. (Wilkinson 
2013, 129).  
Ethnographic research has traditionally been associated with participant observation 
and/or informal conversations. Yet, as scholars recognised the limitations associated 
with understanding space as a geographically distinct location in which practices need 
to be observed, they have come to include formal interviews, documents, texts, images 
and artefacts “to explore processes not immediately or appropriately accessible 
through participant observation” (Amit 2004, 12). Here, a combination of qualitative 
data generating methods was used, including fieldwork, semi-structured interviews 
and a variety of textual resources.  
This dissertation draws on nine months of fieldwork conducted in India and 
Pakistan between 2015 and 2017. Fieldwork is an integral part of a Bourdieusian study 
and “consists of more than collecting data” (Wolcott 2005, 5). It is here understood as 
the process in which the researcher immerses him-/herself in ‘the field’ in which 
practices occur in order to gain a feel for this environment and to conduct empirical 
research. I spent seven months in India (August 2015-February 2016; May 2017) and 
two months in Pakistan (February-April 2017). Time was divided between the national 
capitals, New Delhi (3 months) and Islamabad (1 month), as well as the 
state/provincial capitals Chandigarh (2 months) and Lahore (1 month) and the border 
town Amritsar (1 month).  
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From the border towns Amritsar and Lahore, day trips were undertaken to the 
Attari-Wagah border-crossing point and to eleven Indian villages along the 
international boundary with Pakistan in Amritsar district. These villages include 
Kakar, Ranian, Audar and Mulakot in Ajnala tehsil, and Dhanoia Kalan, Attari, 
Roranwala, Mahawa, Rajatal, Daoke and Naushehra in Amritsar-II tehsil.3 All villages 
were in an area up to about three kilometres from the borderline and situated between 
the international boundary and the first line of defence demarcated through a trench, 
except for four: Kakar, Ranian, Attari and Mahawa are located right behind the first 
line of defence. The location of villages in proximity to the international boundary was 
the key determinant for their inclusion in this study. A second factor was their location 
within reach from Amritsar city for purely practical reasons, as I travelled back and 
forth between villages and Amritsar for my interviews.  
Security concerns for potential interviewees stopped me from visiting border 
villages in Pakistan. Instead, I conducted interviews with four residents from Pakistani 
border villages in Lahore. This considerably reduced my control over their places of 
origin – one was from Kotli in Azad Kashmir, another from the village Chak Garzia, 
located about one kilometre away from the international boundary with India where 
the state borders of Jammu and Kashmir and Indian Punjab meet, others were from 
Banghali and Pirhan village, a 15-minutes’ drive and 500 meters away from the 
international boundary respectively. My reservations towards visiting border villages 
in Pakistan and the limited number of interviews with border dwellers in Pakistani 
Punjab present a major limitation of the cross-border focus of this research. At the 
same time, few people have conducted fieldwork in both India and Pakistan, allowing 
me to make a solid contribution to existing research.  
Research in borderlands has been likened to research in areas of violent conflict 
(Donnan and Wilson 2010, 18), which borderlands frequently are. The Punjab 
borderland is a case in point. Here partition, wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-
49, 1965, 1971 and 1999 and tensions have directly affected everyday life. 
International boundaries are often perceived and represented as politically sensitive 
areas by state officials, especially when they are between antagonistic states like India 
and Pakistan. It can be particularly challenging to get official permission to do research 
in a borderland when researchers seek to conduct research in both states abutting the 
 
3 The spelling of village names varies greatly. I adopted the spelling used in the Census 2011. 
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boundary (Donnan and Wilson 2010, 12–13; Amster 2010, 94) and resulted in 
ethnographers primarily conducting research on one side of the borderland.4  The 
difficulty becomes particularly acute when the researcher is identified with one side in 
the conflict (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 424). Therefore, it has been challenging for 
researchers from India or Pakistan to conduct research inside the other country.5 As a 
German national, I was perceived as non-partisan by those processing my visa 
applications, which is reflected in the fact that I received a multiple-entry research visa 
for India and a multiple-entry business visa for Pakistan.6  At the same time, the 
research environment has affected the way in which I could conduct fieldwork. Firstly, 
the trade areas at the Attari-Wagah border crossing points in India and Pakistan were 
represented as ‘sensitive’ and I was denied access. This was rationalised by saying that 
I am a foreigner. Ultimately, I managed to negotiate access to the trade area at the 
Integrated Check Post (ICP) Attari, but not the Land Freight Unit (LFU) Wagah. My 
inability to negotiate access to the LFU Wagah reinforced my insecurities regarding 
research in border villages in Pakistan, which I cut out therefore. This has restricted 
my ability to observe practices where they occur, while still allowing me to develop a 
feel for the environment in which everyday practices take place and to conduct 
interviews.  
Interviews form the backbone of this research project. I conducted 130 semi-
structured interviews with over 200 people, including farmers, labourers, truck drivers, 
sellers/buyers, traders, business people, representatives of business associations, 
security and intelligence personnel, government officials (including political and 
administrative staff), and a number of (academic) experts (see Appendix 3). Some 
interviewees were pre-selected based on the position they occupy (e.g. presidents of 
business associations, ministers, secretaries, Sarpanches) or for participating in 
particular processes (e.g. the Composite Dialogue Process, trade fairs, trade, etc.). 
Others were interviewed at random (e.g. people in villages), and again others were 
identified using the snowball sampling method. Snowball sampling is invaluable when 
 
4 Amster (2010) primarily conducted research in Malaysia and only took short trips to Indonesia because 
she had no research permit for the latter. 
5 Visas are rarely issued to Indians and Pakistanis, unless they are wealthy businesspeople or have 
family links across the border. Academics face many difficulties getting visas to cross the boundary. 
6 At that time, Pakistan did not have a category for research visas. My visa application was supported 
through a letter from the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry. I assume that I therefore received 
a business visa. Business visas are commonly issued for researchers going to Pakistan. 
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seeking to locate and access interviewees with specific characteristics that cannot be 
identified by an outsider. It is also helpful to access people who are ‘hard to reach,’ 
such as government officials or security personnel. Finally, it is useful to create trust 
and thereby to gain cooperation from interviewees (Cohen and Arieli 2011, 426–30). 
Yet, it may also create problems with representativity because of a gatekeeper bias 
(Cohen & Arieli 2011). The latter was reduced by relying on different people, which 
was facilitated through my affiliation with different institutes in India and Pakistan. 
During my stay in India, I was formally affiliated with the Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies in New Delhi, the Punjab University and the Centre for Research in 
Rural and Industrial Development in Chandigarh. In Pakistan, I was formally 
associated with the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI). Furthermore, 
I was informally associated with the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHD 
CCI) in India and the Government College University Lahore in Pakistan. These 
affiliations provided access to a large number of interviewees, especially to the 
political, the administrative, the economic and the security elite. This is because 
affiliation with these reputed institutes allowed me to build up trust. Building trust is 
key to gaining access. As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, 57) note:  
Once people come to know the researcher as a person who can be trusted 
to be discreet in handling information within the setting, and who will 
honour his or her promises of anonymity in publications, access may be 
granted that earlier would have been refused point blank. 
While I set out to conduct one-on-one interviews, they frequently involved more than 
two people. Many interviewees invited others to join the conversation, often stating 
that they were (more) knowledgeable on the topic of discussion. However, this can 
also be interpreted as a sign of unease in a one-on-one interview situation. I realised 
that interviewees sometimes did not feel at ease and asked other people to join them, 
especially when there was an interpreter or research assistant with me and the numbers 
on my side were therefore higher. This was especially the case where people were not 
used to being interviewed for research purposes and were not entirely sure what to 
expect. Once a balance had been established this did not seem to have (negatively) 
affected the interview situation.  
In border villages and marketplaces, I used the help of an interpreter to conduct 
interviews because I am not fluent in Punjabi, Urdu or Hindi and many people do not 
speak English fluently. In case the source language is translated or interpreted, errors 
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may occur due to misunderstanding or the lack of an adequate word in the other 
language. For instance, in one of the interviews the term ‘mujahideen’ was translated 
as ‘militia’ by the interpreter. This caused protest by the interviewee who insisted that 
it should be translated as ‘freedom fighter,’ revealing that the interviewee spoke 
English. I overcame some errors of translation in the interview situation by audio-
recording most interviews and having them translated and transcribed at a later point 
by another person.7 This, however, did not eliminate the linguistic limits encountered 
in the interview situation. The latter were also present in interviews conducted in 
English, as English is not the first language for most of my research participants, 
including myself. Many spoke English (very) well as it is the official (administrative) 
language in India and in Pakistan. The first languages of my research participants were 
Punjabi, Hindi and/or Urdu, some were trilingual. Conducting interviews in English 
presents a limitation because each language comes with different verbal behaviour, it 
may be linked to different cultural scripts, expectations and memories (Pavlenko 2006, 
27). As Spradley (2016, 17) notes: 
Language is more than a means of communication about reality: it is a 
tool for constructing reality. Different languages create and express 
different realities. They categorize experience in different ways. They 
provide alternative patterns for customary ways of thinking and 
perceiving. 
This is true for both foreign languages and language in use. In each field and sub-field, 
a particular language use and knowledge are common which I had to acquire over time. 
This meant that at later stages of my fieldwork, I was much more at ease in the 
interview situation. This became particularly apparent when working with interpreters 
who did not understand field-specific references and consequently asked interviewees 
to specify what they meant. While they thereby shaped the interview, the explanation 
provided was helpful to verify and clarify the use of different terms. This highlights 
the need to be aware of the language and knowledge particular to a field. Language 
becomes a form of cultural capital (see e.g. Bourdieu 1991; for a context-specific 
discussion see Ayres 2008; 2009). 
 
7 All interviews were audio-recorded, with the exception of those in which the interviewee did not agree 
to have the conversation recorded or where I felt that recording the interview would not be a good idea. 
Especially in India, I found that recording conversations would not be helpful in conversations with 
state-agents and therefore took notes during or after the interview.  Sometimes I offered to turn off the 
voice recorder in exchange for more candid discussion. In this case notes were taken during the 
conversation and sometimes afterwards. 
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I set out to conduct semi-structured interviews and had my list of questions 
prepared and approved by the Ethics and Risk Committee before going to India and 
Pakistan. However, once in the interview situation, this format could often not be 
sustained for long and the most interesting information emerged in conversational 
situations (for a similar observation see Lyon 2004, 45–46). Therefore, I used the 
questions prepared in advance to guide conversations rather than to ask. The formal 
interview setup was valuable when talking to government officials, where they seemed 
to offer credibility to my research. Other researchers decided not to interview 
government officials at all because they felt that it was unlikely that they would 
provide information beyond the official position (Wilkinson 2013, 139). However, 
speeches and official documents are not available on all topics of interest, nor do they 
necessarily reveal anything about everyday practices. Therefore, interviews with 
government officials were a valuable source in this study. 
Interviews were supplemented with textual resources which I began locating and 
collecting during fieldwork. Textual resources were particularly important for 
studying the joint position of the Indian and the Pakistani governments, and the 
respective positions of government officials. Resources included bilateral agreements 
and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), joint statements and minutes of bilateral 
meetings by India and Pakistan, mainly issued between 1997 and 2015. The majority 
of these resources are published online by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs 
(MEA) (see the Media Centre at www.mea.gov.in/index.htm), others were accessed 
on the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations’ (ICRIER) 
webpage on India-Pakistan Trade (indiapakistantrade.org), again others were collected 
along the way from interviewees. For government positions, I consulted reports 
available online, press releases and public statements by relevant ministries in India 
and Pakistan, including the ministries of commerce and industry, defence, 
home/interior and foreign/external affairs. For earlier records, I relied on Avtar Singh 
Bhasin's (2012) compilation of documents on India-Pakistan relations from 1947-
2007. Finally, I accessed news reports on events and themes that emerged through an 
inductive analysis of interviews and textual sources. I only consulted English sources, 
including the Dawn, The Express Tribune, The News International and Customs 
Today in Pakistan and The Tribune, The Indian Express, The Hindu, Hindustan Times, 
the Times of India, The Economic Times and Business Standard in India. I 
supplemented them with reports disseminated by Non-Governmental Organisations, 
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like the South Asia Terrorism Portal (www.satp.org), Human Rights Watch 
(www.hrw.org) and Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org/en).  News reports are 
an indispensable resource of information on (big) events and (important) actors that 
allow researchers to follow processes (Oberg and Sollenberg 2011, 51–52), but this 
can be restricted through censoring. In India, the press is relatively free (score 75/100) 
compared to Pakistan (score 39/100) according to Freedom House (2019), though 
Reporters Without Borders (2019) ranks India and Pakistan relatively low and close 
(places 140 and 142 respectively of 180). This clearly restricts the reliability of the 
information but was not further problematic as I mainly used these sources to 
triangulate data, to check context and background, to confirm dates and to draw on the 
verbatim interviews reproduced in these reports.  
Data generated in this way does not come in neat categories that can easily be 
analysed. The first step in the analysis process was to thematically organise the 
information by identifying broad categories and sub-categories, such as India-Pakistan 
trade > trade routes > road, rail, sea and air. The categories and sub-categories 
corresponded to the themes and questions explored in interviews. The thematically 
organised information was then analysed through Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptual 
framework, i.e. field, capital and habitus. Data was organised and analysed using 
NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software package which supports a large variety of 
sources – such as texts, audio files and photographs – and allows the researcher to 
classify, extract and analyse data.  
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CHAPTER 2: A BOURDIEUSIAN CONTRIBUTION TO 
RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
 
This chapter will start with a review and critique of literature on relations between 
India and Pakistan (Section 2.1). This literature has predominantly focused on three 
themes: security, cooperation and economic relations. I will discuss these three aspects 
in relation to three dominant frameworks in International Relations (IR)8 – Realism, 
Liberalism and Constructivism9 – which have framed more contemporary literature on 
relations between India and Pakistan. Not all authors discussed under these paradigms 
have based their analyses on an IR-framework. The organisation of the literature and 
debates in this framework is my own. The discussion does not deal with these 
approaches in general, but with related arguments on relations between India and 
Pakistan. In the next section, I turn to the literature on borderlands in South Asia, 
identifying existing research on the Punjab borderland, offering a critique thereof and 
outlining my contributions to existing literature on the Punjab borderland (Section 
2.2). In the final section, the contributions of practice literature to understanding 
international relations are outlined. Section 2.3 starts with a general background 
section on international practice theory before moving on to discuss Pierre Bourdieu’s 
contributions to this literature. The shortcomings of Bourdieusian literature in IR and 
of Bourdieu’s practice theory are highlighted before I outline my own contributions to 
this Bourdieu-inspired literature on international relations by focusing on economic 
practices, studying Bourdieu in the post-colonial context and taking him to the 
borderland.  
2.1 SECURITY, COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Relations between India and Pakistan have been subject to considerable research. 
Realist explanations of bilateral relations have dominated the literature, especially by 
scholars from the United States. The increase in cooperation in the framework of the 
Composite Dialogue Process (2004 – 2012) saw a surge of publications on bilateral 
 
8 I use the uppercase in IR to refer to the discipline. When I write about relations between states, I use 
the lowercase. 
9 I am aware that these paradigms are further divided and do not constitute a unified theoretical lens. 
The umbrella terms are used to provide a broad structure and categories, not to dismiss these differences. 
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cooperation and economic relations by scholars based mainly in India and Pakistan, 
more akin to the Liberal school of thought. There are a few Constructivist approaches 
to our understanding of relations between India and Pakistan, but they are outweighed 
by Realist explanations. Each approach rejects the other as inapt for explaining 
bilateral relations, thereby highlighting the inadequacy of traditional approaches in IR 
for a comprehensive understanding of relations between India and Pakistan.  
Much of the literature on India and Pakistan has focused on the history of 
tensions (Wolpert 2011), with particular attention to Kashmir (e.g. Bose 2003; 
Ganguly 1997; Schofield 2003; Wirsing 1998), the origin of wars in 1947-48, 1965 
and 1971 (Ganguly 1986), the reasons for the persistence of conflict (Cohen 2013; 
Ganguly 2002; Paul 2005b) and for the absence of a full-scale military confrontation 
between India and Pakistan despite a number of serious crises since 1971 (Chari, 
Cheema, and Cohen 2007), usually discussed in relation to the two countries’ nuclear 
weapons programmes (Ganguly and Hagerty 2006; Ganguly and Kapur 2010). More 
recently, attention has turned to the role of terrorism (Perkovich and Dalton 2016) and 
counterinsurgency operations (Gates and Roy 2014; Yusuf 2014) in bilateral relations.  
While earlier literature on India-Pakistan wars was predominantly descriptive 
(for a critique see Ganguly 1986, 3, 2016, 2), greater emphasis on theoretical 
frameworks characterises more contemporary work. Ganguly and Hagerty (2006, 3) 
propose that “‘mere realist’ assumptions tend to be more useful [for analysing relations 
between India and Pakistan] than those of any other paradigm in international relations 
theory.” According to the Realist school, states are the main actors in an anarchical 
international system in which they struggle for security and the balance of power 
(Donnelly 2009). The latter is tilted in favour of India, which is larger in size, 
population, conventional military capability since 1965 and economic prowess since 
the early 1990s (Paul 2005a, 12–13). Paul (2005a) argued that Pakistan reduced these 
asymmetries by acquiring qualitatively superior weapons from the United States 
during the 1960s and the 1980s, by initiating short wars in the Rann of Kutch (1965), 
Kashmir (1965) and Kargil (1999), through low-intensity warfare, notably in Indian-
administered Kashmir, and by building alliances with outside powers, especially the 
United States and China since the 1960s (Paul 2005a, 13–16). At the same time, 
Ganguly and Hagerty (2006) suggest that a balance of power of sorts was achieved 
when India and Pakistan officially became nuclear powers in May 1998. They argue 
that this can explain the absence of a major war between these two neighbours since 
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1971 and increased stability. Kapur (2007) contends that the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons led to more aggressive behaviour by Pakistan and provoked more forceful 
conventional military responses by India, thereby destabilising South Asia (see also 
Fair 2011; Ganguly and Kapur 2010, chapter 4; Kapur 2008). Army and Air Force 
operations were rejected as too risky following terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 
(see the introduction in Perkovich and Dalton 2016). However, there has been a rise in 
shelling across the Line of Control in recent years, culminating in so-called ‘surgical 
strikes’ by India in September 2016 (Jacob 2017). The use of airpower following 
attacks on India’s security forces in Kashmir in February 2019 established a new 
threshold for limited conventional responses (Raghavan 2019), supporting Kapur’s 
argument that the acquisition of nuclear weapons has provoked more forceful military 
responses which further destabilise South Asia.  
According to Malik (1993), India and Pakistan face a security dilemma, where 
uncertainty about the other’s intentions have meant that any defensive act is perceived 
as offensive by the other and provokes a corresponding response. This security 
dilemma is difficult to overcome and requires building trust step-by-step or through a 
big leap of faith (Wheeler 2010). In this regard, Realist explanations have little to offer 
for they fail to recognise the mutual benefits brought about by cooperation and do not 
take into account the role of international organisations and of non-state actors in 
shaping state preferences and policy choices in international relations – as advanced 
by scholars of the Liberal school of thought (Burchill 2009). Despite, or precisely 
because of a record of conflict and confrontations, India and Pakistan have repeatedly 
engaged in negotiations to reduce tensions, to resolve contentious issues and to 
promote cooperation since their formal establishment in 1947. Many of their conflicts 
have been diffused with the help of external actors, including international 
organisations like the United Nations and the World Bank and third countries like the 
United Kingdom, the United States or the Soviet Union, while others were negotiated 
bilaterally (see e.g. Kux 2006). Over the past 72 years, India and Pakistan signed at 
least 44 bilateral agreements which institutionalised cooperation, focusing amongst 
others on security, economic and financial relations, cross-border transport of people 
and goods, telecommunications and bilateral and diplomatic cooperation (Tandon and 
Slobodchikoff 2019). These cooperative initiatives have received much less attention 
in the academic literature than the above-discussed security relations but were subject 
of several think tank reports and working papers.  
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Literature on cooperation between India and Pakistan has focused on the 
successful negotiations leading to the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 (see e.g. Adeel and 
Wirsing 2017; Ashutosh Misra 2010, chapter 3; Zawahri 2009a; 2009b) and the 
settlement of the border dispute over the salt marsh Rann of Kutch in the Thar Desert 
in 1968 (see e.g. Misra 2010, chapter 4). Others have studied attempts at resolving 
contentious territorial and border issues like Kashmir (Dasgupta 2015), Siachen (Misra 
2010, chapter 5) and Sir Creek (Misra 2010, chapter 6), which became part of 
negotiations in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) in 1997. The 
CDP also focused on confidence building measures, cooperation relating to terrorism 
and drug trafficking, the facilitation of people-to-people contacts, and cooperation on 
economic and commercial matters (on the CDP see e.g. Akhtar 2015; Dasgupta 2015; 
Gul 2008; Misra 2010; Mukherjee 2009; Padder 2015, 2012; Wojczewski 2014).  
While cooperation between India and Pakistan has produced several successes, 
in part facilitated through third-party mediation, the literature on bilateral negotiations 
tends to focus on the issues that continue to mare bilateral relations, notably the dispute 
over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism. The Composite Dialogue Process was 
designed to treat all issues at par. However, Misra (2010, 1–2) notes that India’s 
concern over Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir and in cross-border terrorism and 
Pakistan’s opposition to India’s policy on Kashmir continue to influence bilateral 
cooperation. Dasgupta (2015, ii) argues that “the script of Kashmir – its land, 
resources, livelihoods and security – runs through all of them [the components of the 
Composite Dialogue Process] in some form or another.” Similarly, cross-border 
terrorism has shaped bilateral negotiations over the past years, frequently by 
interrupting the Composite Dialogue Process (Noor 2007; Ogden 2013). Despite the 
influence of the unresolved territorial dispute over Kashmir and of ongoing cross-
border terrorism on all other areas of bilateral relations, India and Pakistan have 
continued to cooperate on a range of matters, leading Tandon and Slobodchikoff 
(2019) to suggest that they may be moving towards a ‘cooperative rivalry.’ 
Cooperation has been most extensive when it comes to bilateral economic relations, 
which warrant special attention from the perspective of economic interdependence 
theories. Some scholars subscribing to the Liberal school of thought are of the view 
that interdependent states would trade rather than invade while some writing from a 
Realist perspective argue that mutual dependence increases vulnerabilities and 
therefore the propensity for conflict (see e.g. Copeland 1996; 2014). 
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Economic relations between India and Pakistan have been the focus of an 
increasing body of literature since the start of the Composite Dialogue Process in 2004. 
While some scholars have explored the potential of economic interdependence for 
creating peaceful relations between India and Pakistan (Ali, Mujahid, and Rehman 
2015; Baroncelli 2007; Goldsmith 2007; Hogg 2007; Mamoon and Murshed 2010; 
Nabi and Nasim 2001; Raihan and De 2014; Sridharan 2000), others have focused on 
the policy environment of India-Pakistan trade (De, Raihan, and Ghani 2013; Pohit 
and Saini 2015; Taneja et al. 2013; 2015), studied informal trade (Ahmed et al. 2015; 
Taneja and Bimal 2017), highlighted non-tariff barriers to trade (e.g. Gill and Madaan 
2015; Sharma et al. 2016; Taneja 2007) and estimated the potential for bilateral trade 
(Baroncelli 2007; Batra 2004; Taneja et al. 2013).10  
Recognising the limitations of economic integration due to similar trade baskets 
and thus competition in trade rather than complementarity, Sridharan (2000), for 
instance, suggested that greater economic cooperation, especially on infrastructure 
projects and in the energy sector (including gas pipelines and interlinking electricity 
grids), could provide stakes in both countries that could help India and Pakistan to 
overcome their conflicts as it could facilitate greater security cooperation in the long 
run. 11  Projects like the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline 
have made progress in this regard (Ebinger 2011; Huda and Ali 2017) and there have 
been repeated conversations about an electricity grid between the two Punjabs. 
However, we are yet to see their realisation. In the meantime, there has been an 
increase in economic cooperation and a process of trade ‘normalisation,’ commonly 
related to policy changes, which has been accompanied by the growth of bilateral trade 
(Ahmad, Rehman, and Shahid 2012; Khan and Hussain 2014; Taneja et al. 2013, 
2015).  
The normalisation of trade relations between India and Pakistan is not yet 
completed (Taneja and Dayal 2017). The potential for trade between India and 
Pakistan is estimated to lie between US$ 10.9 billion and US$19.8 billion (Taneja et 
al. 2013), compared to the actual value of bilateral trade of US$ 2.7 billion in 2013-14 
(“Export Import Data Bank” n.d.). This untapped trade potential can be related in part 
 
10 See in particular the two edited volumes on India-Pakistan Trade: Strengthening Economic Relations 
(Taneja and Pohit 2015) and India-Pakistan Trade Normalisation: The Unfinished Economic Agenda 
(Taneja and Dayal 2017). For earlier studies see e.g. Chengappa (1999) and Ghuman (1986). 
11 On the potential for energy cooperation between the two Punjabs see also Gill et al. (2010, especially 
pp. 19-32). 
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to a restrictive policy environment and a large volume of trade through informal 
channels,12 estimated to be in the range of US$ 250 million to US$ 2 billion per year 
(Ahmed et al. 2015; Khan et al. 2007; Taneja and Bimal 2017). I expect this informal 
trade to grow with the breakdown of formal trade between India and Pakistan in 
February 2019.  
This large volume of informal trade highlights that India and Pakistan are more 
strongly connected economically than official statistics show. This suggests that 
economic interdependence theories might have more to offer for our understanding of 
economic relations between India and Pakistan than generally acknowledged: for 
Ganguly and Hagerty (2006, 14, note 14), for instance, economic interdependence 
theory has little intellectual purchase because there are few economic linkages between 
India and Pakistan. However, we need to move beyond the dualism between formal 
and informal trade and beyond conceiving of economic connections purely in material 
terms when seeking to understand economic relations between India and Pakistan. As 
some studies on trade relations between India and Pakistan have noted, it is not only 
the policy environment, inadequate payment mechanisms, high tariffs and the lack of 
infrastructure that pushes trade into informal channels, but also perceptions of trade 
and of bilateral relations (Pohit et al. 2015; Taneja and Bimal 2017; Taneja et al. 2017), 
which have been related to media underreporting on trade (Mediratta 2017). However, 
more needs to be done to explore how such perceptions differ and shape bilateral trade 
relations through everyday practices by the social agents that are engaged in trade.  
Only a limited number of studies has moved beyond the traditional Realist and 
Liberal paradigms to analyse relations between India and Pakistan. Building on a 
constructivist framework, Pervez (2012) has shown that the security dilemma between 
India and Pakistan is influenced by the perceptions and social practices of the ruling 
elite and related state identities. Carranza (2016) adds that one needs to move beyond 
domestic and bilateral relations and focus on the international social and normative 
environments in order to understand nuclear relations between India and Pakistan. He 
argues that the nuclear non-proliferation norm has the potential to affect change 
regarding nuclear relations between India and Pakistan because bilateral relations are 
socially constructed. However, his work remains an abstract construct decoupled from 
 
12 According to existing studies, most informal trade takes place through Dubai, followed by luggage 
trade through the Delhi-Amritsar-Lahore bus and rail routes, trade through Afghanistan and across the 
Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir (Taneja and Bimal 2017).  
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the current social reality, just like Pervez' (2012) discussion surrounding a security 
community in South Asia.13  
Ganguly and Hagerty (2006, 14, note 14) concede that “[c]onstructivist theories 
might be useful in explaining the sources of enmity between India and Pakistan”, but 
object that “they would seem to have difficulty explaining why India and Pakistan 
have avoided major war during South Asia’s nuclear era,” which they argue is best 
understood through a ‘mere realist’ lens. They thereby highlight that both Realist and 
Constructivist approaches on their own are inadequate for coming to a deeper 
understanding of relations between India and Pakistan, for neither can capture the full 
social reality. A focus on the material dimension of bilateral relations – military 
capacity and the volume of trade – downplays all the other power struggles that shape 
India-Pakistan relations. A focus on states downplays the role of non-state actors that 
participate in these power struggles, including businesspeople, chambers of 
commerce, etc. This suggests that we need to move beyond existing approaches to the 
study of the international if we seek to come to a deeper understanding of relations 
between India and Pakistan. One way to do this is by drawing on (international) 
practice theories, which have taken a relational approach to the study of the 
international to overcome the dualisms that have characterised much of the thinking in 
IR (Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 14–19; 2011b, 12–18; Bueger and Gadinger 2014, 3, 99–
100; 2018, 5, 166–67).  
To summarise, relations between India and Pakistan have primarily been studied 
through the Realist lens, with a focus on the security dilemma that these two states 
face. In recent years, Liberal ideas have become more prominent in the study of 
bilateral relations with attention to successful third-party mediation and India-Pakistan 
negotiations. Though economic cooperation between India and Pakistan has become 
the focus of considerable research, its role in shaping relations between India and 
Pakistan remains underexplored. To my knowledge, there are only three studies which 
explore relations between India and Pakistan through a Constructivist lens. However, 
this literature is limited by focusing exclusively on security relations between these 
two states. Furthermore, it opposes Realist approaches to the international rather than 
engaging with them in meaningful ways, thus highlighting the need for an alternative 
 
13 For another study analysing relations between India and Pakistan through a constructivist lens, see 
McLeod's (2006) PhD thesis. 
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approach to studying international relations. Before outlining the contributions of 
practice theories to our understanding of the international, the literature on borderlands 
in (South) Asia will be reviewed, as this thesis studies how the state and relations 
between states are reproduced in borderlands.  
2.2 BORDERS IN (SOUTH) ASIA 
There is an increasing body of literature focusing on borderlands in Asia, which draws 
more attention to the everyday than the literature on relations between India and 
Pakistan. This is reflected in a special issue on Geographies at the Margins: Borders 
in South Asia in the journal Political Geography (Cons and Sanyal 2013), a special 
issue on Asian Borderlands in the Journal of Borderland Studies (Schendel and 
Maaker 2014), a book series on Asian Borderlands by Amsterdam University Press, 
under which books have been published since January 2016, and the Routledge 
Handbook of Asian Borderlands (Horstmann, Saxer, and Rippa 2018), amongst others. 
The India-Bangladesh border area is probably the most-studied borderland in South 
Asia (see e.g. Chowdhury 2018; Cons 2016, 2013; Ferdoush and Jones 2018; Hussain 
2013; Jones 2012, 2009; Kabir 2005; McDuie-Ra 2014; Schendel 2005; Shewly 2013; 
Sur 2013). With a length of 4,156 kilometres, it is the fifth-longest land border in the 
world. It is also considered to be one of the most violent borders in terms of the use of 
physical force by border guards (Cons 2016, 2013; Cons and Sanyal 2013; Jones 
2018a; Sur 2014; Shewly 2013). By contrast, not a single contribution to the above-
mentioned special issues and edited volumes focuses on the international boundary 
between India and Pakistan, except for the Line of Control in Kashmir (see e.g. Gupta 
2013; Smith 2013; Sur 2018; Zutshi 2015, 2010).  
With a length of 3,323 kilometres (including the 700-kilometre-long Line of 
Control) the boundary between India and Pakistan is shorter than the India-Bangladesh 
border. It is also less violent than the India-Bangladesh border if one considers how 
many people are killed by border guards during peace times (excluding the Line of 
Control in Kashmir) (Jones 2018a, 25–26). However, the India-Pakistan border has 
been the site of several military confrontations between India and Pakistan and people 
experienced violence during the Khalistan separatist movement during the 1980s and 
1990s that are not included in such counts.  
While the military history of wars between India and Pakistan is well researched, 
and some have pointed to its effects on the Punjab borderland (see e.g. Bisht 2015; 
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Subramaniam 2016), there is only one study that focuses on Indian borderlanders’ 
experiences during these military confrontations (Sekhon and Sharma 2019). How 
people in Pakistan experienced these confrontations is unknown and I am only adding 
little to this knowledge as security concerns prevented me from going to the borderland 
in Pakistani Punjab. I conducted a few interviews with borderlanders in Lahore, but 
more needs to be done to explore their perceptions, thoughts and actions.  
The Khalistan separatist movement is well-researched in India with scholars 
exploring the reasons leading to the Khalistan movement (see e.g. Deol 2000; Jetly 
2008; Purewal 1998), the perspectives and experiences of actors in the movement 
(Pettigrew 1995), the Indian state’s counter-insurgency operations (see e.g. Chima 
2014; Fair 2009; Gates and  Roy 2014; Marwah 2009) and related atrocities (see e.g. 
Gossman 1991; 1994; Laws and Iacopino 2002; Silva, Marwaha, and Klingner 2009). 
Despite being central to this movement, the border area itself and everyday 
experiences of borderlanders have not been the focus research to my knowledge, a 
lacuna I begin to fill with my research in Indian Punjab. A Pakistani perspective on 
this movement could not be provided in the framework of this study.  
The socio- and politico-economic conditions in border areas in Indian Punjab 
have received some attention over the past years. In 1987, the Planning Commission 
of India commissioned a study on the India-Pakistan border areas of Rajasthan, Punjab 
and Jammu & Kashmir, which was published by the Centre for Research in Rural and 
Industrial Development in three parts (on Punjab see Kumar et al. 1989). Chaturvedi 
(2001, 414–19) drew some attention to everyday experiences of people living in the 
Indo-Pak borderland in India, especially in Rajasthan, Punjab and Kashmir. But it was 
only in 2016 that another edited volume on Life on the Indo-Pak Border (Sohal and 
Mehra 2016) was published, focusing on Punjab, with one contribution on Indian-
administered Kashmir. Scholars explored the fencing and its impact on farmers in the 
border area (Sekhon 2014, 2016), the role of social exclusion in the border areas of 
Amritsar and Ferozepur districts in Indian Punjab (Kaur 2014), the relationship 
between security and development (Mangat 2016), evaluated government programmes 
for India’s border areas (Singh and Sohal 2016) and studied the physical and social 
infrastructure of villages (Verma and Singh 2016), amongst others.  Some of my 
research draws on topics covered in existing studies while providing more in-depth 
accounts of people’s experiences, thereby departing from the descriptive and 
quantitative studies predominating existing work. I am not aware of similar studies on 
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the Pakistani Punjab borderland. Due to security concerns which stopped me from 
visiting the border area in Pakistan, my research in Pakistan primarily focused on 
economic affairs. 
In 2010, the Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development in 
Chandigarh published a study to identify areas for economic cooperation between 
India and Pakistan (Gill et al. 2010), focusing on the energy sector, agriculture, 
transport and communication, finance and banking (see also Maini 2007). There are a 
number of studies that have explored trade processes and impediments to trade at the 
Attari-Wagah border crossing point in recent years. The Consumer Unity & Trust 
Society’s Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment (CUTS 
International n.d.), for instance, published a short study on trade facilitation initiatives 
at the Attari-Wagah border crossing point by India and their impact on trade costs and 
inclusive development. They concluded that the creation of a new trade facilitation 
centre has helped reduce trade transaction costs, facilitated greater commercial activity 
and created employment opportunities for borderlanders. In contrast to this positive 
assessment, Sinha et al. (2016) identify many impediments to trade at the ICP Attari 
in their assessment of infrastructure and policy deficits of a selection of India’s trade 
ports, which are echoed in reports by Gill and Madaan (2015), Sharma et al. (2016) 
and Taneja, Dayal, and Bimal (2016). While providing greater insights into trade 
through Attari and Wagah, these studies remain largely descriptive and lack a deeper 
engagement with the social history shaping everyday trade practices, which are the 
focus of this study.  
These topics have been studied by a variety of scholars, but with varying 
attention to the everyday. They have not been analysed within the broader framework 
of relations between India and Pakistan. It is this relationship between everyday 
practices in the Punjab borderland and bilateral relations writ large that I contribute to 
existing research, in addition to a deeper understanding of everyday practices and 
perceptions of borderlanders. The analysis is framed through Pierre Bourdieu’s 
practice theory, whose contributions I outline in what follows. 
2.3 BOURDIEUSIAN CONTRIBUTIONS  
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars has drawn on Pierre Bourdieu’s 
practice theory to study the international (see e.g. Adler-Nissen 2013a; Adler-Nissen 
and Pouliot 2014; Berling 2012, 2015; Bigo and Madsen 2011; Cohen 2018; Pouliot 
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2010a, 2010b; Kuus 2015; Leander 2005), probably in part because Bourdieu provides 
the most elaborate conceptual framework (Bueger and Gadinger 2018, 8) or ‘thinking 
tools’ (Leander 2008). I follow in the steps of scholars like Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 
Trine Villumsen Berling, Didier Bigo, Anna Leander, Vincent Pouliot and others, by 
drawing on Bourdieu’s practice theory to come to a better understanding of relations 
between India and Pakistan. This is because Bourdieu’s practice theory allows to 
explore how international relations are produced and reproduced through everyday 
practices (Adler-Nissen 2013b, 1). Furthermore, Pierre Bourdieu’s emphasis on the 
role of practices, rather than norms and values (Constructivists), interests (Liberalists) 
and rational choice (Realists), on hierarchies rather than anarchy, and on a relational 
instead of an essential or interactional approach to the international (Bigo 2012, 114) 
allows to challenge traditional approaches in IR.14  
Pierre Bourdieu’s work has contributed significantly to the international political 
sociology of security. Didier Bigo was among the first to study security empirically 
through Bourdieu’s conceptual tools.15 Since then, others have drawn on Bourdieu’s 
conceptual tools to study the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Pouliot 
2010a), European security (Berling 2012; 2015) and defence (Mérand 2010), amongst 
others. Bourdieusian analyses have contributed to our understanding of security by 
focusing on the everyday over the exceptional, breaking down the dualism between 
external and internal security, and between the public and the private. As Mutlu and 
Lüleci (2016, 81) observe, a contribution of this literature has been “to focus on the 
everyday over the exceptional, as well as on the ‘everydayness’ of the exceptional […] 
through reflexive lenses that regularly question the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of security’s concepts and theories.” Bigo (2012, 118–19) suggests that 
this has been possible by focusing on the doings of all those actors who practice 
security in the everyday rather than the speech acts of the professionals of politics, for 
the latter tend to emphasise the exceptional over the everyday. This study will bring 
the narratives of elite actors in relation to everyday security practices. I do this by 
developing Bourdieu’s analytical model for the analysis of crisis and exploring 
empirically how crises can be related across time and become part of the everyday 
(Section 3.2 and Chapter 5). 
 
14 See Leander (2011) for a discussion of promises and pitfalls of Bourdieu’s work in IR. 
15 See Bigo (2012) for a review of his own work. 
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A further contribution of Bourdieu-inspired literature on security is an 
interrogation of the distinction between external and internal security. Didier Bigo 
(2001, 2006), alongside others scholars, argued that internal and external security, 
which were traditionally seen as two different domains dominated by two separate 
institutions (police and army), are converging with regard to questions concerning 
borders, orders and identity, and that this process of de-differentiation is related to a 
process of privileging security over questions of state sovereignty. I contribute to this 
literature by exploring the relationship between external and internal security during 
the Khalistan movement in Punjab (See Chapter 6). The chapter also problematises the 
relationship between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ use of force. While the use of force has 
traditionally been associated with the state, the state’s use of force was heavily 
challenged in Punjab and intensified the use of force by non-state actors. This presents 
a different approach to the study of the relationship between the public and private use 
of force in the literature on practices in international relations, which has 
predominantly focused on the privatisation of security. In their empirical study of cases 
in Africa, Abrahamsen and Williams (2011), for instance, explore how the relationship 
between the public and the private is reconfigured in this process of privatisation.  
Anna Leander (2012) has shown that business practices produce the global 
governance of security, highlighting that we need to critically engage with the 
dichotomy between the state and the private sector and between security and economy 
as separate entities. The relationship between everyday security and economic 
practices is problematised in all chapters but addressed specifically in Chapter 7. By 
contrast, Chapter 8 focuses on the relationship between the public and the private in 
the economy. 
Bourdieu’s influence on literature on the international economy has been very 
limited. Bourdieu has written extensively on the economy leading Swedberg (2011, 
67) to argue that we better speak of Bourdieu’s economic sociologies in the plural. His 
economic writings include his study of Algeria (Bourdieu et al. 1963), his work on 
consumption (Bourdieu 1984) and the French housing market (Bourdieu 2005c), 
amongst others. In the latter, Bourdieu also included a chapter on the ‘Principles of an 
Economic Anthropology’ and the development of the economic field ‘From the 
National to the International Field.’ While Bourdieu has contributed significantly to 
economic sociology, he has only had a limited impact on contemporary debates 
(Smelser and Swedberg 2005, 19). The edited volume on Re-Thinking Economics: 
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Exploring the Work of Pierre Bourdieu (Christoforou and Lainé 2014) attests to a 
renewed interest in Bourdieu’s work today. This interest does not seem to extend to 
international political economy, where few have engaged with Bourdieu’s work with 
the notable exception of Anna Leander (2002a, 2002b, 2017). Leander (2001) sees the 
main contribution of a Bourdieusian approach to international political economy in its 
focus on the empirical reality, the power structures governing this reality and 
reflexivity. By focusing on everyday economic practices, I contribute to this literature 
and simultaneously expand our understanding of trade relations between India and 
Pakistan. 
While studies drawing on Bourdieu’s work have contributed significantly to 
understanding the international, the wider use of his core concepts also meant that the 
resulting literature became inconsistent with Bourdieu’s practice theory (Cohen 2018, 
201), which is itself rich in ambiguities. Bourdieu argued that his core concepts field, 
capital and habitus need to be understood in relation to one another and not in isolation. 
As Bigo (2011, 238) notes, “field and habitus exist only in relation to each,” but many 
studies drawing on Bourdieu’s conceptual framework have prioritised one or two 
concepts over the other(s) (Bueger 2016, 130; Mérand and Pouliot 2008, 604). The 
most frequently applied notions of Bourdieu’s practices theory are the concepts of 
habitus (Costa and Murphy 2015) and field (e.g. Hilgers and Mangez 2015), whereas 
the concept of capital “holds largely unexplored potential as a significant contribution 
to understanding the international” according to Berling (2015, 24) and Burke 
(2015).16 To avoid losing sight of Bourdieu’s practice theory and the meaning of his 
core concepts, I will base my own framework on his work, rather than on its application 
in IR, though the literature on Bourdieu in international relations, of course, shapes 
this framework.  
Bourdieu’s practice theory has not been without criticism. His work has been 
challenged for overemphasising structure over agency, reproduction over change, 
objectivism over subjectivism, etc. As part of his attempt to overcome the binary 
between objectivism and subjectivism, Bourdieu developed the concept of habitus 
(Bourdieu 1988, 782), which encapsulates the historically and socially produced 
dispositions shaping practices. However, King (2000) contends that Bourdieu relapses 
 
16 Though note that others have argued that the notion of habitus is most frequently used, while field 
and capital have taken a backseat (e.g. Hilgers and Mangez 2015, 1) 
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into the very objectivism he rejects with his concept of habitus unless the focus shifts 
to the intersubjective interactions between individuals.  
Drawing on Bourdieu’s practice theory to study international relations comes 
with its own challenges because he developed his conceptual framework to study 
processes ‘within’ states and not ‘between’ states. His essays on the international 
circulation of ideas (Bourdieu 2002) and on the international economic field (Bourdieu 
2005a) are an exception. Yet, Bourdieu has influenced a growing body of literature 
seeking to move beyond state-centrism (Adler-Nissen 2011; Go and Krause 2016; 
Madsen 2017; Kauppi 2018; Sapiro 2018). Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of the field 
as a relational space, scholars have sought to identify transnational and global fields, 
which either precede, develop out of or independently of states (Go and Krause 2016, 
12).17 Cohen (2018, 202) notes that much of this literature on ‘transnational’ fields 
tends to overlook that Bourdieu’s conceptual framework was closely tied to his notion 
of the state. This, he continues, is precisely where a Bourdieusian approach can 
contribute to IR by addressing the ‘problem of the state’ in international relations 
rather than dissolving it in transnational fields. I take up this challenge by developing 
a framework based on Bourdieu’s practice theory that can be used to study 
transnational processes and relations between states (see Section 3.3).  
A further challenge lies in Bourdieu’s predominant focus on processes in 
European societies and the focus on Europe or North America in most Bourdieusian 
studies on international relations (Mutlu and Lüleci 2016, 88), which contrasts with 
my proposal to take Bourdieu to the post-colonial world by studying relations between 
India and Pakistan. One might contend that Bourdieu’s theory cannot be applied to the 
post-colonial world, for it is rooted in the European experience which differs markedly 
from that of South Asia. While it is true that Bourdieu primarily drew on the European, 
and in particular the French experience of the state and state-formation processes 
(Bourdieu 1994; 2004b; 2014), he paid attention to colonization in his earlier work on 
Algeria and developed some of his key concepts relevant to our analysis in the colonial 
context (see e.g. Curto 2016; Go 2013; Puwar 2009). This leads Poupeau (2018, 421–
22) to argue that the experience of colonial domination in Algeria has shaped 
Bourdieu’s ‘analytical model of the “universal” state of which Europe and, 
 
17 See e.g. the contributions to the special issue on Fielding Transnationalism in The Sociological 
Review, 64(2), 2016, such as Buchholz' (2016) use of analogical theorising to extend and modify the 
tools of field theory to adapt them to the global. 
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particularly, France are the self-proclaimed representatives.’ While I agree with those 
who might contend that adopting Bourdieu’s understanding of the state is therefore 
inapt for exploring the postcolonial state, I concur with Hansen and Stepputat (2001, 
7) that we need to understand each state as a “historically specific configuration” 
instead of an entity that already consists of certain attributes. Only then will we be able 
to escape analyses based on Eurocentric historical premises.18 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice provides the thinking tools (Leander 2008) for 
understanding the state and relations between states as “historically specific 
configurations” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 7) by conceiving of field, capital and 
habitus as inherently historical (Steinmetz 2011).19 As Bourdieu (2014, 93) notes when 
he talks about the genetic history of the state, it is an “ encounter between two histories, 
at a moment that is itself history on the side of both individuals and structures.” This 
highlights the need to not only consider the structural history about which scholars 
working on relations between India and Pakistan have written, but also the social 
trajectory of actors involved in reproducing these relations every day. At the same 
time, Bourdieu focused on the past in the present and the specific context in which 
practices take place. Here I make my main contribution to existing literature on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s work by taking Bourdieu to the borderland: rethinking how we can analyse 
everyday security and economic practices in the area surrounding the international 
boundary between India and Pakistan in Punjab.20  
Pierre Bourdieu paid relatively little attention to borders and even less to 
physical boundaries. For him, borders are the stake of struggles within fields (Bourdieu 
1993a, 41–43; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 104) that vary in their degree of 
permeability depending on the autonomy of the field (Bourdieu 2004a, 47) and may 
be more or less institutionalised (Bourdieu 1993a, 43). He has been criticised for 
prioritising the internal analysis of fields over their borders, for refusing to establish 
the borders of fields and thereby giving rise to a proliferation of fields and subfields 
(Swartz 1998, 122) and for thinking of the borders of fields in terms of fine lines that 
neatly separate what is inside and outside (Eyal 2013, 162). Instead, it has been 
suggested that borders should be understood as “a space between fields”, “a thick 
 
18 On Bourdieu in postcolonial studies see in particular the edited volume by Dalleo (2016). 
19 On Bourdieu and historical analyses see in particular the edited volume by Gorski (2013a). 
20 To my knowledge, there is only one study that takes Bourdieu to a border post: Nugent (2011) adopts 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework to examine routine border crossings in West Africa. 
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boundary zone”, a “fuzzy zone of separation and connection”, and thus as a zone of 
“boundary work” (Eyal 2013, 175), which can render latent borders active and explicit 
(Mäkinen 2018).21 While this literature goes some way in thinking about borders from 
a relational perspective that is useful for conceptualising borderlands, it is limited in 
scope by focusing on the borders of fields rather than international boundaries. The 
latter are important for Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the state as related to a 
particular territory (Bourdieu 1994, 3). However, Bourdieu paid little attention to 
physical borders himself.  
In the borderland literature, few have drawn on Bourdieu’s conceptual 
framework to study borders and their making. Exceptions include Newman and Paasi 
(1998, 194), who evoke Bourdieu’s notion of distinction to theorise the socio-cultural 
production of borders. Anssi Paasi (1996, 2005, 22, 27, 2009, 221–22, 226) selectively 
refers to discussions on symbolic violence, cultural imperialism and language by 
Bourdieu and his colleagues. But their work remains in the abstract, devoid of the 
empirical analyses Bourdieu advocates. An exception is Anke Struver's (2005) work 
on the Dutch-German border, in which she draws on the concept of habitus to explain 
how everyday practices of (not) crossing the border are routine, common-sense 
improvisations. Similarly, Paul Nugent (2011) draws on Bourdieu’s concept of the 
habitus to examine routine border crossings in West Africa. Both scholars combined 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework with De Certeau's (2011) work on everyday life. 
Building on Reed-Danahay's (2017) work on the social space and its relation to 
transnational processes and Bourdieu's (2018) own understanding of the relationship 
between social and physical space, I will outline a framework for exploring relations 
between states in borderlands in Chapter 3.4.  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Literature on relations between India and Pakistan has privileged Realist over Liberal 
and Constructivist approaches, has focused on the narratives of key decision-makers 
over everyday experiences, and has been, at least partly, ahistorical. A practice 
theoretical approach restores history to the analysis and helps to challenge many of the 
dualisms that have structured thinking in IR by focusing on everyday practices. 
Bourdieu’s practice theory orients attention towards the relational and introduces 
 
21 On borders in Bourdieu’s work see also Gorski (2013a, 331–32). 
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reflexivity into the study of the international. It has contributed to understanding 
security and increasingly also the economy, while the resulting literature can be 
challenged for drawing on Bourdieu’s conceptual framework selectively and 
excluding the state from the analysis rather than interrogating its position in the 
international.  
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSING RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES 
THROUGH EVERYDAY PRACTICES IN BORDERLANDS 
 
 
Relations between India and Pakistan have largely been analysed in relation to the 
states’ military might and to state actors. There is increasing recognition of economic 
relations between India and Pakistan and the role of non-state actors in shaping 
interstate relations. How various actors shape relations between India and Pakistan 
through everyday practices can be captured through a comprehensive analysis drawing 
on Bourdieu’s practice theory and the core concepts field, capital and habitus. With 
these concepts at hand, existing assumptions about security and economic relations 
between India and Pakistan can be challenged and thereby our understanding of 
bilateral relations between these two states enhanced.  
A framework for studying everyday economic and security practices between 
states in the borderland will be developed in the following part by drawing on 
Bourdieu’s work and its application to the international and by linking it to the 
border(land)s literature. The chapter will start by outlining Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice and the core concepts of field, capital and habitus (Section 3.1) before moving 
on to discuss the relevance of his theory for understanding crises (Section 3.2). It then 
moves on to outline Bourdieu’s work on the state and show how it can be developed 
to understand relations between, across and through post-colonial states (Section 3.3). 
Finally, Bourdieu is taken to the borderland and a praxis theoretical framework for 
analysing relations between states in borderlands is developed (Section 3.4).  
3.1 BOURDIEU’S THEORY OF PRACTICE  
Bourdieu developed his practice theory to come to a deeper understanding of how the 
world works in and through everyday practice. He also sought to capture the dialectic 
relationship between objectivism and subjectivism and to overcome the dichotomy 
between theoretical and empirical research. He explored his theory most succinctly in 
his Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu 1977), but the concepts at the heart of 
his theory were further developed in other works.  
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Central to Bourdieu’s theory are ‘practices’.22 Practices are, to use a minimal 
definition, “arrays of activities” (Schatzki 2005, 11) or ‘“ways of operating” or doing 
things’ (Certeau 2011, xi). Practices can thus include a variety of activities, from 
speaking, to writing, to walking and buying. They present the starting point for a 
Bourdieusian analysis. Such an analysis seeks to move beyond a description of 
practices towards an understanding of why practices are performed in one way and not 
another, when and for what purpose, etc., and thus to unravel the logic of practices. 
This is because practices are not wholly conscious ways of doing things for Bourdieu, 
as there is often a discrepancy between what people say they do and what they actually 
do. What actors do is shaped by a ‘practical sense’ or ‘a feel for the game,’ which 
orients practices while escaping practical reasoning (Bourdieu 1998, 82). It enables 
actors to do things as expected or acceptable in a given situation (Bourdieu 2000, 139).  
To explore the logic of practices, Bourdieu developed a number of concepts that 
help orient the analysis, central among them are field and habitus, with the former 
being closely linked to the concept of capital. In what follows I will explore these 
concepts in turn, before bringing them all into relation. It is the relationship between 
these different elements that is at the heart of Bourdieu’s analysis, not the elements 
themselves. However, we need to come to a better understanding of each element, 
before we can put them into relation. 
Bourdieu’s concept of the field has been particularly relevant to contemporary 
debates, with scholars using it to explore the colonial state (Steinmetz 2016), extending 
his work to the analysis of international relations and identifying transnational spaces 
(see e.g. Go and Krause 2016; Kauppi 2018; Madsen 2017; Sapiro 2018). Therefore, 
it assumes a central position in the following discussion.  
Bourdieu understands the social world as a relational space with designated sub-
spaces he calls fields. These fields and sub-field are related, i.e. shaped by and shape 
each other, which he highlights by referring to them as relatively autonomous. Each 
field is a space of power struggles concentrated around a particular activity and a stake, 
such as security, economy and religion, which is divided into sub-fields, such as 
internal and external security, different sectors of the economy, etc. These struggles 
follow their “own logic, rules and regularities,” which Bourdieu also referred to as 
 
22  Scholars have used different terms to refer to practices including action, activity, agency and 
behaviour, and frequently used them interchangeably. There is a debate about the precise meaning of 
these terms and whether they can be used interchangeably (see e.g. Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 5). 
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doxa (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 104). Doxa are socially recognised (and 
incorporated) ways of doing things with the power to orient practices (Bourdieu 1977, 
166, 169). They are tacitly accepted by the actors entering a field, which do so on the 
assumption that what is at stake in a field is worth struggling for.  
A field is “born of the process of differentiation and autonomization” (Bourdieu 
1996b, 265) and needs to be reproduced through everyday practices. This process 
varies from one field to another and means that fields vary in their degree of autonomy. 
The more autonomous a field, the better established its rules and interests and the less 
it is influenced by activities in other fields. Once a field is established and has achieved 
relative autonomy, it tends to reproduce itself without any deliberate intervention 
(Bourdieu 1977, 184). 
A field is a hierarchically organised relational space in which actors occupy 
positions of domination and subordination. The position of an actor in a field is 
determined by the volume of resources (or capitals) s/he is endowed with relative to 
other actors and the value attached to different forms of capital in a field (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992, 97). Each field has its own field-specific capital, such as the 
capital of physical force in the security field. In addition, there are three main forms of 
capital (each with its own subtypes) that are valid in all fields (though their relative 
value may change from one field to another): economic capital (money and property), 
cultural capital (information, knowledge, and educational credentials) and social 
capital (acquaintances and networks, including kinship networks). Finally, there is 
symbolic capital, which is any type of capital perceived and recognised as legitimate 
(Bourdieu 1986; see also Swartz 2013, 34–35; Wacquant 2007, 221). A capital is 
deemed to become symbolic when it is “unrecognized as capital and recognized as 
legitimate competence, as authority exerting an effect of (mis)recognition” (Bourdieu 
1986, 18). The different forms of capital can be converted, which is of interest to actors 
because it can allow them to change their position in the field. Economic capital is the 
easiest to convert. It can give immediate access to goods and services without great 
effort. At the same time, it may require social capital to be convertible, which itself 
requires time to accumulate. Hence, the conversion process is rarely fast and without 
costs (Bourdieu 1986).  
A field is also a space of conflict and competition in which holders of different 
forms of capital struggle for power in the field. Therefore, Bourdieu also defined it as 
a “field of struggles” (Bourdieu 2004a, 34–35). He explains that agents pursue 
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different strategies in a field. These range from conservation and succession strategies 
to subversion strategies. The type of strategy an agent pursues depends on the position 
of an agent in the field and the habitus of the agents occupying a field. Bourdieu 
(1993b, 73) explains that dominant actors, hence those more or less holding the 
monopoly over the field-specific capital, tend to resort to conservation strategies. 
Dominant actors tend to reproduce existing visions of the social world in relation to 
the doxa of the field, whereas those with the least capital in the field, dominated actors 
(generally newcomers), pursue subversion strategies (Bourdieu 1993b, 73). This 
highlights that struggles within a field tend to reproduce rather than challenge existing 
orders, for the dominant have an interest in maintaining the status quo and are in a 
position of power to do so (Bourdieu 1977, 169). This has led critics to argue that fields 
are rarely the sites of social transformation (Swartz 1997, 121) and that change is 
difficult to account for.23 However, Leander (2011, 298) rightly notes that these are 
fields of struggles that are reproduced in practice and therefore in constant (potential 
for) change. Berling (2012, 470–73) has shown this in relation to the European security 
field, in relation to new actors and changing borders of fields. 
The value attached to a particular type of capital not only determines the position 
of an actor within a field but also which actor can enter a field (‘agency-selecting’) 
and thus the borders of a field (‘boundary-setting’) (Berling 2015, 6–7). In her studies 
of the European security field, Berling (2012, 2015, 47–73) found when military 
capital was valued heads of states and NATO Secretary Generals gained a higher 
position in the field because they were seen as possessing greater military capabilities. 
However, when scientific capital became more relevant, think tanks gained a more 
important position in the hierarchy (Berling 2012, 467, 472). This highlights that the 
position of agents in a field can change over time and orients the researcher towards 
asking what voice carries the most weight at a particular point in time and which 
strategies do actors employ to facilitate change (Berling 2012, 468–69). 
An agent’s position in a field needs to be understood in relation to the position-
takings of actors, “i.e. the structured system of practices and expressions of agents” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 105). The space of position-taking is conceived as 
“preferences, taste”, or “stances” and as “space of possibilities” or “objective 
 
23 For a brief discussion of Bourdieu’s relatively static concept versus Latour’s more dynamic concept 
see e.g. Nexon and Pouliot (2013, 344). 
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potentialities, things ‘to be done’, ‘movements’ to launch, reviews to create, 
adversaries to combat, established position-takings to be ‘overtaken’ and so forth,” by 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 86, 99; and Bourdieu 1996a, 235 
respectively). The space of position-taking is closely related to the position of an actor 
in a field. When in a situation of equilibrium, the position of an actor in a field tends 
to shape the positing-taking (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 105; Bourdieu 1996a, 
231).24 Position-takings cannot be understood independently of the habitus of actors, 
for “the space of social positions is retranslated into a space of position-takings through 
the mediation of the space of dispositions (or habitus)” (Bourdieu 1998, 7). 
Each actor is endowed with a habitus, which allows actors to cope with 
unforeseen circumstances. Habitus are dispositions which generate and organise 
practices and representations. It includes both mental dispositions (perceptions and 
thoughts) and bodily schemes (postures and gestures) (Bourdieu 1977, 15, 83, 89, 93–
94), which are historically and socially constituted through past practices and 
experiences (Bourdieu 1977, 72–73; 1992a, 52). As such, the habitus represents the 
past in the present, with history itself being forgotten in this process (Bourdieu 1977, 
78–79; 1992a, 54). In Bourdieu's (1977, 82–83) words, habitus is “a system of lasting, 
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every 
moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the 
achievement of infinitely diversified tasks.” 
Habitus is constituted over the course of an actor’s history, with early 
experiences in the life of an actor leaving a particularly strong imprint, according to 
Bourdieu. This imprint is formed through observations of family relations, the division 
of labour between men and women at home, modes of consumption, household object 
etc. Over time, the resulting dispositions get reinforced through interactions with 
likeminded people, with early experiences building the foundation upon which future 
mental and bodily dispositions are built (Bourdieu 1977, 15; 1992a, 54, 60). Wacquant 
(2016, 68) distinguishes between a primary habitus acquired in early childhood and 
influenced mainly by the family and a secondary habitus grafted onto the former later 
in life through interactions at school and in other institutions. 
 
24 For a discussion on the relationship between the fields of positions and of position-taking see e.g. 
(Bourdieu 2005c, 110–13) on the housing market. 
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Habitus it at once individual and collective. It is individual, in that it is shaped 
by a persons’ trajectory and engagement in different fields. This trajectory is never 
identical with that of other actors. It is also not absolutely unique because one’s own 
thoughts and perceptions are shaped by those of others through interaction. Interaction 
between two people is never entirely interpersonal, as each actor is shaped by 
interactions with others. The actors one engages with frequently share similar 
conditions of existence, and thereby what Bourdieu (1977, 80–82) conceptualises as a 
group or class habitus. Wacquant (2016, 67) distinguishes between a group habitus 
surrounding shared principles of vision and division, such as a national or a masculine 
habitus, and a habitus corresponding to specific institutions, such as a judicial habitus 
or an economic habitus. Such a shared habitus enables practices to be similar among 
members of the same group or class. Thus, each individual habitus exists in direct 
relationship to a group or class habitus (see also Bourdieu 1992a, 58–60), rendering 
habitus a multi-scalar concept (Wacquant 2014, 120, 2016, 67). 
Habitus orients the practices of agents. It allows them to move within and across 
fields which are distinguished by their hierarchies and the rules of engagement 
(Decoteau 2013, 280). But habitus does not produce practices in a mechanical manner. 
The way actors do things ultimately depends on a particular situation, or rather the 
relationship between the objective structures that produce habitus and the conditions 
in which habitus is operated (Bourdieu 1977, 78). The “space of interactions” is 
preconstructed through the agents that are involved in it. It is the locus, where different 
fields intersect and where symbolic power is expressed through rhetorical strategies 
(Bourdieu 1992b, 257–58). Thus, Bourdieu primarily thought about the field in which 
practices take place, that is the space of positions that agents occupy, and highlighted 
that each situation provokes different dispositions. As Bourdieu notes: “We must think 
of it [habitus] as a sort of spring that needs a trigger and, depending upon the stimuli 
and structure of the field, the very same habitus will generate different, even opposite, 
outcomes” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 135; see also Wacquant 2016, 69).  
To end this outline of Bourdieu’s core concepts, let us return to the practical 
sense or the feel for the game which orients practices. The practical sense is an 
encounter between field and habitus, between objectified history and incorporated 
history, between the past and the present, which allows actors to anticipate the future 
in response to a particular situation (Bourdieu 1992a, 66). At the centre of a 
Bourdieusian analysis is the relationship between social positions in a field and the 
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dispositions (habitus) and position-takings of actors. To study practices following 
Bourdieu’s theory, means to unravel the logic underlying practices, and thus field and 
habitus. Field and habitus are particularly pronounced when everyday routines are 
interrupted. Bourdieu (1990, 159–93) conceptualised such moments in time as crises. 
He proposed that his theory of practice does not apply to crises and that rational choice 
may take over (Bourdieu 1988, 783; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 131), which can 
lead to change. It is therefore important to understand crises and their relationship to 
the everyday. 
3.2 A BOURDIEUSIAN MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CRISES  
In a chapter entitled The Critical Moment in his book Homo Academicus, Bourdieu 
(1990, 159–93) developed a theory of a political crisis to overcome the dualism 
between “structural history and the history of events” (Sapiro 2013, 266). This theory 
will be outlined in what follows, drawing on the concepts field, capital and habitus. It 
has received little scholarly attention thus far (for exceptions see Crossley 2003; 
Ermakoff 2010; 2013; Sapiro 2003; 2013; 2014), but is central to this study because it 
allows us to explore the relationship between continuities and changes and between 
the everyday and crises. 
Bourdieu variously described crises as “a visible break in relation to what 
produced it,” (Bourdieu 1990, 161), as “[m]oments when the meaning of the social 
world hangs in the balance” (Bourdieu 1990, 159–60), “when the collective judgement 
falters,” when “the everyday order is challenged” (see Bourdieu 1977, 40, 170 
respectively), when “the routines of everyday life and the practical feel of habitus cease 
to operate” (Bourdieu 1988, 783) and “when the routine adjustment of subjective and 
objective structures is brutally disrupted” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 131). Crises 
are thus moments in time when the routine, patterned and structured practices of 
everyday life are disrupted, and hence when the practical sense ceases to orient 
practices. When ‘“rational choice” may take over’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
131).  
Bourdieu (1990, 173) distinguished a crisis in a single field from a generalised 
crisis, he also describes as a historical event. A generalised crisis emerges when crises 
latent in different fields become synchronized, that is when “the dispositions and the 
interests of agents occupying homologous positions in different fields” coincide 
(Bourdieu 1990, 173). This process leads to the politicisation of the fields involved in 
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the crisis according to Bourdieu’s model, but it can also lead to securitisation and 
militarisation, as I elaborate below.  
The synchronisation of crises can only happen when individual fields share a 
similar structure and logic (Bourdieu 1990, 173–74). The field of power is the glue 
that brings the social world together. A field of power structures different fields and 
the relationships between them (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 104). In the field of 
power, actors holding dominant positions in their respective fields compete for power 
over actors holding homologous positions in other fields. In the field of power, power 
itself is at stake: it “must be conquered or maintained” (Bourdieu 1996c, 10). Power 
resides with those who can determine the relative value and volume of different forms 
of capital and thus the conversion rates. In Bourdieu's (1998b, 264–65) words: 
The field of power is a field of forces structurally determined by the state 
of the relations of power among forms of power, or different forms of 
capital. It is also, and inseparably, a field of power struggles among the 
holders of different forms of power, a gaming space in which those agents 
and institutions possessing enough specific capital (economic or cultural 
capital in particular) to be able to occupy the dominant positions within 
their respective fields confront each other using strategies aimed at 
preserving or transforming these relations of power.  
The concept of the field of power is important to understand relations between 
different fields. This, in turn, is important for understanding generalised crises as fields 
lose some of their autonomy through the process of synchronization (Sapiro 2013, 
267).  
Through synchronization, relations between fields and within fields can be 
reorganised (temporarily); the relationship (domination/subordination) between fields 
or within fields can (temporarily) change and with it the exchange rate between 
different (field-specific) forms of capital (Reed 2015, 273–74). Through a change in 
the value attached to the forms of capital in a field, otherwise marginalized or new 
actors can enter (temporarily). The different forms of capitals can thus provide “points 
of access” to a field (Berling 2012, 455; 2015, 23). 
A generalized crisis may engage agents experiencing the crisis as well as agents 
holding homologous positions in different fields if they share the understanding that 
structural conditions prevent them from achieving what they are entitled to 
(dispossession). This is not necessarily limited to agents endowed with similar 
dispositions but may also involve agents with a different habitus who may identify 
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with the movement, or seek to advance their own interests (Bourdieu 1990, 173–80). 
This can jeopardize a movement because the positions of agents may be incompatible, 
even antagonistic.25  
All agents engaged in a generalized crisis are expected to adopt a relatively 
coherent position, a single vision, which may differ from original attitudes but is 
nonetheless in line with positions held by individual actors in their respective fields. 
This distinguishes crises from the everyday, which is characterised by compromises 
and concessions and diverse position-takings by actors. At the same time, the positions 
taken always diverge to some extent, both in terms of the experiences of actors and 
their way of expressing themselves (Bourdieu 1990, 180–81, 185).  
Bourdieu focused on a political crisis in his own work and suggested that other 
fields are politicised during generalised crises, i.e. that problems are formulated and 
addressed as political problems rather than economic or security problems (Bourdieu 
1990, 187–90; Sapiro 2003, see also; 2013). In Bourdieu's (1990, 188) words:  
“politicization” designates the process which leads to the principle of 
political vision and division tending to prevail over all the others, bringing 
together people clearly separated by former criteria and distancing people 
who in their previous existence were quite close in their choices and 
judgements. 
Through politicisation, political capital tends to trade at a higher rate (Reed 2015, 274), 
rendering crises particularly favourable to the professionals of the political field, i.e. 
politicians, political parties, etc. However, during crises, politicisation is not the 
monopoly of professionals of the political field. Other agents may engage in 
politicisation strategies (Bourdieu 1991, 173). Crises can pose a threat to professionals 
of the political field if they are not “a controlled effect of their action” (Bourdieu 1990, 
193, see also 188, 191). Furthermore, the value of political capital, the extent to which 
the professionals of the political field can assume dominant positions and the degree 
to which fields are subordinated to the principles of vision and division of the political 
field can differ from one field to another due to varying levels of autonomy of fields 
(Sapiro 2013, 267). As each field maintains a degree of autonomy during a crisis, 
politicisation happens in accordance with the logic of a field (Sapiro 2013, 284).  
 
25 Following Bourdieu (1990, 173–80), alliances founded on the homology of positions, involving 
agents with different dispositions, are likely to have a greater chance to be successful when there is no 
direct interaction between them because the latter could expose fundamentally different and even 
antagonistic dispositions. 
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While Bourdieu focused on a political crisis in his work, the principles of vision 
and division of other fields can also become dominant. So, for instance, can issues be 
presented as security threats, rather than political problems, which would be 
particularly favourable though not limited to professionals of the security field, such 
as the military or the police. If their points of view become dominant in other fields, 
one can speak of a process of securitisation. Securitisation has traditionally meant that 
an “issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and 
justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Wæver, 
and Wilde 1998, 23–24). Key to this process is that the presentation of a threat 
(securitising move) is accepted by an audience (securitisation) (Buzan, Wæver, and 
Wilde 1998, 25).26 Yet, Bigo and Tsoukala (2008, 5) contend that securitisation can 
purely be conceptualised as “outside the normal bounds of political procedure” and as 
“politics of exception.” They argue that existential threats cannot be distinguished 
easily from simple threats or a feeling of unease and that securitisation therefore also, 
and above all, works “through the effects of power that are continuous rather than 
exceptional” (Bigo 2002, 73; see also Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, 5). Thus, securitisation 
is here understood as practices that categorise what is a threat, danger, fear and unease 
(insecurity), as well as protection, safety and peace (security) (Balzacq et al. 2010).27 
Conceptualised as such, securitisation is not restricted to crises but part of everyday 
life. However, crises may render securitisation more visible and may accelerate it. 
Securitisation is often distinguished from militarisation. According to 
Bernazzoli and Flint (2009, 450), “[m]ilitarization stresses the military as primary 
actor.” But militarisation is broader than Bernazzoli and Flint's (2009) 
conceptualisation acknowledges. It not only refers to the military as actor but to the 
penetration of the military’s principles of vision and division into peoples’ thoughts, 
perceptions and actions. Militarisation is part of everyday life, as reflected in the 
application of military solutions to all kinds of threats or the use of militarised 
language, such as ‘the war on terror’ or ‘the war on drugs’ (see e.g. Scheper-Hughes 
2014). The lines that separate militarisation from securitisation and politicisation are 
blurred and these processes often overlap. What they all have in common, is the use 
of violence in one form or another. 
 
26 For a discussion of this point see e.g. Balzacq (2005). 
27 For a critique of the securitisation approach see McDonald (2008). 
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“Violence is a slippery concept – nonlinear, productive, destructive, and 
reproductive” (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004, 1). It ranges from the use of 
physical force to what Johan Galtung (1969) has called structural violence – poverty, 
social exclusion and humiliation, amongst others. Bourdieu coined the term ‘symbolic 
violence’ to refer to the perceptions and categories of thought through which we all 
reproduce the social world. This form of violence is not recognised as violence as it is 
not perceived as such. It is exercised with our complicity (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
2004, 272).28 As Bourdieu explains: “symbolic violence accomplishes itself through 
an act of cognition and of misrecognition that lies beyond – or beneath – the controls 
of consciousness and will, in the obscurities of the schemata of habitus” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 2004, 273)  Symbolic violence is misrecognised as it is subtle and not easily 
perceived. But it has a ‘real’ effect (Bourdieu 2001, 1–2), such as gender domination, 
i.e. masculine domination (Bourdieu 2001). It is a condition for the possession and the 
exercise of the monopoly of physical violence (Bourdieu 2014, 4), which receives its 
power precisely because of symbolic violence. As Bourdieu (2014, 191) explains: “the 
most brutal and violent force obtains a form of recognition that goes beyond mere 
submission to its physical effect.” Therefore, violence is best understood as a 
continuum (Scheper-Hughes 1996; 1997; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004, 19–
22). It exists during crises but also in the everyday and can assume quite different 
meanings in these two contexts (Das 2013). 
The process of synchronization and the loss of autonomy imply that the borders 
of fields become more permeable. While this may be true within states, which have 
been the focus of Bourdieusian analyses of crises (Bourdieu 1990; Sapiro 2003; 2013; 
2014), literature on international relations suggests that crises can lead to the hardening 
of borders between states. What has become known as the ‘migration crisis’ in Europe, 
for instance, led to the construction of border fences and barriers to movement through 
changes in bordering practices (see e.g. the contributions in Vallet 2014). The 
hardening of state borders (i.e. the borders of various national fields, including the 
economic, cultural, religious fields, etc.) suggests that crises can enhance the 
autonomy of national fields rather than reducing it. This highlights the need to draw 
 
28  Bourdieu seems to use the term symbolic violence interchangeably with the terms symbolic 
domination, symbolic force and symbolic power (Bourdieu 2014, 163–65).  
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attention to the borders of fields and to adapt Bourdieu’s model for the analysis of 
crises when studying relations between states.  
Because crises require actors to take a coherent position, crises can shake the 
doxa of a field, though a crisis on its own is not enough to produce a critical discourse 
(Bourdieu 1977, 169; 2000, 181–82). Both a crisis and a critical discourse are required 
to produce change (Bourdieu 1991, 128), as Berling (2015) has shown in her analysis 
of changes in the European security field towards the end of the Cold War, where 
agents strategically mobilised different forms of capital to change taken for granted 
assumptions. She termed these abrupt and profound changes engendered by these 
struggles ‘doxic battles.’ 
We can only understand such changes and the role of crises within them when 
crises are analysed in relation to the structural conditions of their emergence (Bourdieu 
1990, 161–62). This includes an analysis of the structural history of each field in which 
a crisis occurred, as well as of the general social space in which the generalised crisis 
took place (Sapiro 2013, 266). The social trajectory of the actors involved in the 
different fields and the generalised crisis also needs to be taken into account, for it is 
in the relationship between history objectified in fields and incorporated in the habitus 
of actors that practices are shaped. However, in order to understand whether a crisis 
has produced any changes, it is not sufficient to place it in relation to the structural 
history of its emergence. It must further be analysed in relation to the structural history 
following the event, which may include further crises. 
Bourdieu’s model for the analysis of crises may be challenged for not 
considering the relationship between crises across time. Nick Crossley (2003, 44-45) 
criticised Bourdieu for not paying attention to “more durable forms of social 
movement activity” and for failing to “recognize the lines of continuity which connect 
such temporarily distant events.” He developed this critique in relation to social 
movement literature. Research on ‘intractable’ or ‘irreconcilable’ conflicts is more 
relevant to this study if intra- or inter-state conflicts are conceptualised as crises based 
on Bourdieu’s framework. Scholars like Daniel Bar-Tal (2007) have suggested that 
people experiencing conflict for a long time or repeatedly develop a 
sociopsychological repertoire made up of shared beliefs, attitudes, motivations and 
emotions, which orient practices. This suggests, that the repetition of crises may lead 
to reproduction rather than change, thus rendering Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
relevant again. This raises questions about the relationship between crises and the 
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everyday. Where does a crisis begin and where does it end? Can a crisis become part 
of everyday life? Is there an everyday of crises? These are questions I explore 
empirically in this study, which requires a better understanding of the state and of inter-
state relations. 
3.3 FROM THE STATE TO RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES 
Bourdieu lectured and wrote extensively about the state formation process and the state 
itself (see e.g. Bourdieu 1994; 2004b; 2014), but he paid little attention to the 
international (for exceptions see Bourdieu 2002; 2005a). An increasing number of 
scholars has drawn on Bourdieu’s concept of the field, to write about the international 
and the development of transnational spaces (Go and Krause 2016; Kauppi 2018; 
Madsen 2017; Sapiro 2018). However, few have taken Bourdieu to the colonial and 
the post-colonial world (for exceptions see Dalleo 2016; Puwar 2009; Steinmetz 2008; 
2016). The purpose of this section is to bring these different bodies of literature into 
communication to outline a Bourdieusian framework for the analysis of relations 
between states. The section starts by outlining Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the 
state, followed by a discussion of the economic, the security and the political fields 
and the state bureaucracy. Attention then turns to the colonial state and transnational 
processes. 
Extending Max Weber’s formulation, Bourdieu (1994, 3) defined the state as “an 
X (to be determined) which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the 
corresponding population.” This X is a relatively autonomous ensemble of fields (a 
meta-field) and sub-fields that are structured by and related through the field of power 
and embedded in a unified social space (explained below). It is a field of struggles over 
statist (or meta) capital, which grants state and non-state actors power over other forms 
of capital and their conversion rates. Central among them are the capital of physical 
force, economic capital, informational capital (cultural capital is one form of it) and 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1994, 4–5).  
A state becomes recognised as having the monopoly of the legitimate use of both 
physical and symbolic violence once its principles of vision and division become 
incorporated in the minds (and in bodies – habitus) and in the objective divisions of 
the social world (fields) (Bourdieu 1994, 3–4). As Loïc Wacquant (1996, xviii) 
explains: “The state is not only ‘out there,’ in the form of bureaucracies, authorities, 
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and ceremonies. It is also ‘in here,’ ineffaceably engraved within us, lodged in the 
intimacy of our being in the shared manners in which we feel, think and judge.”  
The successful inculcation of the state’s principles of vision and divisions results 
in a mental picture of the state as a relatively autonomous, coherent and unitary entity, 
separate from and above society, with clear borders separating the public from the 
private, the internal from the external, the formal from the informal, and the legal from 
the illegal. This image of the state dominated discussions of the state in the political 
sciences until the late 1970s,29 and in International Relations longer still. According to 
Bourdieu (1994, 1–3), it prevents the analyst from seeing the state, as the state “thinks 
itself through those who attempt to think it.” In practice, the state is produced and 
reproduced through diverse, multiple and often contradictory actions by a range of 
state and non-state actors, which constitute the state as a meta-field that lacks the unity 
and coherence of the image of the state. This state in practice coexists with and often 
conflicts with the image of the state (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, 15). 
A state emerges out of a process of concentration of different forms of capital 
and the process of autonomisation of the corresponding fields. The process of 
autonomisation of different fields involves the creation of both internal and external 
borders, processes to which Bourdieu paid little attention. Internal borders separate 
one field or sub-field from another, whereas external borders separate the fields of one 
state from those of another (Wilke 2005, 186). State-making and border-making are 
thus inseparable. The making of external borders highlights that states are bound up 
with one another by virtue of being part of the international system of states. This 
means that state-making in one state is related to state-making in another state. The 
extent to which processes external to a state can influence processes in another state 
depends on the relative autonomy of states and fields. The more autonomous a field, 
the less permeable its borders (Bourdieu 2004a, 47). As all fields and states are only 
relatively autonomous, there is always a degree of external influence. State-making is 
thus interdependent with international relations.  
State-making includes the concentration of the capital of physical force, 
economic capital and informational capital as well as their symbolic power, which 
develop alongside the construction of the corresponding fields. These different forms 
 
29 For early critiques of this understanding of the state see e.g. Abrams (1988) and Mitchell (1991). For 
a more comprehensive review see Migdal and Schlichte (2005). 
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of capital and the corresponding fields are interdependent and thereby constitute the 
state as a meta-field and as the holder of a meta-capital which grants it power over 
other forms of capital and their conversion rates. In order to understand why the state 
is associated with meta-capital, one needs to understand the process of accumulating 
these different forms of capital (Bourdieu 2014, 197), which will be discussed in turn 
in what follows.  
The concentration of the capital of physical force by the state leads to the 
formation of armed forces, and thus a process of autonomisation and separation. These 
processes are frequently violent, as they involve a process of dispossession, for the 
concentration of the capital of physical force in the hand of the state means that the 
right to use violence was removed from non-state actors (Bourdieu 2014, 198–99).  
Drawing on the example of Pakistan, Wilke (2005, 187) linked state-making to 
war-making. War-making generally includes the defence of a state’s external borders 
against another state. However, war-making can also take place within a state against 
challengers to the authority of the state. It is commonly related to a state’s military, 
which is one of the specialists of violence of a state. The other being the police, which 
has traditionally been held responsible for maintaining order within a state, in relation 
to rival powers and to resistance from the dominated (Bourdieu 1994, 5). The security 
field is thus divided into an external and an internal realm. However, the lines that 
separate external from internal threats and the responsibilities of the army from the 
police are blurred and new paramilitary forces are emerging that occupy a space 
somewhere between the military and the police. This led Bigo (2001) to suggest that 
security is best conceived of as a Möbius ribbon where inside and outside and security 
and insecurity are part of the same process.30  
War-making requires financial resources. The concentration of the capital of 
physical force and the development of a security field is therefore bound up with the 
concentration of economic capital and the unification of an economic field. In 
particular, it is through taxation that the state concentrates economic capital in its own 
hands and unifies a national economic space. Taxation is bound up with the 
accumulation of cultural capital, for it requires records. Records contribute to 
informational capital, which is concentrated in the hands of bureaucrats (Bourdieu 
 
30 On the relationship between internal and external security and the responsibilities of the military and 
the police, see also Bigo (2006), Eriksson and Rhinard (2009), Lutterbeck (2004) and Weiss (2011). 
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2014, 201–3). State officials formulate, codify and implement the rules governing 
economic exchanges. They do so under the guise of bureaucratic neutrality, but tend 
to produce policies in line with the interests of dominant actors in the economic field, 
while protecting dominated actors, at least to some extent (Bourdieu 2005c, 114).  
The economic field is the locus of confrontations between public (ministries, 
state departments) and private (banks, firms) actors, in which public-private alliances 
are formed around specific interests (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 112–23). Actors 
compete “for power over state power” and for the benefits that the bureaucratic field 
can provide in the form of preferential tariffs, trade licences, funding for research and 
development, etc. (Bourdieu 2005b, 204). 
The main actors in the economic field are firms (Bourdieu 2005, 193), which are 
sometimes able to “define the regularities and sometimes the rules of the game” 
(Bourdieu 2005, 195). Firms themselves function as fields (Bourdieu 2005b, 205–7) 
and control a section of the economic field whose size depends on the relative volume 
of the capital a firm maintains. There are various (sub-)forms of (economic) capital in 
each subfield or sector of the economy. Bourdieu specifically mentions eight forms of 
capital circulating in the economic field: financial capital (access to financial resources 
through banks), technological capital (technical and scientific resources), commercial 
capital (warehousing, transport, marketing, maintenance), juridical capital (objectified 
and codified symbolic capital), organizational capital, informational/cultural capital,31 
social capital and symbolic capital. The distribution of capital among actors in the 
economic field determines their position in the social hierarchy of the field. The latter 
in turn shapes how agents negotiate purchase and selling prices (Bourdieu 2005b, 193–
99), with prices themselves being “both stakes and weapons” in their struggles 
(Bourdieu 2005b, 200).  
Compared to actors in other fields, firms are deemed to be more autonomous in 
the strategies they can employ in their struggles for power and recognition. Rather than 
having to adjust to the ‘market situation,’ powerful actors (i.e. those who are in a 
position of perfect competition and/or have a monopoly) are able to shape it actively. 
Technological innovations can play an important role in transforming the relations of 
 
31 Bourdieu understands cultural capital as one dimension of informational capital, which he associates 
with the state and its ability to concentrate, treat, and redistribute information (Bourdieu 1994, 7). 
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force in the economic field, though its effectiveness hinges on its relationship to other 
forms of capital (Bourdieu 2005b, 199–204). 
It is important not to reduce the analysis of the economic field to the formal 
economy. There are many informal economic exchanges that do not follow the rules 
and regularities of the state but are nonetheless shaped by the state, such as 
employment without a work contract, smuggling and human trafficking. The state 
categorises such exchanges as illegal activities, to distinguish them from those 
controlled and regulated by the state (legal). Yet, these activities are frequently deemed 
legitimate by those engaged in them, leading Abraham and Schendel (2005) to suggest 
that we distinguish between activities deemed legitimate (legal) by the state and those 
seen as perfectly acceptable by people involved in these activities (licit). The latter are 
frequently shaped by the rules and regularities of the state, thus highlighting the need 
to seem them as interrelated. Such ‘illegal’ activities point to the close relationship 
between the economic and the security fields.  
The process of concentration of economic capital and the creation of an 
economic field is closely intertwined with the emergence of a state bureaucracy 
(Bourdieu 2005, 12). The administrative field or the “field of public office” is a sector 
of the field of power which is defined through the “concentration of instruments of 
violence” (Bourdieu 2014, 3–4, 128). It is a field of struggles over public interests and 
the borders of the state (Arnholtz and Hammerslev 2013, 54). This administrative field 
is divided into sub-fields or ministries and departments (Bourdieu 2014, 20), with the 
different sub-fields competing with one another for power over the state (Bourdieu 
2014, 310).  
State-actors are positioned in this field relative to one another depending on the 
value and volume of different forms of capital, especially statist capital. One of the 
central functions of this field is that the formal position of an actor within it is 
independent of the person occupying this position. Secretaries occupy dominant 
positions in this hierarchy, whereas street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 2010) occupy 
dominated positions. This, however, does not mean that they are without power. As 
Lipsky (2010) showed, they have discretionary powers and a close link to their clients, 
or private actors. While formal rules present the framework within which they operate, 
street-level bureaucrats create public policy in practice.  
The bureaucracy “obey[s] the specific logic of the “public”’ (Bourdieu (2004b, 
31). The public is the general, the collective, visible and open, which becomes 
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differentiated from the private, the particular, the singular, hidden and secret, with the 
establishment of the state (Bourdieu 2014, 48–49). The process of establishing the 
state bureaucracy involves the “transmutation of the private into the public,” which 
happens over a long period of time (Bourdieu 2014, 306–9). In this process, the public 
comes to dominate the private, to the extent that the private ceases to exist, according 
to Bourdieu (2014, 305). At the same time, the distinction between the public and the 
private becomes a central aspect of the state official’s habitus. The state official is the 
representative of the public, of the collective, who sometimes switches between her/his 
public and private persona when, for instance, saying that s/he speaks “in a private 
capacity” (Bourdieu 2014, 48–49). The distinction between public and private is a 
central function of the state, which is one of the main producers of social classifications 
(Bourdieu 2014, 9).  
Though I have outlined the processes of concentration and autonomisation of the 
security, the economic and the administrative fields separately, it is important to note 
that these processes are interdependent. They begin prior to the formal establishment 
of states32 and continue thereafter. They are unique to each state and therefore need to 
be explored empirically. While Bourdieu developed his understanding based on an 
analysis of the French state, this study explores state-making in the colonial and the 
post-colonial context, which few have studied through Bourdieu’s framework (for 
exceptions see Dalleo 2016; Puwar 2009; Steinmetz 2008; 2016).  
The colonial state differs from the state described by Bourdieu, in that it is a 
meta-field in which a foreign power has seized sovereignty and claims the monopoly 
of violence over a population, sometimes within a clearly delimited territory, at other 
times not. A colonial state usually fails to attain legitimacy in the eyes of the colonised 
(Steinmetz 2008, 591–92), for it seeks to disintegrate the indigenous order to 
subordinate it (Bourdieu and Sayad 2004, 445). 
Colonial states are characterised by their relative autonomy from the indigenous 
polity and from the metropolitan state. While the metropole always maintained some 
power over the colonial state, by retaining the right to appoint and dismiss governors 
and colonial officials, for instance, most colonial officials were able to enhance their 
independence from the metropolitan state over time and thereby to attain relative 
 
32 The formal establishment of states is understood to be denoted through the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648) or the independence of states following colonial rule, for instance. 
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autonomy (Steinmetz 2008, 591–92). Colonial officials also struggled for relative 
autonomy from the indigenous polity. With the indigenous polity colonial officers 
share a social space (Steinmetz 2008, 601), a concept that Bourdieu (2014, 123, 223) 
reserved for his studies of the state. 
A social space is constituted by an ensemble of fields in which the positions of 
actors relative to those of others are defined by their position in different fields, but 
more importantly by the overall volume of capital and the composition of different 
forms of capital, i.e. the relative volume of the different forms of capital (Bourdieu 
1985, 724; 2018, 109). It is united through a ‘common sense,’ which permits agents 
occupying different positions to agree and to disagree on the divisions and the 
classifications of the social world around them (Bourdieu 2000, 98). This space is 
divided into different classes, that is agents occupying similar positions in different 
fields who are likely to be subject to similar conditions and therefore to have similar 
dispositions (Bourdieu 1985, 725). The positions in social space are inseparable from 
the habitus of actors, as “it is the habitus that makes the habitat, through the social 
uses, more or less adequate, to which it inclines us and which it enables” (Bourdieu 
2018, 111). Social space is thus characterised by the social positions of actors, which 
in turn determine position-takings through the habitus of actors.  
Bourdieu’s concept of the social space is broader than the concept of the field or 
the field of power. It is important for not all practices are fielded (Steinmetz 2016, 107) 
and because it primarily understands social space in terms of a common sense about 
the social world rather than as territorially bound (Reed-Danahay 2017, 2). While 
Bourdieu (2014, 123, 223) primarily understood social space to be related to the 
construction of the state as a relatively autonomous meta-field, the concept of the 
social space allows us to explore transnational processes, such as international 
migration (Reed-Danahay 2017), cross-border marriage practices, cultural and 
linguistic ties. Understanding transnational processes is central to the present study 
because the states of India and Pakistan emerged from a shared colonial social space 
which shaped everyday life while India and Pakistan were constituted as relatively 
autonomous states.  
Transnational processes are not bound by a definite territory and can therefore 
not be captured through Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the state, though they are 
often shaped by states through the principles of vision and division adopted by the 
actors involved in these processes. While transnational processes are not territorially 
64 
 
bound, they still take place in physical space because actors are biological beings 
which are located in a place (Bourdieu 2018). This renders a better understanding of 
the relationship between the physical and social space in which everyday practices 
take place central to the present study, which focuses on borderlands. 
State-making is closely related to border-making, as outlined above. The making 
of external borders relates state-making in one state to state-making in another state, 
and thus international. The centrality of borders to state-making and international 
relations means that these processes may be most pronounced in borderlands (Wilson 
and Donnan 2012, 1). 
3.4 TAKING BOURDIEU TO THE BORDERLAND 
Bourdieu did not write much about borders and even less about international 
boundaries. He only referred to borders in passing and few explicitly discussed borders 
with reference to Bourdieu’s work (for exceptions see Eyal 2013; Reed-Danahay 
2017). However, borders are central to Bourdieu’s concept of the field and his 
conceptualisation of the state and therefore merit closer attention. In what follows I 
will draw on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, his conceptualisation of crises and the state 
and the border(land) literature to outline an analytical framework for the analysis of 
international relations through everyday practices in borderlands. 
Borderlands are conceptualised as social and physical spaces surrounding state 
borders that are constituted and reproduced through bordering practices by state and 
non-state actors. They are spaces in which the borders of different national fields meet 
and sometimes overlap and where state borders are negotiated in the everyday. They 
are spaces of struggles by a variety of state and non-state actors over the borders of 
different national fields. State borders are multiple rather than singular, as states are 
ensembles of fields, each with its own borders. These borders may materialise on the 
ground in the form of fences, border stones or street signs, they can be objectified in 
rules and regulations and exist in the minds of people. Such borders are thick and 
permeable rather than fine ‘lines in the sand’ that nobody dares to cross (Parker and 
Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009, 582). They are not only at the territorial edges of states, 
but my focus is on the borderland surrounding state boundaries. 
Borderlands have traditionally been conceptualised as areas surrounding state 
borders in which life is affected by the existence of the boundary (Baud and Schendel 
1997, 148; Rumley and Minghi 2015; Martinez 1994). They have traditionally been 
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separated into areas on either side of the line (Prescott and Triggs 2008, 12). However, 
contemporary scholarship views the borderland as an area encompassing both sides of 
the boundary (Asiwaju 1993 footnote 1; Baud and Schendel 1997, 216). Building on 
this literature, borderlands can be conceptualised as physical spaces related to 
international boundaries. The problem with this definition is twofold: it still 
conceptualises state borders as ‘lines in the sand’ that nobody dares to cross, and it 
lacks a conceptual understanding of the borders of this space. 
While borders were traditionally portrayed as fine ‘lines in the sand’ that 
demarcate the territorial edges of states and are far removed from the centres of power, 
it is now well-established in the border literature that state borders are not only at land, 
sea and airports, traditional border-crossing points, but “they are dispersed a little 
everywhere” and “are not marginal to the constitution of a public sphere but rather are 
at the center” (Balibar 2004, 2, 3). 
Borders are also multiple rather than singular, sometimes overlapping but not 
necessarily congruent (Parker and Adler-Nissen 2012, 780–86). This is because states 
are ensembles of fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 111), whose borders include 
territorial boundaries but also the borders of national fields, such as the political, the 
bureaucratic, the security, the economic fields, etc., but also the field of the firm, or 
the family. These borders are not all equally institutionalised. The borders of states are 
perceived to be “more explicit, more evident, more formal, more thing-like” (Parker 
and Adler-Nissen 2012, 775).  
The borders of states are usually relatively clearly delimitated in law. They 
materialise in constitutional and legal documents, including passports and visas, inter-
state agreements etc. However, the degree to which they are demarcated on the ground, 
e.g. through boundary stones, walls and fences, and administered varies greatly. Where 
international borders are not legally binding, disputes are frequent as in the case of the 
Line of Control in Kashmir or the contested maritime boundary in Sir Creek between 
India and Pakistan (Schultz 2014). Such disputes draw attention to the fact that borders 
are frequently contested. This is true for the more institutionalised borders of states, as 
it is for borders in wider social practice.  
Borders can be the loci of struggles involving physical violence, as the 
concentration of the capital of physical force and the construction of external borders 
are part of the state-making process. But they are also spaces in which two states seek 
to impose their principles of vision and division and hence of symbolic violence. 
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Prolonged struggles tend to lead to the hardening of state borders, both objectively and 
in mental structures. Borders are thus not only the stake of struggles within fields 
(Bourdieu 1993a, 41–43; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 104) that vary in their degree 
of permeability depending on the autonomy of the field (Bourdieu 2004a, 47) and may 
be more or less institutionalised (Bourdieu 1993a, 43), but they are also the sites of 
struggles.  
Borders are produced through bordering practices, which include all those 
‘activities which have the effect of […] “constituting, sustaining or modifying 
borders”’ (Parker and Adler-Nissen 2012, 776). They range from being explicit and 
active to subtle and passive. At the explicit end, bordering practices include warning 
signs, threats, military action, treaties, and cooperation. These examples still project 
an understanding of borders from the perspective of the state. Rumford proposes to 
adopt the perspective of the border, in order to capture how borders permeate everyday 
life, are only visible to some and are re-produced through a variety of actors (Johnson 
et al. 2011, 67–69; Rumford 2012; 2014). ‘Seeing like a border’ also means to 
recognise that bordering practices are neither necessarily aimed at producing borders 
nor automatically successful at doing so. They involve ‘“border-making,” “border-
sustaining” and de-bordering actions’ (Parker and Adler-Nissen 2012, 777), thus 
highlighting that bordering practices can at the same time divide and connect. 
Borders frequently (seek to) create and reflect differences, “not only between 
states and geographical spaces, but also between the ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ‘here’ and 
‘there’, and the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’” (Newman 2006, 148). While borders are 
frequently markers of difference, they may also “divide what is similar, or join what 
is different” (Wendl and Rösler 1999, 2). Borders can separate but also, and at the 
same time, connect (Newman 2006, 149–50), through the actors that are involved in 
bordering practices. 
A focus on bordering practices will inevitably lead to a range of actors (Rumford 
2012, 897–99). On one hand, there are state actors, with policymakers at one end of 
the spectrum and street-level bureaucrats at the other. Street-level bureaucrats not only 
produce policy-outcomes but are engaged in translation processes that give them 
discretionary powers and space for manoeuvre, in which they can pursue their own 
interests, which may conflict with the policy-directives (Lipsky 2010). These state 
agents, including policy-makers and street-level bureaucrats, interact with non-state 
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actors, including businesspeople, travellers and citizens (Rumford 2006; 2008), who 
are also engaged in bordering practices. 
Bordering practices by state and non-state actors constitute and reproduce 
borderlands as social spaces that transcend state boundaries while being inseparable 
from them. The positions of actors in these borderland spaces is determined through 
the overall volume of capital and the relative weight of the different forms of capital, 
notably economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1985, 724; 2018, 
109), accumulated through struggles in different national fields, but also through 
struggles in the encounters between the national fields of the bordering states. Such 
encounters are shaped through and shape the habitus of actors. Actors relate social 
space to physical space as they are at the same time social beings positioned in space 
and biological individual located in a place. As Bourdieu (2018, 106) explains, 
biologically individuated bodies, […] are – like things – situated in a 
locus […] where they occupy a place. The locus, topos, can be defined 
first in absolute terms as the site where an agent or a thing is situated, 
‘takes place,’ exists – in short as a location. It can also be defined 
relationally, as a position, as a rank in an order. The place occupied, in 
turn, may be defined as the range, the surface and the volume that an agent 
or a thing occupies, its dimensions or, better its encombrement (bulk or 
volume […]). 
To relate social space to physical space brings us back to the conceptualisation of the 
borderland presented in the beginning of this section, in which a borderland was 
characterised as a social and physical space related to state borders that is brought into 
existence and reproduced through bordering practices by state and non-state actors 
who may employ physical or symbolic violence in this process. Bordering practices 
determine both the objective and subjective borders of the borderland space. These 
borderland spaces can expand and contract, be explicit or subtle. Some borderland 
spaces are delimited in policy directives, others merely exist in the minds of people. 
They may vary from one actor, topic and time period to another. But they are always 
related to state borders.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I outlined a framework to analyse how relations between the 
postcolonial states India and Pakistan are produced and reproduced through everyday 
economic and security practices in the Punjab borderland. In successive sections, I 
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outlined Bourdieu’s theory of practice and its relationship to generalised crises, to 
relations between post-colonial states and to the borderland.  
Drawing on Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, including field, capital and 
habitus, I showed how scholars can explore the everyday of international relations. A 
Bourdieusian approach to the international takes everyday practices as a starting point, 
to unravel the logics that shape practices. The latter are objectified in fields and social 
spaces and incorporated in mental and bodily schemata of the habitus, which orient the 
practices of actors. It is in the relationship between field and habitus that the logic of 
practices is contained. This highlights the need to analyse both in conjunction and not 
independently. 
As historical constructs, fields and habitus, tend to reproduce existing social 
orders rather than to challenge them. However, crises present moments in time when 
change may occur, as the borders of fields lose some of their autonomy, allowing new 
actors to enter (temporarily). While Bourdieu focused on politicisation during crises, 
I proposed that crises might also lead to securitisation. The latter contributes to the 
hardening of borders between national fields as crises recur, thus highlighting the need 
to explore how borders are produced and reproduced through bordering practices.  
Bordering practices produce and reproduce borderlands as social and physical 
spaces related to state borders. They are spaces of struggles among a number of state 
and non-state actors who may recur to physical and symbolic violence in their 
struggles. The positions of actors in this space are shaped through struggles in different 
national fields and at the intersection between the national fields of bordering states.  
The next chapter will historically explore how the Punjab region was constituted 
as a social space and later as a borderland. This will be followed by an outline of state- 
and border-making processes in India and Pakistan and a discussion of their 
international relations.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE CENTRALITY OF PUNJAB TO RELATIONS 
BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
 
Relations between India and Pakistan formally began with their institutionalisation as 
independent states in August 1947. Their relations have been shaped through conflicts 
and cooperation, though attention to wars and crises has dominated scholarly analyses. 
This chapter will link relations between India and Pakistan to their state-making 
processes, as states are important actors in international relations. Building on Pierre 
Bourdieu's (1994a, 3) definition of the state, I will outline the characteristics of and 
the relationship between the political, the bureaucratic, the security and the economic 
fields in the states of India and Pakistan. This includes an analysis of the state-making 
processes (Bourdieu 1994a, 4), which involves the creation of both internal and 
external borders. Internal borders separate one field from another, whereas external 
borders separate the fields of one state from those of another (Wilke 2005, 186). The 
latter highlights that state-making and international relations are inseparable processes. 
They precede the formal establishment of states and continue thereafter. 
While India and Pakistan emerged from the same colonial state, they followed 
different trajectories in the post-colonial period. A relatively autonomous 
bureaucratic-military oligarchy came to dominate the state in Pakistan for much of its 
existence, whereas the state in India was firmly in the hands of bureaucrats and 
politicians who subordinated the military to civilian rule (see e.g. Ganguly 2015; 
Jaffrelot 2002). These differences can in part be attributed to variances in the colonial 
administration, to the unequal distribution of resources during the partition of the 
subcontinent and to the transformation of power relations between political, 
bureaucratic, security and economic actors in the post-colonial period. In India and 
Pakistan, such relations were shaped by regional pulls, which challenged the 
domination of certain ethnoreligious groups in politics, the economy, the bureaucracy 
and the military, i.e. of Punjabis in Pakistan and of Hindus in India. The latter rendered 
the two Punjabs central to state- and border-making processes in India and Pakistan.  
The two Punjabs were formed with the delineation of an international boundary 
and the formal creation of India and Pakistan as separate states in 1947. This process 
turned the Punjab region that was at the heart of British colonial rule, its economy, 
military and bureaucracy, into two border states. While Pakistani Punjab remained 
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central to political and economic processes in Pakistan – Punjabis dominated national 
politics, the bureaucracy, the military and the economy, leading some to speak of the 
‘Punjabisation’ of Pakistan (Talbot 2002) – Indian Punjab lost political influence and, 
from the late 1970s, also its economic status as ‘granary’ of India. However, it was 
able to regain some of its influence in the post-2003 period, when the two Punjabs 
began engaging in sports, cultural and economic matters. The latter points to the 
continuing centrality of the Punjab borderland to relations between India and Pakistan, 
which have been characterised by conflict and cooperation.  
Contemporary relations between India and Pakistan have been shaped by 
processes and practices that preceded their formal establishment as states in 1947. 
Punjab was central to these processes. Therefore, the chapter starts with a section on 
the history of the Punjab region from the Sikh Empire, through colonial rule to the 
partition of the subcontinent (Section 4.1). The latter turned Punjab from a heartland 
to a borderland, which did not negatively affect Pakistani Punjab but reduced the 
political, economic and military significance of Indian Punjab until the mid-2000s, as 
I explore in Section 4.2. The latter points to the role of states/provinces in India’s and 
Pakistan’s foreign relations. Section 4.3 explores state-making and border-making 
processes in India and Pakistan. The final section will return to the conflicts that have 
marred relations between these two states and international interventions, as well as 
the cooperative processes in which they have engaged. This section provides the 
background for the first empirical chapter, which analyses borderlanders’ practices 
during bilateral wars and crises. 
4.1 PUNJAB: FROM HEARTLAND TO BORDERLAND, 1799-1947 
The Punjab region is situated in the north of the Indian subcontinent (see Map 1, orange 
area). It has changed its geographical contours many times across history. Now it is 
divided into the State of Punjab in India and the Punjab Province in Pakistan, where it 
covers 1.53 per cent and 25.8 per cent of the territory respectively (Grewal 2004). The 
region’s name stems from the Persian words ‘punj’ (five) and ‘aab’ (waters) (Virdee 
2018, 20) and alludes to five rivers that criss-cross the region and join the Indus river 
before it flows in the Arabian Sea. These rivers are Sutlej, Ravi and Beas, now in 
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Indian Punjab, and Chenab and Jhelum, in Pakistani Punjab.33 The region is couched 
between the Himalayas in the north and the north-east, the Thar Desert and the 
Cholistan Desert in the south and the Sulaiman Range in the west. It is characterised 
by stony moors in the Salt Range, now in Pakistan, rich central plains around Lahore 
and Amritsar that became border towns with partition, barren famine tracts in Hissar 
and Rohtak, now in Haryana in India, and the mountainous areas of Kangra and Smila, 
now in Himachal Pradesh and Indian-administered Kashmir respectively (Talbot 1991, 
203). 
 
 
Map 1: “India at End of British Period” (1947) 
 
The people of Punjab are known as Punjabis. They are frequently constructed as a 
uniform group of people who speak the same language and have a common history 
and cultural traditions. However, Punjabis are a diverse people from different lineages, 
who vary in their geographic and ethnic origins and their occupations, who follow 
different religions, speak different languages and write in different scripts. Most 
 
33 Technically, the Indus river also flows through the Punjab and the literal meaning of the name is 
therefore a misnomer. 
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Punjabis are associated with three main religious communities which are themselves 
not uniform: Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Prior to partition, most Punjabis were 
Muslims, closely followed by Hindus and by a smaller number of Sikhs. With the 
division of British India, Punjabis were divided along religious lines. Today, Pakistani 
Punjab is predominantly Muslim, while the Sikh population outweighs the Hindu 
population in Indian Punjab. However, conversions were frequent and therefore many 
Muslims and Sikhs have a Hindu lineage (Virdee 2018, 22–23). Sufism, often defined 
as Islamic mysticism, has connected people across religious communities for centuries 
(see e.g. Singh and Gaur 2009; Snehi 2019), and Pir shrines have attracted people from 
India and Pakistan in the borderland of Indian Punjab (Singh 2016). Many people in 
Punjab speak the language Punjabi. Punjabi speakers were divided along religious 
lines with the formal establishment of India and Pakistan in 1947. Through partition,  
“a script divide came to parallel both a national border and religious differences” 
(Murphy 2018, 68). Punjabi is written in three scripts: Persian (also referred to as 
Shahmukhi) is mainly used in Pakistan, Devanagri is associated with Hindu Punjabis 
and Gurmukhi with Sikhs (see e.g. Mir 2010). Many Punjabi Sikhs are Jats, that is a 
peasant proprietor caste that dominates the Sikh caste system which is qualitatively 
different from the Hindu caste system (Judge 2002). Punjabi Hindus dominate the 
urban space, whereas Sikh Punjabis are concentrated in rural areas (Jodhka 2002). 
The diversity of Punjab has its origin in its turbulent history. The Punjab region 
has been on the route of many invasions and the home of several empires which left 
their imprint on the region and its people. The last empire in the region was unified 
and ruled by the Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who started to establish a secular empire 
by wrestling power over Lahore from the Afghan ruler Zaman Shah Durrani in 1799 
(Grewal 1991; Singh 2004a). Lahore became the administrative capital during Sikh 
rule, and nearby Amritsar its commercial and spiritual capital (Talbot 2007b, 154, 
footnote 17). The Sikh Empire was forged from a number of relatively autonomous 
Sikh misls, that are confederacies of the Sikh army known as the Dal Khalsa. The Dal 
Khalsa was formed by the last living Sikh Guru Gobind Singh in 1699 and fought 
against the declining Mughal Empire. During Ranjit Singh’s rule, the Sikh army was 
modernised along European lines and expanded (Grewal 1991; Singh 2004a). The 
death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 led to internal struggles for power which weakened the 
Sikh Empire. Ultimately, the administration broke down, the army could no longer be 
financed through state revenues, mutinied and took over the functions of the state. The 
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British took advantage of the situation and defeated the Sikhs in a number of 
engagements, ending in the annexation of Punjab after the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 
1849 (Singh 2004b, 2:1–81) and its demilitarisation (Yong 2005, 35–36). 
When the British annexed Punjab in 1849, they already ruled most of the Indian 
subcontinent. The British East India Company had well-established systems of 
political control that were financed through land revenues. However, within a few 
years of its annexation, the Punjab region became central to colonial rule and what 
became known as the Punjab administration was exported to other provinces in the 
subcontinent. Punjab’s importance to the British Empire increased after a revolt of 
sepoys34 from Meerut against British rule in Delhi in 1857, during which Punjabi 
Muslim and Sikh landowners remained loyal to the colonisers and played an important 
role in reinstituting their authority in the Gangetic plain (Dalrymple 2006). Their 
loyalty was rewarded through the recruitment of large numbers of Punjabis in the 
military, through the allocation of land in the newly created canal colonies and the 
reservation of positions in the local administration for agriculturalists (Talbot 1991). 
This accounts for the predominance of agriculture in the two Punjabs in the post-
colonial period, the dominance of Punjabis in the military and the public 
administration and renders a better understanding of colonial rule in Punjab central to 
an analysis of everyday practices in the Punjab borderland in the post-colonial period.  
The mutiny of 1857 prompted the British Crown to assume direct control over 
British India. The military was reorganised. Based on the principle of ‘divide and rule,’ 
new regiments were raised, separated from each other through class, caste and 
location. Initially, Punjabis were absorbed in relatively small numbers in the infantry 
and cavalry regiments of the Bengal Army stationed in the north-west frontier of the 
Punjab region. However, in 1880, the perceived threat of an imminent Russian 
invasion led to renewed thinking about the composition of the colonial army. Lord 
Roberts, Commander in Chief of the Bengal Army, put forward the idea that some 
‘races’ were better suited warriors than others. The ‘martial race theory’ was born, 
according to which Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Jats, Ranghurs, Pathans and Gurkas were 
better suited to fighting than high-caste Brahmans and Rajputs from the south and east. 
Thenceforth, recruitment focused on the Punjab region (Yong 2005, 57–68). The 
 
34 Dalrymple (2006, 3, footnote) explains that “[a] sepoy is an Indian infantry private, in this case in the 
employment of the British East India Company.” 
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number of Punjabis in the colonial army rose from 27 per cent in 1880 to 53.7 per cent 
in 1910 (Yong 2005, 71), leading to the Punjabisation of the military (see also Talbot 
1988, 41–46). 
Most military recruits were from what the British labelled agriculturalist tribes 
– a category that was built on existing social structures and was enshrined in the Punjab 
Alienation of Land Act in 1900. As Talbot (1991, 204) explained, the early rulers of 
colonial Punjab deemed the rural population more loyal, more courageous and manly 
than their urban counterparts. Consequently, they established a system of rule through 
the leaders of agriculturalist tribes whose political control was ensured through 
market-oriented agriculture, which was encouraged through canal irrigation (Talbot 
1991, 208–11). 
Starting in the 1880s, existing wells and inundation canals in Punjab35 were 
extended into a perennial canal irrigation system,36 tapping the waters of the five 
Punjabi rivers.37 This helped to turn the semi-arid doabs (interfluvial tracts) of the 
Punjab region into some of the subcontinent’s most fertile lands. Perennial irrigation 
allowed farmers to extend the growing season or to grow two crops rather than one a 
year, depending on the maturing period of the crop, the fertility of the soil, and other 
factors (Michel 1967, 112–17). The western part of the Punjab province experienced 
higher agricultural growth rates and yields in many important crops than the eastern 
part of the Punjab region. However, between 1906-07 and 1941-42, such growth rates 
remained relatively low, at about 1 per cent for west Punjab, whereas east Punjab 
experienced no growth for the most part. The increase in cultivation was mainly in 
non-food crops, such as fodder and (American) cotton, both concentrated in West 
Punjab. While the area under cultivation of non-food crops increased, the area under 
cultivation of food crops decreased between 1906-07 and 1941-42. In West Punjab, 
wheat was the main food crop cultivated. There was more diversity in crop cultivation 
in the east of the province, including wheat, gram (Bengal chickpea) and Bajra (pearl 
millet). The reason for higher overall growth rates in the west of the province may be 
 
35 Such canals are only filled with water during the rainy season, when the rivers are flooded, and irrigate 
areas along the river. 
36 Perennial, or two-season, canals are equipped with headworks and provide water throughout the year. 
37 See Agnihotri (1996) for a discussion of the issues associated with the construction of this irrigation 
system, such as the obstruction of existing drainage channels through the construction of embankments, 
waterlogging, salinity, and silt accumulation. 
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due to a higher proportion of the total area cultivated and higher-yielding crops, such 
as wheat and cotton (Dasgupta 1981).38 
Part of the reason for the extension of the irrigation system in Punjab was to 
settle the thus far thinly populated interfluvial tracts (doabs) of the Punjab region. Nine 
canal colonies were developed in the interfluvial tracts of the river Jhelum in the west 
and the rivers Beas and Sutlej in the east between 1885 and the end of colonial rule in 
1947. The nine colonies include Sidhnai, Sohag Para, Chunian, Chenab, the largest of 
them all, Jhelum, Lower Bari, Upper Chenab, Upper Jhelum and Nili Bar. About one 
million Punjabis moved to the canal colonies (Talbot 1991, 211).  
Land allocation in the canal colonies initially aimed at attracting agriculturists 
and landholding peasants who could contribute to agricultural progress. However, in 
the settlement of the Chunian colony, other colonial interests became evident. About 
12 per cent of the land were devoted to auctions and purchased by men of the landed, 
commercial and professional groups, providing higher returns and thus highlighting 
underlining economic interests. Furthermore, some land was allocated to military 
grantees, a type of settlement that was to achieve much more prominence with the 
settlement of the Jhelum Colony. In this colony, most of the land was reserved for 
military purposes (63.91 per cent), in particular horse-breeding (54.42 per cent). In the 
Nili Bar colony, the last settlement project, commercial considerations came to 
dominate. About 45.02 per cent of the land was reserved for auctions, which allowed 
the government to sell land at market prices. The next largest chunk of land went to 
peasants (about 31.17 per cent) and only 9.32 per cent were allocated for military 
purposes (Ali 2014, 12–43). Thus, a mix of colonial settlement strategies were pursued 
by the British over time. Underlying them were political and economic considerations, 
including the need to maintain and strengthen the loyalty of the dominant classes and 
to extract revenues through control over land and water.  
The origin of settlers in the Punjab region and their social background played an 
important role in land allocation. While large tracts of land were allocated to 
indigenous people, one aim of colonial settlement strategies was to attract settlers from 
central Punjab, including Amritsar and Lahore, to reduce pressures created through 
high population density. Furthermore, the British colonisers considered people from 
central Punjab to be the most skilled and efficient agriculturists and essential to the 
 
38 On agricultural growth rates in pre-Partition Punjab, see also Krishna (1964) and Prabha (1969). 
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success of the canal colonies. The focus on military needs in the settlement of the 
Jhelum Colony shifted supply areas to the northwest of the Province, including 
Gujarat, Sialkot and Gujranwala. In the Lower Bari Doab and Nili Bar Colonies, 
veterans of World War I from other parts of Punjab, Kashmir and the North-West 
Frontier Province could also obtain land (Ali 2014, 43–61). As there was a close 
relationship between location and social background, the canal colonies primarily 
attracted people from landholding castes, led by the Jats, including Kambohs and 
Arains. The Land Alienation Act, 1900, enshrined land allocation to agricultural 
castes. However, these rules were relaxed in the Lower Bari Doab and Nili Bar 
Colonies, where veterans of World War I from non-agricultural castes could obtain 
land (Ali 2014, 43–61).  
Though land allocation was primarily restricted to agricultural castes, migration 
to the west of the Province included subtenants, labourers, service and commercial 
functionaries from other castes who followed their superiors to the canal colonies (Ali 
2014, 43–61). Migrants included large numbers of non-Muslims. Sikh Jats made up 
the largest number of grantees in the Sohag Para Colony, for example (Ali 2014, 47). 
In the Chenab colony too non-Muslim landholders were numerous (Ali 2014, 51). This 
is one of the reasons for a large number of migrants created through the partition of 
the Punjab province in 1947. As Randhawa (1954, 33–66) highlights, many non-
Muslims arriving in East Punjab after Partition were colonists, peasant proprietors and 
middle-class farmers who had migrated to the canal colonies in Lyallpur, 
Montgomery, Multan and Sargodha from their ancestral villages in East Punjab. They 
returned to East Punjab amid rising violence in the west of the province in the lead up 
to the partition of the subcontinent and the Punjab region towards August 1947 
(Kudaisya and Yong 2002, 124).  
Most people were oblivious to deliberations over the position of the international 
boundary(ies) that was to divide the subcontinent and the Punjab and Bengal Provinces 
in two states and to the ramifications this would have for their lives. It was when 
violence swept the subcontinent that people felt forced to leave their homes (Talbot 
and Singh 2009, 102; Virdee 2018, 52). Inter-communal violence between Hindus and 
Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other was widespread, between 200,000 and 
two million people died in the subcontinent (death tolls are disputed). Nearly 100,000 
women were kidnapped on both sides of the border, as they were perceived as symbols 
of honour (Talbot and Singh 2009, 2–3). About 2.2 million people went missing along 
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the Punjab border alone (Bharadwaj, Khwaja, and Mian 2008, 7). Attention to different 
localities has shown that violence was not evenly spread, nor did it occur everywhere 
at the same time nor with the same intensity. While violence had swept large parts of 
the subcontinent by the summer of 1946, “[a]n uneasy peace reigned in the Punjab” 
(Talbot 2007c, 38). In Punjab, and especially in Amritsar and Lahore, violence 
intensified after the resignation of the cross-community coalition government led by 
the Unionist Party in March 1947. From Lahore and Amritsar, violence spread to 
Muslim-majority districts in West Punjab, notably Attock, Rawalpindi, Jhelum and 
Multan. Violence was most intense in East Punjab, where violence aimed at ousting 
the Muslim population to make space for Sikh refugees from West Punjab – in part 
motivated by a desire to establish a Sikh state (Talbot and Singh 2009, 74–82).  
The violence that accompanied partition and the division of the subcontinent 
along religious lines displaced about 15 million people, more in Punjab than in Bengal. 
Around 10 million Punjabis fled their homes in August 1947 alone (Aiyar quoted in 
Talbot and Singh 2009, 91). About 20.92 per cent of the population of West Punjab 
left at partition. By 1951 about 25.51 per cent of the population in Pakistani Punjab 
was from East Punjab, which saw 29.78 per cent of its population leave at partition. 
By 1951, about 16.02 per cent of the population of Indian Punjab was migrants, 
highlighting that more people left Indian Punjab than migrated to it (Bharadwaj, 
Khwaja, and Mian 2008, 2). In Indian Punjab, Amritsar district received a large 
number of migrants, with about 332,000 people, whereas in Pakistani Punjab, Lyallpur 
(renamed into Faisalabad in 1979) received about a million migrants (Bharadwaj, 
Khwaja, and Mian 2008, 9). Out-migration was predominantly related to religion. The 
percentage of Muslims in districts that became Indian Punjab fell from 30 per cent in 
1931 to 1.75 per cent in 1951, whereas in districts that became Pakistani Punjab, the 
percentage of Hindus and Sikhs fell from 21.7 per cent to 0.16 per cent during the same 
period (Bharadwaj, Khwaja, and Mian 2008, 2–3). Most people moved into areas 
closer to the border, to areas vacated at partition or to large cities (Bharadwaj, Khwaja, 
and Mian 2008, 9–11). Punjabis were, for the most part, resettled in Punjab. In 
Pakistani Punjab, most migrants were Punjabi speaking and 97.5 per cent came from 
East Punjab, others from Ajmer, Delhi, Rajputana states and Jammu and Kashmir 
(Waseem 2000, 211–12).  
The demographic consequences of these migration flows were significant. For 
instance, Pakistan experienced a large outflow of literate Hindus and Sikhs and a 
78 
 
smaller but important inflow of Muslims that were more literate than those already 
residing in Pakistan, whereas Indian Punjab experienced an increase in literacy rates. 
Fewer in-migrants in Indian Punjab engaged in agriculture after partition than before 
(Bharadwaj, Khwaja, and Mian 2009), which is partly related to the availability of less 
agricultural land in Indian Punjab. As Kudaisya and Yong (2002, 123) note, “the vast 
majority of refugees [arriving in Indian Punjab] were agriculturists and their 
resettlement was a problem of an enormous magnitude” for there was little land for 
cultivation. Whereas 6.7 million acres of land were abandoned in West Punjab, only 
4.7 million acres of land were available in Indian Punjab. The prosperous canal 
colonies and about 70 per cent of irrigated land of the Punjab region went to Pakistan, 
including the best cotton and wheat-producing areas. Thus, agriculturalists moving to 
Indian Punjab at partition were clearly worse-off than those moving to Pakistan and 
their integration proofed a major challenge (Kudaisya and Yong 2002, 124–25). By 
contrast, the integration of migrants in Pakistani Punjab was less problematic, as they 
occupied different social spaces than the local Punjabi population. Locals had a 
stronghold in politics, commercial agriculture and the army, while migrants opted for 
jobs in the educational field, started new businesses and expanded the industry, with 
the help of Pakistan’s ruling elite (Waseem 2000, 213, 218). Punjabis and Muhajirs 
(Arabic for immigrant) came to dominate the army, the economy and politics, leading 
some to speak of the ‘Punjabisation’ of Pakistan (see Talbot 2002 for a discussion), to 
which I will return in the next section.  
It is important to note here the impact that partition had on the Punjab borderland. 
Punjab went from being at the heart of the British colonial project – its breadbasket, 
military recruitment grounds and administrative heartland – to becoming the 
borderland of India and Pakistan. Amritsar and Lahore went from being at the heart of 
British India to becoming border towns of India and Pakistan. The two Punjabs 
inherited by India and Pakistan differed markedly from the areas the British left in 
1947 in terms of their religious diversity, the education levels and the occupation of 
the population. Partition also affected the two Punjabs in very different ways, as I 
already alluded to here and will explore further in the next section. While Pakistani 
Punjab remained central to politics, the economy, the security apparatus and relations 
between India and Pakistan, Indian Punjab lost much of its influence in these areas, at 
least until the mid-2000s, when it again became central to relations between India and 
Pakistan. 
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4.2 THE CENTRALITY OF THE PUNJAB BORDERLAND, 1947-PRESENT  
 
 
Map 2: The two Punjabs today (Wikipedia 2006) 
 
The Punjab borderland39 was formed with the creation of an international boundary, 
the partition of the subcontinent and the formal establishment of India and Pakistan as 
states in 1947. Partition brought about the division of the Punjab region along religious 
lines and led to the formation of the Indian State of Punjab and the Pakistani Punjab 
Province. The two Punjabs changed their administrative contours several times until 
they reached their present administrative shapes in 1966 (Indian Punjab) and 1972 
(Pakistan Punjab) respectively. Though the political and economic status of Pakistani 
Punjab changed over time, it remained significant for Pakistan and its foreign relations. 
By contrast, Indian Punjab lost its political status and economic significance as border 
state. In 2005, the opening of the road route through the Attari-Wagah border crossing 
point for trade restored to Indian Punjab some influence on India’s foreign policy with 
its neighbour. The heads of the governments of the two Punjabs began cooperating on 
cultural, sports and economic matters. Through the Punjabiyat – a movement centred 
around the revival of Punjabiness – Punjabis in India, Pakistan and the diaspora were 
united. These objective and subjective relations that continue to link the two Punjabs 
 
39 The Punjab was frequently referred to as a frontier to Afghanistan and beyond prior to Independence. 
The use of the term borderland denotes that it is now an area divided by an international boundary. 
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allow the conceptualisation of the Punjab borderland as a shared social space that is 
shaped through bordering practices by state and non-state actors. In this section, I will 
first outline the continuing centrality of Pakistani Punjab to the country’s military, 
bureaucracy, economy and politics, followed by an exploration into the changing role 
of Indian Punjab. The section concludes by outlining contemporary initiatives centred 
around Punjabiness. 
In 1947, the Province of West Punjab (renamed into Punjab in 1950) was formed 
in Pakistan, including the Islamabad Capital Territory. Lahore became the provincial 
capital. The princely state of Bahawalpur remained autonomous until it was merged 
with the province of West Pakistan in 1955, which comprised the area now known as 
Pakistan. The capital of the One Unit Province was first in Karachi, later in Lahore, 
and finally in Islamabad. It was separated geographically from East Pakistan, now 
Bangladesh. After the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, Punjab regained its 
provincial status in 1972 and received its present shape. Lahore became the provincial 
capital. Lahore is also an important cultural, economic and industrial centre of 
Pakistan. Other important cities in Punjab are Faisalabad (known as Lyallpur until 
1979), recognised as the centre of Pakistan’s textile industry, Rawalpindi, the 
headquarters of Pakistan’s Army, and Gujranwala, an important commercial, 
industrial and agricultural market centre (Naz and Zaidi 2013). 
Punjab is the second largest province in Pakistan by area, covering 25.8 per cent 
of its territory. In Pakistan, Punjab shares borders with the provinces Sindh, 
Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (known as the North-West Frontier Province 
until 2010), Islamabad and Pakistani-administered Azad Kashmir. It also shares an 
international boundary with Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian 
states Punjab and Rajasthan. Punjab is the most populous province of Pakistan, 
accounting for 52.95 per cent of its population, with most people living in the Lahore 
Division according to the provisional results of the latest population census (“Province 
Wise Provisional Results of Census 2017”). The large population partly accounts for 
many Punjabis in Pakistan’s army, bureaucracy and politics. 
Punjab is important for Pakistan as Punjabis have been recruited in large 
numbers to the military, whose army has formally ruled the country for 33 of the 72 
years of its existence, and informally longer still. The ‘Punjabisation’ of Pakistan’s 
military can be traced back to colonial recruitment strategies, which focused on Punjab 
from 1857 and were influenced by the so-called ‘martial race theory,’ according to 
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which Punjabis, in particular, Punjabi Muslims amongst others, were better suited to 
fighting than other ‘races.’ The theory was adapted and elevated to “the level of an 
absolute truth” in post-independence Pakistan (Cohen 2004, 104), which meant that 
soldiers and army officers continuously overestimated the actual power of the Pakistan 
army, especially vis-à-vis its Indian counterpart. Its weaknesses were exposed in India-
Pakistan wars in 1947-49, 1965 and 1971, which came as a shock to a generation of 
soldiers who had no adult experience with their Indian counterparts, except in training 
institutions or peacekeeping missions abroad, making them susceptible to the 
propaganda of the Pakistan army (Cohen 2004, 103–4). Following its defeat in the 
1971 war, Pakistan officially discarded the martial race theory. The recruitment base 
was somewhat expanded. However, the Pakistan army continued to be dominated by 
Punjabis, who are estimated to provide about 65 per cent of the army officers and 70 
per cent of other ranks, followed by Pathans or Pashtuns, constituting about 22-25 per 
cent of the army personnel. The dominance of Punjabis in Pakistan’s army can partly 
be attributed to its large population (Rizvi 2000, 240–43). For many peasants from 
Punjabi villages in Pakistan’s arid plains, the military provides a ‘safety net’ against 
poverty. It pays better than civilian institutions, offers a higher pension and prestige, 
which produces a strong bond between the military and people in Punjab’s 
countryside, where “access to military service, rather than access to land, becomes the 
great determinant of the agrarian structure” (Dewey 1991, 262). For army officers, the 
military can be a step towards jobs in the civilian sector, for there are reservations for 
army personnel in government and semi-government institutions (Rizvi 2000, 234–
35). A military-bureaucratic ‘oligarchy’ has dominated the state in Pakistan since its 
creation (Alavi 1973), thus highlighting the importance of Punjabis in the bureaucracy. 
Punjabis have long occupied an important position in Pakistan’s bureaucracy. In 
the early years after independence, Punjabis shared their influence with Muhajirs, 
Muslim migrants who moved to Pakistan after partition (Talbot 2002, 54). By 1973, 
33.5 per cent of senior civil service jobs and 30.1 per cent of jobs in the general 
administration of Pakistan’s were filled by Muhajirs, who only made up three per cent 
of the population, as compared to 53.5 per cent and 49.2 per cent of jobs filled by 
Punjabis. However, the position of Muhajirs in the bureaucracy subsequently declined 
while the dominance of Punjabis increased. By 1983, 55.8 per cent of senior civil 
service jobs and 54.9 per cent of the jobs in the general administration was occupied 
by Punjabis (Jaffrelot 2015, 132). However, Javid (2016, 43) points out that 
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administrative reforms by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (PM, 1973-77) 
somewhat opened the bureaucracy to recruitment from smaller provinces and the 
middle classes (see also Kennedy 1981), but Punjabis continued to dominate the 
bureaucracy, in part by virtue of the much larger population size (Alavi 1988, 72). Ian 
Talbot (1988, 69; 2002, 55) attributes the dominance of Punjabis in the bureaucracy to 
their access to education during the colonial period. From the 1920s onwards, Muslims 
could enter educational institutions like the Government College, Lahore, and the 
Lahore Medical College, earlier the preserve of Hindus. By 1931, 31 per cent of all 
literates in English of 20 years and over in Punjab were Muslims (Alavi 1988, 71). As 
the British devolved more and more power to the indigenous population, education 
gave Punjabi Muslims access to positions in the colonial bureaucracy. The latter was 
largely drawn from land-owning Punjabis (Javid 2016, 42), who wielded both 
economic and social power over other sections of Punjabis rural society through 
proprietor-tenant relations, caste and kinship networks, largely the result of colonial 
practices (Javid 2011).  
Punjabis have not only played an important role in Pakistan’s military and 
bureaucracy, but also in its economy. In 2015-16, Punjab’s industrial sector 
contributed almost 60 per cent to the national economy, closely followed by the service 
sector (about 56 per cent) and the agricultural sector (about 40 per cent) (PERI 2017, 
4–5). The latter is dominated by wheat cultivation, cotton ginning, livestock and 
fishing and was the main employment provider, absorbing about 45 per cent of the 
labour force in Punjab (PERI 2017, 5–7, 16). The focus on agriculture in Punjab can 
be traced to the irrigation project by the British colonisers, which assured that West 
Punjab became the breadbasket of Pakistan. It also allowed large Punjabi farmers in 
the former canal colonies of Punjab to take full advantage of the so-called Green 
Revolution from the 1960s, a term that refers to technological developments in 
agriculture (new seeds, chemical fertilizers, mechanization of farming) that allowed 
farmers to increase their agricultural output (Talbot 2002, 55–57). The 
commercialisation of agriculture benefited large landlords the most. They are “the 
most powerful indigenous class in Pakistan” according to Alavi (1990, 26), which was 
partly the result of colonial policies (Javid 2011), partly of the redistribution of evacuee 
land after partition. The latter concentrated power in the hand of large landlords, 
whereas smaller peasants were turned away, increasing the number of landless 
agricultural labourers (Alavi 1990, 26–27). However, the size of the agricultural sector 
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in Punjab is shrinking (by 16 per cent over the last 25 years), while the service sector 
continues to expand (by 12 per cent over the last 25 years) (PERI 2017, 9–10). The 
service sector is dominated by government services, followed by finance and 
insurance, transport, storage and communication, and wholesale and retail trade. 
Punjab’s service sector contributes about 31.1 per cent to the service sector in Pakistan 
(PERI 2017, 9). Retail and trade, or the bazaar sector, is the largest among them (Javed 
2019, 202). It emerged as an important sector in the Punjabi economy alongside the 
industrial sector from the 1980s (Alavi 1990, 28–29). With the exception of the sports 
goods industry in Sialkot, Punjabi did not inherit any industry from the British. The 
development of the industry was linked to the influx of capital through partition and 
the state’s support of industrial development in the post-partition period (Talbot 2002, 
57). The emergence of Punjab as industrial centre was also a reaction to and a result 
of the nationalisation policies adopted by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (P, 1973-77), 
which reduced the power of the Karachi-based largely Gujarati-speaking Muhajirs 
who had dominated the business sector in the post-colonial period, and due to President 
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s (P, 1978-88) support of the business community, especially 
in Punjab (Javed 2019, 204–13). Punjabis came to dominate Pakistan’s business elite. 
Among them in particular relatives of senior Punjabi military officers and bureaucrats 
who could use their high-level connections to further their own interests (Alavi 1990, 
28–29). Many bazaar traders forged ties with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz 
(PML-N) (Javed 2019, 203), which has dominated politics in Punjab and Pakistan. 
During Nawaz Sharif’s second term as Prime Minister (1997-99), the Punjabi business 
community started to push the government to seek better relations with India (Talbot 
2002, 58–59), a trend that continued and expanded in the post-2003 period as I explore 
in this study. 
Punjab is a politically important province in Pakistan, mainly because it is the 
most populous province which ensures that national power lies in Punjab. This, 
however, is only important during civilian rule (Talbot 2002, 58–59). Criticism of the 
‘Punjabisation’ of Pakistan became particularly pronounced during Nawaz Sharif’s 
second term as Prime Minister (1997-99). Nawaz Sharif, born in Lahore in 1949, was 
Chief Minister of Punjab (CM, 1985-90) before ascending to the position of Prime 
Minister of Pakistan (PM, 1990-93, 1997-99, 2013-17). During his second term as 
Prime Minister, core offices, including that of the President and the Senate Chairman, 
were filled by Punjabis – a matter that was resented by his opponents from other 
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provinces like Sindh and Baluchistan. Pervez Musharraf sought to end inter-provincial 
conflicts when he became Chief Executive (1999-02) and then President of Pakistan 
(P, 2001-08), partly basing his criticism of the civilian regime on the domination of 
important offices by Punjabis (Talbot 2002, 51–53). To summarise, Punjabis dominate 
politics, the bureaucracy, the military and the economy in Pakistan, leading some to 
speak of the ‘Punjabisation’ of Pakistan – a term that obfuscates that power is 
concentrated in the hands of a few rather than Punjabis in general, though their large 
population size means that Punjabis are well-represented in these institutions (see 
Talbot 2002 for a discussion). While Pakistani Punjab remained important politically 
and for the military after partition and was able to expand its role in the national 
economy, the same cannot be said about Indian Punjab.  
On the other side of the newly delineated international boundary, the Province 
of East Punjab was formed, renamed into the State of Punjab in 1950. The princely 
states of East Punjab remained autonomous until they were combined into the Patiala 
and East Punjab States Union (1948-1956) before they became part of the State of 
Punjab. In 1966, the contemporary Indian states Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and the 
Union Territory Chandigarh were carved out of Punjab amid a linguistic 
reorganisation, and the State of Punjab received its present shape. Indian Punjab is 
delimited through a 553-kilometre-long international boundary with Pakistan in the 
West, where it borders the Pakistani Punjab Province. The state is furthermore 
bordered by Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana 
and Rajasthan. The state capital is the Union Territory Chandigarh, shared with 
Haryana. Major cities include Ludhiana, an industrial centre of northern India known 
for its bicycle manufacturing and its apparel industry, and Amritsar, an important Sikh 
pilgrimage centre once renowned for its textile industry (Mehra 2012). Amritsar is a 
border town and the pendant to Lahore, the capital of Pakistani Punjab. However, in 
contrast to Lahore, Amritsar lost its erstwhile role as the most important trade and 
industrial centre of the Punjab region after partition (Talbot 2007b, 154, footnote 17), 
which Ian Talbot (2007b, 179) attributes to the loss of political power and 
administrative importance of the city.  
In contrast to Pakistani Punjab, Indian Punjab is one of India’s smaller states, 
accounting for 1.53 per cent of its territory and 2.29 per cent of its total population. 
The majority of Punjabis are Sikhs (57.69 per cent), followed by Hindus (38.49 per 
cent) and Muslims (1.93 per cent). Most Punjabis live in villages and rural areas (62.52 
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per cent), but there is a move towards the city, as the urban population has increased 
by 37.48 per cent over the past ten years (“Census” 2011). Many interviews for this 
study were conducted in border villages in Amritsar district, the second most populous 
district of Punjab, after Ludhiana, accounting for 8.98 per cent of the population of 
this Indian state. More than half of the people in Amritsar district are living in urban 
areas (53.58 per cent), mainly in Amritsar (88.68 per cent), and 46.42 per cent are 
living in rural areas (Census 2011). I visited and conducted interviews in Amritsar and 
in eleven border villages, including Kakar, Ranian, Audar and Mulakot in Ajnala 
tehsil, and Dhanoia Kalan, Attari, Roranwala, Mahawa, Rajatal, Daoke and Naushehra 
in Amritsar-II tehsil. Most of those interviewed in these villages were agriculturalists, 
owning and/or working on agricultural land.  
Indian Punjab is primarily an agricultural economy, frequently referred to as the 
‘granary’ or the ‘breadbasket’ of India. In 2015-16, Punjab was the third-largest 
contributor of wheat (17.20 per cent of all India) and rice (11.33 per cent) to the food 
grain of India, followed by maize (1.94 per cent), sugarcane (1.87 per cent), and cotton 
(1.49 per cent) (“Agricultural Statistics at a Glance” 2016, 92, 89, 105, 141, 135). 35.5 
per cent of the workforce in Amritsar district are employed in agriculture, either as 
cultivators (19.5 per cent) or as agricultural labourers (16 per cent).40 Another source 
of employment is in animal husbandry. Many farmers augment their income through 
dairy products, especially from cows and buffalos (Directorate of Census Operations 
Punjab 2011a, 9). The predominance of agriculture in Indian Punjab can be traced back 
to colonial policies and developments as well as different governmental policies and 
investment strategies relating to agriculture and rural development in the post-partition 
period (Sims 1988). The latter set the context for growth rates during the so-called 
Green Revolution up to the mid-1980s, which increased disparities between Indian and 
Pakistani Punjab.  Between 1965-66 and 1984-85, agricultural growth rates in Indian 
Punjab (8.3) far exceeded those in Pakistani Punjab (4.3). Farmers in Indian Punjab 
harvested considerably higher yield in crops like wheat, rice, sugarcane, gram and 
maize than their Pakistani counterparts (Sims 1988, 16). However, the share of 
agriculture and livestock in Punjab’s economy started decreasing from 1970-71, when 
 
40 According to the Directorate of Census Operations Punjab (2011, 23), a cultivator is someone who 
“is engaged in cultivation of land owned or from government or from private persons or institutions for 
payment in money, kind or share [and] includes effective supervision or direction in cultivation,” 
whereas an agricultural labourer is “[a] person who works on another person’s land for wages in cash 
or kind or share […] [but] has no risk in the cultivation.” 
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it made up 54.27 per cent of the state domestic product, whereas the contribution of 
the manufacturing sector increased from 8.04 per cent in 1970-71 to 21.10 per cent in 
1998-99 (Singh and Singh 2002, 582; see also Aggarwal 2016). This was largely due 
to a shift in India’s economic policy, from a state-led growth model that characterised 
economic development in the post-independence period until the 1980s, to a market-
led growth strategy and to the liberalisation of the economy. The latter made farmers 
vulnerable to market forces and marginalised the rural population and particularly 
those dependent on agriculture (Jodhka 2006, 1531). Economic insecurities, amongst 
others, fuelled the Khalistan Sikh separatist movement in Punjab from the late 1970s 
(see e.g. Deol 2000, 241–83), which turns our attention to the role of Punjabis in 
India’s security forces.  
Punjabis, and among them in particular Sikhs, have played an important role in 
India’s armed forces since partition, despite a change in the ethnic composition and 
recruitment strategies in the post-independence period. Before 1947, Muslims had 
made up almost one-third of the army’s other ranks and almost a quarter of its officers 
(Wilkinson 2015, 88). Most of which left for Pakistan at partition. With the loss of 
what was West Punjab, the North West Frontier Province and Bengal to Pakistan, the 
ethnic imbalance in the Indian army decreased substantially. By December 1947, 
Punjab still contributed 32 per cent to the Indian Infantry (down from 54 per cent 
before partition), followed by Uttar Pradesh (18 per cent). Sikhs made up 17.2 per cent 
of the Infantry, followed by Dogras (16.6 per cent) and Jats (15.09 per cent). Among 
the officer corps, Punjabi Sikhs continued to dominate (26 per cent) the army in 1951, 
followed by Punjabi Hindus (16 per cent) (Wilkinson 2015, 90–93). However, after 
independence, recruitment to officer ranks was opened for people from other regions 
and ethnic groups (Wilkinson 2015, 107–10). In 1981, senior officers were mainly 
drawn from Punjabi Hindus (26 per cent), followed by Punjabi Sikhs (18 per cent), 
thus still heavily tilted in favour of Punjabis (Wilkinson 2015, 138–39; see also Khalidi 
2001, 540–43). However, in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution 1973, the Shiromani 
Akali Dal (henceforth Akali Dal or SAD), a Sikh-centred political party in Punjab, 
claimed that the number of Sikhs in the army had dwindled and demanded that more 
Sikhs be recruited to the military (Khalidi 2001, 536–37). Sikhs have long been 
perceived as warriors and fighters and have enlisted in large numbers for the military. 
In the late-1970s, a militant movement emerged in Punjab, known as the Khalistan 
movement, which sought greater autonomy from the Hindu-dominated Indian central 
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government and the establishment of a state for all Sikhs called Khalistan. During this 
time of violence in Punjab, Khalistan fighters came to prominence, but also those that 
sought to quell militancy. This includes both army officers and members of the police. 
Among them are Major General Kuldip Singh Brar, who led an attack by the army on 
the Golden Temple41 in Amritsar in 1984, known as Operation Bluestar, to quell the 
Sikh separatist movement, during which many Sikhs died. Another well-known figure 
is Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1934-35-2017), then Director General of Police of Indian 
Punjab (DGP, 1988-90; 1991-95), who was credited with overcoming Sikh militancy 
during the Khalistan movement, while also being heavily criticised for the 
indiscriminate use of force by those under his command (Dorn and Gucciardi 2017, 
276). The rise of violence in the late 1970s was facilitated by the failure of the central 
government to address the economic and political demands of Sikhs in the post-
independence period (Jetly 2008).  
In the post-independence period, the Hindu dominated central government and 
the Congress Party in Punjab were perceived to sideline Sikh Punjabis, leading to 
repeated quests for greater political autonomy by Sikh Punjabis through the Akali Dal. 
Their demands were partly granted with the linguistic reorganisation of Punjab in 
1966. While this initially satisfied the political leadership, demands for greater 
autonomy were made again in the 1970s to 1990s, though remained unfulfilled by the 
central government (see e.g. Deol 2000, 178–206; Jetly 2008, 61–65, 67–69). Scholars 
have noted the increasing influence of states on India’s foreign policy since the 1990s, 
which had been the preserve of the central government till then, as stipulated in the 
Indian constitution (see e.g. Asthana and Jacob 2017; Blarel 2017; Blarel and van 
Willigen 2017; Jacob 2016; Jaganathan 2019; Jain and Maini 2017; Pattanaik 2014). 
Trividesh Singh Maini (Jain and Maini 2017; Maini 2007; 2011; 2018) repeatedly 
discussed the role of the two Punjabs in forging closer ties between India and Pakistan. 
Their foray into foreign policy can at least be traced to the late 1990s, when the Akali 
Dal was part of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government under the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The NDA formed the central government from 
1998 to 2004 and from 2014 to now, in principle giving the Akali Dal, and through 
them Indian Punjab, a voice in national affairs and also in India’s foreign relations. In 
 
41 The Golden Temple is one of the most important Gurdwaras for Sikhs. A Gurdwara is a place of 
worship of Sikhs. During the Khalistan movement, it was used by militants as a centre from which they 
organised their violent resistance against the Indian state. See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.  
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1999, for instance, Prime Minister Vajpayee took Parkash Singh Badal, then Chief 
Minister of Punjab,42 on a historical bus trip to Lahore, inaugurating a bus service 
between New Delhi and Lahore (Pattanaik 2014, 38). However, Jaganathan (2019) 
contends that state governments in coalitions led by the BJP or the Indian National 
Congress (INC) are less likely to influence India’s foreign and security policy, while 
they are more likely to be relatively autonomous when it comes to non-traditional 
security issues, such as water-sharing. Indian Punjab became more autonomous in its 
dealings with its neighbour in the post-2004 period, though the Akali Dal was not part 
of the INC-led coalition government of the United Progressive Alliance. This can 
partly be related to Manmohan Singh’s election as first Sikh Prime Minister (2004–
2014), which Dorn and Gucciardi (2017, 277) described as a “major step forward for 
Sikhs in mainstream Indian politics.” It may also be because the INC was in 
government in Punjab (2002-2007).  
The increasing involvement of Indian Punjab with its neighbour followed the 
opening of the road route through the Attari-Wagah border crossing point for trade by 
Pakistan in 2005. The Attari-Wagah border crossing point receives its name from the 
two border villages – Attari in India and Wagah in Pakistan. It is based on the Grand 
Trunk (GT) Road, one of the oldest and longest roads in Asia. It exists since at least 
2,500 years and connects the Indian subcontinent with Central Asia by running from 
Chittagong in Bangladesh, through Delhi and Amritsar in India to Lahore and 
Peshawar in Pakistan until it ends in Kabul in Afghanistan. It was important socially, 
economically and militarily for centuries (for the history of the GT Road see e.g. Dar 
2000) but lost its role as trade route between India and Pakistan following the partition 
of the subcontinent. While transit trade with Afghanistan continued through the GT 
Road, land-based trade between India and Pakistan could only take place through 
trains plying between Amritsar and Lahore. However, the service was terminated 
during the India-Pakistan war in 1965 and only reopened in 1976. The so-called 
Samjhauta Express (also known as ‘Friendship Express’) was the only transport link 
between the two Punjabs until the inauguration of the Sada-e-Sarhad (Urdu: ‘Call of 
the Frontier’) bus service between New Delhi and Lahore in 1999. The services were 
terminated after attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The Attari-Wagah 
 
42 Parkash Singh Badal is the patron of the Shiromani Akali Dal and was four times Chief Minister of 
Punjab (1970-71, 1977-80, 1997-2002, 2007-2017).  
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border crossing-point was reopened for cross-border travel through the Sada-e-Sarhad 
bus in November 2003 (The Hindu 2003) and through the Samjhauta Express train in 
January 2004 (“Joint Press Statement on Samjhauta Express” 2003). Furthermore, 
representatives from India and Pakistan agreed during the Composite Dialogue 
Process to start bus services between Amritsar and Lahore and Amritsar and Nankana 
Sahib in January 2006 (Joint Statement on Operationalisation of Bus Services 2005). 
Nankana Sahib, now situated in Pakistan’s Punjab, is the birthplace of Guru Nanak, 
the first Guru of the Sikhs and an important pilgrimage centre. In 2005, Pakistan also 
opened the road route for trade with India, which was an important step for interstate 
trade relations, as I explore in detail in Chapter 8.  
The opening of the road route meant that India and Pakistan had to cooperate to 
facilitate trade. While the border crossing point and foreign trade are the 
responsibilities of the central governments and were discussed in bilateral negotiations 
in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process on Economic and Commercial 
Cooperation between 2004 and 2012, trade through Attari-Wagah required the 
cooperation of the Punjab governments, for the latter are responsible for the roads 
leading to the border crossing point, for instance. This highlights the centrality of the 
two Punjabs to relations between India and Pakistan. While Indian Punjab lost its 
political and economic significance as border state in India, as outlined above, it 
regained some of its political and economic statuses in India’s dealings with its 
neighbour in the post-2003 period. 
The Chief Ministers of Indian and Pakistani Punjab began cooperating on 
cultural and sports matters in 2004, and later also engaged on economic matters. In 
January 2004, Amarinder Singh, the Chief Minister of Indian Punjab, visited Pakistan 
to strengthen Punjab-Punjab relations and to attend the World Punjabi Conference in 
Lahore, upon invitation of his counterpart, Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhry Pervaiz 
Elahi (CM, 2003-2007) (Ranal 2004). Elahi reportedly said that “[s]uch visits will 
facilitate resolution of differences between the two countries” (DAWN 2004), thus 
highlighting the joint understanding that closer relations between the two Punjabs can 
facilitate dialogue on bilateral issues. In April 2004, Chief Minister Amarinder Singh 
announced the creation of a World Punjabi Centre at the Punjabi University, Patiala. 
The foundation stone for the centre was laid by the Chief Ministers of the two Punjabs, 
Amarinder Singh and Pervaiz Elahi, during the World Punjabi Conference in 
December 2004 (The World Punjabi Centre n.d.). The stated aim of the World Punjabi 
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Centre is, amongst others, “to work on the principles of cooperation and coordination 
for people from the two Punjabs and rest of the Indo - Pak subcontinent and the Punjabi 
Communities abroad” (The World Punjabi Centre n.d.). Pakistan Punjab’s Chief 
Minister Elahi came to Indian Punjab to attend the first India-Pakistan Punjab games 
taking place in Patiala (The Tribune 2004). In March 2005, Indian Punjab’s Chief 
Minister Amarinder Singh visited Pakistan for the last time during this tenure to meet 
his counterpart Pervaiz Elahi. Following his visit to Pakistan in 2005, Indian Punjab’s 
Chief Minister Amarinder Singh reportedly said in an interaction with the Indian 
newspaper The Hindu:  
I have developed a great equation with the Pakistan Punjab Chief 
Minister, Pervaiz Elahi. We thought of supplementing the efforts made 
by the two countries for resolution of differences by establishing links on 
both sides of Punjab in the fields of sports and culture…In this context 
our efforts have been fruitful. (quoted in Reddy 2005) 
During the visit, the Chief Ministers also called upon Pakistan’s President Pervez 
Musharraf and Chief Minister Amarinder Singh conveyed to President Musharraf 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s commitment to the development of longer-term 
peaceful ties with Pakistan (Singh 2017 Chapter 36). During this meeting, President 
Musharraf agreed to release Indian prisoners in Pakistan’s custody, who returned with 
Chief Minister Amarinder Singh via the Attari-Wagah border, a gesture India 
reciprocated (DAWN 2005). The fate of Indian and Pakistani prisoners became a core 
topic of debate during the bilateral Composite Dialogue Process, which was 
interrupted between 2008 and 2011, which temporarily ended Punjab-Punjab 
cooperation. 
The Chief Ministers of the two Punjabs resumed cooperation in 2012. The focus 
now shifted from sports and culture towards strengthening economic relations between 
Indian and Pakistani Punjabs. In April 2012, the Chief Ministers of the two Punjabs, 
Shahbaz Sharif from Pakistan and Parkash Singh Badal from India, attended the 
inauguration ceremony of a new Integrated Check Post at Attari (Maini 2012). In 
November of the same year, Deputy Chief Minister, Sukhbir Singh Badal, reciprocated 
the visit by leading a business delegation to Pakistan, inaugurating the Second Asia 
Kabbadi Cup43 and holding discussions to increase trade via the Attari-Wagah border 
crossing point and to export energy to Pakistan’s Punjab with Pakistan Punjab’s Chief 
 
43 Kabaddi is a South Asian contact team sport, played between two teams of seven players. 
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Minister Shahbaz Sharif and representatives of trade and industry (The Times of India 
2012). In December 2013, Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif visited India upon invitation 
of Chief Minister Badal. In a joint statement, the two Chief Ministers resolved “to 
promote cooperation for the common interest of peace, harmony, economic growth 
and leveraging each other’s potential” (Business Standard 2013). Two years later, M/s 
Adani Enterprises Ltd, one of India’s largest trading companies, visited Pakistan to 
further discuss matters related to the import of power. Yet with a change in the central 
government in India, the time did not seem ripe (Kiani 2015). When Amarinder Singh 
became re-elected as Chief Minister of Indian Punjab in 2017, he took up the issue 
with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (The Indian Express 2017). The latter gave 
the green light a few days later (Krar 2017) but relations have since deteriorated and it 
does not look as though the heads of the governments of the two Punjabs will be able 
to act as brokers between the central governments of India and Pakistan.   
Cooperation between the two Punjabs in cultural, sports and economic matters 
appears to have been a leadership function, both of the Punjab Chief Ministers and of 
the heads of the central governments of India and Pakistan. As Mattoo and Jacob 
(2009, 183) highlight, “[t]he political weight of a particular state leader can also 
influence foreign policymaking, albeit informally.” However, the ability of the Chief 
Ministers of the two Punjabs to cooperate and influence foreign policymaking was 
closely related to the support of the heads of the central governments. As Raja C. 
Mohan (2014) notes:  
Much of the agenda outlined by Badal and Sharif [in the above-quoted 
joint statement issued in December 2013], however, can only be 
implemented by the central governments in Delhi and Islamabad. The two 
leaders therefore agreed to press their national capitals to facilitate deeper 
cooperation across the border in Punjab. 
Trividesh Singh Maini (2018) argues that Prime Minister “Manmohan Singh 
supported initiatives of the erstwhile Shiromani Akali Dal Government (SAD) and ally 
of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The current government, led by Narendra Modi, 
however, has not really looked at Punjab as stakeholder in the relationship.” This may 
partly be related to the personal connections Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (PM, 
2004-2014) has to Punjab. He is a Punjabi Sikh who was born in Gah, now in Punjab 
in Pakistan, from where he moved to Amritsar with his family at partition (Baru 2014). 
He thus has personal connections to places in both Punjabs. Narendra Modi is a 
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Gujarati Hindu, born in Vadnagar, present-day Gujarat, also a border state to Pakistan, 
but without immediate connections to Punjab or Pakistan (Marino 2014). In Pakistan, 
Punjab-Punjab cooperation received the support of President Pervez Musharraf (P, 
2001-2008), who described Indian Chief Minister Amarinder Singh as  
a visionary leader who as chief minister of Indian Punjab put in a vigorous 
effort in bringing peace between Pakistan and India when I was president 
of Pakistan. A sane voice of reason, which was singularly focused on 
bringing the two Punjabs closer together through enhanced trade, added 
connectivity, religious tourism, sports and regular people-to-people 
contact (quoted in Singh 2017, Chapter 36).  
Musharraf was born in Delhi in British India and moved with his family to Karachi at 
partition (Musharraf 2006). He thus also has personal connections across the 
international boundary, unlike his successor, Asif Ali Zardari (P, 2008-2013), whose 
family was from Karachi. Of the ten Pakistani Prime Ministers that have headed the 
government since 2004, only three are from Punjab, the others are from Sindh, 
Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, these three Punjabi Prime Ministers 
ruled the country for nine of these past 15 years. They are Yousaf Raza Gillani (PM, 
2008-2012), Nawaz Sharif (PM, 2013-2017) and the incumbent Prime Minister Imran 
Ahmed Khan Niazi (PM, 2018-present). I will return to the role of the central 
governments in shaping relations between India and Pakistan in Section 4.4. Let me 
dwell a little longer on the role of Punjabis in shaping relations between India and 
Pakistan.  
While the central governments’ support is important for closer cooperation 
between the governments of the two Punjab, much cooperation took place outside 
political corridors between Punjabis from India, Pakistan and the diaspora. From the 
late 1990s, activists and intellectuals on both sides of the international boundary as 
well as in the Punjabi diaspora sought to revive the historical, linguistic and cultural 
connections between Punjabis through musical, literary and dramatic exchanges and 
sports events under the banner of the Punjabiyat or ‘Punjabiness’. This prompted 
Alyssa Ayres (2005, 63) to suggest that  
developments taking place outside the international spotlight – not in 
Delhi and Islamabad, but in Amritsar and Faisalabad, Lahore and 
Ludhiana – could potentially transform the nature of India-Pakistan 
relations. In such places, exchanges between ordinary Punjabis could 
snowball into a movement that could overcome the longstanding enmity 
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of these two nuclear-armed neighbors. This effort even has an official 
slogan: “Reviving the Spirit of Punjab, Punjabi, and Punjabiyat.” 
The Punjabiyat movement emphasises transnational relations between Punjabis – a 
Punjabi language, literature, culture and history. It puts Punjabiness over other markers 
of identity. “The choice for Punjabi can,” according to Anne Murphy (2018, 71), 
“speak to the crossing of borders, both in national terms and at intersection with class, 
caste and gender.” However, the movement took on different shapes in India, Pakistan 
and the diaspora (Ayres 2008), reflecting the divisions created with the formation of 
these two states. 
Punjabiness is not only reproduced in literary, cinematic and musical movements 
but is reflected in common perceptions of Punjabis in India and Pakistan, as 
exemplified in the following statements of interviewees. A Pakistani businessman 
from Lahore explained: 
When I cross the border from Lahore to Amritsar, we have the same 
language, Punjabi, we are Punjabi people, we have the same food, the 
same culture, the same abuses [laughs at expression], everything is the 
same. So, when we cross the border, when we come to Indian Punjab or 
to Pakistani Punjab, there is no difference of culture and no difference of 
language. I feel very comfortable. (Ali Hussain (m), Amritsar, 
07.12.2015)  
A Pakistani businessman, who organised trade fairs in India, explained: 
We’re mostly concentrating on the Punjab and Chandigarh.  One of the 
obvious reasons being the similar culture, similar language so they’re 
very similar. Plus, their acceptability towards Pakistan is higher, I would 
say, so I think Punjab is an easier market to penetrate in India. (Abdul 
Baig (m), Islamabad, 27.03.2017) 
Similarly, a trader from Fazilka near the Pakistani border in Indian Punjab explained:  
[W]ith Pakistan, we have a lot of things in common. We have the same 
language whether it is their executives or the promoters, we speak in the 
same Punjabi language. There is not much of a difference even between 
Urdu and Hindi. Let me tell you. They are almost twin sisters. Not much 
of a difference. And whenever you listen to Hindi songs, most of the 
words are in Urdu. We enjoy the lyrics written by a renowned lyricist, 
which are of course sung by renowned singers and then shown to the 
people in the movies. So the culture is the same. (Amarjeet Jakhar (m) 
New Delhi, 12.9.2015). 
This suggests that Punjabis share a social space that is united through a ‘common 
sense,’ which permits agents occupying different positions to agree and disagree on 
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the divisions and classifications of the social world around them (Bourdieu 2000, 98). 
This social space is characterised by connections, both real and perceived, but also 
fraught with frictions. As Ian Talbot (2002, 59-61) observed when writing about the 
Punjabisation of Pakistan: Punjab is not homogenous. Pakistani Punjab can be divided 
into four distinct economic and cultural regions and there are large class differences. 
The same is true for Indian Punjab and the Punjabi diaspora. Furthermore, it must be 
noted, that the interviewees quoted above are part of the ‘middle’ or ‘intermediate’ 
class and that there might therefore be a representational bias. Whether this sense of 
Punjabiness is shared beyond this class is a question I am unable to answer. Alyssa 
Ayres (2005) suggests this might be the case. 
To summarise, the Punjab borderland is both characterised by connections and 
divisions, which do not necessarily coincide with national boundaries. Therefore, the 
Punjab borderland is best conceptualised as a social space in which the borders of 
different fields are negotiated every day. This borderland is at the heart of relations 
between India and Pakistan, both geographically and figuratively, though the Kashmir 
region has received much more attention since the 1990s. But perhaps it is the absence 
of attention to Punjab that affords it a greater role in shaping relations between India 
and Pakistan. The following section will explore the making of state borders between 
India and Pakistan and related state-making processes, which are understood to be 
inseparable from the foreign relations of these two states.  
4.3 STATE- AND BORDER-MAKING IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
While the states of India and Pakistan emerged from the same colonial state, they 
followed different trajectories in the post-colonial period. A relatively autonomous 
bureaucratic-military oligarchy came to dominate the state in Pakistan for much of its 
existence, whereas the state in India was firmly in the hands of bureaucrats and 
politicians who subordinated the military to civilian rule (see e.g. Ganguly 2015; 
Jaffrelot 2002). These differences can in part be attributed to variances in the colonial 
administration, to the unequal distribution of resources during the partition of the 
subcontinent and to the transformation of power relations between political, 
bureaucratic, security and economic actors in the post-colonial period, which I will 
explore in what follows, beginning with state-making processes during the colonial 
period. 
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The partition of the subcontinent long preceded the political struggles 
surrounding the event. As Chatterjee (1993, 6) explained, in British India:  
anticolonialism create[d] its own domain of sovereignty within the 
colonial society well before it beg[an] its political battle with the imperial 
power [...] by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into 
two domains – the material and the spiritual.  
The material domain was that of the colonial state, its bureaucracy, economy, science 
and technology. The spiritual was the domain of cultural identity, where anti-colonial 
struggles formed through language, education (e.g. through the establishment of the 
Aligarh Muslim University in 1875) and the family. He proposes that in this domain 
“the nation [was] already sovereign, even when the state [was] in the hands of the 
colonial power” (Chatterjee 1993, 6). But what emerged from the colonial state was 
not one but two states.  
The struggles that took place in the spiritual domain translated into challenges 
of the “rule of colonial difference” (Chatterjee 1993, 10) in the domain of the state 
which were translated into the formal establishment of the Indian National Congress 
(1885) and the All-India Muslim League (1906). From about 1929, the All India 
Congress called for independence from the British colonisers. A year later, the Muslim 
League followed, not only demanding independence but insisting that Hindus and 
Muslims were fundamentally different and constituted two ‘nations’ (Cohen 2004, 29). 
The idea of Pakistan as a Muslim nation independent of a Hindu-dominated India was 
born. Initially, the idea of Pakistan did not embody a territorial vision of nationality. It 
was the Congress’ increasingly territorial vision of nationality that led the League to 
adopt a similar image of Pakistan (Gilmartin 1998, 1081–83).  
The British themselves were reluctant to partition the subcontinent at first. Lord 
Wavell, Viceroy and Governor General of India (1943-47), repeatedly warned the 
India Office in the United Kingdom of an imminent partition during Clement Attlee’s 
Premiership (PM, 1945-1951). Wavell’s outline of potential partition boundaries 
received little attention in the metropole (French 2011, 322), while the ‘Breakdown 
Plan’, calling for a complete withdrawal from the subcontinent, alarmed the British 
Cabinet. It resulted in the ‘ABC Plan’, which proposed a loose federation of three 
groups of provinces. The plan was first accepted, then rejected by the Congress and 
then the Muslim League. This was followed by the ‘Direct Action Day’ and the ‘Great 
Calcutta Killing’ (16 August 1946). The latter triggered communal riots in many parts 
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of the subcontinent, though not in Punjab which was spared from violence until March 
1947. As violence intensified, Attlee’s confidence in Wavell decreased and, as the 
latter refused to resign, he was forced out of office and replaced by Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, the last viceroy (12 February – 15 August 1947). Mountbatten quickly 
concluded that partition was the only way forward and that a speedy process was 
necessary to avoid the further intensification of violence, though the latter was but one 
reason for a speedy withdrawal of the British. Other reasons included Indian nationalist 
pressure, Britain’s precarious economic situation since World War II and American 
pressure to decolonise (Chester 2008; 2009, 10–17). 
On 3 June 1947, Mountbatten announced his plan to move Independence Day 
forward, from June 1948 to 15 August 1947. Three days later, he circulated a report 
on ‘The Administrative Consequences of Partition’ among senior bureaucrats. 
According to the plan, a Partition Committee/Council was formed with a Steering 
Committee to mediate between the former and ten Expert Committees. Within 70 days, 
their members had to delimit international boundaries, divide the personnel of the 
Armed Forces of British India, split the staff, organisations and records of the colonial 
state bureaucracy,44 split the assets and liabilities of the British Indian Government 
and the Reserve Bank, decide on the jurisdiction of High Courts and Federal Courts, 
on future economic relations, transport and diplomatic representations abroad 
(Raghavan 2012, 26–27; Rai 1965, 58–59; Sengupta 2014). Along the same lines, a 
partition bureaucracy was set up in the provinces to deal with local matters. In Punjab, 
seven Expert Committees were formed to deal with financial assets and liabilities, 
physical assets, services and records, the use of important provincial institutions, civil 
supplies, budget and accounts, and contracts. Upon partition in August 1947, an 
implementation committee was set up at the Punjab provincial level to realise the 
decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal and the Punjab Partition Council (Rai 1965, 60–71) 
The logic of religious differences, i.e. Muslims on one side and non-Muslims on 
the other, structured all decisions, from the composition of partition committees with 
Muslim and non-Muslim representatives (Sengupta 2014, 530), to the division of 
territory along religious lines (Chester 2009, 39) and the separation of the Armed 
 
44 The administrative unites to be divided included the Central Civil Departments, Railways, Posts, 
Telegraphs, Broadcasting, Civil Aviation, Meteorology, Public Works, Income-Tax, Customs, Central 
Excise, Accounts and Audit, Scientific Services, Central Waterways, Inland Navigation Board, Central 
Power Boards (Rai 1965, 59). 
97 
 
Forces, where loyalty was thought to be based on religious affiliation. Prisoners were 
an exception. They were transferred to the places where they were convicted, 
irrespective of their religion or will. Government officials were free to choose between 
India and Pakistan (Sengupta 2014, 535–37), as were the people living in British India. 
However, communal tensions and violence frequently forced people to leave and join 
their Muslim and non-Muslim fellows respectively, as I explained in Section 4.1. 
While religion became an important tool of governance that aided state officials 
to classify people and things, there was an attempt among authorities “to produce a 
common [secular] statecraft” apart from religious sentiments to promote order and 
stability (Chatterji 2013, 42). To avoid dragging out the process, top-level bureaucrats 
from India and Pakistan cooperated to finalise partition. Of course, such cooperation 
coexisted with conflicts over the division of assets and people, which more often than 
not resulted in mutual assistance (see also Chatterji 2012; Raghavan 2012). This, 
however, did not avoid differences between top-level officials and those who ought to 
implement policies and decisions, who top-level bureaucrats perceived to be much 
closer to and more influenced by nationalist sentiments among the population 
(Chatterji 2013, 46; Sengupta 2014, 539–441).  
Cooperation was important to divide British India and to disentangle India and 
Pakistan. But it was also vital to establish the sovereignty of both states (Raghavan 
2012, 11–13). After partition, India and Pakistan strove to unify and constitute 
themselves as relatively autonomous meta-fields. Though India and Pakistan emerged 
from the same colonial state, the trajectories of these two states varied greatly 
regarding the process of differentiation and autonomisation of the political, the 
bureaucratic, the military and the economic fields and the relationship between them. 
Discussions on the state in Pakistan often boil down to two non-elected 
institutions, the military and the bureaucracy, and their relationship to elected 
politicians (see e.g. Alavi 1973; 1990; Jalal 1991; Waseem 1989). According to Hamza 
Alavi (1973), whose work builds the foundation for debates on the state in Pakistan, 
Pakistan inherited an ‘overdeveloped state’ from the British, dominated by a relatively 
autonomous bureaucratic-military ‘oligarchy’ with close ties to the landed elite in 
which politicians and political parties occupied dominated positions. In his words, they 
“provided a facade of parliamentary government” to military rule after partition (Alavi 
1973, 65). However, scholars like McCartney (2019) object that the bureaucratic-
military’s dominance in the state was due to post-independence developments rather 
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than inheritance. In 1947, the state of Pakistan had to be built from scratch (Jaffrelot 
2002, 255), which meant that national bureaucratic, security, economy and political 
fields had to be differentiated and relations between them renegotiated. Pre-partition 
developments certainly influenced these processes. The resulting dominance of 
bureaucracy and military can be explained in relation to at least four factors: the 
unmixing of the British Indian military and the ethnic imbalance in the army (1) 
insecurities of a Muslim-minority in relation to a Hindu-dominated British India that 
translated into insecurities vis-à-vis a much larger India, reinforced through the first 
India-Pakistan war over Kashmir that started only two months after partition (2); 
internal struggles among the provinces of Pakistan which challenged the Punjabi-
dominated bureaucratic-military oligarchy (3); and the military’s ability to expand its 
role in Pakistan’s economy (4).45 
While the military is generally seen to have wielded power behind the scenes 
since independence, it assumed direct control over the state with the first coup d’état 
in 1958. This brought General Ayub Khan (P, 1958-69) to power, followed by thirteen 
years of military rule, which Wilke (2005, 197) described as an attempt to consolidate 
the state. After an interlude of apparent political rule over six years, during which the 
elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (PM, 1977-77) enjoyed a degree of 
autonomy from the bureaucratic-military oligarchy (Alavi 1973, 66–67), the military 
formally resumed control over the state in 1977 and ruled for another 11 years. Alavi 
(1990, 33) described the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) as “the first truly 
‘military regime’ in Pakistan.” Until then, he argued, the Pakistan army was a ‘junior 
partner’ of the bureaucracy. Under Zia, army personnel came to occupy key positions 
in the bureaucracy and in key sectors of the economy (Wilke 2005, 200–2002). Ayesha 
Jalal (1991) came to speak of Pakistan as a ‘state of martial rule.’ After another 
interlude of political rule under Benazir Bhutto (1988-90) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93, 
1996-99), during which the Prime Minister’s position was boosted through political 
and constitutional changes in 1997 (Rizvi 2000, 191), a further nine years of military 
rule under General Pervez Musharraf followed from 1999 to 2008, totalling 33 years 
of military rule in Pakistan to date. The end of formal rule by the military in Pakistan 
did not mean a decline of its power. However, relations between the military, the 
 
45 On Pakistan’s bureaucracy after independence see also Shafqat (1999). 
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bureaucracy and politicians but also economic actors were and are constantly 
renegotiated and did not remain static.  
At partition, the British Indian armed forces were divided along religious lines 
as religious affiliation was seen as the basis of loyalty by members of the Partition 
Council (Sengupta 2014, 537). Pakistan received 36 per cent of the armed forces 
personnel, plus movable military stores and equipment. Pakistan was to receive one-
third of the surplus stores, proportionate to the size of the Pakistani army. However, 
under pressure from the Congress government, the British Supreme Commander’s 
Headquarters supervising the division of the armed forces was closed three months 
after partition, long before all allotted stores had been moved to Pakistan. This left 
Pakistan without the necessary equipment for its military, and without the hope that it 
would receive its share (Jalal 1987, 295–96), leaving Pakistan in a perpetual state of 
insecurity.  
The sense of insecurity in Pakistan was accentuated through the first India-
Pakistan war over Kashmir that took place between October 1947 and January 1949, 
only two months after their formal establishment. Kashmir, a Muslim-majority 
princely state under the formal rule of a Hindu Maharaja, sought to remain independent 
from India and Pakistan after partition. But the elites in both states lay claim to this 
territory – the Pakistani elite for it was a Muslim-majority region that ought to be part 
of the homeland for all Muslims and the Indian elite to support its claim to a secular 
state. These incompatible images of the state escalated into the first war over Kashmir 
between India and Pakistan, only two months after independence. In response to the 
incursion of Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal militias into Kashmir’s territory and in return for 
military assistance, the Maharaja of Kashmir decided to accede to India on 26 October 
1947. This was heavily contested by Pakistan and drew the militaries of both states 
into the conflict. The war resulted in the division of Kashmir through the UN Ceasefire 
Line in 1949. Two-thirds of Kashmir went to India, including the Kashmir Valley, 
Jammu and Ladakh. About one third went to Pakistan, including Azad Kashmir and 
Gilgit-Baltistan. However, this division did not resolve the conflict over Kashmir. 
India and Pakistan fought two more wars over this territory, in 1965 and in 1999. In 
1972, following the India-supported war of independence of Bangladesh from 
Pakistan, the UN Ceasefire Line was converted into the Line of Control, which remains 
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a bone of contention between India and Pakistan to date (see e.g. Jacob 2017), as is 
common for de facto borders (Schultz 2014).46  
The first war over Kashmir allowed the armed forces in Pakistan to portray India 
as an existential threat that required corresponding government spending for defence 
purposes (Ganguly 2015, 4). The sense of urgency for defence spending was reinforced 
as India was able to expand its army by 10.5 per cent within the first year of its 
existence. By September 1948, the Indian Army stood at approximately 540,000 
personnel, as compared to 215,000 poorly equipped and trained personnel in Pakistan. 
Despite suffering from a lack of economic reserves, Pakistan put about 70 per cent of 
the total government spending into the defence budget in the first three years after 
partition (Jalal 1987, 296–307). On average, more than half of the budget went to the 
military between 1947 and 1959 (Jaffrelot 2002, 256). High defence spending gave the 
military a degree of financial autonomy in the state of Pakistan, which it was able to 
expand over time. This led to increasing challenges from other provinces in Pakistan, 
largely due to the domination of the state by Punjabis and Muhajirs.  
Pakistan was divided into two separate territories in 1947, a wing on each side 
of India. Bengalis constituted a majority of 55 per cent of Pakistan’s population in 
1951 (Jaffrelot 2002, 257), but the state of Pakistan was a ‘migrant state’ (Waseem 
1989) dominated by Muhajirs and Punjabis in which other regions were 
underrepresented. The institutional imbalance in favour of the military increased 
tensions between the centre and Pakistan’s provinces, notably between Punjab and 
non-Punjabi provinces, including East Bengal, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP). These were violently quelled by the military, which 
increasingly assumed the role of establishing order internally. The border between the 
responsibilities of the military and the police were blurred – traditionally, the military 
is tasked with guarding a state’s external borders, whereas the police is responsible for 
maintaining order internally (Wilke 2005, 187). This culminated in the secession of 
East Pakistan and the formal establishment of Bangladesh in 1971 (Alavi 1973, 65–
66; Jaffrelot 2002, 256–57; Wilke 2005, 190, 193–98), further increasing insecurities 
of the state of Pakistan vis-à-vis its neighbour, for East Bengal received support from 
 
46
 For detailed analyses of the Kashmir conflict see e.g. Bose (2003), Schofield (2003) and Wirsing 
(1998).  
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India in its struggles for independence, pointing to a close relationship between 
internal and external affairs.  
The secession of East Bengal presented a blow to the military’s attempt to keep 
the state of Pakistan together. It also reduced peoples’ support of the military and 
opened the state meta-field to political parties and politicians. Furthermore, it 
presented an opportunity for non-Punjabis to gain greater influence. Pakistan’s new 
ruler, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (P, 1971-73; PM, 1973-77), was a Sindhi who received 
widespread support in all provinces. However, he alienated the military, the 
bureaucracy and businesspeople by cleansing the military, politicising the bureaucracy 
and nationalising key sectors of the economy. This weakened rather than strengthened 
the basis of the state. When the autonomy movement of Baluchistan escalated into 
civil war in 1973 (till 1977), Bhutto brought the army back into the state, which 
resumed direct control through a coup d’état led by the Chief of Army Staff, General 
Zia ul-Haq, in 1977 (Wilke 2005, 199–200).  
Under General Zia ul-Haq’s presidency (P, 1978-88), Pakistan experienced its 
“first truly ‘military regime’” (Alavi 1990, 33). The military deepened its involvement 
in the state, including in politics, the bureaucracy and the economy. Furthermore, Zia’s 
drive towards the Islamisation of Pakistan opened the space for religious actors. 
(Retired) Military officials, mainly from the army, were posted to key government jobs 
and in key sectors of the economy, both legal and illegal. Instead of de-nationalising 
key industries, Zia’s technocrats improved the performance of the economy. Between 
1977-78 and 1985-86 Pakistan’s Gross National Product increased by 76 per cent and 
the per capita income rose by 34 per cent (Burki 1988, 1093). Pakistan also received 
large sums of foreign aid and sophisticated weapons from the United States to support 
Afghanistan in its fight against the Soviet Union (1979-1989). Arms and ammunition 
were channelled to freedom fighters in Afghanistan by the Pakistan army, which 
guaranteed Zia support from senior officers of the armed forces (Burki 1988, 1096–
97). During Zia’s rule, the military’s internal economy grew significantly and with that 
its financial autonomy (Siddiqa 2017, 161–76).47   
After Zia’s death in 1988, his successor as Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza 
Aslam Beg, formally handed power back to civilians.48 However, neither Benazir 
 
47 On Zia ul-Haq’s rule see also Shafqat (1988). 
48 On Benazir Bhutto see Shafqat (1996). 
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Bhutto’s (PM, 1988-90, 1993-96) nor Nawaz Sharif’s (PM, 1990-93, 1996-99) 
governments survived their full terms. They were dismissed by Presidents of Pakistan, 
who were vested with greater powers than the Prime Minister. However, the President 
itself was subject to the generals, “who remained kingmakers and arbiters in Pakistan” 
(Wilke 2005, 203).  
During his second term as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif ruled through loyalists 
and family members, frequently bypassed the cabinet and the parliament, challenged 
key government officials, like the President, the Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme 
Court, put pressure on the press and finally also challenged the army itself, culminating 
in the dismissal of the Chief of Army Staff, General Musharraf. Sharif’s rule was 
considered by many that of a democratically elected authoritarian regime. In response, 
the army launched a coup d’état to dislodge Sharif from power. According to Wilke 
(2005, 185), “the military government seemed to be more eager than any of its civilian 
and military predecessors to pursue good governance targets.” The latter were 
reinforced through external pressure, created through the US-led ‘war on terror’ 
following attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, which Pakistan 
joined. This had domestic implications, for sections within the Pakistani military had 
supported the Taliban politically and militarily until then. By joining the US-led ‘war 
on terror,’ Musharraf challenged powerful domestic groups (Wilke 2005, 183–85), 
which contributed to his downfall in 2008. 
The accumulation of statist capital by Pakistan’s military has given it significant 
influence not only over the state’s internal affairs but also over its foreign relations. 
To date, the military retains control over Pakistan’s foreign relations with countries 
like Afghanistan, India and the United States (Ganguly 2015, 3; Rizvi 2000, 191). 
Given the military’s dominance over internal and external affairs and its relative 
economic autonomy, some have come to think of the military as a ‘parallel state’ (Aziz 
2008, 97–98). Dewey (1991, 270), for instance, suggested that “[t]he army constitutes 
a state within the state, and it may be a superior state, compared with the civilian 
alternative.” While the military, and in particular the army, undoubtedly occupy 
dominant positions in the state of Pakistan, it is not one actor that constitutes a state. It 
is the army’s relationship to other actors, which is negotiated and renegotiated all the 
time, that constitutes the state as a relatively autonomous meta-field, in this case 
dominated by a bureaucratic-military elite. The latter continues to dominate the state 
in Pakistan due to the logic of reproduction. As Ayesha Jalal (1991, 2) explained: 
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A state structure dominated by the non-elected institutions - namely the 
military and the bureaucracy - is not easily amenable to a transformation 
that readily acknowledges the ascendancy of the elected institutions - 
parliament in particular. 
However, globalisation and changes in the world market did not leave Pakistan 
unaffected. From the 1980s onwards, the space for businesspeople and joint action in 
the state of Pakistan has expanded. As Nadvi (1999) explored with regard to the 
surgical instrument industry in Sialkot in Pakistan’s Punjab, joint action among 
producers, suppliers and subcontractors through trade associations has increased due 
to the introduction of international quality assurance standards. Through sector-
specific business associations, relations between the private sector and the state have 
been renegotiated. This benefitted larger producers more than small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME), which dominated the surgical instrument industry in Sialkot. 
However, many SME’s were also able to meet good manufacturing practices standards 
through cooperation in trade bodies, allowing them to participate in the international 
economic market. Chapter 8 highlights that the space for collective action among 
businesspeople further increased and extended to chambers of commerce and industry 
in the post-2003 period, at least when it comes to trade between India and Pakistan. In 
India too globalisation and the liberalisation of the economy had profound effects on 
the state (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan 2011), which emerged more or less intact from 
the colonial period (Jaffrelot 2002, 255).  
In contrast to the state in Pakistan, the state in India is commonly seen to be 
firmly in the hands of civilians. With the exception of a state of emergency from 1975 
to 1977, civilians upheld a democratic system and enforced strong control over the 
military. However, like in Pakistan, the military has been involved in several internal 
security missions (Staniland 2008). Furthermore, it has been able to shape state policy 
on certain topics, notably on security and foreign relations, due to its relative autonomy 
in operational matters (Raghavan 2012). Globalisation and the liberalisation of the 
Indian economy also opened the space for business actors to assume a greater role in 
the state of India (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan 2011; Jaffrelot, Kohli, and Murali 
2019). 
In 1950, India received its Constitution, which laid the basis for a British-style 
parliamentary democracy in which the military was subordinated to politics. Post-
partition India was among a few stable democracies in the non-Western world in the 
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1950s and the 1960s. Businesspeople were politically powerful, as were the landed 
and caste elites (Kohli 1990, 3–5). However, in the post-partition period, the political 
field was dominated by a single party, the Indian National Congress, and became 
known as the ‘Congress system’ (Kothari 1964).  
Following its formation in 1885, the Indian National Congress led India’s 
independence movement. It appealed to the masses and created some form of unity, 
which allowed it to dominate the political scene after independence. The Congress 
became the chief party. Struggles for power took place within the party rather than 
through inter-party competition (Kothari 1964). This initially provided some stability 
and did not seem to obstruct the participation of other actors in the polity. However, 
from the late 1960s onwards, the role of political parties was eroded and in its stead 
powerful individuals came to dominate politics at the national, the state and the district 
levels (Kohli 1988, 4; 1990, 5).  
From 1967 onwards, the state in India became increasingly dominated by 
powerful individuals rather than party politics, which can be linked to the dominance 
of politics by a single family. The Nehru-Gandhi family ruled the country for 37 years: 
from 1947 to 1964 (Jawaharlal Nehru), from 1966 to 1977 and from 1980 to 1984 
(Indira Gandhi, daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru) and from 1984 to 1989 (Rajiv Gandhi) 
(Jaffrelot 2002, 251). During Indira Gandhi’s time as Prime Minister, personal rule 
became particularly pronounced, in part due to the seeds of division sown in the period 
leading to partition.  
The consolidation of the state in India in the post-partition period involved the 
(armed) repression of dissidents. Over time, the state’s authority was increasingly 
challenged. Instead of accommodating demands for greater political participation, 
Indira Gandhi suppressed challenges to her authority by cancelling elections, 
appointing loyal chief ministers in the states, personalising national elections and 
centralising power. This reduced institutional support and thereby her and Rajiv 
Gandhi’s ability to implement changes (Kohli 1990, 16, Part IV).  
As challenges to Indira Gandhi’s and Rajiv Gandhi’s authority were suppressed, 
the law and order situation declined in several Indian states. Growing discontent in the 
political field was accompanied by a rise in violence, as Kohli (1990) explores in 
relation to the Indian state Bihar. Other notable examples include Punjab (from the 
late-1970s to mid-1990s) and Kashmir (from the late 1980s), amongst others. The rise 
in violence periodically brought India’s armed forces in to deal with internal security 
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matters, as civil police forces were unable to deal with these challenges. While 
Staniland (2008, 329–30, 345, 355–60) argues that this had no further implications for 
civil-military relations in India and that the military remains under firm political and 
administrative control, Raghavan (2012) contends that the rise of internal and external 
threats allowed the military to become more autonomous in operational matters in the 
period up to 1971, which has provided it with influence on India’s security policy on 
Siachen and cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, for instance. Conflicts over the 
position of the border on the Siachen glacier in Kashmir and cross-border terrorism 
emerged during Rajiv Gandhi’s premiership, but negotiations continued until the early 
1990s. They were institutionalised during P.V. Narasimha Rao’s time as Prime 
Minister (1991-96), who became known for liberalising India’s economy. 
Following two short interludes by V.P. Singh (1989-90) and Chandra Shekhar 
(1990-91), Narasimha Rao took over as Prime Minister of India. To deal with the 
financial crisis of the country, he initiated reforms of the Indian economy with Finance 
Minister Manmohan Singh in 1991, aimed at integrating the national into the 
international economy. This led to changes in the relationship between the state and 
the economy. Private actors could now enter key sectors of the economy, including 
education, healthcare, telecommunication, transport, etc., on which the state used to 
have a monopoly. According to Chatterjee (2008, 61–62), industrial capitalists now 
dominate the state in India. Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan (2011a, 6-8) attribute this to 
the fact that industrial capitalists already occupied dominant positions at the centre and 
therefore were better able to take advantage of the removal of licence restrictions than 
agrarian actors and the federal nature of the state. As Rao devolved power from the 
centre to state and local elected bodies, states could pursue their own economic policies 
and Foreign Direct Investments, strengthening the role of capital industrialists in 
states.49 
To summarise, in both India and Pakistan internal and external security threats, 
globalisation and the incorporation of liberal ideas in the habitus of actors reshaped 
relations between different actors in the state. Though to varying degrees, the militaries 
have become important actors, as have businesspeople.  
 
49 On the role of business in the Indian state see also Jaffrelot, Kohli, and Murali (2019). 
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4.4 CONFLICTS, COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Relations between India and Pakistan have been marked by repeated cycles of peace 
and conflict since their independence in 1947. Therefore, relations between these two 
states have been referred to as an ‘enduring rivalry’ (Misra 2010; Paul 2005b) or an 
‘intractable conflict’ (Cohen 2013, 55). Violent episodes were generally short-lived 
yet associated with immense suffering. They alternated with and paralleled peace and 
confidence building measures and cooperation, some of which were more successful 
than others. This section traces the history of interstate relations from the partition of 
the subcontinent to the ceasefire established in November 2003. The section is 
structured according to critical moments in interstate relations, including three wars in 
1947-49, 1965 and 1971, nuclear tests (1998), limited military engagement in Kargil 
(1999) and a military standoff in 2001-02. Analysed through Pierre Bourdieu’s work 
on the relationship between the everyday and critical moments (Bourdieu 1990, 159–
93), I conceptualise military confrontations and the threat thereof as crises. A crisis is 
a period of time in which routines are interrupted and rational choice may shape 
practices, potentially leading to changes. 
India and Pakistan first went to war in 1947, only two months after these two 
states became formally independent. Another two wars followed in 1965 and 1971. 
These wars may be understood as attempts by India and Pakistan to constitute 
themselves as states by establishing the borders of their respective meta-fields. 
Following the war of independence of Bangladesh (1971), India and Pakistan agreed 
in the ‘Simla Agreement’ (1972) to settle their political differences peacefully in 
future. They reiterated their commitment to establishing peaceful relations in 
declarations, joint statements, memoranda of understanding (MOUs) agreements and 
protocols in the following years. However, relations between India and Pakistan 
remained strained and after a relatively peaceful decade one crisis followed the other.  
The 1971 war exposed a clear conventional asymmetry between India and 
Pakistan, increased insecurity in Pakistan and contributed to a national identity crisis 
in the country. This contributed to Pakistan accelerating its nuclear programme and 
the development of nuclear weapons capabilities.50 As Pakistan developed its nuclear 
 
50 Following Ganguly and Hagerty (2006, 62, Note 1) I distinguish between ‘nuclear capabilities’ and 
‘nuclear weapon capabilities’, with the former referring to technologies which can be used for peaceful 
and military purposes and the latter to the development of nuclear weapons. 
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technology, India became increasingly concerned with the development of nuclear 
weapons in Pakistan, reportedly leading to deliberations of an attack on Pakistan’s 
nuclear facilities to stop its nuclear weapons programme. Between 1979 and 1984 
rumours about a preventive strike by India abounded in Islamabad, leading to a minor 
crisis in 1984. When two squadrons of the Indian Air Force Jaguar fighter-bombers 
could no longer be spotted by US intelligence services, suspicion of an imminent attack 
was high in the US and Pakistan. Yet, the crisis could be diffused as India and Pakistan 
recognised the risk posed by an attack on each other’s nuclear facilities and the release 
of radioactive materials into populated areas. In December 1985, President Zia and 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi agreed verbally not to attack each other’s nuclear 
facilities at a bilateral meeting in New Delhi.51 A formal 'Agreement on the Prohibition 
of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities' was signed in 1988, and ratified 
in 1991. It has been upheld since. Therein the two governments resolved to exchange 
a list of nuclear installations and facilities by January 1 of every year as part of nuclear 
confidence building measures. In another move to “avoid unnecessary alarm,” India 
and Pakistan signed an ‘Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for 
Permitting Over Flights and Landings by Military Aircraft’ in 1991. 
At the time of this crisis, India and Pakistan were pre-nuclear weapons states. 
However, scholars have argued that despite the absence of nuclear weapons “a state of 
virtual deterrence” (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 2007, 27) or “boosted conventional 
deterrence” (Ganguly and Hagerty 2006, 46, 60–61) existed in 1984, which may 
explain why India and Pakistan refrained from escalating the crisis. They refer to a 
situation in which nuclear weapons do not yet exist but are in development and thus 
add to conventional deterrence. Ever since the nuclear factor has loomed over India-
Pakistan relations. By the time the agreement was signed, Pakistan probably possessed 
the capabilities for nuclear weapons (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar 2011, 244–
45). This suggests that a state of nuclear deterrence had been reached. However, it was 
not until 1998, when India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons, that they 
officially became nuclear weapons states.  
A next crisis was on the horizon when India deployed its troops to key ridges 
and passes at the Siachen Glacier in Kashmir on April 13, 1984, known as Operation 
 
51 For a discussion of the domestic and international context and the 1984 crisis see e.g. Ganguly and 
Hagerty (2006, 44–61). For a brief overview see Chari, Cheema, and Cohen (2007, 23–28). 
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Meghdoot. The latter was launched in anticipation of Pakistan’s Operation Ababeel, 
which had essentially the same aim. The Siachen Glacier lies in one of the “highest, 
most rugged, glaciated, remote, and unpopulated portions of the Karakoram 
Mountains,” described as a “seemingly inaccessible terrain” (Wirsing 1998, 76). Yet, 
by the mid-1980s the armies of India and Pakistan were engaging in high-altitude 
warfare.52 While seeking control over all heights, many died as a result of the location 
of the manoeuvre rather than military engagement, highlighting the precarious nature 
of high-altitude warfare (Baghel and Nüsser 2015). 
The dispute over the Siachen Glacier is an “offspring of the Kashmir dispute” 
(Wirsing 1998, 75), essentially constituting a “dispute within a dispute” (Ganguly and 
Hagerty 2006, 51). As such, it goes back to the Karachi Agreement (1949), in which 
an UN-monitored Ceasefire Line (CFL)was established, and the Simla Agreement 
(1972), which recognised the slightly altered ceasefire line of 1971, naming it Line of 
Control (LoC). However, unlike the Kashmir dispute where controversy exists over 
the position of the CFL/LoC, the Siachen Glacier dispute originated over the absence 
of an CFL/LoC of about 40 miles in an area adjoining China’s Xinjiang province in 
Kashmir. The dispute thus also involves China.53  
By the second half of the 1980s, the situation at and around the Siachen Glacier 
had become routinized, leading President Zia and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to 
agree to hold formal discussions to settle the Siachen dispute during a bilateral meeting 
in New Delhi in December 1985.54 This was followed by six rounds of bilateral talks 
led by the Defence Secretaries of India and Pakistan between January 1986 and 
November 1992. Yet, Wirsing (1998, 198) observes, in 1986 “[t]he moment, in any 
event, was hardly ripe in South Asia for negotiating an issue as delicate as Siachen.” 
At that time, India and Pakistan exchanged charges and counter-charges. India, among 
others, accused Pakistan of undermining the Simla Agreement by bringing the 
Kashmir issue up in international fora; of provoking a conventional arms race in South 
Asia; of threatening a nuclear arms race; and of backing the Sikh insurgency in Indian 
 
52 This, however, was not the first time Indian forces had advanced into this terrain. The Indian Air 
Force had reportedly landed its helicopters on the glacier in 1978 and the Indian Army had moved troops 
to the foot of the Siachen glacier for training purposes in 1983 (Baghel and Nüsser 2015, 30). 
53 For a detailed discussion of the Siachen dispute and related boundary delimitation issues, see e.g. 
Wirsing (1998, 75–83). 
54  More notable for this meeting was their commitment to not to attack one another’s nuclear facilities, 
mentioned above. 
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Punjab. Pakistan, on the other hand, amongst others accused India of denying Kashmiri 
Muslims their right to self-determination; of instigating Hindu-Muslim rivalry in 
India; of abetting the Sindh movement for more autonomy and representation; and 
later in that year, of amassing its forces along the international boundary (Wirsing 
1998, 197–98).  
In May 1986, India mounted a major military exercise in Rajasthan, known as 
Operation Brasstacks (1986-87), which provided the background for another crisis that 
“escalated to a point just short of war” (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 2007, 1). The 
Brasstacks exercise had four key components spread over a period from May 1986 to 
March 1987. It achieved a critical stage in the end of 1986, leading to a three-month 
crisis. As India’s military exercise was underway, Pakistan was holding its annual 
military manoeuvres near the Indian border states Rajasthan and Punjab. Upon 
completion of the exercise Pakistani troops remained combat-ready and moved closer 
to the Punjab border. Indian intelligence reports suggested a Pakistani collaboration 
with Sikh secessionists and simultaneous troop movement to cut off Indian access to 
Kashmir. It was not until January 23/24, 1987, that the crisis could be diffused and 
both sides agreed to confidence building measures, leading amongst others to Zia ul-
Haq’s “cricket diplomacy” trip to India in February 1987.55 The crisis prompted the 
‘Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop 
Movements’ (1991), in which the two governments highlighted the need “to prevent 
any crisis situation arising due to misreading of the other side’s intentions”.  
Although controversy exists as to Brasstacks’ precise political and strategic 
goals, Ganguly and Hagerty (2006, 72) suggest that it was designed to dissuade 
Pakistan from supporting the Sikh insurgency in Punjab and to demonstrate India’s 
military capacities. However, India would probably not have been able to conduct an 
all-out war at this stage and its goal to stop Pakistani support to the Sikh secessionist 
movement was not fulfilled. In fact, it was only through a crackdown on Sikh 
insurgents by Indian forces that the Punjab crisis could be brought to an end (Ganguly 
and Hagerty 2006, 78). Contrary to expectations, the nuclear factor does not seem to 
have played an important role in ending this crisis (Ganguly and Hagerty 2006, 79). 
 
55 For detailed discussions of this crisis see e.g. Ganguly and Hagerty (2006, 68–79) and Chari, Cheema, 
and Cohen (2007, 39–79). 
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However, Chari, Cheema, and Cohen (2007, 1, 185) suggest that the crisis probably 
accelerated the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. 
As the crisis surrounding Operation Brasstacks came to an end, tensions started 
to increase in Jammu and Kashmir where militant insurgencies were on the rise. The 
rise of militancy in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir may be traced 
back to Legislative Assembly elections in March 1987. These are widely believed to 
have been rigged in favour of the Indian National Congress-backed National 
Conference (NC), exposing the lack of democratic rights, processes, and institutions 
in J&K. Though Wirsing (1998, 115) observes that it would be wrong to trace India’s 
political failure in Kashmir to this electoral event alone because unrigged elections 
have been the exception in India. Combined with economic insecurities, it contributed 
to the discontentment of the Muslim youth, leading to violent uprisings. While violent 
outbursts were initially sporadic, the situation changed dramatically following a 
violent crackdown on demonstrators by Srinagar police forces in January 1990. This 
event transformed the insurgency in Kashmir into an international affair, with groups 
such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JiI), the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani 
Army allegedly assuming a more active role in supporting the separatist movement. 
By this point, India and Pakistan were exchanging allegations. The Indian government 
accused Pakistan of waging a sub-conventional war against India in Kashmir, while 
Pakistan accused India of violating the rights of Kashmiris to self-determination. 
Concerned about the insurgency in Kashmir, but also in Punjab, the Indian government 
deployed paramilitary and later also military forces to these two states in August 1989 
to stem infiltration attempts by Pakistani-backed militants into India (Ganguly and 
Hagerty 2006, 87). 
Despite reiterating their commitment to the promotion of friendly neighbourly 
relations, India and Pakistan always relapsed into crises. In order to get out of this 
vicious cycle,56 the two governments took another approach towards the management 
of bilateral relations with the exchange of ‘non-papers’ and the institutionalisation of 
a dialogue process in the mid-1990s.57 In January 1994, the Pakistani Foreign Office 
 
56  The term ‘vicious cycle’ is frequently used in the literature on intractable conflicts to refer to 
relationships that repeatedly move from peaceful to violent episodes.  
57 Following Teasdale and Bainbridge (2012), “[a] non-paper is an informal document, usually without 
explicit attribution, put forward in closed negotiations … in order to seek agreement on some 
contentious procedural or policy issue. …[It] seek[s] to test the reaction of other parties to possible 
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submitted two non-papers titled “Measures required to create a propitious climate for 
peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and other issues” and 
“Modalities for the holding of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir” (Official 
Spokesman MEA 1994). Yet, the latter was vehemently rejected by India, which 
labelled it a “propaganda exercise to obfuscate the realities of the situation in J & K” 
and reiterated that “Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India” (Official 
Spokesman MEA 1994). While these ‘non-papers’ were heavily criticised on both 
sides, Prime Ministers Inder Kumar Gujral and Nawaz Sharif repeated their 
commitment to improving bilateral relations at the sidelines of the South Asia 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Male, 1997. They 
highlighted the need for an “integrate approach” to bilateral relations and agreed to 
initiate a “composite dialogue” (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 2007, 206). 
25 years after the Simla Agreement, following numerous crises that had driven 
India and Pakistan to the brink of war, the realisation seemed to have sunk in that only 
a mutually acceptable solution would put an end to the conflicts that had marred 
relations between India and Pakistan over the past 49 years (Misra 2010, 1). “[T]o 
address all outstanding issues of concern to both sides,” India and Pakistan started a 
Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) in June 1997 (Joint Statement FS 1997). The 
dialogue was organised around eight issue areas: (1) Peace and security, including 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), (2) Jammu and Kashmir, (3) Siachen, (4) 
Wullar Barrage Project/Tulbul Navigation Project, (5) Sir Creek, (6) Terrorism and 
drug-trafficking, (7) Economic and Commercial Cooperation, and the (8) Promotion 
of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields. Initiated by the heads of government from 
India and Pakistan, the dialogue was led by bureaucrats from India and Pakistan, 
headed by the Foreign Secretaries. The Foreign Secretaries were responsible for 
deciding upon the composition of the working groups and to “coordinate and monitor 
the progress of work of all the working groups” (Joint Statement FS 1997). 
Furthermore, they met before and after each round of talks to discuss the way forward 
and review progress on all issue areas. They were also leading discussions on Peace 
and Security, including CBMs (1) and Jammu and Kashmir (2), which were both 
discussed in expert-level talks. Dialogue on Siachen (3) and Sir Creek (5) were led by 
 
solutions, without necessarily committing the proposer or reflecting his or her public position up to that 
point.” 
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the Defence Secretaries. Matters relating to the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation 
Project (4) came under the ambit of the Secretaries of the Ministry of Water & Power 
(Pakistan) and the Ministry of Water Resources (India) respectively. Talks relating to 
terrorism and drug-trafficking (6) were led by the Interior (Pakistan) / Home (India) 
Secretaries and the Commerce Secretaries were responsible for aspects on economic 
and commercial cooperation (7). Finally, the secretaries of the Ministry of Culture, 
Sports and Youth Affairs (Pakistan) and the Ministry of Culture (India) respectively 
were leading the first four rounds of talks on the promotion of friendly exchanges in 
various fields (8). Thereafter, talks on this dialogue component were also led by the 
Foreign Secretaries.  
However, the goodwill that had put the dialogue in place in 1997 was short-lived. 
Nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 led to an increase in 
tensions, followed by the “Lahore Declaration" in February 1999 in which the Prime 
Ministers of India and Pakistan reaffirmed their commitment to the structured 
dialogue. This did not last long, as a limited military confrontation in the Kargil sector 
in Jammu and Kashmir followed less than three months later. An attempt to end 
hostilities ended with the failure of the Agra summit in July 2001. Attacks on the 
Indian Parliament in December 2001 precipitated a military standoff (2001-02) and 
brought the two states to the brink of war. Tensions were diffused through the 
mediation of the United States and the United Kingdom, and backchannel engagement, 
amongst others by Brajesh Mishra, Indian National Security Adviser, and Tariq Aziz, 
Secretary of Pakistan’s National Security Council. This led to a ceasefire agreement 
in November 2003, which built the basis for the continuation of the CDP (on reasons 
for the resumption of the CDP in 2004 see e.g. Ganguly 2016b, 81–83). 
In June 2004, India and Pakistan resumed the Composite Dialogue Process. A 
year later, President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh jointly 
declared that “the peace process was now irreversible” (“Joint Statement, India-
Pakistan” 2005). It was between 2004 and 2008 that most progress was made in all 
issue areas of the CDP. However, the dialogue process continued to be fraught by 
several crises. As the third round of bilateral talks drew to an end, a series of bomb 
blasts in which approximately 200 people died took place in Mumbai on July 11, 2006. 
This led to the suspension of Foreign Secretary-level talks. Yet, only two months later, 
General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met in Havana, 
expressed their desire to carry the dialogue forward and directed their Foreign 
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Secretaries to meet and continue the dialogue process (Joint Statement P/PM 2006). 
Another round of talks followed, strained by blasts on the Samjhauta Express train 
connecting Lahore with New Delhi in Diwana, Haryana, India, on February 18, 2007. 
In the blast 68 people died, most of which were Pakistani civilians, leading the two 
countries to trade accusations. The incident took place just two days before Pakistani 
Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri was due to visit India for the 5th meeting 
of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission, suggesting that it was aimed at derailing the 
peace process. While Kasuri (2015, 426) was advised to cancel his visit by his own 
account, he refused to do so “since that would encourage terrorists by raising their 
moral and into believing that they had succeeded in sabotaging my visit.” The fourth 
round of talks found an abrupt end through a series of blasts in Mumbai killing 166 
foreign and Indian civilians, taking place between November 26 and 29, 2008. The 
attacks have been attributed to the Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT), one of the largest and most 
active militant organisations based in Pakistan (Fair 2011b). Kasuri (2015, 426)  
described the incident as “a calculated attempt” to sabotage the visit of Shah Mahmood 
Qureshi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, who was in India for a bilateral meeting, and to 
derail the Composite Dialogue Process. This time the perpetrators were successful. 
The dialogue was suspended until March 2011, although high-level meetings 
continued to take place.  
A few months after the Mumbai attacks, the two Prime Ministers Manmohan 
Singh and Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani jointly declared that “terrorism is the main threat 
to both countries.” They agreed to work together to fight this threat and to investigate 
the Mumbai attacks. In their joint statement, no mention was made of the resumption 
of the composite dialogue process, although “[b]oth Prime Ministers recognized that 
dialogue is the only way forward” (Joint Statement PM 2009). High-level meetings 
followed between the Foreign Ministers (September 2009, UN General Assembly) and 
the Foreign Secretaries (25.02.2010, New Delhi). At their meeting on the sidelines of 
the 16th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in 
Thimphu, Bhutan, in April 2010, Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousaf Raza 
Gillani agreed to resume the composite dialogue. The Foreign Secretaries 
subsequently met in Islamabad in June 2010 to “reflected on the modalities for 
restoring trust and confidence so that we are able to pave the way for a comprehensive, 
sustained and meaningful dialogue on all issues of mutual interests and concern” (Rao 
2010). This was followed immediately by a meeting of the Home/Interior Ministers on 
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the sidelines of the 3rd SAARC Meeting of Home/Interior Ministers in Islamabad in 
June 25-27, 2010. Less than a month later, the External/Foreign Ministers of India and 
Pakistan, Qureshi and Krishna, met in Islamabad to discuss the way forward. This was 
followed by Home/Interior Secretary-level talks in New Delhi from March 28-29, 
2011, marking the resumption of the dialogue and the beginning of the fifth round of 
talks. Another three rounds of talks followed without any major disruptions. The 
seventh and final round of talks ended with the India-Pakistan Expert Level Dialogue 
on Nuclear CBMs in Islamabad on December 28, 2012. 
In the end of 2012, the dialogue was suspended due to upcoming general 
elections in Pakistan (May 2013), and one year later in India (April/May 2014), with 
the argument that it would be the responsibility of the new governments to take up the 
CDP. These elections led to a change in government in both states. In Pakistan, 
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), 
took office for a third non-consecutive term until he was disqualified for life by the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan in July 2017. In India, the Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) ousted the Congress government after ten years. This change in 
government was accompanied by a different approach towards the management of 
interstate relations, with the Modi-led government taking a fiercer stand. When 
Foreign Secretary-level talks were scheduled to resume in August 2014, Modi issued 
a warning to Pakistan that talks with members of the Kashmiri separatist organisation, 
the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), would not be acceptable to India. Such 
warnings had been issued by previous governments but went ignored and talks 
proceeded anyway, not this time. By cancelling the talks, the Modi-led government 
made clear that interference with “India’s internal affairs were unacceptable” (Official 
Spokesperson 2014). Further attempts were made to resume the dialogue, including 
Modi’s much-debated surprise stopover in Pakistan on Nawaz Sharif’s birthday in 
December 2014, during which the two Prime Ministers agreed to resume Foreign 
Secretary-level talks (Zahra-Malik and Das 2015). However, border skirmishes in 
Jammu and Kashmir in late 2014 delayed these talks until March 2015 (Singh 2015). 
Another breakthrough seemed to have been achieved during a meeting between Prime 
Ministers Modi and Sharif on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Summit in 
Ufa, Russia, in July 2015. During their meeting, the Prime Ministers among others 
agreed to talks on terrorism between the National Security Advisors (NSAs) of India 
and Pakistan (Ufa Statement 2015). The talks were scheduled for August 2015 but got 
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cancelled due to recriminations regarding the agenda. Following a meeting between 
the Prime Ministers on the sidelines of the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
in Paris, the NSAs met in Bangkok in December 2015, together with the Foreign 
Secretaries (Joint Press Release 2015). A few days later, on the sidelines of the First 
Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference (also: Istanbul Process) in Islamabad, both sides 
agreed to resume the dialogue, renaming it Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue. Two 
issue areas were added that already featured high in discussions during the CDP to that 
date: Humanitarian Issues and Religious Tourism (Joint Statement 2015). However, 
the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue never took off as tensions increased amid a rise 
in ceasefire violations and a terrorist attack on the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot, 
Punjab, in January 2016. Thereafter, the Modi-led government reached out to its 
Pakistani counterpart to initiate a joint investigation, which has been described as a 
“final effort of the regime to publicly demonstrate its willingness to improve relations 
with Pakistan” by journalists (Ganguly 2017, 135). The final blow came through an 
attack on the Indian Army brigade headquarters near the Line of Control in Uri, in 
Indian-administered Kashmir in September 2016, followed by surgical strikes by 
India. Since then, the Modi-led government has focused on improving ties with all 
South Asian states but Pakistan, according to interviews with Indian foreign policy 
officials (Ganguly 2017, 135). The latest blow to bilateral relations came in February 
2019, as a suicide attack on Indian security forces killed 40 personnel. The attacks 
were claimed by the Jaish-e-Mohammad, a Pakistan-based militant organisation. India 
responded to the attacks by launching airstrikes across the Line of Control and 
withdrawing the Most Favoured Nation Status from Pakistan and increasing custom 
duties on goods coming from Pakistan to 200 per cent, thereby virtually ending imports 
from Pakistan. Pakistan closed its airspace until mid-July 2019. This was the latest in 
a series of events that shaped relations between India and Pakistan in the post-2003 
period, whose implications for everyday life will be explored in subsequent chapters. 
While currently experiencing a relatively peaceful phase, a history of high 
tensions has left India and Pakistan in a state of suspicion, mistrust and volatility 
leading them to relapse into violent cycles ever since their independence. Although 
new dialogue processes and peace overtures have provided reasons to argue for the 
potential of peaceful relations between these two states, the history of bilateral 
relations suggests that the current phase is only the calm before the next storm. One 
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author suggested that they will be Shooting for a Century (Cohen 2013), hence there 
are another twenty-eight years to go. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter traced the historical roots of the state in India and in Pakistan and of 
international relations between them from the Sikh Empire, through the partition of 
British India to state-making processes in the post-colonial period and interstate 
relations. It emphasised the centrality of Punjab and of Punjabis to state-making and 
international relations across time to provide a historical context and framework for 
subsequent analyses. 
The chapter outlined how the Punjab was constituted as a shared social space 
structured around a common sense across time, by emphasising the common 
characteristics and differences of Punjab – a common history and language, similar 
cultural traditions, religious diversity (dominated by Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus), 
kinship, friendship and economic networks. This social space preceded and continued 
to shape everyday practices after the formal establishment of India and Pakistan as 
states. It is reproduced through cross-border interactions between state governments, 
traders, intellectuals, musicians and others, who have sought to revive these common 
connections under the banner of the Punjabiyat. This made state-making particularly 
violent in the Punjab borderland following partition, as border-making divided a 
unified social space, as I explore in the following two chapters. 
India and Pakistan already began to constitute themselves as states prior to their 
formal establishment in 1947, by creating their own sphere of influence that was 
relatively autonomous from the colonial state (Chatterjee 1993). This domain was 
dominated by the Indian National Congress in the political sphere, which competed 
for power with the Muslim League and the Unionist Party in the Punjab Province. 
Their struggles ultimately culminated in the formation of not one but two states, which 
followed different trajectories in the post-colonial period.  
To constitute themselves as relatively autonomous states, the formally unified 
colonial bureaucracy, the military and the economy had to be divided and integrated 
into two separate states. These states were established through the internal 
differentiation of national spaces or fields, which led to the domination of the 
bureaucracy and later the military in Pakistan. In India, by contrast, the state came to 
be dominated by the bureaucracy and politicians. Externally, these states were 
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constituted by differentiating themselves from one another, which required close 
cooperation and facilitated conflicts. State-making and related processes of border-
making were associated with both physical and symbolic violence, especially in the 
Punjab borderland. 
State- and border-making in India and Pakistan cannot be understood in isolation 
but need to be approached in relation to one another as states are only relatively 
autonomous entities that are always shaped through their positions in the international 
system of states. This culminated in several military confrontations between India and 
Pakistan, which were followed by promises for peaceful coexistence and paralleled by 
interstate cooperation institutionalised in the Composite Dialogue Process.  
The alternation between peaceful periods and often violent confrontations has 
led some to label India-Pakistan relations as an ‘enduring rivalry’ (Misra 2010; Paul 
2005b) or an ‘intractable conflict’ (Cohen 2013, 55). In the following chapters I will 
explore how military confrontations and other historical events, conceptualised as 
crises, shaped everyday life in the Punjab borderland and constituted the same as a 
crisis space.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE PUNJAB BORDERLAND AS CRISIS SPACE  
 
India and Pakistan have a history of high tensions and violent engagement. The 
borderlands between India and Pakistan were the sites of several military 
confrontations, militancy, cross-border drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal border 
crossings during which everyday life was interrupted. People in the Punjab borderland 
were directly affected by wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-49, 1965 and 1971, 
the violent Khalistan separatist movement (1978-1993), the Kargil crisis (1999), a 
military standoff after attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 (till 2003) 
and preparations for a potential Pakistani military incursion following Indian military 
operations succeeding an attack on an Indian army brigade headquarter in Uri in 
Indian-administered Kashmir in September 2016. Other events that have shaped 
everyday life in the Punjab borderland include a suicide bombing at the Attari-Wagah 
border crossing point in Pakistan (2014), an attack on a police station in Gurdaspur in 
India (2015) and on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot (2016). Punjab is known 
for illegal border crossings and cross-border drug trafficking, which affect the 
everyday life of those living and working in the Punjab borderland when contraband 
is intercepted or people are killed attempting to cross the border.58  
Building on Bourdieu's (1990, 159–93) framework outlined in Section 3.2, these 
historical events are conceptualised as crises: moments in time when the routines of 
everyday life are interrupted. Such events can contribute to generalised crises, which 
can lead to politicisation, securitisation or militarisation and facilitate changes. 
Politicisation takes place when issues are brought into the public realm and when 
political capital becomes more valuable, often leading to the domination of the 
professionals of the political field (Bourdieu 1990, 188). Securitisation is understood 
as practices through which actors and actions are categorised as threats, danger, fear 
and unease (insecuritisation), as well as safety, protection and security (securitisation) 
(Balzacq et al. 2010). Militarisation is the process through which military actors and 
their principles of vision and division come to dominate practices, but is in no way 
restricted to military actors (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009; Scheper-Hughes 2014). 
 
58 For a discussion of military confrontations and crises in relations between India and Pakistan see 
Chapter 4, especially Section 4.4. 
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Through the repetition of crises and through politicisation, securitisation and 
militarisation the Punjab borderland was constituted as crisis space. The borders of 
this crisis space are delimited in policy directives, such as the Indian Border Area 
Development Programme. According to current programme guidelines, the heart of 
this space is up to 10 kilometres from the international boundary and up to a distance 
of 50 kilometres (Department of Border Management 2015, 1). However, such a rigid 
conceptualisation of the borders of this crisis space is at odds with the crisis space in 
practice, which can expand and contract across time and differ from actor to actor. 
This crisis space is reproduced through practices by politicians, the military, Khalistan 
fighters, drug traffickers and borderlanders, amongst others, and shapes everyday life. 
This chapter focuses on military confrontations between India and Pakistan and 
their implications for everyday life. Much has been written about the military and 
nuclear history shaping relations between India and Pakistan (see e.g. Cohen 2013; 
Ganguly 1986, 2002, 2016; Ganguly and Hagerty 2006; Ganguly and Kapur 2010; 
Paul 2005b; Subramaniam 2016). However, little is known about their implications for 
everyday life in the Punjab borderland (for exceptions see Kaur 2014, 227–30; Sekhon 
and Sharma 2019) and how everyday practices in the border area link to relations 
between India and Pakistan more broadly. Existing literature is predominantly 
descriptive and lacks a deeper analysis of borderlanders’ practices and perceptions 
during crises.  
The chapter contributes to an understanding of how crises shape the practices of 
borderlanders through an analysis of field, capital and habitus. It shows that the 
repetition of crises led borderlanders to develop a shared crisis habitus. This crisis 
habitus is evoked every time tensions increase between India and Pakistan but also 
shapes everyday practices. The chapter thereby contributes to debates on the 
relationship between the exceptional and the everyday in international relations (for a 
normative discussion see e.g. Huysmans 2006) and in the international political 
sociology of security (Mutlu and Lüleci 2016, 81). In contrast to much of the literature 
in critical security studies, which focuses on the everyday over the exceptional (Mutlu 
and Lüleci 2016, 88), this chapter takes crises as a starting point for the analysis and 
demonstrates how they become part of the everyday. The Khalistan movement and the 
securitisation of everyday life are addressed in subsequent chapters. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. It starts by describing Indian 
borderlanders’ practices during Indian Punjab’s reaction to so-called ‘surgical strikes’ 
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in Kashmir in September 2016 (Section 5.1). In line with Bourdieu’s historical-
sociological approach, it traces borderlanders’ practices during military confrontations 
from 1965 to 2016 in Section 5.2. Many borderlanders were temporarily displaced 
from their homes, but their practices changed across time. This is related to changes in 
security practices by state actors that are linked to changes in the security environment. 
In Section 5.3, the chapter explores the underlying factors shaping mobility and 
immobility by borderlanders during military confrontations, drawing attention to the 
role of kinship networks, economic capital and fear. It shows how emotions like fear 
link crises to the everyday through the habitus of actors, thereby rendering the Punjab 
borderland a crisis space with a corresponding crisis habitus.  
5.1 THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CRISIS SPACE  
In September 2016, tensions between India and Pakistan increased following a strike 
on the Indian Army brigade headquarters in Uri (Ahmad, Phillips, and Berlinger 2016). 
This was the latest in a series of assaults on India’s security forces over the last few 
years.59 In March 2015, a police station in the district Kathua in Indian-administered 
Kashmir came under attack (The New Indian Express 2015). A few months later, in 
July of the same year, three perpetrators dressed in army uniforms attacked the Dina 
Nagar police station in Gurdaspur district of Punjab, India (The Hindu 2015). In 
January 2016, the Pathankot Air Force Station in Punjab was struck (The Indian 
Express 2016).  
These incidents were quickly linked to Pakistan by Indian government and 
security officials, thus amounting to a securitising move (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 
1998, 25). India’s Vice President, Mohammad Hamid Ansari (2016), stated that 
“[s]uch attacks are the result of the use of cross-border terrorism by one particular 
country in our region”, implying Pakistan’s involvement. Lieutenant General Ranbir 
Singh (2016a), Indian Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), was more 
explicit in his statement to the media, in which he said that  
 
59 The most recent attack against security personnel in India took place in Pulwama District in Indian-
administered Kashmir in February 2019, during which at least 40 members of the on the Central Reserve 
Police Force were killed (The Times of India 2019). Interviews were conducted before this attack and I 
will therefore not further discuss it here. 
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[a]ll four killed were Foreign Terrorists and had some items with them 
which had Pakistani markings. Initial reports indicate that the slain 
terrorists belong to Jaish-e-Mohammed tanzeem.60 
By contrast, while Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2016b) and President Pranab 
Mukherjee (2016b) condemned attacks on the army brigade headquarters in Uri in 
September 2016 and expressed their condolences towards victims and their families, 
they refrained from linking the attacks to Pakistan.  
The perceived link to Pakistan laid the ground for a military response by India’s 
security forces, representing a reaction outside the normal bounds of political 
behaviour (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24) and thus a securitisation practice 
that goes beyond linguistic practices traditionally analysed by those drawing on 
securitisation theory (Balzacq et al. 2010; Bueger 2016, 132). Ten days after attacks 
on the army brigade headquarters in Uri in September 2016, the Indian army conducted 
swift attacks on ‘terrorist launch pads’ 61  across the Line of Control in Pakistan-
administered Kashmir, commonly referred to as ‘surgical strikes.’ 62  They sought “to 
pre-empt infiltration by terrorists”, according to the Director General of Military 
Operations of India (Singh 2016b).  
This military operation in response to the attack on India’s security forces points 
to the militarisation of state policy-makers as the operation must have been authorised 
by the central government, which retains control over military affairs in India 
(Staniland 2008, 323). The manoeuvre increased fears about a corresponding military 
response by Pakistan among government officials in New Delhi, which directed the 
state governments or border states to take action. In a media brief, the Indian Punjab 
Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal said that the Ministry of Home Affairs had 
directed the Punjab government to evacuate the civilian population from villages 
within a distance of 10 kilometres from the international boundary in its six border 
districts. As many as 987 villages were affected, of which 137 are in Amritsar district 
 
60 The Jaish-e-Mohammed is a Deobandi Islamist terrorist group with close ties to anti-Shia groups such 
as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi/Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban, the Deobandi Afghan 
Taliban, and al Qaeda (Fair 2016). 
61 Places from which people arguably cross the Line of Control to become involved in the separatist 
movement in Indian-administered Kashmir. 
62 Interviewees adapted this militarised language and often referred to ‘surgical strikes.’ The Collins 
Dictionary (n.d.) defines surgical strikes as “a military action designed to destroy a particular target 
without harming other people or damaging other buildings near it.” In reality, they do affect both nearby 
areas and civilians. Civilians are not easily distinguished from ‘legitimate military targets’ and even 
when attacks do not kill or injure ‘civilians’, they are perceived as a threat by many, near and far. 
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(Government of Punjab 2016). Though the advice to evacuate the border area was 
issued to all Indian governments of border states with Pakistan, only the Punjab 
government followed through with the evacuation. This points to the securitisation of 
the state government in Punjab, i.e. a belief that this crisis required an exceptional 
response. The Punjab borderland was constructed as a crisis space and a clear 
demarcation line was delimited – though in practice the 10-kilometre mark was more 
a guideline than a definitive line.  
One Sarpanch (elected head of the village government) interviewed remembered 
that he and other Sarpanches were informed about evacuation plans through the 
Deputy Commissioner (executive head of a district) or a member of the legislative 
assembly (MLA) of Punjab. Asked whether he left the village he added:  
I am the sarpanch of the village, I can’t leave. It would be chaotic. In the 
middle of the night, people might need support. The day the village was 
evacuated, I had to get the announcement done in the evening. (Amar 
Singh (m), Raja Thal, 07.05.2017).  
Another interviewee explained his experience of the evacuation process as follows:  
We were forced to leave during surgical strikes. There was a notification 
for evacuation within one hour. It caused a lot of hassle and disruption. 
We had to leave in a hurry. We had to leave our belongings behind. 
(Amritpal Singh (m), Daoke, 07.05.2017).  
The Sarpanch felt the responsibility to stay in the village and to coordinate the 
evacuation process, whereas the landlord Amritpal Singh felt forced to leave. It 
appears from this statement that he experienced the evacuation as imposed on him and 
that he left reluctantly.  
The Punjab government sent buses to areas to be evacuated (The Tribune 2016) 
and set up camps in schools, community centres, places where marriage ceremonies 
are held and other premises, following Punjab government sources (Government of 
Punjab, India, 2016). A landowner from the village Mullakot recalled:  
There were tents and camps but we were unable to take shelter there 
because the entire village had taken shelter there. We had to live with our 
relatives elsewhere. (Jaikaar Singh (m), Mullakot, 09.05.2017)  
However, not everyone left at the behest of the government. “Only the community of 
farmers who live on daily wages [dihadi] left the village” according to Baldev Singh 
(m) from Ranian (06.05.2017). Another person added that people with many animals 
could not leave as they had to feed their cattle. Other people mentioned that it was 
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irrigation season and that they had to stay to water their rice (Jaikaar Singh (m), 
Mullakot, 09.05.2017). While others did not want to leave their homes unattended and 
had to take care of their business (Bilal Singh (m), Audar, 09.05.2017). Borderlanders 
explained that most children and women were moved away from the border area, while 
one or two male members of the family would stay behind (Raghu Singh (m), Kakkar, 
06.05.2017). One of the women I interviewed expressed concern for her husband’s 
well-being while gone (Bishan Kaur (f), Rorawala Khurd, 08.05.2017). Another 
borderlander made the point that women had become stronger and would not leave 
either. He said: “Not even half of the village left. Our people, especially our women, 
have become stronger. They don’t fear these things anymore” (Amar Singh (m), Raj 
Thal, 07.05.2017).  
These different narratives about the practices adopted by men and women 
reproduce the crisis space as gendered, and more specifically as a masculine space. 
Women and children were sent away/left the immediate border area. While children 
are in need of protection, women were socially constructed as ‘weak,’ in need of 
‘protection’ and to be eliminated from the crisis space. But this does not mean that all 
women and children left during wars and crises – they did not! While the crisis space 
may have been dominated by men, its social construction as a masculine space went 
beyond the sex of borderlanders. Women formed part of this masculine crisis space, 
in so far as they were seen as ‘without fear’ and ‘strong,’ attributes that are associated 
with men and masculinity. 
The crisis did not last long. On September 29, Pakistan’s Inter Services Public 
Relations (ISPR), the media wing of Pakistan’s armed forces, issued a press release 
stating that “[t]here has been no surgical strike by India, instead, there had been cross 
LOC fire initiated and conducted by India … [that] was strongly and befittingly 
responded by Pakistani troops” (ISPR 2016). Following this announcement, many 
people returned to their homes, while others stayed away for a few more days. On 
October 6, the Punjab government revoked its decision to evacuate the border area. 
Following a news report, Punjab Chief Minister’s adviser Harcharan Bains explained: 
“Since Pakistan chose to deny surgical strikes, chances of a military reaction from 
across the border also diminished” (Sharma 2016). The exceptional circumstances that 
had led to securitisation and the construction of the Punjab borderland as crisis space 
were formally declared to be over.  
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The construction of the Punjab borderland as a masculine crisis space is a process 
that evolved over time, as Amar Singh’s ((m), Raj Thal, 07.05.2017) statement that 
“[Women] don’t fear these things anymore,” indicates. He implies that people in the 
border area have been exposed to similar situations before and are therefore used to 
tensions between India and Pakistan. Another border dweller further explained this 
form of adaptation of borderlanders to violent tensions between the two countries: 
There was a fear that a war might happen, but people didn’t leave the 
village. In earlier wars, people have left the village. They took their 
belongings and cattle. They came back later. People are not afraid 
[laughs]. We have become used to it. (Chehzaad Singh, Naushahra, 
07.05.0217). 
This statement suggests that the practices adopted by borderlanders during crises have 
changed across time. It also highlights that crises are part of the everyday, as the 
statement “We have become used to it,” implies. 
This event and references to earlier wars and crises by interviewees prompted 
me to further inquire into the experiences of people in the Punjab borderland during 
military confrontations and to trace borderlanders’ practices across time. An insight 
from Bourdieu’s theory of practice is that actions, perceptions, thoughts and 
representations (practices) are historically constituted. They reflect the past in the 
present and shape the future, and this, so Bourdieu’s argument, facilitates reproduction 
rather than change. However, the scale and location of securitisation practices in the 
borderland between India and Pakistan gradually changed over time, which needs to 
be understood in relation to changes in the security environment in which they are 
embedded, as I will explore in what follows. 
5.2 BORDERLANDERS’ PRACTICES IN A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
India and Pakistan have gone through numerous wars and crises since their 
independence in August 1947. The first war over Kashmir started only two months 
after independence and initiated the militarisation of relations between India and 
Pakistan (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 2007, 15), that is the domination of interstate 
relations by the security field, its actors and practices. The war was concentrated in 
Kashmir. However, the army moved its forces closer to the international boundary in 
Punjab too (Raghavan 2010, 132–48). One borderlander recalled that people had to 
leave the village amid tensions over Kashmir in 1947-48 (Chehzaad Singh (m), 
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Naushahra, 07.05.2017). However, no other interviewee remembered what happened 
in Punjab at that time as they were too young when the war took place, or not yet born. 
Conversations with borderlanders in Punjab revealed that five military confrontations 
affected their lives (more than others): the 1965 and 1971 wars, the Kargil crisis 
(1999), the military standoff (2001-02) following attacks on the Indian Parliament in 
December 2001 and military operations following attacks on the Indian army brigade 
headquarters in Uri in September 2016. In this section, the practices adopted by 
borderlanders during these military confrontations will be explored in relation to 
security practices by state actors and in relation to the security environment in which 
these practices are embedded. It is shown that there is a shift in terms of the actors 
employing securitisation practices from the military to the central and state 
governments, which is related to the nuclearization of bilateral relations in May 1998. 
Sixteen years after their first war over Kashmir, India and Pakistan engaged in 
their second full-scale war. Dalbir Singh (m) from the village Dhanoakalan 
(06.05.2017) recalled: 
When the ’65 war happened, there was bombarding in the fields by 
Pakistan. Because of that fear, we had to leave.  
I was in the village. We had to evacuate the village. Pakistan sent three 
planes here at 3.30 am. We were outside at that time for agriculture. 
All interviewees asked about their experience during the military confrontation in 1965 
said that they temporarily left the border area and returned after the war was over. Parts 
of the village Ranian were abandoned and rebuilt further away from the international 
boundary. Thus, the war led to the permanent displacement of some. 
Only six years later, in 1971, India and Pakistan fought their third full-scale war, 
ultimately leading to the independence of Bangladesh. Again, Punjab became a theatre 
of military engagement. Interviewees recalled that: 
A lot of people had moved away from the village by then. There was a lot 
of gunfire around so most villagers had fled. They couldn’t afford to take 
most of their belongings with them as they were trying to save their lives. 
(Basant Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017) 
But not everyone left in 1971. Deep Kaur, a woman in her early sixties who previously 
worked as a teacher in the village Mahawa explained:  
I saw it [the war in 1971] with my own eyes. We didn’t go anywhere. It 
was all in front of my eyes. It was like the movies ….. Especially the aged 
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people stayed back. The small children and the ladies went away. (Deep 
Kaur (f), Mahawa, 08.05.2017).  
Following a few years of calm, India and Pakistan went from crisis to crisis involving 
military actors, though none of these crises escalated into a full-fledged war (see e.g. 
Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 2007; Ganguly 2002; Ganguly and Hagerty 2006). But in 
May 1999, India and Pakistan engaged in another military confrontation in the Kargil 
district in Kashmir. People recalled that: 
All the villages were pushed back from the border. The area was 
evacuated. People had to take all their belongings and move. We had a lot 
of problems at that time. (Amar Singh (m), Raja Thal, 07.05.2017) 
There were land mines in most of the border area during the war. People 
would get severely injured, they would lose their limbs if they set off the 
mines. A lot of people had to leave the village because of this during that 
time. (Davinder Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017) 
During that time, we were forced to leave. The army had installed mines 
in the fields. We could not cultivate crops, we had to leave. One person 
in the family would stay back so that our belongings in the house don’t 
get stolen. (Amritpal Singh (m), Daoke, 07.05.2017) 
The people didn’t evacuate and leave their homes during Kargil. The 
number of times people have packed their belongings and left and kept it 
with their relatives elsewhere, it got broken or the relatives refused to 
return it. People just got frustrated. So people stopped leaving. (Chehzaad 
Singh (m), Naushahra, 07.05.2017) 
The first two interviewees quoted here show that the practices adopted by many 
borderlanders in Punjab at the time were similar to those during previous wars – they 
left the border villages. However, two interviewees quoted suggest that some changes 
took place. Not everyone left the border area during the Kargil crisis, a trend that 
continued during future military confrontations. 
 In December 2001, following attacks on the Indian Parliament, the Indian army 
mobilised its forces along the entire boundary between India and Pakistan, to which 
the Pakistani army responded in like measure. For two years, the armed forces of India 
and Pakistan faced each other across the international boundary and the Line of 
Control, but the confrontation did not escalate into full-scale fighting. Amritpal Singh 
(m) from the village Daoke recalled that “We were forced to leave when the attacks 
on the Parliament happened. […] Because the army came into the village and forced 
people to leave” (07.05.2017). However, all other seven interviewees asked said that 
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the military standoff had no direct impact on their lives and that they had not left their 
villages since the Kargil crisis. This suggests a further change in the practices adopted 
by borderlands during crisis. Now, the majority of interviewees said that they stayed 
in their homes.  
 The latest military confrontation took place in September 2016 with the so-
called ‘surgical strikes’ in Kashmir. Asked about its effect on peoples’ lives in Punjab, 
interviewees responded that many people stayed in their homes: 
Nobody is asked to go. We are informed about the war if it ever happens. 
Or when people see that the army is in action, they make their own 
arrangements to stay far. They go in the evening and come back in the 
morning and generally ladies go and men stay back here. (Bishan Kaur 
(f), Rurawala Khurd, 08.05.2017) 
People moved back. We didn’t as we have to farm and look after animals. 
All our belongings are here. We couldn’t leave as we had to take care of 
the house. (Devjeet Kaur (f), Mahawa, 08.05.2017) 
Yes, of course, we decided to stay here as we have our family-owned 
house and business here. We surely cannot leave the village. (Bilal Singh 
(m), Audar, 09.05.2017) 
Yes [it did have an effect]. People didn’t leave, though. There was a fear 
that a war might happen, but people didn’t leave the village. In earlier 
wars, people have left the village. They took their belongings and cattle. 
They came back later. (Chehzaad Singh (m), Naushahra, 07.05.2017) 
While there was a repetition of military confrontations in the Punjab borderland, the 
interviews indicate that there was a broad change in the practices adopted by 
borderlanders over time. Starting during the Kargil crisis, many people said that they 
remained in the border area during subsequent military confrontations. Interviews 
suggest that this is related to a change in military practices by India’s and Pakistan’s 
armed forces: 
During the ’65 war, they destroyed our houses a lot with continuous 
bombarding. There was a lot of gun-firing as well.  
Interviewer: And during the ’71 war?  
There was less destruction in ’71. The villages near the border had been 
abandoned and they had become military areas. The Pakistani army 
targeted these areas only. (Basant Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017) 
The army had installed landmines near the zero line [during the Kargil 
crisis]. It went on for six months. We couldn’t work on our fields [in Raja 
Thal]. The crops were destroyed. All the villages were pushed back from 
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the border. The area was evacuated. (Amar Singh (m), Raja Thal, 
07.05.2017) 
It [the Kargil crisis] didn’t have any impact [on Naushahra]. The army 
just came here and set up base in case a war ensues here. I came back as 
well. Nothing happened. The army just stayed here as a precautionary 
measure. (Chehzaad Singh (m), Naushahra, 07.05.2017) 
It [the surgical strikes] had a lot of effects. People were asked to move 
back again. We got messages from the Deputy Commissioner and the 
MLA. Not even half of the village left. Our people, especially our women 
have become stronger. They don’t fear these things anymore. (Amar 
Singh (m), Raja Thal, 07.05.2017) 
The interviews highlight that the presence and impact of military actors from India and 
Pakistan diminished over time and that insecurity was no longer primarily related to 
the army.  
In 1965 and 1971, two full-scale wars took place in Punjab. 1971 was the last 
time that India and Pakistan engaged in a full-scale war. Fighting during the Kargil 
crisis was limited to the area around the Line of Control in Indian-administered 
Kashmir. According to interviewees, the armed forces placed landmines in the border 
area in Punjab, which forced some to leave, but no fighting ensued. No report on 
landmines mentioned their use in Punjab during the Kargil crisis. This may be because 
people referred to the Kargil crisis while talking about the military response to attacks 
on the Indian Parliament in 2001, known as Operation Parakram. Following the 
Landmine Monitor Report (2002), the entire area surrounding the international 
boundary between India and Pakistan was mined during Operation Parakram, in what 
is considered to have been one of the largest mine-laying operations in the world in 
recent years (ICBL 2002, 660). 1.05 million mines were laid, according to an Indian 
government source (MoD 2004, 29). Only one interviewee suggested that the army 
was in the Punjab borderland during the 2001-02 military standoff, everyone else 
denied that this crisis had any impact.  
When asked about the role of security forces following events such as the 
Pathankot attacks in January 2016, an interviewee explained: “The BSF personnel did 
arbitrary searches on people from the fencing to the bridge.” Asked whether it is only 
BSF staff or also army personnel, he continued explaining: “The Punjab police and the 
BSF. But if something goes wrong, the army turns up as well.” (Davinder Singh (m), 
Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017).  
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The evacuation of the Punjab borderland following surgical strikes in 2016, was 
ordered by the central and the Punjab governments and transmitted to the Sarpanches 
of border villages through the Deputy Commissioner and the MLA (Amar Singh (m), 
Raja Thal, 07.05.2017). Thus, the military became a less dominant security actor in 
Punjab during crises over time. Starting during the Kargil crisis, there is a move from 
military actors to political actors and a move from militarisation to securitisation. 
Crises were no longer seen as requiring a military response, but they were still 
perceived as security threats. 
This change from militarisation to securitisation needs to be understood in 
relation to changes in the security environment. In May 1998, India and Pakistan 
conducted nuclear tests, rendering them nuclear powers. Since then, interstate relations 
have taken place in the “shadow of nuclear weapons”, to borrow from Ganguly and 
Hagerty (2006). In the “Lahore Declaration” (1999) issued eight months later, India 
and Pakistan recognised that “the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the 
two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two 
countries.” While India and Pakistan went to war again in Kargil just over two months 
later, were at the brink of war following attacks on the Indian Parliament, from 2001 
to November 2003, and have been exchanging fire across the Line of Control (e.g. 
during surgical strikes), fighting has been geographically limited to Kashmir and did 
not escalate into a full-scale war since. In a joint statement, the Foreign Secretaries of 
India and Pakistan recognise “the nuclear capabilities of each other constituting a 
factor for stability” (MEA 2004c). However, it appears that the introduction of nuclear 
weapons into relations between India and Pakistan has also increased insecurities 
among government officials. This can be gauged from discussions during the 
Composite Dialogue Process, which have focused on reducing the threat posed by 
nuclear weapons through nuclear confidence building measures, amongst others.  
Over seven rounds of expert-level talks led by representatives from the Indian 
and Pakistani Ministries of External/Foreign Affairs between June 2004 and December 
2012, two agreements were negotiated that hold to date. These included an Agreement 
on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles (2005) and an Agreement 
on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons (2007). 
Furthermore, representatives decided to upgrade the existing hotline between the 
Director Generals of Military Operations, established pursuant to the Simla Agreement 
(1972) after the India-Pakistan war of 1971 and to establish a hotline between the 
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Foreign Secretaries (FS) through the Foreign Office (active since September 2005) 
(MEA 2004a). According to Joint Statements issued by the Indian and Pakistani 
governments: 
The proposed Agreement commits both sides to pre-notify in a structured 
format flight testing of ballistic missiles, with the objective of enhancing 
mutual confidence and engendering predictability and transparency of 
intent. (MEA 2005) 
These measures [flight testing agreement and hotline between FS] are, 
inter alia, intended to prevent misunderstanding and reduce risks relevant 
to nuclear issues. (MEA 2004b)  
Nuclear Confidence Building Measures aim at reducing insecurities at the 
governmental level, however, they do not address insecurities of people living in the 
borderland spanning the international boundary and the Line of Control between India 
and Pakistan, who bear the brunt of practices by state security actors along the Indo-
Pak border. As the preceding discussion has shown, borderlanders in Punjab have been 
exposed to two full-scale wars between India and Pakistan and faced the repercussions 
of several military crises. The most common reaction of borderlanders to crises was to 
temporarily move away from their homes, especially during earlier military 
confrontations. Interviews suggested that they adapted their practices across time, with 
more people staying in the borderland as time went on. In what follows, I will explore 
the underlying mechanisms shaping mobility and immobility by borderlanders, 
drawing on Bourdieu’s core concepts capital and habitus. 
5.3 IM-MOBILITIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CRISIS HABITUS  
During military confrontations, many people in the Punjab borderland were displaced 
from their homes due to the security practices adopted by the armed forces of India 
and Pakistan. The following section will explore the underlying mechanisms shaping 
the practices of borderlands during crises. It will highlight that mobility and 
immobility (henceforth im-mobilities) were shaped by kinship networks of 
borderlanders, their mobile and immobile economic capital and fear. Fear led to the 
formation of a crisis habitus, which is activated and rationalised in different ways. This 
crisis habitus linked historical events to the everyday. 
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When displaced from their homes, all interviewees indicated that they stayed 
with relatives throughout the military confrontation and sometimes with different 
relatives during the same crisis: 
When the ’65 war happened, the villagers moved inwards, away from the 
border. They lived with their relatives. For a while, I lived with my 
maternal uncle in Gandi. I moved villages both in ’65 and ’71. (Davinder 
Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017) 
Interviewer: Where did you go when you had to leave the village in 1965 
and 1971? 
With relatives elsewhere. We had to stay with different relatives for 2-4 
months in different villages. (Basant Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017) 
Interviewer: Do you remember the 1971 war? 
In ’71 as well we had to go away from the border area.  
I: Where did you have to go? 
We had to go, live with relatives. (Eqbal Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017) 
The reference to relatives alludes to the importance of social capital in facilitating 
mobility during India-Pakistan wars, understood as the resources held through being 
part of social networks, in particular kinship networks (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
119). Social capital is thus closely related to other forms of capital. 
Kinship networks represent the structural conditions underlying everyday 
practices. Following Bourdieu (1977, 33–38), two forms can be distinguished: official 
kin and practical kin. The former refers to the “official representation of the social 
structures” through genealogical diagrams or marriage ceremonies and the latter to 
“the functions of kin relationships, or […] the usefulness of kinsmen” (Bourdieu 1977, 
34). Interviews showed that marriage practices were central to understanding the role 
of kinship for mobility during crises, thus highlighting the importance of practical kin 
relations. As Davinder Singh (m) highlighted in the interview above, he stayed at the 
maternal uncle’s place in Gandi during the war in 1965. The village Gandi is the 
birthplace of his mother, who moved to Dhanoakalan upon getting married (Davinder 
Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017). Similarly, Bishan Kaur, wife of the Sarpanch 
of Rorawala Khurd, moved from her home village Krenda to Rorawala Khurd when 
she got married in 1988 (Bishan Kaur (f), Rurawala Khurd, 08.05.2017). It was and is 
a common practice among Punjabi Sikh women to take up residence at the husband’s 
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family home upon getting married (see also Ballard 1990, 230). By contrast, most male 
interviewees have (patrilineal) family roots in the villages where I met them, some 
going back several generations. There was one exception: The Sarpanch of Attari 
moved in with his in-laws because they needed support and his wife has no brothers 
(Gaganjot Singh (m), Attari, 09.05.2017). Thus, mobility through kinship networks is 
not only tied to marriage practices, but also to procreation and the gender of children.  
Most interviewees indicated that their daughters were married in Punjab. Two 
interviewees suggested that some people in the border area face difficulties in 
arranging a suitable match and wedding ceremonies for their daughters due to military 
confrontations, though they were not affected (Bishan Kaur (f), Rurawala Khurd, 
08.05.2017; Amritpal Singh (m), Daoke, 07.05.2017). This, in turn, affects mobility 
during crises: if daughters cannot be married to men in villages further away from the 
border area, then their homes are unlikely to provide a safe haven during military 
confrontations as they are likely to be equally affected. This is supported by the fact 
that several borderlanders reported having moved from one relative’s place to 
another’s during the same crisis. However, Amritpal Singh (m) from Daoke 
(07.05.2017) explained, while “[t]he border does cause problems to arrange marriages 
[…] people who own more land don’t have any issues compared to people with less 
land.” This indicates that marriage practices are closely related to the economic capital 
that people are endowed with and to a transfer between social and economic capital.  
While most women are married in Punjab, several people said that their sons had 
moved to Australia (Bishan Kaur (f), Rurawala Khurd, 08.05.2017; Gatnam Singh (m), 
Naushahra, 07.05.2017) or New Zealand (Chehzaad Singh (m), Naushahra, 
07.05.2017), while another one said that his family had been based in Germany and 
England before settling in the United States (Basant Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017). 
Punjabis, and among them in particular rural Sikh Jats, have a long history of migration 
abroad (see e.g. Talbot and Thandi 2004). Tatla (2004, 46) estimates that as many as 
95 per cent of all Sikhs settled abroad are of rural origin, which he attributes to policies 
of the colonial state. Their links to Australia, for example, go back one-and-a-half 
century. Migrants primarily included men of working age who joined their spouses in 
Australia. Thus highlighting that traditional rules of patrilocality may be broken in 
order to facilitate migration abroad (Voigt‐Graf 2004, 30–33).63  However, one of 
 
63 See also McLeod (1986) on Punjabis in New Zealand and Tatla (1999) on the Sikh diaspora. 
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Chehzaad Singh’s daughters had also settled abroad, in New Zealand, thus challenging 
the dominant narrative that women are married in Punjab, while men go abroad. 
Kinship networks abroad were also important during wars in Punjab, as Chehzaad 
Singh went to New Zealand during the Kargil crisis, where his daughter and one son 
had settled (Chehzaad Singh (m), Naushahra, 07.05.2017). Economic capital shapes 
mobility, for it is not possible to travel abroad without money.  
 The degree of mobility during India-Pakistan crises was frequently related to 
property by borderlanders. For example: 
Most people did [leave the village during the war in 1971]. We had to 
move our cows and buffaloes. We couldn’t do that, however because of 
time constraints. There were many less vehicles, no tractors. (Amritpal 
Singh (m), Daoke, 07.05.2017) 
During that time [of the Kargil crisis in 1999], as fear was induced, people 
took their children away from the border. They took their animals and 
tractors away from the border as well. Everyone was on their toes and had 
everything packed just in case they had to move away during nighttime. 
(Amar Singh (m), Raja Thal, 07.05.2017) 
At that time [of the surgical strikes] we packed some money, jewellery 
and some clothes. We are always afraid when we pack things that they 
might get lost somewhere. (Bishan Kaur (f), Rorawala Khurd, 
08.05.2017). 
Narratives of mobility by borderlanders were closely related to houses, farmland, 
animals, vehicles, jewellery and money, in short, economic capital. Mobility was 
shaped through different types of economic capital. Land and houses are the least 
mobile. Animals are mobile but slow. By contrast, possessions like jewellery and 
clothes can quickly be packed and taken from one place to another, are thus very 
mobile. Vehicles, like tractors and cars, are also quickly movable if there are no 
mechanical issues and roads are free and safe to use. In this case, they can speed up 
mobility. Money is the most mobile of them all as it can circulate through banks 
without having to be physically moved. But it can lose its value during crises if it 
cannot be accessed. During crises, banks may stay closed and people will therefore not 
have access to printed money, which could reduce its value. Money can also lose its 
value through inflation, which could make other forms of economic capital more 
valuable. Economic capital can be placed on a continuum from immobile (land) to 
mobile (money) economic capital. Their relationship to mobility becomes clearer in 
the following interviews: 
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People moved back. We didn’t as we have to farm and look after our 
animals. All our belongings are here. We couldn’t leave as we had to take 
care of the house. (2016 military operation, Devjeet Kaur (f), Mahawa, 
08.05.2017) 
Yes, of course we decided to stay here as we have our family owned house 
and business here. We surely cannot leave the village. (2016 military 
operation, Bilal Singh (m), Audar, 09.05.2017) 
Especially during more recent crises, many people stayed in the border villages to look 
after their houses, fields and animals. Resources on the upper spectrum of immobile 
economic capital reduced mobility, including land, houses and animals. The reduction 
of mobility during more recent military confrontations needs to be understood in 
relation to past experiences of borderlanders: 
Our homes, when we returned, were completely looted by bad people. 
Our utensils and manjis [makeshift beds] were removed from our house. 
Our chulha [makeshift, manual stove made from camphor and straw] was 
taken away by the Ganeria battalion. […] The villages were primarily 
makeshift kutcha [not cement] houses which were completely destroyed. 
[…] Everything was in ruins after the [1965] war. (Dalbir Singh (m), 
Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017) 
During that period [of the Kargil crisis], there were land mines across the 
borderline to kill people. We weren’t allowed to go to the fields because 
there was a fear of mines on that side as well. The government gave us a 
compensation later as we weren’t allowed to cultivate our fields. (Dalbir 
Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017) 
During the war in 1965, and to a lesser extent in 1971, many houses were destroyed 
and looted during military confrontations. Furthermore, people were not able to 
cultivate their land, which is the main source of income for many people in the Punjab 
borderland. While people were monetarily compensated for the losses accruing during 
military operations, the losses outweighed the compensation. This posed a threat to 
peoples’ livelihoods, as many people living in the borderland are relatively poor. This 
disposed people to change their practices during subsequent crises: 
The people didn’t evacuate and leave their homes during Kargil. The 
number of times people have packed their belongings and left and kept it 
with their relatives elsewhere, it got broken or the relatives refused to 
return it. People just got frustrated. So people stopped leaving. (Chehzaad 
Singh (m), Naushahra, 07.05.2017) 
During that time, we were forced to leave. The army had installed mines 
in the fields. We could not cultivate crops. We had to leave. One person 
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in the family would stay back so that our belongings in the house don’t 
get stolen. (Kargil, Amritpal Singh (m), Daoke,07.05.2017) 
The destruction of immobile economic capital, in particular during earlier military 
confrontations, created fear for their livelihood among borderlanders. Consequently, 
people reduced mobility to protect their livelihood. This change in peoples’ behaviour 
during crises suggests that the dispositions of people to act are shaped through a 
learning process (see also Yang 2014, 1532–34). Past experiences that drove people 
away from the borderland led to losses, which could be compensated by remaining in 
their homes, to some extent. Not all losses could be compensated by reducing mobility, 
for crises also have structural effects. 
During military confrontations, the value attached to mobile and immobile 
economic capital changed. While immobile economic capital, like land and property, 
is of great value in the Punjab in peaceful times, its value declines during crises. As 
Talbot (1988, 17) explained, social status derived from landownership in Punjab and 
Punjabis still refer to land as patlaj, meaning power, honour and respect. The loss of 
value of land is for two reasons: Firstly, land and housing prices drop. Secondly, land 
and houses cannot be quickly converted into mobile economic capital like money. 
However, mobile economic capital is required to facilitate mobility and therefore 
acquires greater value during wars – if it can be accessed and does not lose its monetary 
value. Those who are endowed with immobile economic capital, but not with mobile 
economic capital, therefore find it more difficult to move during crises, as the 
following interviews suggest: 
The rich people went to Amritsar and Jallandhar because they had means 
of a car. They could drive up and down and still run their shops and 
businesses. The poor people had no option but to stay behind. Their 
relatives are poor as well and don’t have the resources to host them. (2016 
military operation, Gaganjot Singh (m), Attari, 09.05.2017) 
When we go to our relatives, it is very difficult for them to host us for a 
long time. (Amritpal Singh (m), Daoke, 07.05.2017) 
These interviews point to a close relationship between (im-)mobile economic and 
social capital, which is suggested by Bourdieu's (1986, 21) definition of social capital 
as the resources actors can tap into by being part of a social network. While people 
may have relatives they can stay with (social capital), the economic resources that they 
can tap into during crises shape the extent to which they can mobilise this social 
capital. If their relatives are not endowed with sufficient mobile economic capital, 
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borderlanders may not be able to benefit from their social networks. The lack of mobile 
economic capital can thus offset the role of social capital in shaping mobility in the 
Punjab borderland in times of crises.  
Crises were closely linked to and translated into the everyday. Borderlanders 
explained that “[p]roperty prices are down” (Gatnam Singh (m), Naushahra, 
07.05.2017), that they cannot sell their land because “[n]o one wants to settler here 
[and that t]he price of the land is much lower here” (Amritpal Singh (m), Daoke, 
07.05.2017). They suggest that this is the result of the repetition of military 
confrontations between India and Pakistan, which creates insecurity not only among 
those who would otherwise consider settling in the border area, but also among 
borderlanders themselves. Summarising the experiences of borderlanders, Bishan 
Kaur (f) from the village Rurawala Khurd explained: 
There is no comparison to the life of people living away from the border. 
Here, people are afraid to live and work, they cannot even think of 
building their new houses as they are afraid if some war starts here, it will 
be difficult to carry all the stuff and move to a new place. (Bishan Kaur 
(f), Rorawala Khurd, 08.05.2017) 
The borderland is thus constructed as a crisis space. This crisis space is not only shaped 
by the here discussed military confrontations but also by the Khalistan movement, 
discussed in Chapter 6. It is reproduced through everyday practices by India’s border 
guarding forces and institutionalised in projects like the Border Area Development 
Programme, discussed in Chapter 7.  
The construction of the Punjab borderland as a crisis space was accompanied by 
the formation of a crisis habitus which linked crises to the everyday. This crisis habitus 
formed through the repetition of military confrontations and was linked to fear. 
Borderlanders frequently expressed a fear for life and physical integrity when talking 
about military confrontations. Bilal Singh ((m), Audar, 09.05.2017) explained that “A 
lot of people were killed and moved away from the area [and that] We were very scared 
[during the Kargil crisis].” Bishan Kaur ((f), Rurawala Khurd, 08.05.2017) added that 
the military “had planted mines in the entire area [and that] they were afraid that they 
cannot walk freely in the entire area. So they vacated the entire village.” By contrast, 
the Parliamentary attacks in 2001, for example, had little effect on the border village 
Dhanoakalan, according to Davinder Singh ((m), 06.05.2017). However, “it does 
induce fear in people,” he explained. Similarly, the surgical strikes had no immediate 
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effect on the border area, but “Some people got scared, so they moved back” (Gurjot 
Singh (m), Mahawa, 08.05.2017), though most of them stayed, according to another 
border dweller.  
Even when there were no military confrontations, but tensions increased 
between India and Pakistan, people were on their toes fearing a repetition of the wars 
in 1965 and 1971. As Bishan Kaur (f), from the border village Rorawala Khurd, 
explained (08.05.2017): “Whenever there are chances of war, we are afraid that we 
will have to move now.” Chehzaad Singh (m) from Naushahra added that “There was 
a fear that a war might happen [following surgical strikes], but people didn’t leave the 
village.” (07.05.2017). As such, fear has become part of everyday life. As Veena Das 
(2007, 9) put it: “The affect produced on the registers of the virtual and the potential, 
of fear that is real but not necessarily actualized in events, comes to constitute the 
ecology of fear in everyday life.” 
The crisis’ everyday requires a shift in attention from Bourdieu’s model for the 
analysis of crises towards his theory of practice. While Bourdieu (1990, 159–93) 
emphasised the need to understand a crisis in relation to the structural history 
preceding the event, he did not consider that crises may be related across time and can 
contribute to the development of a crisis habitus that shapes everyday practices. This 
crisis habitus, like any other aspect of the habitus, can lead to quite different responses 
from one situation to another as the situation always acts as a ‘trigger’ for practices 
and does not determine them in a linear fashion (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 135; 
Wacquant 2016, 69). 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
The chapter explored how the Punjab borderland is produced and reproduced as crisis 
space through military confrontations. It investigated how wars and tensions between 
India and Pakistan shaped everyday practices of people living in the borderland from 
and including their second war in 1965 onwards. It noted the role of the security 
environment, kinship networks, economic capital and fear in shaping borderlanders’ 
practices. It showed that the repetition of military confrontations constituted the Punjab 
borderland as crisis space and led to the development of a crisis habitus among 
borderlanders. 
As is well-known, India and Pakistan have been through numerous military 
confrontations. By focusing on borderlanders’ practices during and experiences of 
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these crises from the 1965-war to date, the chapter showed empirically that there is a 
link between individual crises, which Bourdieu failed to recognise as Nick Crossley 
(2003, 45) rightly noted.  
The repetition of military confrontations in the Punjab borderland revealed a 
continuity in borderlanders’ practices across time: the perceived threat of military 
engagement created fear of an imminent confrontation which led many villagers to 
temporarily move away from their home along the international boundary in search of 
safety. The repetition of crises contributed to a durable disposition to act, a crisis 
habitus, which alludes to Bourdieu’s work on reproduction and challenges his own 
assertion that his theory of practice may not apply to crises and that ‘rational choice’ 
may take over (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 131; see Ermakoff 2013 for a 
discussion). At the same time, this research showed that people changed their practices 
slightly over time upon reflecting on past experiences, implying a learning process: 
while most borderlanders moved away from the border area during wars in 1965 and 
1971, more people stayed during subsequent crises to avert the destruction of their 
livelihood. Among those staying behind were men and women who were described as 
fearless. Through this narratives, interviewees constituted the Punjab borderland as a 
masculine crisis space.  
The change in borderlanders’ practices was not only the result of a learning 
process, but also due to changes in security practices that were related to structural 
changes in the security environment: from May 1998, when India and Pakistan 
officially became nuclear powers, military engagement has been geographically 
confined to Kashmir and/or did not escalate into fighting in the Punjab borderland, 
resulting in a shift from militarisation to securitisation and a focus from military actors 
to the professionals of the political field. These changes seem to challenge Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on reproduction. However, Bourdieu does not reject the possibility for 
change (for a discussion see e.g. Yang 2014) and crises represent moments in time 
when change is more likely to happen. However, this is not independent of the 
everyday and thus the structural conditions in which crises are embedded (Bourdieu 
1990, 161–62). 
The everyday provided the grounds on which borderlanders’ practices during 
these different crises were grown, while crises also shaped the everyday. Kinship 
networks both preceded crises but were also shaped by crises. Borderlanders explained 
that it is more difficult for them to marry their girls off, which they attribute to their 
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provenance from the border area. Likewise, the value of immobile economic capital 
did permanently change. According to people living in border villages, the repetition 
of wars and crises led to a devaluation of their property. While land is considered to 
be an important status symbol, it is now more difficult to turn it into money. Finally, 
fear for life, bodily well-being and property generated through military confrontations 
now shapes everyday decisions and flares up every time tensions increase between 
India and Pakistan, forming part of a crisis habitus.  
A final contribution of this chapter lies in drawing attention to the role of fear in 
shaping the crisis habitus of actors. Though Bourdieu has touched upon the role of 
emotions when discussing taste (Bourdieu 1984), its role in shaping habitus has only 
recently become the focus of scholarly debate (see e.g. Reed-Danahay 2005, 99–128; 
Scheer 2012). This research emphasises the need to further develop our understanding 
of the role of emotions in shaping practices, especially as they connect crises with the 
everyday.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONTESTED BORDERS: THE KHALISTAN 
MOVEMENT 
 
In November 2018, a grenade ripped through a Nirankari prayer gathering near 
Amritsar killing three (Rana 2018b). The Nirankari are a Sikh sect deemed apostate 
by traditionalist Khalsa Sikhs because its followers believe in a living guru and do not 
generally wear the Five Ks: Kesh (uncut hair), Kangha (wooden comb), Kara (iron 
bracelet), Kachera (cotton undergarment) and Kirpan (iron dagger) (see e.g. McLeod 
2008).64 Sikhs are a religious group in majority in Indian Punjab, where the roots for 
Sikhism were laid by Guru Nanak (1469-1539) around 1500. In 1699, the Khalsa 
(‘pure’) tradition was introduced by the tenth and, according to this line of thought, 
the last Sikh master, Guru Gobind Singh (1666-1708). Following Guru Gobind Singh, 
a Khalsa Sikh ought to be initiated, wear the Five Ks, follow the Sikh code of conduct 
known as Rahit Maryada and reject class and gender discrimination (Singh and Fenech 
2014, 1).65 
The attack on the Nirankari prayer gathering in November 2018 evoked 
memories of an event in April 1978, when Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his 
supporters, who promoted the return to the Khalsa traditions, attacked Nirankari 
followers, killing seventeen people (Singh 2004b, 2:328–29). The attack is generally 
deemed to mark the beginning of two decades of violence in Indian Punjab during the 
Khalistan movement (Fair 2009, 106, 125 note 2). The movement is known for the 
Indian Army’s attack on the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984, named 
Operation Blue Star (Gates and Roy 2014, 166–68; Marwah 2009, 98–100), and the 
subsequent killing of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh security 
guards on 31 October 1984. The assassination of Indira Gandhi precipitated three days 
of massive anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi, during which many more died, were displaced 
and property was destroyed (see e.g. Das 2007, 135–61). Officially, violence ended 
with the restoration of the normal electoral cycle in 1993 (Fair 2009, 107). However, 
 
64 There are many Sikh sects who differ in their interpretation of scriptures, the lineage of Gurus, which 
Guru they follow and whether they follow the behavioural rules set forth in the Sikh Rahit Maryada (see 
e.g. Kaur Takhar 2014). 
65 For a detailed study of the Khalsa see e.g. McLeod (2005), on the Nirankaris see especially McLeod 
(2005, 151–54). 
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individual violent incidents related to the Khalistan movement are reported to date, as 
the above-described incident shows (Rana 2018b). The revival of militancy under the 
banner of the Khalistan movement also remains a concern for the Indian government. 
Basant Singh (m) from the village Ranian observed (06.05.2017) that 
“[t]errorism has inflicted more damages and deaths than both [India-Pakistan] wars [of 
1965 and 1971] combined.” According to official figures, about 20.000 people died 
between 1980 and 1993, including security personnel, militants, politicians, 
businessmen and civilians (Wallace 2007, 428). However, unofficial estimates by 
Human Rights Watch suggest that the number is much higher, that “[t]ens of thousands 
of people died” (Kaur and Dhami 2007).66 By contrast, during India-Pakistan wars of 
1947-48, 1965 and 1971, about 1.500, 6.800 and 11.500 Indian and Pakistani people 
died respectively, totalling about 19.800 deaths (Ganguly 1986, 14, 48, 83), slightly 
below the official estimates for casualties during the Khalistan movement. 
The Khalistan movement is a Sikh separatist movement which seeks to establish 
a state called Khalistan (‘land of the pure’) in the Punjab region to serve as a homeland 
for all Sikhs. Its origin has been traced to the diaspora and an advertisement by Jagjit 
Singh Chauhan in the New York Times on 12 October 1971, with the headline “The 
Sikhs demand an independent state in India…the only guarantee for peace on the sub-
continent” (quoted in Axel 2001, 98). Members of the Sikh diaspora in Canada, the 
United Kingdom and the United States played an important role in the separatist 
movement by providing diplomatic and financial support to militants and enabling 
Pakistan to get involved in the conflict by arranging for cadres to travel to Pakistan 
where they received financial assistance and training (Fair 2005) before being (re-
)infiltrated into India by the Pakistan Rangers and the Inter-Services Intelligence, 
Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency (Kiessling 2016, 28–29, 153–60). Cross-border 
movement of people, weapons, ammunition and drugs led India to seek cooperation 
with Pakistan to fight terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling (Section 6.4). India 
also constructed a fence along its border with Pakistan to reduce mobility across the 
border (discussed in the next chapter, Section 7.1).  
The reproduction of the border between India and Pakistan through cooperation 
and its materialisation in a border fence in India are conceived of as being part of the 
 
66 In the absence of accurate official figures, estimates vary greatly. Christine Fair (2009, 129) quotes 
Human Rights Watch stating that 40,000 died. However, when I cross-checked her reference, I could 
not find this number in their reports. 
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process of state-making, autonomisation and differentiation, outlined in Section 3.3. 
This process is difficult, especially in the Punjab borderland, as this borderland is 
characterised by more similarities than differences (for a discussion see Sections 4.1 
and 4.2). This led to several crises and the use of physical and symbolic violence by 
security actors and government officials of the states of India and Pakistan. Through 
politicisation, securitisation and militarisation the Punjab borderland was produced 
and reproduced as crisis space (see Chapter 5), both externally vis-à-vis Pakistan and 
internally against challengers. 
 The Khalistan movement presented an internal challenge to the unity and 
integrity of the state of India, to its secular outlook and to its claim to the monopoly 
use of physical and symbolic violence within its territory. After the division of British 
India in 1947, the Indian National Congress party heading the central government 
sought to create a secular Indian state. Demands based on religion were non-negotiable 
after partition, leading the Sikh-dominated party Shiromani Akali Dal to call instead 
for a linguistic reorganisation of the state of Punjab to receive greater autonomy from 
the Hindu-dominated central and often also the state governments. 67  This was 
eventually granted in 1966, but gave way to electoral manipulation, direct 
administration of Punjab from New Delhi under President’s Rule68 and the use of 
physical violence by central government forces in the 1980s and the 1990s (Talbot and 
Singh 2009, 131–35, 138–39).  
 Much has been written about this decade of violence in Punjab, often with a 
focus on the state and on  counterinsurgency operations by India’s security forces (see 
e.g. Chima 2014; Fair 2009; Gates and Roy 2014; Marwah 2009). Reports by human 
rights organisations have documented arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, 
disappearances and extrajudicial killings by Indian security forces (see e.g. Gossman 
1991; 1994; Laws and Iacopino 2002; Silva, Marwaha, and Klingner 2009). Joyce 
Pettigrew's (1995) study adds to this literature by bringing out the ‘unheard voices’ of 
Khalistan militants (see also Mahmood 1996). The contribution of this chapter is its 
focus on people’s everyday experiences of the use of violence by state security actors 
and militants during the Khalistan movement. By focusing on the border area, it 
 
67 The Indian National Congress was in government in Punjab for 42 years: 1947-67, 1972-77, 1980-
85, 1992-97, 2002-07, from 2017. By contrast, the Shiromani Akali Dal was in government for only 24 
years, for full terms from 1997: 1967-71, 1977-80, 1985-87, 1997-02, 2007-17. 
68 President’s Rule was imposed in Punjab during the following periods: 1968-69, 1971-72, 1977, 1980, 
1983-85, 1987-92. 
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enhances our understanding of violent dynamics during the Khalistan movement, for 
the three border districts Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Ferozepur (now further divided into 
Pathankot, Tarn Taran and Fazilka) were the epicentres of violence (SATP n.d.) and 
this research was conducted in Amritsar district. The chapter further enhances our 
understanding of relations between India and Pakistan, in which the Khalistan 
movement became an actor that drew the two countries into conflict while 
simultaneously stimulating cooperation. A major limitation of this chapter is the lack 
of interviews in Pakistani border villages. The involvement of Pakistan in the conflict 
is explored by drawing on official documents and secondary sources.  
The chapter is divided into four parts. It starts by exploring the structural history 
leading to the Khalistan movement and the use of violence by militants and state 
security forces (Section 6.1). The chapter then turns to the securitisation of the 
Khalistan movement by the central government, the militarisation of the Punjab 
borderland and the concomitant blurring of borders between the external and the 
internal security fields. It explores how security practices by state actors and militants 
were experienced and perceived by borderlanders, highlighting that the majority of 
people felt more insecure through state actors than militants (Section 6.2). In the third 
section, attention shifts to the internationalisation of the conflict through the cross-
border movement of people, weapons, ammunition and drugs between India and 
Pakistan and the construction of Pakistan as the national enemy by the Indian 
government (Section 6.3). The final section explores how Pakistan and India began to 
collaborate to contain cross-border movement. It shows that such collaboration 
achieved only limited success and was not sustained. The section ends by highlighting 
the role of militancy in India-Pakistan relations more broadly, in particular with 
reference to Kashmir (Section 6.4). 
The violence that ensued during the Khalistan movement is commonly referred 
to as terrorism by interviewees, state actors and scholars alike. I will focus on the 
practices at the heart of the movement, which were frequently violent or shaped by 
violence. Members of the Khalistan movement using violence to pursue their goals 
will be referred to as militants to distinguish them from civilians and state security 
actors – a distinction that is of course much less clear cut than this terminology 
suggests, as the Khalistan movement received support from members of the Punjab 
police and civilians. 
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6.1 A SIKH STATE: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE KHALISTAN MOVEMENT  
Though the Khalistan movement is associated with the 1980s and the 1990s, demands 
for a state for Sikhs can be traced back to the times of Guru Gobind Singh (1666-
1708). They were realised with the establishment of a secular Sikh Empire (1799-
1849) under the leadership of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. As Khushwant Singh (2004, 
2:286) notes: “since the days of Guru Gobind Singh, Sikh congregations have chanted 
the litany raj karey ga Khalsa – the Khalsa shall rule – at the end of their daily prayers.” 
Khalsa rule was established with the Sikh Empire through Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 
which at its peak extend all the way from the ‘land of five rivers’ to Afghanistan, China 
and included the two towns Amritsar and Lahore (see e.g. Grewal 1991, 2004, 2; Singh 
2004a, 1:188–286). After his death in 1839, the Empire was weakened through 
infighting and collapsed following the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848-1849). After the 
war Punjab was annexed by the East India Company (Singh 2004b, 2:1–81), which 
was perceived as a temporary setback in the pursuit of a Sikh state by Sikh leaders 
(Singh 2004b, 2:286).  
When the East India Company took charge of Punjab, the Sikh army was 
dismantled. However, during an uprising by sepoys against the rule of the British East 
India Company in 1857, many Sikhs sided with the British and subsequently became 
important partners of the colonisers, both as landlords and soldiers (Singh 2004b, 
2:85–120; see also Section 4.1). Sikhs only made up 12-13 per cent of the population 
of the Punjab Province, which meant that they had little influence in politics due to 
proportional representation. In 1920, the political party Shiromani Akali Dal was 
formed to press for greater political representation of the Sikhs. This was averted 
through the Government of India Act of 1935, through which the province attained 
autonomy and representation was based on numbers which were in favour of the 
Muslim-dominated Unionist Party. The imminent departure of the British revived calls 
for self-rule (Singh 2004b, 2:286–87). Sikh leaders began to say: “If the British have 
to go, it is only right that the Punjab should be restored to the Sikhs from whom they 
wrongfully seized it” (quoted in Singh 2004b, 2:286). But the creation of a separate 
Sikh state was dismissed by Congress and Muslim League. The partition of the Punjab 
region eventually divided the Sikh population: over 150 Sikh shrines, their most fertile 
lands and half of the Sikh population were left on the Pakistani side (Singh 2004b, 
2:275). Amid rising violence, Sikhs left for East Punjab, where they settled in places 
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with Sikh majorities which provided people with a sense of security (Singh 2004b, 
2:279). But there was a lack of fertile land for refugees, urban property was small 
compared to that left behind in Pakistan, Sikh merchants had to compete with Hindu 
traders and many Sikh politicians lost their influence. This revived demands for a Sikh 
state in the post-partition period (Singh 2004b, 2:281–84). 
In 1948, eight princely states in Punjab were merged into the Patiala and East 
Punjab States Union, in which Sikhs made up 48.8 per cent of its population, with 
Hindus constituting the other majority (48.8 per cent). This strengthened demands for 
territorial autonomy of Sikhs from Hindu influence. Such demands were further 
nurtured through the recognition of Hindi and Punjabi as official languages of Punjab 
in 1957, which led to calls for a separation of Hindi-speaking areas from Punjabi-
speaking areas. The Punjabi Suba Movement was born, which officially pursued a 
linguistic reorganisation of Punjab, but really sought to create a state in which Sikhs 
would be in majority and able to wield enough power to preserve the Sikh traditions 
and identity (Brass 1974, 277–400; Deol 2000, 92–101; Singh 2004b, 2:290–92).  
The linguistic division of Punjab was granted by the central government in 1966. 
This was the second time Punjab was divided along religious lines. At partition it was 
divided into Muslim and non-Muslim areas. This time the division was between 
Hindus and Sikhs. Unlike at partition, this division did not lead to mass killings. It 
appeased the political factions that demanded greater representation for Sikhs in 
Punjab. Sikhs now made up about 56-60 per cent of the population of Punjab (Singh 
2004b, 2:289–307), but there were Punjabi-speaking areas left in Haryana and 
Himachal Pradesh. Furthermore, Chandigarh was declared a Union Territory shared 
by Haryana and Punjab. The central government also retained control over the canal 
headworks and thereby over the allocation of the waters of the Punjabi rivers. This 
created discontent among Akali Dal members, who deemed these to be anti-Sikh 
policies and responded through a comprehensive charter of demands, known as the 
Anandpur Sahib Resolution 1973 (Singh 2004b, 2:337).  
The Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 put forth several religious, social, 
economic and political demands, but did not attract much attention until the Akali Dal 
released another Draft of the New Policy Programme in 1977.69 I will only focus on 
 
69 There are several versions of the Resolution. I draw on the version authenticated by Sant Harchand 
Singh Longowal because it builds the basis of the Central Government’s White Paper on the Punjab 
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the political demands here for they were among the most controversial for the Central 
Government.70 The Akali Dal demanded to redraw the boundaries of Punjab to include 
Punjabi-speaking areas in adjacent states, to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab, to give 
control over the headworks to Punjab and to revise the water distribution of the rivers 
Ravi and Beas, to maintain the present strength of Sikhs in the Army and to re-examine 
centre-state relations to increase provincial autonomy by restricting the central 
government’s powers to defence, foreign affairs, currency, post, telegraph and 
railways (Res. 1, 2, 12), the latter being the most controversial. In the White Paper on 
the Punjab Agitation (henceforth White Paper), the official narrative of events leading 
up to the storming of the Golden Temple in 1984, the Indian government painstakingly 
established that it had sought to accommodate Akali demands, but it also interpreted 
the demands put forth in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution as a threat to the central 
government’s authority as well as to the state’s territorial integrity. In the White Paper 
the government stated: 
The propositions contained in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution on Centre-
State relations are at total variance with the basic concept of the unity and 
integrity of the nation as expressed in our Constitution. These cannot be 
accepted even as a basis for discussion. (Government of India 1984, 17) 
The Anandpur Sahib Resolution did not call for secession. In fact, the foreword 
highlights the Akali’s “keenness to safeguard the interests of the Sikhs and the 
Country.” However, the resolution also stated that the aim of the resolution is “to 
obviate the possibility of any danger to National unity and the integrity of the 
Country,” which can be interpreted as an implicit threat to the territorial integrity of 
India if demands are not met.71  
The resolution remained a non-issue while the Akali Dal was in power (1977-
80) (Singh 2004b, 2:343–45). However, by dismissing the Akali government and 
bringing the Punjab under President’s rule in 1980 (February – June), the central 
government provoked a number of peaceful protests, including the ‘block the roads’, 
the ‘block the rails’ and the ‘halt the work’ campaigns which aimed to hamper the 
functioning of the state. In view of the rising number of protests the Punjab Assembly 
 
Agitation that I draw on in what follows (for this version of the resolution see the Government of India 
1984, 67–90).  
70   For the economic and religious demands see Purewal (1998) and Singh (2004b, 2:340–41) 
respectively. 
71 For a discussion of the resolution see e.g. Deol (2000, 101–4) and Singh (2004b, 2:337–50). 
147 
 
was dissolved and the state was brought under the control of the central government 
in 1983, which lasted till the end of September 1985. In 1985, the central government 
sought to come to an agreement with the reinstated head of the Akali Dal, Sant 
Harchand Singh Longowal, commonly referred to as the Rajiv-Longowal Accord. 
However, the latter lacked support by a large number of Sikhs and failed. In April 
1986, an independent state of Khalistan was proclaimed to which the central 
government responded with more violence after bringing the Punjab under President’s 
Rule again from May 1987 till February 1992 (Deol 2000, 101–3, 110–12), when the 
normal electoral cycle was restored (Fair 2009, 107). 
These political processes were accompanied through the increasing use of 
violence by Khalistan militants, state security forces and central armed forces from the 
late 1970s. The next section explores how physical force was used by Khalistan 
fighters to gain greater autonomy from the state of India, how the Indian government 
responded through the use of violence and how violence was experienced by 
borderlanders. 
6.2 THE PUNJAB IN VIOLENCE: THE SECURITISATION OF THE BORDERLAND 
The beginning of violence in pursuit of a Sikh state called Khalistan is commonly 
traced to an attack on Nirankari followers by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his 
supporters in April 1978, in which seventeen people were killed (Fair 2009, 106, 125 
note 2; Singh 2004b, 2:328–29). Bhindranwale was a Sikh religious preacher who 
urged people to abstain from the consumption of drugs and alcohol and who 
denounced dowry customs, making him popular among the rural population in Punjab. 
As his reputation and influence grew, he was discovered by the Congress Party in 
power at the centre, which sought to break the Akali Dal’s power in Punjab by turning 
him into a political ally. Bhindranwale exploited the situation and turned Congress and 
Akali Dal against each other (Jetly 2008, 63), creating a political space for people 
advocating militancy to protect Sikh interests. This space was occupied by 
Bhindranwale, who appealed to his supporters by combining the quest for greater 
political control by Sikhs with religious revivalism (Kohli 1990, 361). From the late 
1970s, he openly promoted the use of violence (Singh 2004b, 2:329), which led to the 
formation of various militant groups, among them the Babbar Khalsa International, the 
Khalistan Commando Force and the Khalistan Liberation Force, which became active 
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in the mid-to late 1980s (for the perspectives of militants see e.g. Mahmood 1996; 
Pettigrew 1995). 
The rise of violence in Punjab was presented as a threat to India. In its White 
Paper on the Punjab Agitation, the Indian government, for example, stated that 
“violence and terror […] threatened to undermine the social, political and economic 
stability not only of Punjab but the whole country” (Government of India 1984, 1), 
that the insurgency was “seriously threatening the country’s unity and territorial 
integrity” (Government of India 1984, 3) and that “[t]he larger national considerations 
of preserving the unity and integrity of the country were the guiding principles 
followed by [the] Government” (Government of India 1984, 7). This focus on ‘national 
unity’ and ‘territorial integrity’ can be traced back to the partition of the subcontinent 
and the Indian constitution. It became part of the nationalist discourse in the post-
partition period, where ‘national unity’ and ‘territorial integrity’ were frequently 
contrasted with ‘secession’ and ‘separatism’ (Talbot and Singh 2009, 131–35). This 
was also the case in the White Paper, which states that the “Government have affirmed 
[…] the imperatives of national integrity against all forms of separatism” (Government 
of India 1984, 3).  
The state and central governments initially treated the rise of violence as a law 
and order situation to be handled by the Punjab police (Chima 2014, 265). This is in 
line with the Indian Constitution, which stipulates that the maintenance of law and 
order lies with the Indian states and its police forces, not the central government (Misra 
1980, 371). However, as the Punjab government and the police were not able to end 
violence, the central government “were convinced that this challenge to the security, 
unity and integrity of the country could not be met by the normal law and order 
agencies at the disposal of the [Punjab] State” (Government of India 1984, 3). Evoking 
Article 356 of the Constitution of India, the central government dismissed the Punjab 
government and brought the state under President’s Rule in October 1983 (till 1985). 
It declared the Punjab a ‘disturbed area’ with effect of October 7 (“The Punjab 
Disturbed Areas Act, 1983”). This paved the way for a number of legal provisions that 
gave extraordinary powers to the central armed forces, the police and the judiciary. 
These laws include The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act, 
(1983), which legitimated the deployment of central armed forces inside Punjab, 
including the army and the Border Security Force, and provided them with special 
powers; the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (1983), the National Security 
149 
 
(Amendment) Act (1984) and the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Court) Act (1984), 
to mention but a few. 72  The introduction of these acts shows that the Indian 
government no longer perceived the Khalistan movement as a political issue that can 
be negotiated or a law and order situation to be handled by the Punjab police, but as a 
threat to national unity and territorial integrity that had to be handled by the central 
government and central armed forces. A move from the politicisation of Sikh demands 
to securitisation took place.  
In June 1984, the Indian Army was posted inside Punjab, alongside para-military 
forces like the Border Security Force and the Punjab Armed Police,73 which were 
placed under the command of the army. The deployment of the armed forces and the 
army inside Punjab was legitimated through The Armed Forces (Punjab and 
Chandigarh) Special Powers Act (1983). By deploying the Indian Army and 
paramilitary units like the Border Security Force inside Punjab, a move from 
securitisation to militarisation took place.  
Through the militarisation of Punjab, the lines separating the internal from the 
external security fields were blurred. This can occur during crises, for a generalised 
crises involves the “synchronization of crises latent in different fields” (Bourdieu 
1990, 173). Through synchronization, individual fields lose some of their autonomy, 
albeit to varying degrees (Sapiro 2013, 267). This can open the field of power as well 
as individual fields to (temporal) reorganisation; the relationship (domination/ 
subordination) between fields or within fields may (temporarily) change, and with it 
the exchange rate between different (field-specific) forms of capital (Reed 2015, 273–
74). Through a change in the value attached to the forms of capital in a field, otherwise 
marginalised or new actors can enter (temporarily). This was the case with the army, 
the Border Security Force and other central paramilitary forces, whose coercive 
powers were traded at a higher rate than that of the state police. However, as a police 
force with military status the Border Security Force already operated at the intersection 
between the internal and external security fields. Their deployment for internal security 
matters in the Punjab was possible until the withdrawal of  The Armed Forces (Punjab 
 
72 For the constitutional and legal framework of COIN operations in India see e.g. Telford (2001, 2-3). 
73 The Punjab Armed Police policed the border after independence. In 1966, the majority joined the 
Border Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Forces, the Sashastra Seema Bal (border guards), the 
Haryana Armed Police and the Himachal Pradesh Armed Police. The strength of the Punjab Armed 
Police has been increased again since 1966 (Punjab Police n.d.). Among its duties is to “assist the district 
police in maintenance of law and order” (Punjab Armed Police n.d.). 
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and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act (1983) in 1997. The blurring of borders between 
the internal and the external security fields was thus temporarily limited to the crisis, 
after which the central armed forces were again withdrawn from interior Punjab.  
At the same time as the border between the internal and the external security 
fields was blurred, this border was reproduced in legal documents which legitimated 
the use of ‘external’ security actors inside Punjab. The Indian government produced a 
further border between militants and civilians. Following the Government’s White 
Paper, the army’s task was to bring violence under control and to provide security to 
the people: 
To check and control extremist, terrorist and communal violence in the 
State of Punjab and the Union Territory of Chandigarh, provide security 
to the people and restore normalcy. (Government of India 1984, 43) 
One of the first tasks of the Indian army was to oust Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and 
other militants from the Golden Temple in Amritsar, known as Operation Blue Star. 
Bhindranwale and his armed followers had taken refuge in the Golden Temple in 1982, 
from where they used violence against the state. Indian planes were hijacked and 
diverted to Pakistan, unsuccessful attempts were made on the life of the Punjab Chief 
Minister Darbar Singh (CM, 1980-1983) of the Indian National Congress and others 
in his assembly and police officers – many were killed (Singh 2004b, 2:329–36). 
According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 101 civilians were killed between 1981 
and 1983, and another 298 until the storming of the temple in June 1984 (SATP n.d.). 
Killings, bank robberies and the looting of arms from state armouries became part of 
everyday life in Punjab. These crimes were not only committed by Bhindranwale’s 
supporters, but also by the Babbar Khalsa and other militant groups like the Akand 
Kirtani Jatha, who lived in close proximity to Bhindranwale in the temple complex. 
This led to many conflicts among these militant groups. When Sant Longowal 
announced that Sikhs would launch a non-cooperation protest against the government 
and stop food grains from leaving Punjab in June 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
decided to intervene and authorised Operation Blue Star (Singh 2004b, 2:329–36). 
The military attack led to the death of Bhindranwale and many of his supporters, 
army personnel and Sikh worshippers and destroyed parts of the Golden Temple. 
According to the White Paper, 554 civilians and terrorists were killed and 121 injured 
and 92 army personnel were killed and 287 injured (Government of India 1984, 169). 
Unofficial estimates suggest that the number of civilians killed is seven times that 
151 
 
indicated in the White Paper, and includes many pilgrims. The temple was also heavily 
damaged, all of which was denied in the White Paper, which was dubbed “Operation 
White-Wash” in a news article (Singh 2004b, 2:364–66).  
The use of force by the Indian Army was presented as an inevitable reaction to 
the rise of violence by militants in Punjab by the Indian government. In a broadcast 
during Operation Blue Star, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi denied other actors the 
legitimate use of force. She stated that “Too much blood has been shed. Violence leads 
to counter-violence and some misguided Hindus seem to think that this is the heroic 
way to meet terrorism. There can be nothing more senseless and dangerous than such 
thoughts and actions” (Government of India 1984, 108). Government-authorised 
violence was thus the only acceptable use of physical force, in line with Max Weber's 
(2007, 78) well-known definition of the state. But, like Indira Gandhi highlighted, it 
breaded further violence. 
Instead of bringing violence under control and restoring ‘normalcy’ in Punjab, 
as the  Government of India (1984, 43) described the task of the Indian Army above, 
Operation Blue Star led to a rise in violence in Punjab. Basant Singh (m) from the 
village Ranian recalled: “In the `80s, after the attack on the Golden Temple in 1984, 
the terror wave picked up a bit” (06.05.2017). The violence that followed Operation 
Blue Star culminated in the killing of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh 
bodyguards on 31 October 1984, which was followed by anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi 
and other parts of India (see e.g. Das 1985). During the riots, as many as 10,000 Sikhs 
died, half of them in Delhi, and property was damaged. Over 50,000 Sikhs were put 
up in refugee camps in Delhi and another 20,000-30,000 fled to Punjab, according to 
one estimate (Singh 2004b, 2:378–79). Here, violence continued.  
Operation Blue Star fuelled resentment among the Sikh population and increased 
support for the Khalistan movement. The army action was interpreted by many as an 
assault on the Sikh religion because the Golden Temple is the holiest Gurdwara and 
the most important pilgrimage site of Sikhs.74 Its destruction during Operation Blue 
Star was understood as an act of desecration. This led to a conflict within the Indian 
Army, where Punjabi Sikh soldiers were represented in significant numbers. 75 
 
74 A Gurdwara is a place of assembly and worship of Sikhs.  
75 Though post-independence the Indian governments refused to release data on the religious and/or 
ethnic origins of military personnel, it is estimated that Sikhs accounted for 10-15 per cent of all ranks 
in the Indian Army in the early 1980s (Kundu 1994, 48). 
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According to Kundu (1994, 61), “over two thousand Sikh Indian Army personnel 
deserted [left their posts] and or mutinied [openly revolted against superiors’ orders] 
upon learning of Operation Blue Star.” In addition, Sikh police officers left their 
forces, Sikhs resigned from government jobs and politics and intellectuals returned 
honours (Deol 2000, 107–8; Singh 2004b, 2:362), some of which joined the Khalistan 
movement, as Pettigrew's (1995, 139) interviews with Khalistan militants showed.  
People’s reaction to Operation Blue Star and the violent practices of India’s 
security forces showed that the central government lacked legitimacy among Sikhs in 
the Punjabi population. The latter is central to our understanding of the modern state 
(Weber 2007, 78) and can explain why the state tried to restore its monopoly over the 
use of violence in the border region. 
Violence was concentrated in the three border districts of Punjab, i.e. Amritsar, 
Gurdaspur and Ferozepur (now further divided into Pathankot, Tarn Taran and 
Fazilka), according to the Director General of the Punjab Police (DG PP 1988-90, 
1991-95), K.P.S. Gill (New Delhi, 17.05.2017). In border villages in Amritsar district 
interviews for this chapter were conducted. Here the army was deployed to support the 
Border Security Force in its duties from 1984. Part of the army’s task was to control 
cross-border mobility to/from Pakistan. This was paired with its task to “provide 
security to the people” (Government of India 1984, 43).  
The high presence of security personnel in the border area increased the feeling 
of safety of some people. Hadwin Singh (m) from the village Rurawala Khurd, for 
instance, explained: “We felt safe here at that time since we had the BSF at the front 
and army personnel at the back” (08.05.2017). However, others felt threatened by the 
presence of the armed forces. Dalbir Singh (m) from the village Dhanoakalan, for 
instance, recalled: 
The army became really dominant. They were searching for illegal 
miscreants. They would grab and frisk anyone arbitrarily. […] The police 
was not clean either […] they were scoundrels, really. […] They made 
arbitrary arrests, they took anyone in custody. A lot of people were killed 
during fake encounters during this time. (06.05.2017) 
Davinder Singh (m) from the same village added: 
One of my nephews was killed by the Punjab police. He was killed in a 
fake encounter in Gurdaspur. Three people from my village were killed. 
(06.05.2017) 
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The euphemism ‘fake encounter’ was regularly used in interviews to refer to 
extrajudicial killings by Indian security forces, often attached to the claim that the 
victim was a militant who was killed in action. Such practices were frequent in Punjab 
during the Khalistan movement and have been widely documented by human rights 
organisations, which also recorded extrajudicial executions, disappearances and 
torture by India’s security forces (see e.g. Gossman 1991; 1994). 
Many borderlanders framed security practices by state and central security forces 
as threats. The practices by India’s security forces were legitimated through the above-
mentioned Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act (1983), 
amongst others, which conferred upon the central armed forces rights otherwise 
restricted to the police, such as the right to fire on and kill people to maintain public 
order, to arrest people and to enter and search premises without warrant, and to stop, 
search and seize any vehicle. However, according to these interviews, it was mainly 
members of the Punjab police which staged encounters. Many of these fake encounters 
remain uninvestigated (see e.g. Kaur and Dhami 2007) because of the legal provisions 
that legitimised these actions. Following The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) 
Special Powers Act (1983), for example:  
No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except 
with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person 
in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the 
powers conferred by this Act. 
Borderlanders felt that no distinction was made between perpetrators and those the 
security forces were meant to protect – all Sikhs were suspects. Davinder Singh (m) 
from Dhanoakalan recalled: 
We would have to take off our turbans to hide our identities. […] People 
had to live in fear during that time. The police would show up at 
Gurdwaras and interrogate people as they suspected Sikhs were terrorists. 
(06.05.2017) 
The turban or dastaar is mandatory to wear for many Sikhs and is therefore a visible 
identifier of people practicing this religion. The literature is divided about the precise 
significance of it. Some argue that it is worn because it is a religious mandate, for 
others it signifies equality, again others suggest that is worn for practical reasons by 
Khalsa Sikhs, as the turban covers the uncut hair (Kesh), one of the five articles of 
faith (for a discussion see Sidhu and Gohil 2016, 47–57).  
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As all practicing Sikhs in the Khalsa tradition wear a turban and many militants 
were Khalsa Sikhs, this can explain why the police and central armed forces targeted 
Sikhs with a turban. Another reason was the security force’s difficulty in 
distinguishing militants from civilians. This is reflected in the official numbers of 
people killed and injured during Operation Blue Star in the White Paper, in which the 
government did not distinguish between civilians and militants (Government of India 
1984, 169). Similarly, the Deputy Commissioner for Amritsar, Sarab Jit Singh (2014, 
119), explained that it was difficult for police officers to distinguish civilians from 
passive and active supporters of the violent movement. The lines between civilians 
and militants were blurred. As were those between militants and security forces. 
Borderlanders said that members of India’s security forces supported militancy in 
Punjab. Dalbir Singh (m) from the village Dhanoakalan explained: 
They [the police] were involved with terrorists themselves. […]. When 
the army stormed the Golden Temple, the police helped in getting the 
weapons into place. That’s how the attacks happened. (06.05.2017) 
While the armed forces were perceived to increase insecurity by borderlanders, they 
were also described to keep militants at bay. Most of the people living in the border 
area explained that: 
Terrorism in the ‘80s had little impact in the border area. Loss and 
destruction happened more inwards. Terrorists were afraid because this 
was close to the border and there were security forces here (Gatnam Singh 
(m), Naushahra, 07.05.2017). 
During the 1980s, because of the heavy presence of the BSF at the border, 
terrorist activities didn’t have much effect on the area (Amritpal Singh 
(m), Daoke, 07.05.2017). 
The problems in this village were less vis-à-vis other places because 
there’s a lot of army personnel around. The army was really powerful 
here, terrorism didn’t create any problems for us. (Eqbal Singh (m), 
Ranian, 06.05.2017) 
A lot of loss happened. People on the border belt didn’t face as much 
impact. The movement didn’t spread here much because of the army’s 
presence. People feared the army (Amar Singh (m), Raja Tal, 
07.05.2017). 
However, Bilal Singh (m) from the village Audar recalled that 20 men in his village 
were killed by militants and that he and his family hid in sugarcane fields. Asked 
whether anything happened to his family he explained: 
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No, nothing happened to our family. We were saved. Our house was a 
little further away. People would put revolvers to our foreheads to 
threaten us. I told them they can shoot me but I don’t have any money. 
They asked for 2 lakhs [about 2.900 US dollars] and we didn’t have that 
kind of money (Bilal Singh (m), Audar, 09.05.2017). 
This was the only reference by a villager from the border area to insecurity created by 
Khalistan militants. Others interviewed suggested that the high presence of security 
forces kept militants away from the border area. This is important to highlight because 
violence was concentrated in the three border districts Amritsar, Gurdaspur and 
Ferozepur, according to K.P.S. Gill (m), then Director General of the Punjab Police 
(New Delhi, 17.05.2017). Data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP 
n.d.) supports such claims: most people were killed in Ludhiana district, followed by 
Tarn Taran, Majitha, Amritsar, Batala and Ferozepur between 1981 and 2000, and thus 
with the exception of Ludhiana, in the border districts. But not in the immediate border 
area, according to most interviewees. The presence and practices of India’s security 
forces were perceived to be more threatening than those of militants by borderlanders.  
To summarise, demands for greater autonomy by Sikhs received support in the 
post-partition period when the Akali Dal found its attempts to gain greater control over 
Sikh affairs threatened by the Congress-led central government. As political processes 
did not provide the desired results, a move to violence took place. This was presented 
as a threat by the Indian government, that required corresponding measures. A move 
from the politicisation of Sikh demands to securitisation took place. By legitimising 
the deployment of central armed forces inside Punjab, the border area was militarised 
and the borders between the internal and the  
external security fields were temporarily blurred. The practices of members of 
the armed forces of India and personnel of the Punjab police created insecurity among 
borderlanders in Punjab, who perceived these practices as an attack on all Sikhs. At 
the same time, the high presence of the army and the Border Security Force in the 
borderland arguably kept militants at bay. This, however, was contested by the Indian 
government, as will be explored in the next section. 
6.3 PAKISTAN AS NATIONAL ENEMY: MOBILITY AS THREAT 
Over the course of the Khalistan movement, the border between India and Pakistan in 
Punjab became notorious for cross-border smuggling of weapons, ammunition and 
drugs and the movement of people. This section explores the reasons for cross-border 
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movement and the meaning that mobility achieved for borderlanders and the Indian 
and Pakistani governments. Borderlanders presented mobility, the border and Pakistan 
as providing security from India’s armed forces during the Khalistan movement. While 
the Indian government also understood Pakistan as providing a safe haven, it presented 
those crossing the border and the supporters of cross-border mobility, i.e. Pakistan, as 
threats, amounting to a process of securitisation at the border. The Pakistani 
government denied supporting cross-border mobility and the separatist movement in 
Punjab, however, secondary literature suggests quite the opposite and thereby 
strengthens the Indian government’s allegations. 
Davinder Singh (m) from the village Dhanoakalan recalled that “During that 
time [of the Khalistan movement], smugglers could easily cross the border. There 
weren’t any barriers for them” (06.05.2017). The Punjab emerged as a major transit 
route for drugs in the 1980s: heroin and opium were trafficked from Pakistan to India, 
whereas acetic anhydrides, used for the synthesis of heroin, were traded from India to 
Pakistan (Chouvy 2009, 84–85; Haq 2000, 119–24; Das 2012, 8–16). Amritsar 
emerged as an important node in drug trafficking routes, which included the Samjhauta 
Express train plying between Lahore and Amritsar (Chouvy 2009, 84–85). The 
Lahore-Fazilka-Bhatinda-Delhi land route became another important trafficking route 
(Das 2012, 13).  
People living in the Indian Punjab borderland explained that “this drug business 
is not new. It has been going on since the time when rajas and maharajas [kings] used 
to rule” (Davinder Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017).76 Drug trafficking was a 
long-established practice, not a new development. A reason for drug trafficking via the 
Punjab is the region’s proximity to the Golden Crescent, an illicit opium producing 
area spanning Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Further to drugs, the number of weapons 
and ammunition smuggled across the border from Pakistan to India was perceived to 
have increased in the 1980s. This is more closely tied to the Khalistan movement. As 
Dalbir Singh (m) from Dhanoakalan recalled: 
After the Golden Temple was attacked in ’84, weapon smuggling reached 
its peak. The weapons were very cheap. I hadn’t seen or heard of any of 
these weapons before. (06.05.2017)   
 
76  The last princely states were incorporated into India and Pakistan following partition (see e.g. 
Copland 1991; 2002). On the history of drug trafficking in South Asia see e.g. Chouvy (2009 and Haq 
(2000). 
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Let us recall here, that the attack on the Golden Temple was perceived by many Sikhs 
as an assault on their religious group, increasing support for the Khalistan movement 
within India and abroad. Weapons allegedly came from arms markets on the border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as Miran Shah (Singh 2014, 117), which 
emerged during Zia-ul-Haq’s Presidency (1978-88) in Pakistan. 
Like borderlanders, the Government of India (1984, 2) and the Director General 
of the Punjab Police (DGP 1986-88) at that time, linked the smuggling to the Khalistan 
movement. According to the DGP Ribeiro, “smugglers give arms and information to 
extremists, and help them in their passage across the border” (quoted in India Today 
1986). Thus, further to goods, people now also increasingly crossed the international 
boundary. Asked about the cross-border movement of people during the Khalistan 
movement, Basant Singh (m) from the village Ranian explained:  
Before fencing happened [in Punjab] in ’92-’93,77  people would flee 
across the border to save their lives during fake police encounters [during 
the Khalistan movement]. (06.05.2017)   
People fled from the violence of security forces, often to Pakistan, which was 
perceived as safe. Another borderlander explained: 
Before fencing, the BSF [Indian Border Security Force] could be easily 
bribed with a 500 rupee note and they would allow people to smuggle 
weapons across the border line. [….] It was very easy to smuggle 
weapons openly [at that time]. (Dalbir Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 
06.05.2017) 
Dalbir Singh (m) implicates India’s security forces for facilitating cross-border 
mobility. But according to The Border Security Force Rules (1969, Chapter III, Article 
15), it is the task of the Border Security Force to “prevent trans-border crimes, 
unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India” and “smuggling and any 
other illegal activity.” To summarise, the threatening practices of India’s security 
forces were reasons for people to flee across the border and smuggle weapons and 
drugs, according to borderlanders. Proximity to and support in Pakistan probably 
increased the likelihood that people headed there but did not cause cross-border 
movement. By contrast, the Indian government presented those crossing the border 
and supporting cross-border movement as threats. 
 
77 Between 1988 and 1993, India fenced the entire border to Pakistan in the Punjab to contain cross-
border movement, which was later extended to other border areas with Pakistan. I discuss this process 
in the next chapter in 7.1. 
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An Aide Memoire on ‘Illegal border crossings from Pakistan into India’ 
furnished by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to its Pakistani counterpart in 
December 1985, notes that over 5800 illegal border crossings were detected in Punjab 
in 1985-86. The Aid Memoire further states that: 
Elements detected in such illegal crossings include terrorists motivated 
and trained in Pakistan, espionage agents, drug traffickers, criminals, 
smugglers and carriers of fire-arm. In addition, persons who have 
completed their prison term in Pakistan and Bangladeshi nationals are 
also being pushed into India. Many instances have also come to notice 
where terrorist elements after committing heinous crimes in Punjab are 
being granted safe passage and shelter in Pakistan. (MEA 1985b)  
The Indian government portrayed those illegally crossing the border as criminals – this 
contrasts with the representation of India’s security forces as threats by borderlanders. 
In the quote above, the government distinguishes between ‘persons’ and other 
‘elements.’ It describes as ‘persons’ people who have completed their prison term in 
Pakistan – probably referring to Indian citizens who inadvertently crossed the border 
– and Bangladeshi nationals. By contrast, militant supporters of the Khalistan 
movement and those associated with Pakistan – spies and smugglers – are described 
as ‘elements.’ By referring to ‘elements,’ the Indian government objectified and 
dehumanised people who attempted to cross the border – a common terrorism 
management practice (see e.g. Heflick and Goldenberg 2014). In its Aide Memoire, 
the Indian government further alleged that: 
Hundreds of Sikh youth have been identified who after having been 
motivated and imparted training in Pakistan were infiltrated by Pakistani 
authorities into India. Most of these elements were escorted up to the 
border by the Pak Rangers in their vehicles. The others were sent escorted 
by couriers. (MEA 1985b) 
Pakistan is portrayed as a supporter of felonious activities by the Indian government 
in this Aide Memoire, but also in the Government of India's (1984) White Paper (see 
also Talbot 2010). Furthermore, Indian Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi (PM, 1980-84) 
and Rajiv Gandhi (PM, 1984-89) repeatedly highlighted the involvement of a ‘foreign 
hand’ in Punjab in their speeches, implying that Pakistan and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (or other unnamed foreign actors) played a role in Punjab and other internal 
crises (Tully and Jacob 1985, 210). Such allegations can at least be traced back to the 
hijacking of an IAC plane to Lahore in September 1981, the first of several hijacking 
cases by supporters of the Khalistan movement in which a plane was diverted to 
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Pakistan.78 However, it allegedly increased after the Army’s attack on the Golden 
Temple in 1984 (Cronin 1984, CRS-27 as cited in Jetly 2008, 70). There is no mention 
of the support that Indian border guards provided in facilitating cross-border 
movement according to borderlanders. Hence, there is a deflection of the wrongdoings 
by Indian state officials. To summarise, the Indian government and state officials 
securitised those crossing the border and presented Pakistan as a threat to security in 
India.  
In a meeting with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, Pakistani President Zia-
ul-Haq (P, 1978-1988) responded to such allegations stating: 
I assure you that Pakistan has no interest at all in interfering in the Punjab. 
Why should we have any such interest? More so, since we want to 
develop good relations with India. I assure you that Pakistan will not 
interfere in Punjab even in its wildest imagination. (Gharekhan 1985)  
President Zia-ul-Haq denied all allegations made by India regarding Pakistan’s support 
of the separatist movement. He reiterated this position on various occasions. While Zia 
did not overtly support the Khalistan movement, Kiessling (2016, 154) argued that 
support for the separatist movement was already provided by Prime Minister Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto (PM 1973-1977) and deepened during Zia ul Haq’s presidency. He 
suggested that the Inter-Services Intelligence supported the movement and channelled 
weapons and ammunitions to Sikh militants, set up training camps in Karachi and 
Lahore, and transformed “gurudwaras on both sides of the border [into] rest, retreat 
and preparation areas, but also as depots for weapons and ammunition storage” 
(Kiessling 2016, 155). Ian Talbot (2010) argued that Pakistan sought to destabilise the 
border area as part of a proxy war that extended to Kashmir. He argued that this was a 
strategic decision in response to the 1971 debacle and India’s alleged involvement in 
Baluchistan and Sindh.79 This supports the Indian government’s allegations that the 
Pakistani government was supporting cross-border mobility in Punjab.  
To summarise, the preceding discussion showed that everyday practices in the 
Punjab borderland in the form of cross-border movement shaped relations between 
India and Pakistan by leading the Indian government and security forces to construct 
Pakistan as a supporter of felonious activities, provoking the Pakistani government to 
 
78 Planes had previously been hijacked by supporters of the Kashmiri cause in 1971 and again in 1976. 
Both times the plane was landed in Lahore where the hijacking was ended.  
79 In 1971, the Pakistan army was defeated in the war of Independence of Bangladesh, leading to the 
secession of East Pakistan. India has allegedly supported insurgencies in Sindh and Baluchistan. 
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deny responsibility, while the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Pakistan Rangers 
supported cross-border movement. During the Khalistan movement, people and things 
increasingly crossed the border between India and Pakistan in Punjab. People often 
went in search of safety but also to smuggle goods. This was facilitated by Indian and 
Pakistani border guards. However, the Indian government blamed Pakistan, thereby 
shifting attention away from the insecurities created by its own security actors for 
Sikhs in Indian Punjab.  
Smuggling and cross-border movement of people were well-established 
practices in the Punjab borderland since the independence of India and Pakistan and 
the creation of an international boundary with partition in 1947 (Talbot 2007c, 67–80), 
and have been repeatedly discussed before by political authorities from India and 
Pakistan. A record from a meeting between Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Pakistani President Ayub Khan from 1960, for example, notes that there is a drain 
on Pakistan’s foreign exchange due to smuggling and the illicit transfer of funds 
(Record of Discussion P/PM 1960). The Indian central government thus brought to 
public attention long-established practices along the international boundary in Punjab, 
rather than indicating new developments. By presenting cross-border movement of 
goods and people as a threat to the Indian state and by emphasising the involvement 
of Pakistan in facilitating mobility across the border, the Indian government 
constructed Pakistan as a threat. This led to two parallel developments: on one hand, 
India and Pakistan increased cooperation to facilitate the exchange of information. On 
the other hand, the Indian government constructed a fence along its border with 
Pakistan to strengthen its border and to reduce cross-border movement and launched 
several unilateral initiatives to strengthen its border security. In what follows I will 
focus on the former process. India’s unilateral initiatives are explored in the next 
chapter.  
6.4 FROM ENEMY TO COLLABORATOR: CONTROLLING MOBILITY 
At the same time as constructing Pakistan as a national enemy and as a threat to be 
contained, the Indian government cooperated with various security and government 
actors from Pakistan aimed at strengthening the border and reducing cross-border 
smuggling, drug trafficking and terrorism through the exchange of information from 
the late 1980s. However, much of this cooperation was short-lived and did not reduce 
the perceived threat coming from across the border for Indian government and security 
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officials, which continue to construct the cross-border movement of people, militancy 
and the Khalistan movement as threats. However, attention has shifted from militancy 
in Punjab to Kashmir, where Indian state actors crack down on militants with impunity 
(Duschinski 2009; 2010).  
On the bilateral level, the Home Secretary (HS) of India and the Interior 
Secretary (IS) of Pakistan agreed to regular meetings between the border security 
forces, flag meetings as and when required, and joint border patrols in selected areas 
of Punjab “to contain terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal border crossings, 
etc. along the India-Pakistan border” in a meeting in 1988 (Joint Statement HS/IS 
1988). Joint patrolling commenced in July 1989 ('Proposal for Joint Patrolling along 
the India – Pakistan Border' 1989), taking place twice or thrice a week in Punjab, 
Rajasthan and Gujarat. According to the former BSF officer, Arjun Gupta (m), these 
patrols present an opportunity to sort out any differences that may emerge and help in 
“keeping peace on the border” (New Delhi, 02.11.2015). Since 1989, the Director 
Generals (DGs) of the Pakistan Rangers and the Indian Border Security Force meet bi-
annually to  
review the implementation of the agreed norms of cooperation between 
the two Border Guarding Forces […] and discuss issues of relevance to 
both the forces. Issues requiring coordinated efforts like dealing with 
Drug menace, smuggling, simultaneous coordinated patrolling, timely 
exchange of information etc. were to form the core of discussions. (MHA 
2015b; 2017b). 
Cooperation between the central armed forces of India and Pakistan remains the most 
sustained for of cooperation set up at that time, as joint patrols, flag meetings and 
annual meetings between the DGs continue to date. 
To manage drug trafficking and smuggling, the Home and Interior Secretaries of 
India and Pakistan furthermore decided in their meeting in December 1986 to set up 
an India-Pakistan Committee to Combat Drug Trafficking and Smuggling (Joint Press 
Release HS/IS 1986), which held its first meeting in 1987. Therein, Representatives of 
the Indian Narcotics Control Bureau and the Pakistani Board, the Directorates of 
Revenue Intelligence (India) and Intelligence and Investigation (Customs & Excise) 
(Pakistan), the Border Security Force and the Pakistan Rangers, and the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) agreed to share operational intelligence and information on routes, means and 
people involved in smuggling and drug trafficking (Committee to Combat Drug 
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Trafficking and Smuggling 1987). In 1997, these efforts were institutionalised in the 
Composite Dialogue Process on Terrorism and Drug Trafficking. When the Composite 
Dialogue Process effectively began in 2004, the narcotics control authorities of India 
and Pakistan agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) “to 
institutionalize cooperation in this area” (Joint Press Statement HS/IS 2004). Seven 
years later, the Director Generals of the Indian Narcotics Control Bureau and of the 
Pakistani Anti-Narcotics Force signed an MoU on Drug Demand Reduction and 
Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics Drugs/Psychotropic Substances and 
Precursor Chemicals and Related Matters (2011).80 Though drug trafficking had been 
grouped together with terrorism in the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP), 
highlighting the perceived link between them, these issues have been discussed in 
separate meetings during the CDP and therefore I address them separately here. 
Terrorism had long been a key concern for India in its relations with Pakistan, 
whereas Pakistan had predominantly focused on the unresolved Kashmir question, 
both of which are closely related as a lot of cross-border terrorism takes place in 
Kashmir or is related to the Kashmiri cause. Following the Annual Report of the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs from 1984-85, “Pakistan’s deep involvement in Punjab 
developments and their help and encouragement to terrorism and hijacking caused a 
set-back to progress on bilateral relations” (MEA 1985a). But India and Pakistan 
reapproached each other in the following years and officially launched the Composite 
Dialogue Process in 1997. Nuclear tests by the two states in 1998, set them back again 
but was followed by the famous Lahore Declaration. Another setback came when 
Pakistan launched a military attack in the Kargil sector in Kashmir in 1999. In July 
2001, Pakistan’s “unacceptable and untenable fixation on the Jammu & Kashmir issue, 
a reluctance to address cross-border terrorism, and a negative approach indicated 
towards the Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration” 81  were reasons for the 
breakdown of bilateral talks at Agra, according to a statement released by the Indian 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA 2001). Speaking to the media upon his return to 
 
80 The following agreements build the basis for the MoU: Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, 
as amended by the 1972 Protocol; Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; UN Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988; SAARC Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1990. 
81  The Simla Agreement (1972), signed after Bangladesh’s war of independence, and the Lahore 
Declaration (1999), signed after both countries conducted nuclear tests, are landmark agreements in 
which India and Pakistan reiterated their commitment to resolving their issues peacefully. 
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Pakistan after the Agra summit, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf (2001) 
objected: “Our policy is not uni-focal, rigid, as we also want to address all these 
problems.” But in the same press statement he said that domestic pressure in Pakistan 
meant that Pakistan had “to take the Kashmir dispute first.” This did not mean that 
Pakistan did not address terrorism. In October 2001, Pervez Musharraf supported the 
US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, launched in response to 9/11. But Pakistan’s 
key concern was not with threats emanating from Iran and Iraq, but with the new 
government in Kabul, New Delhi, the unresolved Kashmir dispute and sectarian 
groups within Pakistan (Fair 2004). 
On 13 December 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked by perpetrators from 
a Pakistan-based terrorist organisation, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), killing 14 
people. India held Pakistan responsible for the attacks, for many recruits of the JeM 
are from Pakistan’s Southern Punjab (ICC 2016). In response, India launched a 
military build-up along its border with Pakistan, the largest of its kind since 
Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971 (Fair 2011b, 9). Tensions remained high 
until a ceasefire was agreed upon in November 2003. The latter paved the way for the 
resumption of or rather the launch of the Composite Dialogue Process in 2004. 
However, it was only after attacks on a commuter train in Mumbai in July 2006, that 
President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh jointly 
called for setting up a Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM) “to identify and 
implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations” (Joint Statement P/PM 
2006). The JATM held its first meeting in March 2007, wherein representatives from 
India and Pakistan agreed that “specific information will be exchanged through the 
Mechanism for (i) Helping investigations on either side related to terrorist acts and (ii) 
Prevention of violence and terrorist acts in the two countries” (Joint Statement JATM 
2007). To further cooperation in relation to terrorism, the Home/Interior Secretaries of 
India and Pakistan agreed to set up a hotline between them “to facilitate real time 
information sharing with respect to terrorist threats” in their meeting in September 
2011 (Joint Statement HS/IS 2011). 
Although these bilateral initiatives differ in the issues they address, they share 
commonalities: the establishment of the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism and the 
hotline between the Home/Interior Secretaries and of the MoU on Drug Demand 
Reduction and Prevention of Illicit Trafficking (2011), all aimed at creating closer 
cooperation between different actors within India and across the international 
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boundary. The aim was to bridge the border and to broaden the social networks of 
actors involved in border management, and thus to increase the social capital of those 
governing the border. By broadening their social networks, agents can enhance the 
scope of the resources they can tap into. The key resource circulated and circulating 
through these networks is information. Thus, social capital in the form of social 
networks between different agencies, can be transformed into informational capital. 
This informational capital, in turn, can be used to control movement across the 
international boundary and within India when combined with technologies of control. 
However, it appears that cooperation and the exchange of information have been 
limited and had little effect on reducing terrorist incidents. 
There have been no joint statements, press releases or news reports on encounters 
between the Director Generals of the Narcotics Control Bureau of India and the Anti-
Narcotics Force of Pakistan since their ninth and last meeting in December 2012 
(MHA 2012b). This suggests that cooperation and information sharing within the 
framework of the MoU signed in 2011 is unlikely to happen now. The Joint Anti-
Terrorism Mechanism held its third and last meeting in June 2008, following joint 
statements by India and Pakistan (Joint Statement 2008). It is often deemed inefficient 
by scholars (Fayyaz 2009, 1; Misra 2010, 44–48). Investigations into terrorist incidents 
did not produce mutually satisfactory results nor did cooperation in this matter prevent 
further terrorist attacks. In February 2007, bombs exploded on the Samjhauta Link 
Express connecting New Delhi with Attari, catering to those who travel to and from 
Lahore. Victims were mainly Pakistani civilians (for a detailed discussion see Tiwari 
n.d.). In October of the same year, a bomb was set off in the Shingar Cinema Hall in 
Ludhiana in Indian Punjab (MHA 2008, 23). In November 2008, a series of terrorist 
attacks occurred in Mumbai, killing 166 people. The attacks were linked to the 
Pakistan-based terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba, “the most lethal terrorist group 
operating from South Asia” according to Christine Fair (2011b, 1). The attacks caused 
a breakdown of bilateral talks in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process 
for three years. But for the first time the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan jointly 
declared “terrorism [to be] the main threat to both countries” (Joint Statement PM 
2009). Similar statements were later made by the Home/Interior Secretaries (Joint 
Statement HS/IS 2011; 2012), the Foreign Secretaries (Joint Statement FS 2011; 
2012), as well as the Foreign Ministers (Joint Statement FM 2011; 2012).  
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Until this joint statement, the two states had been divided over matters of 
priority. While the Indian government was more concerned by terrorism, the Pakistani 
government focused on the territorial issue over Kashmir. This led to a controversy 
following a meeting between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on the sidelines 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Ufa, Russia in 2015. Action 
points listed in a joint statement read out by the Foreign Secretaries after the meeting 
appeared like a promising step towards closer cooperation on terrorism by focusing 
exclusively on terrorism and engaging the national security advisors (Ufa Statement 
2015). However, tensions increased subsequently, which is generally attributed to the 
exclusion of Kashmir from the statement (Kormoll 2015). This suggests that the Indian 
and Pakistani governments continued to be divided over matters of priority.82  
Seventeen days after the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met on the 
sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Ufa, Russia, and agreed 
to closer cooperation to fight terrorism (Ufa Statement 2015), an attack was launched 
on the Dina Nagar police station in Gurdaspur District in Indian Punjab in July 2015. 
This was followed by another attack on the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot in 
Indian Punjab in January 2016 (see MHA 2016a, 5; 2017a, 4 respectively). In 
November 2018, a Nirankari prayer meeting near Amritsar was attacked by Sikh 
fundamentalists, killing three people (Rana 2018b). In press releases issued on behalf 
of Indian President Pranab Mukherjee and Prime Minister Narendra Modi following 
Pathankot attacks in January 2016, the violence was framed as an attack on the Indian 
nation and as a threat to national security. But no link was made to foreign intervention:  
The President complimented our jawans [soldiers] for their valour and 
courage while fighting terrorists. He also called upon security forces to 
remain vigilant against any threat to the peace and security of our 
nation (Mukherjee 2016a). 
Strongly condemning the terror attack in Pathankot today, Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi has said that enemies of humanity who cannot see the 
nation succeed, had attempted to cause harm to the Indian Armed Forces. 
[…] The Prime Minister said that the nation stood united against these 
enemies and therefore their evil designs would never succeed (Modi 
2016a). 
 
82 Other terrorist incidents have taken place all over India, and in particular in Kashmir, which have not 
been mentioned here because the focus of this chapter is on Punjab. 
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By contrast, the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence states that the attack came 
“from across the border” (MoD 2017, 107). While, the Ministry of Home Affairs stated 
vis-à-vis the Committee on Estimates in the Lok Sabha that the attack was launched 
“by  the  militants  coming  from  Pakistan” (Committee on Estimates 2018, 21). No 
press releases were issued by the central government after attacks in Gurdaspur (2015) 
or Ludhiana (2008), although they were mentioned in the Annual Report of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA 2008, 23; 2016a, 5). Generally referring to terrorist 
attacks in 2007-08, the report states that: 
The hand of Pakistan based terrorist organizations, viz., LeT [Lashkar-e-
Taiba] and JeM [Jaish-e-Mohammed] and, increasingly, of the 
Bangladesh based HuJAI [Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami], who, in turn, are 
known to have close links with Pakistan ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence]83 
has been observed in most of these cases. (MHA 2008, 23) 
In these and other statements and reports, the Indian government clearly identified 
Pakistan, and especially Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, as threats to India’s 
national security. The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs also alleged that Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence seeks to revive militancy in Punjab. In its report on Central 
Armed Police Forces and Internal Security Challenges (2018), the Committee on 
Estimates in the Lok Sabha quotes the Ministry of Home Affairs stating that: 
There have also been some developments on the Sikh militancy front. Its 
commanders based in Pakistan are under pressure from ISI to further ISI’s 
terror plans not only in Punjab but also in other parts of the country. Sikh 
youth are being trained in ISI facilities in Pakistan. Interdictions and 
interrogations have revealed use of jailed cadres, unemployed youth, 
criminals and smugglers by Pak based Sikh terror groups for facilitating 
terror attacks. (Committee on Estimates 2018, Section 2.3) 
Responding to a question in the upper house of the Indian Parliament, the Minister of 
State in the Ministry of Home Affairs explained that “Inputs indicate that ISI 
operatives are making efforts towards moral/financial support to pro-Khalistan 
elements for anti-India activities as well as to revive militancy in Punjab” (Ahir 2017). 
The Indian government suggested that recent attacks in Punjab were attempts by 
Pakistan to revive the Khalistan movement.84  
 
83 The ISI is Pakistan’s intelligence agency. 
84 On the revival of the Khalistan movement see also past Annual Reports of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (notably MHA 2004, 40, 2005, 50, 2006, 31). 
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While the Khalistan movement and the revival of terrorism in Indian Punjab 
remain concerns for Indian government officials, attention shifted to militancy in 
Kashmir in the 1990s, where practices are remarkably similar to those in Punjab. As 
Duschinski (2009, 2010) examines, Kashmiri civilians were identified as threats to 
national order leading to the intensive militarisation of Kashmir, legitimated through 
legal provisions that have facilitated fake encounters and forced disappearances, like 
in Punjab during the heights of the Khalistan movement. Militancy in Kashmir goes 
further back than in Punjab and can be traced to the partition of the subcontinent in 
1947 and the first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir (1947-49), which was precipitated 
by the infiltration of Pakistan's Pashtun tribal militias in the Kashmiri territory. 
However, the current violence in the region is commonly dated to 1990. This renders 
the Punjab experience particularly relevant to our understanding of contemporary 
practices in Kashmir, for both are closely intertwined with international relations 
between India and Pakistan. Kashmir and Punjab are not the only regions where fake 
encounters have taken place in India. Civilians have been framed as terrorists and 
criminals in places like Andhra Pradesh and Bihar as a result of Maoist rebels, in 
Gujarat for Muslim subversives and in Assam, Manipur and Tripura for rebelling 
soldiers, amongst others (Duschinski 2010, 112, see also p. 127, note 1). 
Its counter-insurgency operations in Punjab served the Border Security Force to 
establish its own position and to expand its role by being deployed in other counter-
insurgency operations, like in Kashmir (Ganguly 2009). This highlights that the Indian 
state continues to face internal challenges to its authority and needs to establish itself 
internally and in relation to other states, like Pakistan. 
6.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter explored how the Khalistan movement challenged the Indian state’s 
authority and was used by India to establish the state against an internal and an external 
threat. After outlining the historical roots of demands for greater autonomy over Sikh 
affairs, the chapter turned to securitisation practices by India’s state security actors and 
borderlanders’ perceptions thereof. It then shifted attention to the role of Pakistan in 
the Khalistan movement and how the latter was constructed as national enemy for its 
support of militancy in Punjab by the Indian government. The chapter concluded by 
drawing attention to bilateral cooperation on reducing drug trafficking, smuggling and 
the cross-border movement of people in response to the Khalistan movement.  
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I showed that in the late 1970s a move from the politicisation of Sikh demands 
to their securitisation took place, explored the dynamics of violence in the Punjab 
borderland in the 1980s and 1990s and highlighted its contemporary outliers. The 
chapter showed that the Indian government constructed the Khalistan movement and 
the use of violence by militants as a threat to its territorial integrity and to its social, 
political and economic stability. It responded to such threats by bringing the state of 
Punjab under President’s Rule (1980; 1983-1985; 1987-1992), by legitimising the 
deployment of its central armed forces inside Punjab and by conferring upon them 
special powers, leading to the militarisation of Punjab.  
By deploying central armed forces inside Punjab and conferring upon them 
powers usually confined to the police, the lines between the external and the internal 
security fields were blurred in at least two ways: firstly, India perceived and 
constructed the threats as transversal by emphasising militancy within the state and 
cross-border movement; secondly, by deploying the central armed forces inside Punjab 
and legitimising actions usually confined to the police, the lines of responsibility were 
further blurred. However, as a police force with military status the Border Security 
Force already operated at the intersection between the internal and external security 
fields. By being deployed inside the state, violence served the Border Security Force 
to establish its own position and expand its role. Since the Khalistan movement, the 
Border Security Force is regularly deployed in counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism operations within India, notably in Jammu and Kashmir. The Khalistan 
movement thus served to renegotiate the borders between the internal and the external 
security fields.  
Interviews shows that many borderlanders perceived the presence and practices 
of India’s state and central security actors as more threatening than those of militants. 
At the same time, the high presence of security forces in the borderland created a sense 
of security among border dwellers and an absence of threats from militants for most 
of those interviewed. 
During the Khalistan movement, militants used the border to Pakistan in search 
of safety from persecution through India’s security forces. In Pakistan, many were 
imparted training and received weapons and ammunition to continue their fight against 
the Indian state in Indian Punjab. Militants brought weapons, ammunition and drugs 
to India, to finance their violent struggle. This led India to present Pakistan as a 
supporter of felonious activities and as a national enemy to be contained. By 
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constructing Pakistan as national enemy and cross-border movement as a threat to 
national security, the Indian government diverted attention away from the security 
practices by its own forces. Paradoxically, this was paralleled by closer cooperation 
with Pakistan to fight the threats emanating from terrorism, drug trafficking and 
smuggling.  
From the late 1980s, India and Pakistan set up cooperative mechanisms between 
various security and government actors. The focus was on strengthening social 
networks and through them to exchange information aimed at responding to the above-
mentioned threats. However, cooperation was short-lived for the most part and did not 
produce the desired results. Terrorist incidents continue to negatively affect relations 
between India and Pakistan and the cross-border smuggling of drugs has facilitated its 
consumption in Indian Punjab, where many youngsters are drug dependant. Indian 
government and security officials continue to construct cross-border drug trafficking, 
smuggling, the movement of people, militancy and the Khalistan movement as threats, 
though attention shifted to Kashmir in the 1990s.  
In addition to cooperating with Pakistan, India responded unilaterally to the 
threats coming from across the border during the Khalistan movement by constructing 
a fence, increasing the presence of border guards and restricting access to the land 
beyond the fence for farmers living in the border area. To mitigate the negative effects 
of these measures on everyday life in the borderland, the Indian government also 
launched a Border Area Development Programme. However, this programme is 
fraught by placing security concerns over development goals, as I explore empirically 
in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE SECURITISATION OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
In a recently published report on Border Security (2017), the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Home Affairs in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Indian 
Parliament, stated that: 
The major border security challenges of India are: cross-border terrorism, 
infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants and insurgents, narcotics 
and arms smuggling; illegal migration; left-wing extremism and 
separatist movements aided by external powers. India has actively 
pursued the strategy of strengthening of border policing and guarding, 
creation of border infrastructure like roads, fencing and flood lighting on 
the borders, […] implementation of Border Area Development 
Programme [to tackle its border security challenges]. (Standing 
Committee on Home Affairs 2017, 1) 
I trace these threat perceptions and responses by the Indian state to the Khalistan 
movement, which gained momentum in Punjab in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. 
As explored in the previous chapter (especially Sections 6.2 and 6.3), from the 
late 1970s, separatism, violence and the illegal cross-border movement of people and 
goods in Punjab have been perceived as threatening India’s social, political and 
economic stability, the state’s territorial integrity and its claim to the monopoly use of 
physical force by Indian government officials. Indian government and security forces 
responded to such threats by increasing cooperation with Pakistan and launching 
unilateral initiatives to secure India’s external borders. While bilateral initiatives have 
been discussed in detail in the preceding chapter (especially Section 6.4), I will explore 
how crises are reflected in everyday practices in this chapter. 
Little has been written about the initiatives taken by the Indian government to 
secure its borders in Punjab and their implications for everyday life in the border area. 
To my knowledge, no publication has focused on the construction of the India-Pakistan 
border in Punjab, in contrast to the India-Bangladesh border (see e.g. Jones 2009; 
2012, especially chapters 3 and 6; Kabir 2005; Schendel 2005, 212–18). In the late 
1980s, the Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development in Chandigarh 
conducted a study on socio-economic developments in the Punjab borderland for the 
Indian government (Kumar et al. 1989). A study on Border Risk and Unemployment 
Dynamics (Singh, Singh, and Brar 2004) has provided insights into employment 
171 
 
dynamics in the border area of Punjab, comparing it to non-border rural areas. The 
most recent volume on Life on the Indo-Pak Border (Sohal and Mehra 2016) was 
published by scholars from Guru Nanak Dev University in Amritsar in 2016, with a 
focus on the relationship between security and development in Punjab. These 
publications on the Punjab borderland are predominantly descriptive and based on 
quantitative methods. My qualitative analysis adds depth and a reflexive evaluation to 
existing literature. It enhances our understanding of perceptions of borderlands, crucial 
for understanding the securitisation of everyday life. 
This chapter is organised into three sections. The first section focuses on the 
construction of a fence and other defence structures in the border area and their 
implications for cross-border mobility. The second section turns to everyday border 
guarding practices, explores the changes precipitated by the construction of a fence 
and the implications of the material construction of the border and of border guarding 
practices for everyday life. Finally, I will turn to the Border Area Development 
Programme, launched by the Indian government to address the special needs of the 
border area, and show how development was securitised in the Punjab borderland.  
7.1 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BORDER AND ITS IMPACT ON MOBILITY 
The Indian government perceived cross-border mobility as a threat to be contained. 
This threat perception led to the erection of a fence and other defence structures. This 
part explores the materialisation of the boundary between India and Pakistan in Indian 
Punjab and its implications for mobility. It shows that the material construction of the 
border is closely intertwined with nature and technology, which expose human 
weaknesses. It also demonstrates that the fence not only reduced mobility across the 
international boundary but also to land beyond the fence within India. 
The Indian government evoked the image of Pakistan as a national enemy and 
constructed cross-border mobility as an existential threat to justify the construction of 
a fence and other border guarding practices along its border with Pakistan in Punjab. 
Following a recent report by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs: 
In order to curb infiltration, smuggling and other anti-national activities 
from across the Indo-Pakistan border, the Government has sanctioned 
2,063.066 km fence, out of which 2,004.66 km fence work has been 
completed. (MHA 2018, 33) 
172 
 
The decision to fence the international boundary to Pakistan in Punjab was taken in a 
meeting headed by Indian ministers in April 1988. 120 kilometres of the border were 
identified for fencing and its construction commenced in the same month (Singh 2014, 
264, 119). Under the so called Punjab Action Plan, 462.45 kilometres of the 553 
kilometre-long international boundary were fenced and 460.74 kilometre were floodlit 
by the Central Public Works Department between 1988 and 1993 (Standing 
Committee on Home Affairs 2008, 1;see Image 1).85  
 
 
Image 1: The Border Fence near Daoke, Punjab, India (Kormoll 2017) 
 
In its report, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs in the Rajya 
Sabha suggested that:  
as a result of fencing/floodlighting of the Punjab sector, terrorism and 
other anti-national activities from across the border have been checked to 
a large extent. (Standing Committee on Home Affairs 2008, 1) 
 
85 The fencing project in Punjab was just the beginning of an extensive border materialisation project 
by India. It subsequently also built a fence in Gujarat, Rajasthan and along the international boundary 
in Kashmir, fencing about 2,004.66 kilometres of the 3,323 kilometre-long Indo-Pak boundary (MHA 
2018, 33). A temporary fence has also been erected parallel to the Line of Control. In 2002, the Indian 
government also expanded its fence along the Indo-Bangladesh border (Jones 2012, 57).The Indian 
government already took the official decision to fence the border in 1986, but only five per cent of the 
border were fenced by 1998 (Schendel 2005, 212–13).  Today, approximately 3,006.48 kilometres of 
the 4096.7 kilometre-long boundary between India and Bangladesh have been fenced (MHA 2018, 32). 
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The border resident Amar Singh (m) from the village Raja Thal also explained: 
In ’84, before fencing [there was a lot of smuggling]. After that, fencing 
happened, and it became negligible. (07.05.2017) 
The fence is thus deemed to be less permeable. But, of course, a fence is also an 
imperfect barrier to movement. In some places, the fence was cut and people could go 
through (C. V. Rao 2002). In others, people found ways to circumvent the border to 
smuggle goods: they airdropped contraband through drones (Sura 2018), dug tunnels 
(Gaganjot Singh (m), Attari, 09.05.2017; Maqbool Dar 1997) and smuggled drugs 
through pipes through the fence or threw them in Coca Cola bottles  across the fence 
(Davinder Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017). Thus, people found different ways 
to cross or smuggle goods through, over and under the fence.  
The fence itself was subject to the natural environment, which reduced its barrier 
function. In riverine areas of Ravi and of Sutlej the fence regularly gets washed away 
(Rijiju 2014). Further to floods, high-velocity winds, shifting sand dunes, corrosion 
and rainfall have also damaged the fencing (Ramachandran 2013; Sibtey Razi 1995; 
Rao 2001a). This is closely related to human practices, as a Minister of State in the 
Ministry of Home Affairs explained: 
Due to floods, change of course and construction of spurs by Pakistan on 
the embankment of the river [Ravi], a threat always exists to the border 
security fencing in that sector. (Rao 2001b) 
The Indian Minister of State blames Pakistan for the destruction of the fence. But, of 
course, similar practices on the Indian side also affected the built environment. Sand 
mining in riverine border areas, for example, led to the destruction of border roads that 
are part of the infrastructure development undertaken by India to strengthen border 
security (Standing Committee on Home Affairs 2017, 24).  
The construction of a fence was but part of the infrastructure development 
undertaken by India to increase its border security. It also includes the construction 
and upgradation of border roads, barriers, observation towers and Border Out Posts 
(see e.g. Rijiju 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; Selvi 2009). Border Out Posts are the main 
workplaces of the Border Security Force along the border. Further to providing  
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Image 2: A Border Out-Post (BOP) of the Indian Border Security Force in Front of the Fence (Kormoll 2017) 
 
Image 3: A look-out and defence construction along the international boundary in the Punjab (Kormoll 2017) 
 
accommodation and a logistic basis, Border Out Posts are represented as deterrents by 
the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs: 
BOPs are meant to provide appropriate show of force to deter transborder 
criminals, infiltrators and hostile elements from indulging in the activities 
of intrusion/ encroachment and border violations. (MHA 2018, 31–32) 
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BOPs clearly stand out against the natural environment. At the same time, the Border 
Out Posts I visited were encircled with a wall of soil and trees (see Image 2). The 
natural environment was thus appropriated as part of the defence structure. In other 
areas, the natural environment was subdued for defence construction along the border 
in India (see Image 3).  
Nature was incorporated into border-making by India’s security forces. There 
are areas of land trapped between the de jure boundary between India and Pakistan in 
Punjab and the rivers Sutlej and Ravi. An agricultural labourer from the village Kakkar 
explained: “We aren’t allowed to go there [to the land beyond the river Ravi]” (Raghu 
Singh (m), Kakkar, 06.05.2017; see also Image 4). The river Ravi is thus the de facto 
border between India and Pakistan in this riverine area. India and Pakistan recognised 
administrative over natural boundaries in their Agreement Regarding Procedures to 
End Disputes and Incidents along the Indo-West Pakistan Border Areas in 1960. 
However, contemporary practices show that the rivers in the border area of Punjab 
continued to be de facto boundaries between Indian and Pakistan (Minutes HM/IM 
1955; Note by MFA 1955).  
 
 
Image 4: Area of land trapped between the de jure border (yellow line) and the river Ravi near the Indian villages 
Kakkar and Ranian (Google Earth 2018) 
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To summarise, the natural environment was shaped by and shaped practices of human 
actors; in places facilitating the erection of permanent structures, in others impeding 
it. Following several Ministers of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs:  
A total of about 249.61 km of Indo-Pakistan Border (IPB) […..] have not 
been covered by fencing, primarily due to riverine/nala/marshy terrain 
and in some cases due to pending land acquisition etc. (Rijiju 2017a; see 
also Gupta 1997; Rao 1999)  
To control movement along and across the international boundary in ‘non-feasible’ 
riverine areas, other gadgets are used according to the former BSF officer Arjun Gupta 
(m, New Delhi, 02.11.2015) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA 2016b). At the 
time of the Khalistan movement, technologies of control were limited. According to 
Deshpande (2015, 92, 94), vehicles were equipped with search lights and tractors were 
made bulletproof, small bells were attached to the fence to alert border guards if the 
fence was fiddled with (this presumably led to a lot of false alarms), concertina coils 
were placed on the fence and electric wires were run through them, but few gadgets, 
like night vision equipment, existed. Today, technologies of control include, inter alia, 
Floating Border Out Posts (FBOPs), mechanized boats, speed boats, medium crafts, 
specialised vehicles and hi-tech surveillance equipment’s such as Electro-Optic 
Sensors (high resolution day & night cameras), radars, thermal sensors like Hand - 
Held Thermal Imager (HHTI), day and night vision equipment and advanced weapons 
(see e.g. Rijiju 2017b; 2016b; 2015; Selvi 2009; Rao 2000). These technologies of 
control, like the fence, serve to mitigate human weaknesses and imperfections. Night 
vision equipment, for example, allows border guards to see in the dark, vehicles speed 
up mobility and weapons can be perceived as deterrents. Of course, these measures are 
never total or perfect. Unsurprisingly, people still find ways to cross the border and to 
move goods between India and Pakistan in Punjab.  
Just like the Indian Border Security Force deployed technologies of control, 
those who sought to cross or take goods across the border into India resorted to 
technology to facilitate mobility. Recent news reports have claimed that trafficking 
rackets use divers to smuggle drugs through the riverine tracts of Sutlej and Ravi (Sura 
2017). Borderlanders suggest that drug trafficking continues to be rampant. This is 
supported through reports studying drug abuse in Punjab (see e.g. PODS 2015, Verma 
and Mishra 2010). By contrast, data on heroin, opium and hashish seizures by the 
Narcotics Control Bureau of India suggests that there has been a decrease in drug 
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trafficking from South West Asia (the so-called ‘Golden Crescent’) since the late 
1980s and that drug trafficking through the India-Pakistan border has stabilised. 
Pushpita Das (2012, 9–12) attributes these differences to underreporting of drug 
seizures by India’s security actors. Another reason could be that the concerned 
authorities are not as efficient at intercepting consignments as they portray through 
data.  
To summarise, the construction of a border fence and infrastructure 
developments in India have contributed to the reduction of mobility across the border. 
However, the fence is not a perfect barrier to movement. It can be circumvented or 
damaged, thereby losing its barrier function. In places, the natural environment not 
only damaged the fencing, but prevented humans from building a fence in the first 
place. Here, alternative technological solutions were employed to facilitate border 
guarding practices. The latter are the focus of the next section. 
7.2 BORDER GUARDING PRACTICES: EVERYDAY INSECURITIES  
The Indian Border Security Force is responsible for “prevent[ing] trans-border crimes, 
unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India”, for “prevent[ing] smuggling 
and any other illegal activity”, and for “promot[ing] a sense of security among the 
people living in the border area” (“The Border Security Force Rules, 1969”, Chapter 
III, Article 15). The construction of a fence aided the Border Security Force in 
discharging its duties but also changed its responsibilities. It led to the securitisation 
of everyday life for those owning and working on land beyond the fence, which created 
insecurities for borderlanders in Punjab rather than ‘a sense of security’. 
Amar Singh (m) from the village Raja Thal recalled: “Before fencing, the BSF 
was only needed for security purposes. They used to patrol the zero line with lamps at 
nighttime” (07.05.2017). Today, the entire border area is floodlit. Eqbal Singh (m) 
from the village Ranian explained that “You can see an ant in an area of 3 acres” 
(06.05.2017). Therefore, lamps are no longer required for patrolling the border at 
night. However, patrols continue to be among the key border guarding practices 
adopted by the Border Security Force to control cross-border movement in Punjab 
(MHA 2012a, 8, see also 2013, 6; 2014, 7; 2015a, 5).  
Patrolling is closely intertwined with the material construction of the border and 
the technologies of control. As Baldev Singh (m) from the village Ranian explained: 
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Before fencing happened [in Punjab] in ’92-’93, people would flee across 
the border to save their lives during fake police encounters [during the 
Khalistan movement]. [Thereafter] It wasn’t possible anymore. The army 
would now kill anyone trying to cross the border to hide in Pakistan. It 
became very hard to come back. (06.05.2017) 
Through newspaper articles, government reports and conversations with neighbours, 
borderlanders are regularly appraised of incidents in which smugglers die at the hand 
of the Border Security Force when allegedly attempting to cross the international 
boundary for smuggling purposes (see e.g. The Times of India 2018; Hindustan Times 
2018). In a recent encounter, for instance, two Pakistanis allegedly infiltrating the 
international boundary in Amritsar district were shot by the Border Security Force 
(NCB 2017, 16). Such incidents reproduce the Punjab borderland as crisis space. 
However, the material construction of the border, technologies of control and border 
guarding practices did not allow the Border Security Force to fill all gaps. In July 2015, 
militants crossed the international boundary from Pakistan and attacked a police 
station in Dina Nagar in Gurdaspur sector in Punjab (Chaudhary 2015). The Punjab 
government subsequently requested the central government to increase the deployment 
of the Border Security Force in this sector (Singh 2016; The Economic Times 2015). 
Four months later, attacks on the Indian Air Force Base in Pathankot showed that the 
border was still permeable, for the perpetrators again came from Pakistan (Chaudhary 
2016). In response, five additional battalions of the Border Security Force were posted 
along the Punjab border, according to a news report (Tur 2018). The continuation of 
cross-border movement thus led to an increase in boots on the ground in Indian Punjab. 
This was paralleled by the securitisation of agricultural activities in fields beyond the 
fence. 
In line with the West Pakistan/Punjab (India) Border Ground Rules (1961), the 
fence was constructed from 150 yards away from the zero line or the de jure border 
between India and Pakistan inside Indian territory. Thereby, more than 17.000 acres 
of cultivated land belonging to 11.000 families from 212 villages were cut off from 
the ‘mainland’ (Randhawa 2009, quoted in Sekhon 2014, 237–38).86 This basically 
created a second de facto border which shaped everyday life of those owning and 
 
86 A recent news report states that 24.000 acres of land by around 6,000 families in 212 border villages 
are affected in Pathankot, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Tarn Taran and Ferozepur districts (Sura 2015). By 
contrast, a note on the Border Area Development Programme by the Department of Planning of the 
Punjab Government states that 18.500 acres of land are situated across the border fence (DoP 2006, 4). 
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working on land beyond the fence. Landlords and agricultural labourers explained that 
the fence reduced their mobility: 
It [the fence] has restricted our movement. We can’t go and cultivate our 
land beyond the fence. (Dalbir Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017)  
[With the construction of a fence] Problems arose for those who have to 
cross the fencing to go to work. […..] When there is need of labour, only 
then labourers are allowed to go. (Eqbal Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017) 
We have a lot of problems because our land is beyond the fence. The 
government doesn’t allow us to go beyond the fencing. […..] Our ID 
cards have been made but that doesn’t make it easy to travel across the 
fence either. (Raghu Singh (m), Kakkar, 06.05.2017) 
The challenges posed by the fence for farmers were contested by a Minister of State 
in the Ministry of Home Affairs who answered a question in the Lok Sabha, the lower 
house of the Indian Parliament, stating: 
Fencing is not a hurdle for the farmers as gates have been provided in 
fencing at an appropriate distance and farmers are permitted to cultivate 
their land ahead of the Fence. (Rijiju 2016a) 
 
Image 5: A Gate in the Fence, Floodlighting and an Observation Platform (Kormoll 2017) 
 
To provide access to this land, gates were put in the fence (see Image 5). These gates 
are controlled by the Border Security Force, which regulates who can cross the fence, 
when and where. Farmers explained, that they require a so-called gate pass to gain 
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access to their fields beyond the fence. Passes are issued by the Border Security Force 
upon confirmation of rightful ownership of land beyond the fence and labour 
requirements by the Sarpanch, the head of the village government. Once a gate pass is 
obtained, those mentioned on the permit can cross the fence at designated times. But 
only if there are no incidents. Farmers and agricultural labourers explained: 
Whenever there is some problem of smuggling, suppose someone is doing 
something wrong or they find something suspicious, they will not open 
the gates until the complete investigation is done. (Utam Singh (m), 
Attari, 08.05.2017) 
For instance, if they [Border Security Force] have a function or they have 
their periodical checks. If there is a problem going on at the border, then 
too [the gates remain closed]. If a shooting happens at night or smuggling. 
(Amar Singh (m), Raja Thal, 07.05.2017) 
Even if there is an incident 30 kilometres away, the whole border is 
sealed. It last happened a month ago. (Raghu Singh (m), Kakkar, 
06.05.2017). 
As the Indian Border Security Force kept gates closed following such incidents, cross-
border drug trafficking and smuggling not only presented threats to the state of India, 
but also to borderlanders. When they were denied access to their land for prolonged 
periods of time, their products could wither and spoil.  
Instead of providing those owning and working on land beyond the fence with 
security, the Indian government and the Border Security Force perceived agricultural 
activities, and by extension, landowners and agricultural labourers, as threats. 
Following the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs' (2017, 36) report 
on Border Security “[c]ultivation of fields right upto zero line on both sides of border” 
facilitates drug trafficking, which is considered a threat. The security practices that 
followed from these threat perceptions involved the strict regulation of access to land 
beyond the fence. Even when gates were opened, people had to go through thorough 
security checks. Farmers explained that: 
There are registers at the gate. Guards sit at the gate. They note our details 
[name etc.] in the register. They write down everything – how many 
trucks and tractors we have, what is inside them etc. Then they take down 
our signatures. They write down how many tools we have and what kind. 
(Basant Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017) 
Whatever equipment we need to carry with us for the work, say to water 
fields, we have to write that down in the registers. Even if you’re carrying 
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a box of rotis [bread], you have to write that down. They check that as 
well. (Eqbal Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017) 
Yet, the efficiency of frisking at gates is challenged by state actors themselves. An 
anonymous official stated via the press that “Checking for a needle in the haystack is 
impossible, as is searching the harvested crops being transported in the state in trucks 
and tractors” (Tur 2018).  
The emphasis on checking everything farmers seek to bring to and from their 
field highlights the vulnerability that people experience. A special emphasis on the 
checking of rotis (bread) by several interviewees shows the perceived interference of 
security forces in everyday life and the daily struggle for survival. Securitisation by 
state actors lead to insecurity for those who own and work on land beyond the fence. 
Thus, a closer look at the relationship between farmers and Border Security Force 
guards is required. This relationship varied greatly. While some said that they have 
cordial ties, others said that they face problems: 
No, there are no problems with the BSF. They generally have a cordial 
relationship with the farmers. For instance, if we need more time on the 
fields, they concede that. (Jaikaar Singh (m), Mullakot, 09.05.2017) 
There seems to be a link between the economic capital of farmers and their relationship 
to the BSF. Farmers with larger land holdings reported fewer problems than those with 
small operational holdings. 
The people who are most likely to be harassed by the BSF during such 
times are the poor and the illiterate. They don’t harass people like me 
because they know of us. They know we’re good, honest men. (Davinder 
Singh (m), Dhanoakalan, 06.05.2017) 
Eqbal Singh (m), an agricultural labourer living in the village Ranian, echoed this 
sentiment when he explained that “They [BSF officials] are rude. We don’t mix well” 
(06.05.2017). At the same time, farmers with larger holdings are subjected to the same 
rules and regulations by the BSF. 
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Image 6: The Tree to the left demarcates the end of the Indian Territory: A Tractor can be seen on the Fields 
Beyond the Fence (Kormoll 2017) 
 
Securitisation does not stop at the gate but extends to the crops that can be cultivated 
in the fields and irrigation. For example, for security reasons, farmers are only allowed 
to grow crops below a certain height, as Hadwin Singh (m) from the village Rurawala 
Khurd explained:  
[W]e cannot grow crops with high leaves because it hinders the security. 
With the crops that have high leaves there is the possibility of intruders 
[sneaking in]. (08.05.2017).  
However, there are different guidelines regarding the height of crops. Jagrup Sekhon 
(2014, 226) puts the permissible height at three feet, while other news reports quote 
four and six feet respectively (Sura 2015; The Tribune 2017a). This excludes, for 
example, maize and sugarcane and means that mainly wheat and paddy (rice) are 
grown in the fields beyond the fence, which is in line with general cropping trends in 
Punjab. In 2015-16, the Punjab was the third largest contributor of wheat (17.20 per 
cent of all India) and rice (11.33 per cent) to the food grain of India, followed by maize 
(1.94 per cent), sugarcane (1.87 per cent), and cotton (1.49 per cent) (“Agricultural 
Statistics at a Glance” 2016, 92, 89, 105, 141, 135).  
To be able to grow rice and wheat, regular irrigation needs to be ensured. This 
has been a problem in fields beyond the fence, where provisions for irrigation are 
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limited. Some farmers can water the crops from this side of the fence at night, while 
others have to take all the equipment for irrigation with them when they go to their 
fields during the day as there are few electric tube wells for irrigation installed in the 
border area (Sekhon 2014, 227). The depletion of ground water resources in Punjab 
further exacerbates the problem of farmers in the border area (see e.g. Sarkar 2011; 
2012 for a discussion).  
These security and environmental considerations impact farmers’ opportunities 
and returns. Septuagenarian Jagir Singh, a resident from the village Wazirpur in 
Gurdaspur district, explained:  
Planting sugarcane is ruled out as the Border Security Force (BSF) and 
the Army say we can’t sow any crop that reaches a height of over 6 ft. 
Sowing paddy, too, is not feasible as it needs a lot of water. We can’t 
install tube wells as the [Punjab State Power Corporation Limited] 
PSPCL doesn’t give power connections to farmers with land across the 
fence. We only have to grow wheat, which is not financially 
remunerative. (quoted in The Tribune 2017a) 
Paddy (rice) and wheat have a very low value of output per hectare. Nonetheless, many 
people in Punjab continued to grow these crops because they are assured procurement 
at the minimum support price (MSP). The MSP is fixed by the Indian government to 
protect farmers against an excessive fall in prices (Mann 2017, 33). However, farmers 
stated that the minimum support price is not enough to make a proper living. 
The harvest is sold at nearby open markets (see Image 7), which presents yet 
another challenge. These markets are under the open air and, if it rains, crops get 
damaged. The livelihood of farmers in the borderbelt of the Punjab is thus threatened 
by natural calamities in addition to man-made security practices. Areas close to the 
rivers Ravi and Sutlej are flood prone. A major flood in September/October 1988, for 
example, devasted the crops and created a food shortage in Punjab, according to 
interviewees. People were displaced from their homes by the waters, which reached 
up to Amritsar (Basant Singh (m), Ranian, 06.05.2017).  
Summarising the dilemma faced by farmers, Jaikaar Singh (m), a farmer from 
the village Mullakot (09.05.2017), explained: “The crops suffer because farmers 
cultivate them under restrictions.” Farmers cannot make the revenues they require to 
sustain their livelihood, further increasing the plight of farmers in the Punjab border 
area.  
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Image 7: Wheat Market in Rajatal (Kormoll 2017) 
  
To conclude, it is important to highlight that not all people are equally affected by 
everyday security practices in the Punjab borderland. Those who own land beyond the 
fence are probably the most vulnerable. They experience insecurity every time they go 
to their fields behind the fence and upon their return in the late afternoon. For most 
people in the Punjab borderland, these security practices only become visible through 
small events: when gates remain closed due to the interception of drugs, the killing of 
smugglers or infiltrators, or higher-level visits by BSF officers; when people are 
arrested on suspicion of being involved in cross-border smuggling and face legal 
prosecution; or when they are arrested on suspicion of homicide, as has been the case 
more frequently in recent times. However, securitisation not only affects those owning 
and working on land beyond the fence, but everyone living in the border area.   
The Punjab borderland is characterised by poor infrastructure, few education 
facilities, high illiteracy rates, unemployment, a lack of higher-revenue employment 
opportunities and indebtedness of farmers (see e.g. Sohal and Mehra 2016 for a 
detailed study). This is partly related to changes in the agricultural sector in Punjab 
since 1947, to economic policies by the central government and to ever-looming 
security threats posed by drug trafficking, smuggling and Pakistan. 
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Following the partition of Punjab in 1947, Indian government policies and 
investments focused on rural development and agriculture. This set the context for 
growth when new agricultural technology became available in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Such technologies included high-yielding varieties of seeds, mainly wheat, the use of 
fertilisers and pesticides and the mechanisation of agriculture. They led to a 
phenomenal increase in agricultural growth rates up to the mid-1980s, commonly 
referred to as the Green Revolution (see e.g. Sims 1988). With the rise of violence 
during the Khalistan movement in the late-1970s, the Punjab became seen as a state in 
crisis. Its implications became visible during the 1990s, when the central government 
embarked on a process of economic liberalisation. While it benefitted the urban 
population, economic liberalisation further marginalised rural people and those 
dependent on agriculture in particular (Jodhka 2006). Not only did people become 
vulnerable to market forces, but as the Green Revolution spread to other parts of India, 
the demand for food grains from Punjab also declined. While crop prices declined, 
cash expenditure on crop production rose. As resources were limited, people had to 
borrow money to invest in crops, leading to indebtedness among the farmers of Punjab 
(Jodhka 2006). This was further aggravated with the mechanisation of agriculture, 
which reduced the requirement for agricultural labour from the mid-1990s, especially 
the use of family labour. An increase in the demand for labour in the dairy sector 
compensated for this to some extent (Sidhu and Singh 2004). However, almost all 
interviewees were either landlords or agricultural labourers. Agriculture is no longer 
profitable, but there is a lack of alternative sources of employment in the border area 
which is perceived to have contributed to drug consumption and smuggling. One 
borderlander explained: “We [borderlanders] are backward because we can’t get any 
other jobs apart from agriculture. There is low employment” (Raghu Singh (m), 
Kakkar, 06.05.2017). A comparative study of unemployment of border and non-border 
areas in Punjab reveals that the share of unemployment, and the number of educated 
unemployed in particular, is considerably higher in border areas of Punjab, viz. 
Amritsar Gurdaspur and Ferozepur districts (Singh, Singh, and Brar 2004, 165–70; see 
also Kaisii 2016). This, paired with the precarious situation in the Punjab borderland, 
dissuades businesspeople from investing in industrialisation, and thus in the creation 
of higher-skilled work opportunities which could absorb those that are better educated. 
As I have shown in previous chapters, the Punjab borderland has been the site of 
military confrontations between the armed forces of India and Pakistan in 1947, 1965 
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and 1971; it has witnessed almost two decades of violence during the Khalistan 
movement, and faced a military build-up during the Kargil crisis and following attacks 
on the Indian Parliament from 2001 to 2003. Although no full-scale war has taken 
place since 1971, tensions continue to be high, as we last saw in September 2016, when 
the Central government ordered the evacuation of the Punjab borderland in 
anticipation of a military response by Pakistan to so-called surgical strikes by India in 
Kashmir. Through politicisation, securitisation and militarisation during military 
confrontations, the Khalistan movement and smaller events, the Punjab was 
constituted as crisis space.  
To summarise, insecurity is widespread and affects the entire border area. The 
Indian government is well-aware of the ‘special characteristics’ of the border area and 
launched a Border Area Development Programme (BADP) in response. However, the 
latter is fraught due to the primacy of security concerns over development goals, as I 
outline in the next section.   
7.3 BADP: THE SECURITISATION OF DEVELOPMENT 
Alongside the construction of a fence and a related change in border guarding 
practices, the Indian government launched the Border Area Development Programme 
to develop what it refers to as ‘sensitive’ border areas. The programme is flawed due 
to the primacy of security concerns over development goals, thereby having limited 
impact on the development of the border area. Development is here broadly understood 
to include governance practices that aim at enhancing the well-being of a population 
(Buur, Jensen, and Stepputat 2007, 11). 
Aware of the special characteristics of the border area, the Indian government 
launched the BADP during the seventh five-year plan (1985-1990) in 1986. The aim 
of this centrally sponsored Special Areas Development Programme was to promote 
“the balanced development of sensitive border areas” (Planning Commission 1985). 
The term ‘sensitive’ is frequently used in government reports and by interviewees to 
describe India’s borders and border crossing points, without being explained. Asked 
what he meant by ‘sensitive’, a member of the Land Ports Authority of India 87 
explained that there are illegal things happening, such as the smuggling of drugs, 
 
87 The Land Ports Authority of India is responsible “to develop, sanitize and manage the facilities for 
cross border movement of passengers and goods at designated points along the international borders of 
India.” (“The Land Ports Authority of India Act, 2010”, Chapter III, Article 11(2)) 
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counterfeit currency, arms and the movement of people (Teja Surwat, New Delhi, 
16.05.2017). Some areas are deemed to be more sensitive than others, a former BSF 
officer explained with reference to Kashmir (Arjun Gupta (m), New Delhi, 
02.11.2015). Another person explained that there is a high presence of security forces 
in sensitive areas (Raza Sangha (m), Lahore, 13.03.2017) and others added that there 
are more security checks (Shahid Khalil (m), Lahore 07.03.2017; Pardeep Sehgal (m), 
Amritsar, 10.12.2015). The understanding of the term ‘sensitive’ is related to security, 
as the Border Area Development Programme seeks to promote “a sense of security 
among the local population” (Planning Commission 1992), thus highlighting the 
primacy of security concerns over development goals.  
The programme was initially designed to provide infrastructure facilities. Then 
it was extended to focus on education (Planning Commission 1992). After being 
revamped in 1993-94, supply of drinking water and communication facilities also 
became eligible (Planning Commission 1997). Furthermore,  
Since [the] promotion of sense of security among the people in the Border 
Areas is an important aspect of the Programme, schemes designed for 
public participation in crisis management, information and motivation of 
the people including their involvement in prevention of subversive 
activities, smuggling, infiltration etc. [are also eligible]. (Planning 
Commission 1997) 
This again shows that the programme is oriented towards promoting security rather 
than development.  
Launched in the Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat in 1986-87 (Planning 
Commission 1988, 119), the programme has since been extended to other border areas. 
Today, the BADP covers 394 border blocks in 111 border districts of India’s 17 border 
states sharing an international boundary with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhuta, Nepal, 
China, Afghanistan (disputed) and Pakistan (MHA 2018, 35). In Punjab, 21 blocks are 
covered, including Chogawan and Attari in Amritsar district (MHA n.d.) where I 
conducted research. Following lists of villages covered under the programme 
published in 2010, eight of the eleven villages visited were covered by the programme, 
including Attari, Daoke, Dhanoia Kalan, Mahawa, Rajatal and Rorawala (Khurd) in 
Attari block and Kakkar and Ranian in Chogawan block (DoP 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). 
However, many interviewees, including the heads of village governments 
(Sarpanches), were not aware of the Border Area Development Programme or did 
arguably not receive funds under this scheme.  
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In the late 1990s, two committees were set up: the Empowered Committee at the 
Centre, responsible for policy matters, the scope of the programme and the allocation 
of funds; and Screening Committees at the state-level, which gave states more 
flexibility in formulating and implementing the scheme (Planning Commission 1997) 
(on the committees see also Department of Border Management 2015, 5–10). Though 
the responsibility for utilising funds is with state governments, the Border Security 
Force plays an important role in the allocation of funds. Following the most recent 
guidelines issued for the allocation of funds, the Border Security Force can use up to 
10 per cent of the annual allocation of the state for projects such as the construction of 
porter tracks, bridges, roads, transit camps and huts along patrol routes and the supply 
of electricity and water. Not permissible under the BADP is infrastructure-related work 
within Border Out Posts, the procurement of vehicles, night vision devices, etc. 
(Department of Border Management 2015, 18–19). Furthermore, the Border Security 
Force is responsible for identifying villages in need of development and investment. 
Describing the relationship between the BSF and the civil administration, Arjun Gupta 
(m) a former BSF officer explained that the  
BSF informs the civil administration as to where, because they are on the 
border, so where the funds are required, where the development has to 
take place, and which village is to be adopted. (New Delhi, 02.11.2015).  
Following the most recent guidelines issued in 2015, priority is given to all villages up 
to 10 kilometres from the international boundary, and within this radius, to those 
villages identified by the Border Security Force as ‘strategic villages.’ Only once the 
needs of these villages have been ‘saturated,’ can the programme be extended to other 
areas up to a distance of 50 kilometres from the boundary. Following the above-
mentioned guidelines:  
District Level Committees (DLCs) shall make their own definition for 
‘saturation of a village’ infrastructure. However, for ‘saturation of a 
village’, the minimum facilities will include road connectivity, schools 
along with facilities like separate toilets for girls, sports facilities, health 
services, electricity, 2 water supply, community centre, public toilets 
particularly for women, houses for teachers and health staff, etc. 
(Department of Border Management 2015, 1–2) 
While road connectivity is generally provided – often keeping in view the movement 
of the Border Security Force rather than the needs of borderlanders – many villages 
along the international boundary still lack some of these facilities (for a study of 
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Amritsar district see e.g. Verma and Singh 2016). This is closely related to the non-
use of funding (Singh and Sohal 2016, 200–204) and the allocation of funding. 
Following an evaluation of the BADP by the Indian Government, 70 per cent of the 
funds were allocated to infrastructure developments, followed by education (19 per 
cent), the social sector (8.5 per cent) and health (3.5 per cent) in Punjab. No funds were 
allocated for agricultural development (NITI AAYOG 2015, 16). However, the Punjab 
borderland is predominantly agricultural, and, as illustrated, has been negatively 
impacted by the construction of a fence and security practices. 
The construction of a fence cut large parts of farmland off the mainland which 
restricted people’s access to their agricultural land, as highlighted in the previous 
section. To facilitate security operations to curb drug trafficking and smuggling across 
the international boundary and to reduce the hardship of farmers, it was suggested that 
the fence be moved closer to the zero line. 23.38 kilometres of fencing and 
floodlighting in Abohar tehsil in Ferozepur district in Punjab were identified for this 
project (Standing Committee on Home Affairs 2008, 10; 2011, 3; MHA 2009, 28). 
Following news reports, areas close to the villages Rose and Bohar Wadala in 
Gurdaspur district were also identified for shifting the fence (Gopal 2016). However, 
it is not clear whether these measures have been completed. Furthermore, the fence 
has to be 150 yards away from the zero line according to the West Pakistan/Punjab 
(India) Border Ground Rules, 1961. Therefore, there will always be agricultural land 
trapped between the zero line and the fence. Consequently, landowners will face 
challenges regarding access to their land unless agricultural development is placed 
above security concerns.  
Keeping in view the hardship faced by people owning land beyond the fence, the 
Punjab and Haryana High Court ruled in 2014 that the government pay a compensation 
of 10,000 rupees (about 141 US dollars) per acre annually to those owning land beyond 
the fence for the losses accrued. Recent annual reports by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
state, that 10.25 crore rupees (about 1,437,203.75 US dollars) have been released by 
the central government to the state government of Punjab under the Border Area 
Development Programme as compensation to farmers whose land is across the security 
fence (MHA 2015a, 39; 2016a, 48; 2017a, 46). However, landlords lament that they 
have not received the money and that it is not sufficient to cover losses. A news report 
suggests that the money allocated by the centre and state government for compensation 
was used for ‘other tasks’ by the Punjab government (Singh 2017). Thus, in addition 
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to being security oriented, the funds released under the BADP do not seem to reach 
those for whom they are intended. 
To summarise, while the aim of the Border Areas Development Programme is 
to spur development, a closer look at the BADP revealed that security concerns trump 
the needs of the border population in the programme design and allocation of funds. 
The border area continues to be characterised by poor infrastructure, few education 
facilities, high illiteracy rates, unemployment, the lack of higher-revenue employment 
opportunities and indebtedness of farmers, suggesting that the programme had limited 
impact on development. What we thus see is what has been referred to as the 
“securitisation of development”  (Buur, Jensen, and Stepputat 2007, 9). 
The relationship between security and development has frequently been looked 
at as a vicious circle where underdevelopment is considered to be the root of violence, 
conflict, and crime, while the latter are understood to contribute to underdevelopment 
(for a discussion see e.g. Buur, Jensen, and Stepputat 2007). However, I concur with 
Menkhaus (2004), who draws on the case of Somalia, that the securitisation of 
development in the border area is driven by the interests of the national and state 
governments, security actors and borderlanders rather than by the lack of development.  
7.4 CONCLUSION  
India’s responses to threats in the Punjab borderland – the material construction of the 
border, contemporary border guarding practices and the Border Area Development 
Programme – can be traced back to the Khalistan movement in Punjab. This chapter 
explored the implications of these responses for everyday life in the Punjab borderland 
and showed that securitisation is omnipresent and has had far-reaching socio-
economic implications, which contributed to constituting the Punjab borderland as 
crisis space. 
The Indian government evoked the image of Pakistan as national enemy and 
constructed cross-border smuggling of weapons, ammunition, drugs and people as 
existential threats to justify the construction of a fence and other border guarding 
practices along its border with Pakistan in Punjab. The representation of Pakistan as 
enemy and the materialisation of the border need to be understood as part of the 
government’s attempt to project its power “to the very edge of its territory, where it 
meets […] another sovereign power projecting its command” (Scott 2009, 11) and as 
an attempt to consolidate the state itself. As Jones (2012, 73) highlights, “[t]he 
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incorporation of previously marginal areas into the sovereign space of the state brings 
it substantially closer to the nationalist vision of a coterminous nation, state and 
territory.” Of course, while marginalised by the Indian government politically, and 
experiencing a downward trend economically, the Punjab was never as marginal as the 
Bengal borderland to which Jones refers. In fact, the Khalistan movement brought it 
to the heart of the state-making project by India, of which the construction of a fence 
was the material expression.  
The border fencing process was shaped by and shaped the natural environment. 
Nature was both part of border-making and border-evasion process, for riverine areas 
represented de facto borders and were used for smuggling purposes. Technological 
solutions replaced the fence in riverine areas, but they only received a function as 
barriers to movement through human actors. While the fence reduced the mobility of 
those the Indian government and security forces consider a threat, interviews showed 
that it also reduced the mobility of those they sought to protect: law-abiding Indian 
citizens.  
People with land beyond the fence are viewed with suspicion by the Indian 
government and security forces for cultivation up to the international boundary is 
deemed to facilitate cross-border smuggling. Security practices by India’s border 
guarding force created insecurities for farmers and agricultural labourers who own and 
work on land beyond the fence. Restrictions imposed by security forces meant that 
farmers incurred losses. As agriculture-related work is frequently the primary source 
of income, the livelihood of farmers living in the Punjab borderland is at risk due to 
security practices by India’s security forces.  
In order to counter the negative effect of the border and related practices and to 
further development, the Indian Government launched the Border Area Development 
Programme in Punjab in 1986. However, the programme is flawed due to the primacy 
of security concerns over development goals. Through the securitisation of 
development, it contributes to constituting the Punjab borderland as crisis space. This 
crisis space is clearly delimited in the Border Area Development Programme: it 
includes an area up to 40 kilometres from the international boundary. This delimitation 
is too rigid for understanding the borders of this space from a Bourdieusian 
perspective, according to which bordering practices determine the extent of this space, 
which can expand and contract across time and from actor to actor. This will become 
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clear through the analysis of everyday trade practices at the Attari-Wagah border 
crossing point in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8: TRADE PRACTICES AT THE ATTARI-WAGAH 
BORDER CROSSING POINT  
 
 
Image 8: Trucks crossing trade gate at Attari-Wagah (File Foto 2014) 
 
The Punjab borderland has been constituted as crisis space since the partition of British 
India in 1947. This crisis space has shaped everyday life in this borderland, especially 
for those owning and working on fields beyond the fence, where mobility is perceived 
and constructed as a threat by the Indian government, as I showed in the preceding 
chapters. It has also shaped the practices of those seeking to cross or to send goods 
across the Attari-Wagah border crossing point. This chapter explores everyday trade 
practices at rail and road links between the two Punjabs, with a focus on the latter. 
Every day hundreds of trucks cross the international boundary dividing Indian 
and Pakistani Punjab on the Grand Trunk Road that connects the Indian border village 
Attari with the Pakistani border village Wagah (see Image 8). The Attari-Wagah 
border crossing point is the only land route through which formal trade is permitted 
between India and Pakistan. Formal trade includes the movement of goods according 
to states’ rules and regulations as recorded in official trade statistics.88 The movement 
 
88 The emphasis on official trade statistics is important because trade through Kashmir is also governed 
by the state through rules and regulations and state officials register which goods cross the border, but 
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of goods takes place through trucks on the Grand Trunk Road, in wagons of the bi-
weekly Samjhauta Express train, which takes people from the Pakistani border town 
Lahore to the Indian border village Attari and from there through the Samjhauta Link 
Express to New Delhi, and in goods trains on the railway line between the border towns 
Lahore in Pakistan and Amritsar in India.  
The aim of this chapter is to come to a better understanding of the relationship 
between everyday trade practices at the Attari-Wagah border crossing point and 
relations between the two governments in New Delhi and Islamabad. This will be 
explored through the Commerce Secretary-led dialogue on Economic and Commercial 
Cooperation that took place in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process 
(CDP) between 2004 and 2012. The dialogue was split in two phases, from 2004 to 
2008, and from 2011 to 2012. It provided an institutional platform for cross-border 
communication, not only at the commerce secretary level, but also through various 
dedicated working groups and technical-level groups. Bilateral negotiations during the 
CDP led to several trade-related agreements, the formal establishment of channels of 
communication across the international boundary and the facilitation of movement of 
goods and people through Attari and Wagah, which are the focus of this chapter.  
Negotiations in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process reflect the 
influence of the state on bilateral trade. While states have disproportionate influence 
on the economic field because the latter developed alongside the construction of the 
state (Bourdieu 2005, 12), the main actors in the economic field are firms (Bourdieu 
2005, 193), which are sometimes able to shape the rules and regulations (Bourdieu 
2005, 195) governing trade. This highlights the need to explore the relationship 
between state and non-state actors and how they shape rules and regulations (Bourdieu 
2005, 92). In this chapter, this relationship will be studied through the role of chambers 
of commerce and industry and other business associations in shaping the (move from) 
the positive to the negative list by Pakistan. The lists detail respectively which goods 
can and cannot be imported from India. 
The cross-border movement of trucks, trains and goods, and tariffs are regulated 
by the central governments of India and Pakistan in transport and trade agreements, 
unilateral policies that determine which goods can cross the border and at what cost, 
 
this trade does not appear in official statistics on India-Pakistan trade as it is on barter basis. On intra-
Kashmir trade see e.g. Conciliation Resources (2010) and Kira (2011).  
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and regional and international trade and tariff agreements. They draw attention to the 
preponderant influence of the state in shaping everyday trade practices through rules 
and regulations. This highlights that the state not only has influence over its own 
economic field, as Bourdieu (2005, 12) already explained, but also on the economy of 
neighbouring states, as will be shown in this chapter. 
In India and Pakistan, rules and regulations on trade through Attari-Wagah were 
shaped by infrastructure developments, which are a reflection of the social space in 
which trade takes place (Bourdieu 2018). The infrastructure itself is a materialisation 
of relations between India and Pakistan as well as of the positions taken by different 
actors, for states contribute to the existence and persistence and the structures of force 
within national economic fields through investments in infrastructure (Bourdieu 
2005c, 12–13), as will be explored in Section 8.4. 
While rules, regulations and infrastructure aim to reproduced states as unitary 
actors, states delegate their authority to their employees for implementation, 
highlighting the multiplicity of actors that make up the state. State agents translate 
policies into practice. While policies are translated, they are adapted to the local 
context and the interests of a variety of actors affected by the policy in question 
(Bourdieu 2005, 126). The different and sometimes antagonistic strategies adopted by 
custom officials, traders, porters and drivers at the Attari-Wagah road border crossing 
point will be another focus of this chapter.  
Much has been written about trade relations between India and Pakistan in recent 
years, with a focus on obstacles to trade and opportunities for trade (see e.g. Taneja 
and Pohit 2015; Taneja and Dayal 2017), reviewed in detail in Section 2.1. My 
contribution to this literature lies in exploring the close relationship between processes 
in and between Islamabad and New Delhi and everyday trade practices at Attari and 
Wagah. In particular, I study the social history underpinning trade between India and 
Pakistan through three main groups of actors who shape everyday trade practices from 
different positions of power: the bureaucratic and the business elites which shape the 
economic field(s) and trade relations through rules and regulations; street-level 
bureaucrats (a term coined by Lipsky 2010 [1980]) who translate policy into practice 
through interaction with non-state actors; and traders, truck drivers and porters who 
are at the receiving end of state policy and practice and shape everyday interactions at 
Attari and Wagah.  
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This chapter is divided in five sections. Section 8.1 will outline the structural 
history of trade relations between India and Pakistan, drawing attention to the close 
link between trade relations and the development of the economic fields in India and 
Pakistan. I then turn to the policymaking process and explore the role of 
businesspeople in policymaking through chambers of commerce and industry and 
other business associations (Section 8.2). The third section will explore how everyday 
trade practices are governed through rules and regulations (Section 8.3), followed by 
an exploration of how relations between India and Pakistan materialise in 
infrastructure developments (Section 8.4). Finally, I will turn to everyday trade 
practices at Attari and Wagah and the relationship between state and non-state actors, 
outline the hierarchical relationship shaping everyday trade practices (Section 8.5).  
8.1 CONSTITUTING NATIONAL ECONOMIC FIELDS AND TRADE RELATIONS 
From 1858 till 1947, the areas now known as India and Pakistan were part of a single 
but highly fragmented economic field89 shaped through its relationship with British 
colonial rulers (Charlesworth 1982). The Punjab formally became part of this 
economic field through its annexation in 1849. It was subsequently integrated into the 
British Indian economy and became its model agricultural province and the bread 
basket of the subcontinent (Talbot 1991; 2007a). With the departure of the coloniser, 
the partition of British India and the formal creation of India and Pakistan in 1947, this 
economic field was divided. An international boundary now marked the end of a 
railway line and road, thereby disrupting the infrastructure network that represented 
the backbone of the economy during British colonial rule (Donaldson 2010). The 
arrival and departure of trains had provided employment opportunities and structured 
everyday life of people living along the railway line in the Punjab region prior to 
partition. The rupture of railway traffic therefore fundamentally affected life in these 
places (Prasad 2013; Virdee and Safdar 2017). Where people were able to take the 
road from one village to another to visit friends and family and to pursue their business, 
an international boundary now formally prevented them from doing so (Talbot 2007c, 
67–83).  
 
89 Further to differences across the subcontinent, there were independent kingdoms whose relationship 
to this economic field was shaped through their relations with the British colonial rulers, amongst others. 
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The creation of this boundary rendered economic relations international. Trade 
relations between India and Pakistan can be divided into four periods, which structure 
the following discussion. The first period started with partition and lasted until the 
second India-Pakistan war in 1965. It was characterised by a process of economic 
disintegration and the consolidation of two national economic fields. The second 
period began in 1975 and lasted until the mid-1980s. It was marked by government 
intervention. The third period began in the mid-1980s and lasted until the late-1990s. 
During this time, a pro-business orientation and economic liberalisation in India and 
in Pakistan began to shape interstate trade. Rapprochement between India and Pakistan 
following a ceasefire agreement end-2003 characterises the fourth period. The section 
will conclude by briefly outlining the core rules, regulations and agreements shaping 
trade through the Attari-Wagah road route in the post-2003 period. 
For six months, the so-called ‘Standstill Agreement’ allowed the continuation of 
business as usual. Thereafter, the movement of goods between India and Pakistan was 
regulated by thirteen trade and payment agreements signed between 1948 and 1965 
(Ghuman 1986, 92–93). Trade was high right after partition, but then declined from 
US $ 556.20 million in 1948 to US $ 24.70 million in 1959, when it reached its lowest 
point in the immediate post-partition period. Over the next six years trade levels 
averaged US $ 46.3 million annually, well below trade levels after partition. The 
second Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 was followed by a trade embargo, which led to the 
suspension of all trade links between India and Pakistan, reflected in very low levels 
of trade between 1966 and 1971, and the complete absence of trade following the war 
of independence of Bangladesh from 1972 till 1975, according to official statistics 
(IMF n.d.). This drop in trade in the post-partition period reflects the division and 
disintegration of the British Indian economic field, the creation of two separate 
economic fields and the search for new trade partners by India and Pakistan.  
The bases on which India and Pakistan could build their economies differed 
fundamentally. Pakistan’s economic basis was primarily agrarian. There was virtually 
no manufacturing capacity – there was an oil refinery, a few cotton textile plants, some 
sugar refineries, tea processing and cement manufacturing units – and some small-
scale and cottage industry in textile, bidis production (indigenous cigarettes), wheat 
milling, rice husking and the production of simple agricultural implements (Lewis 
1970, 1–3). Most industrial unites went to India, which also had the resources 
necessary for heavy industry – including coal, iron ore, manganese, bauxite, precious 
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and radioactive minerals. Because India had few jute, raw cotton and wheat resources 
(Wilcox 1964, 193, 195), it depended on Pakistan for agricultural raw materials after 
partition, including food grains, raw jute and raw cotton, whereas Pakistan depended 
on India for manufactured goods, many of which were made from raw materials 
imported from Pakistan (Lewis 1970, 2). However, relatively soon after partition, the 
governments of India and Pakistan strove to disintegrate their economies and to 
fashion separate and independent economies through regulating foreign trade and 
domestic production, with a view to establishing India and Pakistan as autonomous 
entities.  
The consolidation of India’s economic field as national proceeded along with the 
establishment of institutions like the Planning Commission and the Economic 
Committee of the Cabinet through which the state intervened in and managed the 
economy (Raghavan 2012, 114–15; see also Kudaisya 2009). The first five year plan 
(1951-56) of India, focused on developing its agricultural sector, which was further 
pursued through the second five year plan (1956-61), which additionally focused on 
developing India’s industry (especially in iron and steel) (Tyagi 1958, 4–6). In 
Pakistan, a Council of Industries was constituted, comprising industrialists, traders and 
members of state governments, which advised the government on the development of 
an industrial policy. Furthermore, boards for the regulation of the production and 
export of cotton, wool and jute were set up and the Industries Development 
Corporation Act, 1950, promoted the creation of councils for key industries, including 
jute, paper, heavy engineering and chemicals and fertilisers (Raghavan 2012, 115). 
India and Pakistan now went through, what Bourdieu (2012, 12) called, the inhabiting 
of the economic field by the state. While both states consolidated their independent 
power, they also constituted their separated economies as national through the 
provision of rules, regulations, budgets and investments (Bourdieu 2005c, 92). In 
addition to rules and regulations that aimed at unifying their respective economies, 
India and Pakistan actively sought to diversify their foreign trade in order to reduce 
interdependencies.  
Pakistan soon created custom barriers, import/export restrictions and solicited 
imports from other countries, which allowed its manufacturing sector to grow 
substantially in the period up till 1964-65 (Lewis 1970, 9). India also sought to 
strengthen its foreign trade relations, mainly with the Middle East (Tyagi 1958, 4–6). 
However, as the economies of India and Pakistan were strongly dependent on one 
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another, the regulation of interstate trade remained necessary (Raghavan 2012, 115–
16). This demonstrates that India’s and Pakistan’s economic fields were not only 
shaped by one state but by relations between states. This is because states only exist in 
relation to one another in the system of states and state-building involves a process of 
differentiation and border-making as states, and with them the different fields, become 
more mature and autonomous through rules and regulations that aim at unifying the 
different national spaces. While Bourdieu adopted a state-centric view of the economy, 
the examples of India and Pakistan highlight the need to understand the economies in 
relation to one another (see also Raghavan 2012, 112–45).  
The formation of autonomous economic fields also needs to be understood in 
relation to non-state actors, for it is firms that are the main actors in the economic field 
according to Bourdieu (2005, 193). Prior to partition, trade, industry and banking in 
the subcontinent were dominated by Hindus, Parsis and Europeans (Kochanek 1974, 
16–26; 1984, 19–27) – categories that materialised through historically constituted 
essentialisations. Few Muslims were involved in trade and those that were did not 
make the transition into industry. The partition of the subcontinent and large-scale 
migration of the Hindu business elite, however, created a vacuum in the West Pakistani 
economy that was filled by Muslim businessmen and industrialist, many of whom 
came from what was now India. They developed close ties with the political elite, 
which favoured private enterprises and rapid economic growth after partition, leading 
to the consolidation of power among a few businessmen and industrialist families 
which controlled a substantial share of Pakistan’s business assets (Papanek 1972). The 
role of these core business families was further consolidated during President Ayub 
Khan’s rule (1958-69), as they facilitated the entry of new families into commerce and 
industry and thereby broadened their power basis. Due to their dominant position in 
Pakistan’s economy, and on the basis of their wealth and financial power, they were 
referred to as the ’22 families’ (Shafqat 1988, 41), which reflects their symbolic power. 
In India, too, there was a powerful commercial elite comprising about 75 firms, which 
lobbied with the government to extract individual benefits. Its power was based on a 
close alliance with the Congress leadership, developed during the independence 
struggles for India (Kochanek 1996, 159–60). These top firms provided the leadership 
of specialised business associations which dealt with the government on a collective 
basis. However, the relative autonomy of the state, a strong believe in state intervention 
among the political and the bureaucratic elite and a relatively low status of Indian 
200 
 
businesspeople left relatively little space for the latter to shape economic policy in 
India after partition (Kochanek 1996, 157). To what extent or whether businesspeople 
sought to shape trade relations between India and Pakistan in this time period has not 
been the subject of research, to my knowledge. However, the embargo on trade from 
1965 to 1975 did certainly not leave much space for businesspeople to shape trade 
relations between India and Pakistan. After the embargo was lifted, trade took place 
through government agencies. 
In 1975, India and Pakistan resumed trade after signing a “Protocol” (1974) on 
the resumption of trade and a “Trade Agreement” (1975) – the last trade agreement 
entered by India and Pakistan that expired in June 1978 (Ghuman 1986, 52). 
Furthermore, they restored direct shipping services for trade in February 1975 
(“Protocol Regarding Shipping Services” 1975), followed by the resumption of rail 
traffic across the Attari-Wagah border crossing point for goods and passenger 
movement in July 1976 (“Agreement Relating to Rail Communication” 1976). 
However, trade levels between India and Pakistan remained relatively low, though 
they steadily increased from US$ 10.31 million in 1976 to US$ 58.20 million in 1982, 
after which trade levels dropped again (IMF n.d.). State-control over trade was high, 
as reflected in the India-Pakistan trade “Protocol” (1974) and “Trade Agreement” 
(1975), which state that “trade will be conducted on Government-to-Government basis 
or through Government Controlled Trade Corporations of the two countries.” This 
shows the states’ attempts to bring their economic fields under government control. 
Restrictive policies can explain relatively low levels of trade. From 1969 to 1973, 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (PM, 1966-77) enacted what Corbridge, Harriss, and 
Jeffrey (2012, 29) describe as dirigiste and anti-business policies, including the 
nationalisation of India’s leading banks (1969), the regulation of big firms through the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1969) and the regulation of foreign 
direct investment and technology through the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
(1973) (see e.g. chapter 3 in Panagariya 2010). In Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also 
nationalised key industries (1972), banks (1974) and insurance companies during his 
tenure as President (1971-73) and Prime Minister (1973-1977) (see e.g. Shafqat 1988), 
with the aim to restructure the economy and strip the twenty-two Pakistani business 
families of their control. However, his nationalisation policies led to an anti-Bhutto 
movement by big businesses, with the support of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
ultimately leading to the end of Bhutto’s Premiership. The demands of business people 
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were partially satisfied by the new military regime led by General Zia-ul-Haq (Chief 
Martial Law Administrator 1977-1978; President 1978-1988), which denationalised 
wheat, rice, and cotton ginning mills (1977), followed by big businesses (1978) 
(Kochanek 1984, 80–83). A pro-business orientation in India and Pakistan provided 
the background for an increase of bilateral trade in the following years.  
From 1986 onwards trade levels started increasing, rising from US$ 27.84 
million in 1986 to US$ 197.75 million in 1992. Trade levels dropped again to US$ 
104.56 million in 1993 but continued to rise up to US$ 287.28 million in 1998 (IMF 
n.d.). This rise in trade levels needs to be understood in relation to the participation of 
the private sector in bilateral trade, a pro-business orientation in India and Pakistan 
followed by economic liberalisation, and rapprochement between India and Pakistan 
from the mid-1990s. 
The bilateral “Trade Agreement” from 1975 not only stated that trade shall be 
conducted on a government-to-government basis, but also that “the two Governments 
shall encourage relevant enterprises and organizations of their respective countries to 
explore the scope for long-term contracts and, where appropriate, to conclude such 
contracts” (Article 2). While India had permitted private actors in trade even before 
the trade embargo, and the private sector had a big share in trade (Ghuman 1986, 84), 
the government of Pakistan only permitted the private sector to participate in trade 
with India in July 1976. But the government banned private actors again two years 
later (Ghuman 1986, 52, 93 note 21), when their last bilateral trade agreement expired. 
In November 1985, India and Pakistan finally agreed to allow private actors to enter 
bilateral trade (Ghuman 1986, 55), which significantly increased levels of trade 
between these two countries (Ghuman 1986, 61).  
The commercialisation of trade relations took place in the context of a pro-
business orientation by the governments in India and Pakistan in the 1980s, and 
economic liberalisation in the 1990s. Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) showed, that the 
return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980 (PM, 1980-84) was accompanied by a shift 
from a socialist rhetoric towards a pro-business orientation, which was reinforced 
through Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother in 1984 (PM, 1984-1989). 
Successive liberalisation, among it the removal of price controls and a reduction of 
corporate taxes, was accompanied by economic growth in India during the 1980s. At 
the same time, the balance of trade worsened in India, external debt rose, and the 
government found it increasingly difficult to service its debts. This provided the 
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background to an economic crisis in 1990-91 (Pedersen 2000, 271), which led the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to requested further liberalisation in 
exchange for a $ 500 million bail out for the Indian government. External pressure was 
paralleled by the spread of a neoliberal doxa, which permeated the discussions and 
perceptions of the business and political elite in India (Chopra 2003) and facilitated 
liberalisation. In Pakistan, the liberalisation of the economy during General Zia’s 
military regime (Chief Martial Law Administrator 1977-1978; President 1978-1988), 
opened up space for specialised business associations, like the Pakistan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PPMA) and the All-Pakistan Textile Mills 
Association (APTMA) in shaping policymaking (Kochanek 1984, 80–81). As 
Kochanek (1984, 82) explained: “Collective action to influence the major directions 
of public policy now replaced the older struggle for distributive benefits.” Benazir 
Bhutto, who succeeded Zia as Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1988 (PM, 1988-90; 1993-
96), embarked on further denationalising the economy and encouraging privatisation. 
However, her government did not develop a coherent privatisation policy which 
weakened the confidence of industrialists in Bhutto (Shafqat 1996, 665–66).  
The rise in trade levels during that period also needs to be understood in the 
context of rapprochement between India and Pakistan. In the mid-1990s, India and 
Pakistan started exchanging ‘non-papers’ on Kashmir (Official Spokesman MEA 
1994), followed by the institutionalisation of a dialogue process to address all issues 
of mutual concern in an integrated manner in 1997. The announcement of this so-called 
Composite Dialogue Process was made on the sidelines of a summit of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was established in 1985. 
SAARC promotes the development of economic and regional integration through the 
SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), which entered into force in 
1995, thus highlighting how the regional environment was favourable for enhancing 
trade. In 1996, India extended the Most Favoured Nation status to Pakistan. The Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) status is an economic principle to which all members in 
theory agree when they sign the General Agreement on Tariffs in Trade (GATT), 
replaced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. It implies that no country 
can discriminate between GATT/WTO trading partners when it comes to the import 
of goods or tariffs, unless they are exempted from this rule (WTO n.d.), as were India 
and Pakistan when they joined GATT in 1948 (GATT 1947, Part III, Article XXIV, 
paragraph 11). This highlights the close link between bilateral trade and the global 
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economic field. India replaced its positive list on imports and eliminated any Pakistan-
specific restrictions on the import of goods and tariffs. However, the momentum 
created through the Composite Dialogue Process and closer regional cooperation was 
short-lived, as India and Pakistan proceeded to nuclear tests in May 1998, followed by 
a limited war in Kargil in Kashmir in 1999. After attacks on the Indian Parliament in 
December 2001, trade through the land route was suspended until January 2004 and 
shifted from the rail to the sea route (Taneja 2008, 84–85).  
In November 2003, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire and railway 
delegations from India and Pakistan subsequently agreed to resume the freight and 
passenger services with effect from January 15, 2004 (“Joint Press Statement on 
Samjhauta Express” 2003). In July 2005, Pakistan also opened the Attari-Wagah road 
route for bilateral trade for the first time since partition, in addition to transit trade to 
Afghanistan.90 The latter was opened for the cross-border movement of trucks up to 
designated areas in India and Pakistan in 2007, which further facilitated bilateral trade. 
As is clear from Figure 1, trade between India and Pakistan reached unprecedented 
levels in the post-2003 period, with the bulk of goods moving from India to Pakistan. 
Trade through the rail route is governed by the bilateral Railway Agreement from 
1976, whereas trade through the road route is regulated through mutual understandings 
reached in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process on Economic and 
Commercial Cooperation, which were later translated into Standard Operating 
Procedures at Attari and Wagah. Trade is also shaped by the MFN status under the 
GATT/WTO agreements, and, since 2006, through the South Asian Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA), through which South Asian members agreed to reduce their tariffs on 
imports to 5 per cent, except for items listed under the sensitive list of each country. 
When India upgraded its infrastructure at Attari in 2012, Pakistan replaced its positive 
list for imports from India with a negative list, detailing all those items that could not 
be imported from India. Combined with India’s import and export policies, it 
determined which items can be traded between India and Pakistan and at what tariff. 
All taken together explains the hike in trade post-2003. 
 
 
90 India had already notified the Attari-Wagah land route and several other border crossing points as 
Land Customs Stations (LCSs) for the clearance of goods in 1994 (“Notification 93/04-Customs (NT)” 
1994). Other LCSs along the India-Pakistan border in the Punjab include Khalra (Patti-Khalra-Lahore 
road) in Amritsar District and Hussainiwala (Ferozepur-Lasur road) in Ferozepur District. 
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Figure 1: India-Pakistan Trade in US $ Million, 1948-201891 
 
The rising trade levels, while often referred to, are seldom studied in their micro-
political and economic dimensions. The next section attempts to close this gap by 
exploring everyday trade practices at the Attari-Wagah border crossing point, 
emphasising interactions of state and non-state actors in cross-border trade.  
8.2 POLICYMAKING THROUGH COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATIONS 
Firms are the main actors in national economic fields (Bourdieu 2005, 193) and foreign 
trade relations. Dominant business actors are at times able to influence the rules of 
economic transactions (Bourdieu 2005c, 195), thereby shaping everyday trade 
practices. These regularities and rules are translated into policy by state actors 
(Bourdieu 2005c, 12–13) through interaction with the private sector, as I explore in 
this section. Business actors have shaped policies through business associations and 
chambers of commerce and industry, which not only provided an important link 
between the government and the private sector in their respective countries but also 
between India and Pakistan. In this section, their influence on policymaking will be 
explored regarding Pakistan’s positive and negative lists on imports from India, which 
detail respectively which goods can and cannot be imported from India. It is shown 
that the relationship between state and private actors has been renegotiated in recent 
years and that business actors’ space to shape policymaking in Pakistan has increased. 
 
91 The figure is made from data from the IMF (n.d.). 
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Until 2012, Pakistani imports from India took place under a positive list 
approach, according to which only a small number of items could be imported from 
India. Over time, Pakistan gradually increased the number of items that could be 
imported, from 770 items in 2005 (Import Policy Order 2005) to 1,946 items in 2009 
(Import Policy Order 2009). In 2012, Pakistan replaced its positive list with a negative 
list of 1,209 items that could not be imported through the sea, rail and air routes (Import 
Policy Order 2009 Amendment 2012), thereby opening its economy to imports from 
India. However, it maintained a small positive list of 137 items that could be imported 
through the road route, which significantly limited the number of items that could be 
imported through this route. 
The positive and negative list approaches taken by Pakistan regarding its imports 
from India were major points of discussion during the Commerce Secretary-led 
Composite Dialogue Process on Economic and Commercial Cooperation. Initially, 
conversations concentrated on increasing the number of items on the positive list 
importable from India. This involved both an internal process in Pakistan and 
deliberations with their Indian counterpart in the framework of the dialogue. During 
the third round of Commerce Secretary (CS)-led talks, Pakistan agreed to “consider 
enlarging the list of importable items from India in consultation with stakeholders and 
after fulfilling legal and procedural requirements” (Joint Statement CS 2006). These 
‘legal and procedural requirements’ involved Cabinet approval in Pakistan. As the 
former Additional Joint Secretary (Trade Diplomacy) of Pakistan, Robina Ather (f), 
explained: 
The positive list was an internal arrangement within the government that 
if an industry apply that this particular item should be, we need this as a 
raw material to import it from India, it would go to the cabinet and the 
cabinet approves, if the cabinet approves, then this item would be added 
to the positive list. This was the arrangement at that point.  
I: So it was always the cabinet that had to approve it? 
Yes. Yes. It was always the cabinet that had to approve. Only then this 
one particular item could be added onto the list. (Robina Ather (f), 
Islamabad, 28.03.2017) 
Cabinet approval was not only required to increase the number of items on the positive 
list but also to change from the positive to the negative list and to phase out the latter 
for full ‘trade normalisation,’ as this process is generally referred to in the Composite 
Dialogue Process. The need for Cabinet approval highlights the highly political nature 
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of bilateral trade. It indicates, that bureaucrats cannot make changes to trade relations 
with India without political consent.  
Which items were to be included in the positive list was also influenced by 
Indian government officials. During the fourth round of bilateral talks, “The Indian 
delegation handed over a list of 484 tariff lines for inclusion in the Positive List of 
items importable from India. The Pakistan side agreed to examine the request “in 
consultation with stakeholders” (Joint Statement CS 2007). Subsequently, the positive 
list was increased from 773 items in July 2006 (Import Policy Order 2006) to 1802 
items in October 2007 (Import Policy Order 2007). In reaction to continuously 
increasing the number of items in the positive list, Pakistan eventually agreed to 
replace the positive list with a negative list and promised to identify items that cannot 
be imported in consultation with “all stakeholders including business chambers and 
trade bodies” (Minutes CS 2011). In March 2012, a negative list was published, with 
1,209 items banned for import from India (Import Policy Order 2009 Amendment 
2012). The aim was to dismantle the negative list altogether by the end of 2012 and to 
trade under the regional South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) (Joint Statement CS 
2012). However, the end of the Composite Dialogue Process in 2012 precluded this 
move. 
The references in joint statements and minutes of bilateral meetings to a 
‘consultation process’ with ‘stakeholders’, including business chambers and trade 
bodies by Pakistan suggests that bureaucrats in the Ministry of Commerce in Pakistan 
were aware that Cabinet approval was not sufficient for policy changes and that 
business people had to be taken on board for such changes to be effective. This 
indicates a change of thinking on part of government officials regarding the role of 
businesspeople in policymaking compared to the 1970s when business associations 
and chambers of commerce were highly governmentalized and there was little space 
for collective action by the private sector (Kochanek 1984, 80–81, 122–39).92  
 
92 This is the last study published on business associations in Pakistan to my knowledge, hence the 
reference to the 1970s. Nadvi (1999) conducted a study on the surgical instrument industry in Sialkot 
in 1994, demonstrating that business associations were able to influence the government to invest in the 
economy. This suggests that the space for business associations was increasing with privatisation during 
Benazir Bhutto’s (PM 1988-90; 1993-96) and more importantly Nawaz Sharif’s (PM 1990-93; 1997-
99) premiership in the 1980s and 90s. However, Nawaz Sharif’s hold of the business community was 
weak. As Rizvi (1999, 181) noted, the business community, which was traditionally a stronghold of 
Nawaz Sharif, foiled two attempts of the government to impose a general sales tax. This highlights the 
government’s weakness vis-à-vis the business community as a whole. 
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Though the space for businesspeople and associations in shaping policymaking 
may be increasing, which can be related to broader processes of liberalisation, their 
influence vis-à-vis government officials remains limited. How elite government 
officials position themselves in relation to businesspeople in the policymaking process 
can be gauged from the following statement by a former Joint Secretary (Foreign 
Trade) of Pakistan who explained: 
We meet with the chambers and these businessmen also come to these 
meetings and we have a very open discussion about serious concerns and 
see how genuine they are. If we are convinced that their concerns are 
genuine, then we find a way to accommodate them. (Shafi Tarar (m), 
Islamabad, 05.04.2017) 
Government officials are the last instance in the policymaking process, in which 
bureaucrats play an important role. In Pakistan, the bureaucracy is recognised as a 
relatively autonomous entity (Hull 2012, 5), whose dominant position grew out of the 
bureaucracy’s colonial and post-colonial experience (Alavi 1973; 1983; 1990; Jalal 
1991, 136–93). However, the relative autonomy of the bureaucracy in policymaking 
with regard to trade with India is contingent on its relationship with the political elite.  
The ability for bureaucrats to create new policy for bilateral trade ceased with the end 
of the Composite Dialogue Process in 2012, leaving it to businesspeople to take the 
process of trade normalisation forward.   
The Pakistani business sector is made up of three interrelated groups: individual 
families and firms, industry associations and chambers of commerce, which each have 
their own influence on policymaking. While business and industrial families are said 
to have established personal contacts with the bureaucracy and political leadership 
which they attempt to mobilise to secure individual benefits, smaller and medium-
sized businesses in Pakistan have joined forces in industry-specific business 
associations or broadly organised chambers of commerce (Kochanek 1984, 99–100). 
Association and chambers are used to influence policy and trade relations between 
India and Pakistan. As the following statement by a former Joint Secretary (Foreign 
Trade) of Pakistan exemplifies, a consultation process between the bureaucracy and 
business associations was key to creating the negative list in Pakistan: 
Not individual businessmen, the chambers and associations [were 
consulted]. See, we cannot reach out to all the businessmen in the 
industry. So basically they are represented through these associations and 
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chambers and we meet with the chambers and these businessmen also 
come to these meetings. (Shafi Tarar (m), Islamabad, 05.04.2017) 
There is a direct link between powerful individual businessmen and industrialists and 
business associations and chambers of commerce and industry. This is because every 
trader needs to be registered with a trade body as they are the only organisations which 
can issue certificates of origin, which are required for export. All traders interviewed 
were members of different chambers and business associations, notably the Lahore 
and the Rawalpindi Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Pakistan and the Progress 
Harmony Development Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHD CCI) and the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in India. Further research is required to 
ascertain the role that individual businesspeople and industrialists or families play 
within chambers of commerce and business associations (for earlier studies on this 
matter see e.g. Kochanek 1974, 1995, 1996, on India; and 1984, on Pakistan).  
Pakistani businesspeople were divided over whether to promote closer trade 
relations between India and Pakistan, with some being in favour and others against. 
Their struggle to influence trade relations became particularly apparent through their 
representation in business associations and chambers of commerce. The former had 
considerable influence on the items on Pakistan’s negative list that has governed trade 
between India and Pakistan since 2012. 
There were several industries in Pakistan which were initially opposed to 
opening trade with India by increasing the number of items on the positive list or 
removing restrictions under the negative list or the sensitive list under SAFTA. 
Opposition to opening the Pakistani economy to imports from India was particularly 
strong among sections of the automobile, the pharmaceutical, the agriculture, the 
textile (including polyester staple fibre) (Shafi Tarar (m), Islamabad, 05.04.2017) and 
the iron and steel industries (Robiner Ather (f), Islamabad, 28.03.2017). These 
industries are represented through different business associations, including the All 
Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA), the Pakistan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (PPMA), the Pakistan Association of Automotive Parts 
Accessories Manufacturers (PAAPAM), the Pakistan Automotive Manufacturers 
Association (PAMA), and the Farmers Association of Pakistan (FAP), amongst others.  
The relative influence of these different sectors and associations on 
policymaking can be gauged from a closer look at Pakistan’s negative and sensitive 
lists. The latter is important because some industries were willing to remove items 
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from the negative list, provided they were guaranteed higher tariffs through the 
sensitive list under SAFTA, according to a former Joint Secretary (Foreign Trade) of 
Pakistan (Shafi Tarar (m), Islamabad, 05.04.2017). Under Pakistan’s negative and 
sensitive lists, the textile and clothing, the pharmaceutical and the automobile sectors 
are well-protected. By contrast, many agricultural items are found on Pakistan’s 
positive list for imports through the road route, suggesting that the agricultural sector 
was relatively less powerful in the policymaking process.93  
Sector-specific business associations were the first to carve out some space for 
collective action in Pakistan in the mid-1970s. As Kochanek (1984, 81–82) notes: 
“[t]he most active [private organisations] were not the broadly based regional 
association[s] but the specialized associations like the Pakistan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (PPMA), the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), and the All-
Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA).” Together with the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Karachi, they were the most effective spokesmen of 
businesspeople during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s regime. Representatives of leading 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Pakistan now perceive themselves to be able 
to play an important role in shaping trade relations between India and Pakistan (Raja 
Amer Iqbal (m), Rawalpindi, 21.03.2017), for they also represent the interests of these 
different sectors (Shahid Khalil (m), Lahore, 07.03.2017). This indicates a change in 
the power basis of sector-specific business associations vis-à-vis Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, at least when it comes to trade between India and Pakistan. 
In 2011, six chambers were officially recognised by India and Pakistan in the 
framework of the Composite Dialogue Process, three in India and three in Pakistan. In 
Pakistan, this included the Karachi (KCCI), the Lahore (LCCI) and the apex 
Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) (Minutes JWG 
2011). By contrast, no sector-specific association was officially recognised, thus 
highlighting the centrality of chambers of commerce and industry to India-Pakistan 
trade relations. However, not all chambers are considered equally influential. 
Describing the relative position of these chambers vis-à-vis one another, a former 
 
93  For detailed discussions of the different sectors and India-Pakistan trade see the following 
publications on the pharmaceutical industry (Ahmed and Batool 2017; Pant and Pande 2017), on the 
textile and clothing industry (Taneja, Ray, and Pande 2017), on the automobile industry (Nag 2017), 
and on the agricultural sector (Chand and Saxena 2017; Khan and Hussain 2014). 
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Senior Vice President of the Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI) 
explained: 
There are bigger organisations, like the Karachi chamber, which is also 
very important. It’s the biggest. The second biggest is Lahore. The Lahore 
Chamber of Commerce has a lot of say in making a budget, making 
suggestions and all that. In fact, all chambers make suggestions to the 
FPCCI and the FPCCI passes it on to the Finance Minister. They have 
very frequent meetings with the Finance Minister and the Chairman of 
the FBR- Federal Board of Revenue. Sometimes they also approach us 
[at the ICCI] for recommendations. (Khalid Malik (m), Islamabad, 
03.04.2017) 
The influence of these chambers varies from region to region. As a former Chairman 
Co-ordination of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(FPCCI) added: 
The Karachi chamber has influence in the province of Sindh and also in 
the federal area because the members of the Karachi chamber are very 
influential. They are very big entrepreneurs. They are very big 
industrialists. Their stakes are higher than those of any other chamber in 
Pakistan. The same is the case with Lahore. Lahore is the biggest chamber 
in the province of Punjab. So they have got their own identity, their own 
importance by sitting in Punjab. Both, the Lahore and Karachi chambers 
play a very important role in the economy of the country, nationally and 
internationally, both. (Malik Sohail Hussain (m), Islamabad, 03.04.2017) 
Businesspeople affiliated with the Karachi and the Lahore chambers compete for trade 
between India and Pakistan. Until 1999, the rail route was the most important trade 
link between these two countries. However, trade then shifted to the sea route (Taneja 
2008, 84–85). This can in part be attributed to a crisis in relations between India and 
Pakistan following attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001, which led to the 
temporary closure of the land route for trade between December 2001 and January 
2004. This was followed by the revision of a restrictive maritime protocol in 2005, 
which made trade through the sea route more economically viable. However, with the 
resumption of trade via rail in January 2004 and the opening of the road route for trade 
in July 2005, the sea route again lost some trade to the land route. While the sea route 
accounted for 92 per cent and 97 per cent of Indian exports to and imports from 
Pakistan in 2002-03 respectively, this share dropped to 87 per cent and 72 per cent in 
2006-07 for exports and imports respectively (Taneja 2008, 84–85). Today, the value 
of Indian exports to Pakistan far exceeds the value of imports. However, the land route 
only accounts for about 13 per cent of Indian exports to Pakistan, thus pointing to the 
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significance of the sea route for bilateral trade. Though significantly smaller in value, 
about 46 per cent of all Indian imports from Pakistan take place through the land route 
(road and rail) (calculations based on port-wise trade data on the financial year 2018-
19 retrieved from the “Export Import Data Bank” n.d.). The majority of land-based 
exports is done through rail and not through road, which can be linked to Pakistan’s 
restrictive import policy in force since 2012, which limits imports through the road 
route to 137 items. A businessman from Amritsar suggested that restrictions on road-
based trade through Attari-Wagah from 2012 in the form of a positive list of 137 items 
may have been imposed in part because the Karachi chamber put pressure on the 
government to restrict trade through the land route so that trade would have to be 
routed through Karachi (Kabir Singh (m), Amritsar, 08.12.2015). Though not 
implausible, he was the only person to suggested that and I am not sure whether the 
Karachi chamber did exert influence on the government in this regard. In fact, others 
have suggested that such restrictions were imposed due to the lack of infrastructure at 
Wagah to handle larger volumes of trade and for political reasons. 
The Lahore Chamber has been at the forefront of promoting trade through the 
Attari-Wagah border crossing point and is widely regarded as the most influential 
chamber in Punjab. Lahore is another industrial centre in Pakistan and the LCCI has 
many influential businesspeople as members. It has a dedicated Standing Committee 
on India-Pakistan Trade which comprises ten businesspeople from relevant sectors, 
which regularly invites government officials to discuss issues experienced by traders 
(Amrita Cheema (f), Lahore, 07.03.2017), thus providing a direct link between the 
government and the private sector. The committee addresses specific issues that arise 
in relation to trade through the Attar-Wagah land route, such as the absence of testing 
and laboratory services, delays in the trading process due to scanning issues and the 
like (Amrita Cheema (f), Lahore, 07.03.2017). The committee itself is more concerned 
with practical issues rather than policy matters. However, the Lahore Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry has been an important actor when it comes to facilitating trade 
between India and Pakistan.  
Pakistani and Indian chambers of commerce have worked closely together to 
facilitate bilateral trade. This primarily led to closer cooperation between chambers 
present in the landlocked Punjab and those at seaports. In 2011, three Indian chambers 
were officially recognised by India and Pakistan in the framework of the Composite 
Dialogue Process, including the Progress Harmony Development Chamber of 
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Commerce and Industry (PHD CCI), the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(BCCI) and the apex Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI) (Minutes JWG 2011). FICCI and the Pakistani apex chamber FPCCI have 
long worked together. They exchanged trade delegations in the early 1980s (Ghuman 
1986, 94, note 23) and signed a Memorandum of Understanding to jointly form the 
India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IPCCI) in 1999. Under the 
umbrella of the IPCCI, FICCI and FPCCI have exchanged various business 
delegations, among others during trade fairs (Acharya and Marwaha 2012, 55). A 
representative of FICCI explained, that they worked closely with their Pakistani 
counterparts when it comes to the move from the positive to the negative list in 
Pakistan: 
The shift from the positive list to the negative list. Here we have been 
playing a very, very crucial role through the chambers of commerce of 
India and Pakistan by creating an opinion in Pakistan through the business 
community that by restricting items in the positive list trade cannot grow 
as much as its potential. So we have been able to influence the business 
community in Pakistan to rally from their end with their government to 
move it from the positive list to the negative list. And also now reducing 
the items in the negative list as much as possible. So this is a very, very 
strong policy move where we have been able to contribute quite a bit. 
(Goutam Ghosh (m), New Delhi, 06.10.2015) 
Such cooperation also took place through other chambers. Heeding the bilateral 
agreement to explore the possibility of setting up joint chambers (Minutes CS 2011), 
the Karachi and Mumbai chambers signed a cooperation agreement to establish a 
Bombay-Karachi Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 2011 (The Express 
Tribune 2011). However, they are waiting for government approval to date. Between 
2005 and 2012, the Lahore chamber signed three Memoranda of Understanding with 
its Indian counterpart the PHD chamber, according to official records by the LCCI 
(n.d.). The MoU’s aimed at enhancing bilateral trade relations, promoting trade 
through Attari-Wagah, exchanging trade delegations, facilitating B2B meetings, 
enhancing mutual cooperation and increasing visa facilities. Like the Lahore chamber 
in Pakistan, the PHD chamber has a regional office in Chandigarh, the state capital of 
Punjab. This has meant that representatives of these two chambers worked particularly 
closely together on matters relating to trade through the Attari-Wagah border crossing 
point. Interviews also pointed to the role of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) 
and the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) 
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in shaping bilateral trade relations through informing policy-changes and providing a 
bridge between the government and the private sector. According to a long-term active 
member of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII),  
[W]e at CII proposed the idea [of the negative list], kept following it up, 
but the catalyst became ICRIER. Because ICRIER was designated with 
the task of doing that [by the Indian government]. (Kabir Singh (m), 
Amritsar, 08.12.2015) 
CII is the only chamber with a regional office in Amritsar, highlighting that they are 
privy to trade practices at Attari and Wagah. Furthermore, CII, together with the 
Pakistan Business Council, is the secretariat of the India-Pakistan Joint Business 
Council (also referred to as Pakistan India Joint Business Forum, PIJBF n.d.), which 
was officially proposed by the Commerce Ministers of India and Pakistan in 2012, “as 
an additional institutional framework for regular and sustained dialogue between the 
business communities” from India and Pakistan (Joint Statement CM 2012). A former 
Additional Secretary Commerce (Trade Diplomacy) of Pakistan, who had proposed 
setting up the Joint Business Forum in the first instance, explained that the purpose of 
the forum was to facilitate communication among businesspeople: 
We set up a, what we call the Pakistan-India Business Forum. The forum 
was basically…the idea was at that point, and that was my idea which 
was later accepted, I said we had a history of this official dialogue 
stopping and then resuming, so let’s set up some body which could 
continue. That was the idea to set up the business forum so that the 
businesspeople could communicate whatever the political conditions or 
the official dialogue is. (Robina Ather (f), Islamabad, 28.03.2017) 
The India-Pakistan Joint Business Council was formally notified in March 2013, 
including fifteen prominent businesspeople from India and Pakistan (Basu 2013). The 
PIJBF set up several sector-specific taskforces relating to trade in agriculture, auto and 
engineering, banking, textiles, pharmaceuticals and energy (PIJBF n.d.), which held 
regular meetings for about three years. In 2016, the sixth and till now last meeting of 
the Joint Business Forum took place (Basu 2016), suggesting that cooperation in this 
forum has been limited. As the above quoted former Additional Commerce Secretary 
(Trade Diplomacy), Robina Ather (f, Islamabad, 28.03.2017) of Pakistan explained: 
The idea was that the business forum could resolve these issues 
themselves, that they could then recommend to the governments what 
should be further done to improve the trade between the two countries. 
[…] But I haven’t received or seen anything, any recommendations 
coming out of there.  
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That forum was really useful in the first two three meetings and they set 
up different working groups to do research and to [not understandable] 
but unfortunately that business forum also, like the official forum, became 
useless over time.  
This may in part be due to overlap with other collaborative initiatives, such as the 
India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IPCCI), though I suggested above 
that this collaboration effort is also limited.  
The most sustained cooperation probably took place with regard to the 
organisation of bilateral and regional trade fairs in India and Pakistan. Among them, 
the Punjab International Trade Expo (PITEX), which takes place in Amritsar in 
December annually, was probably the most prominent event, at least in Northern India. 
It started as the Indo-Pak International Trade Expo (IPEX) in 2005. However, as more 
and more representatives from other SAARC countries joined, it was renamed into the 
Punjab International Trade Expo (PITEX). It is organised by exhibition experts 
through the Rawalpindi and the PHD Chambers of Commerce and Industry, though 
many exhibitors from Pakistan come through the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. In 2016, demonetisation by India kept many Pakistani businesspeople away 
from PITEX, for there was not enough cash available in the market for Indians to spend 
on merchandise. The deterioration of bilateral relations in the following year kept all 
those Pakistanis away that required a visa. As Anil Khaitan, the President of the PHD 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry explained to the press: “It is a matter between the 
governments of both the nations that traders from the other side of the border did not 
make it to the expo this time.” (quoted in The Tribune 2017b). The same was the case 
in 2018, when “On the [Punjab] state government’s behalf, Vinni Mahajan, Additional 
Chief Secretary, Industries and Commerce, had written to the MEA [Indian Ministry 
of External Affairs] for facilitating visa for Pakistani exhibitors for PITEX, but it flatly 
refused to consider it,” according to RS Sachdeva, chairman of the Punjab chapter of 
the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry (quoted in Paul 2018b).94 Cooperation 
between business associations and chambers is shaped by relations between the 
governments of India and Pakistan, for such events cannot take place without their 
approval. Indeed, the end of the Composite Dialogue Process in 2012 also led to a 
 
94 The visa process is crucial to trade relations between India and Pakistan, which reproduces existing 
hierarchies among the business community. However, the lack of space in this dissertation prevents me 
from elaborating on this matter. 
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decline in formal business-to-business cooperation because effective cooperation 
requires government support. 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that businesspeople in Pakistan, 
through collaborative efforts with businesspeople in India, have been able to shape 
policymaking with regard to the positive and the negative lists. It highlighted, that the 
space for business associations and chambers of commerce to shape policymaking has 
increased in Pakistan in recent years. The increasing role of business actors in shaping 
trade relations between India and Pakistan does not signify the ‘decline of the state.’ 
Rather, we see that the relationship between the public and the private is renegotiated, 
with the help of bureaucrats, diplomats and politicians who promote a liberal economic 
model. Cooperation in the framework of the Composite Dialogue on Economic and 
Commercial Cooperation was instrumental. However, the end of the Composite 
Dialogue Process in 2012 also ended government-to-government cooperation and 
prevented the realisation of initiatives like the creation of a Bombay-Karachi Joint 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This left the business sector to take things 
forward. But collaborative efforts at the chamber level did not proof sustainable, as in 
the case of the India-Pakistan Joint Business Council or bilateral trade fairs due to 
changes in the political climate since 2012.  
8.3 GOVERNING EVERYDAY TRADE PRACTICES THROUGH RULES AND 
REGULATIONS  
States produce and reproduce foreign trade relations through rules and regulations that 
aim at streamlining everyday trade practices and at removing the discretionary power 
of individual state actors from the process. Once rules and regulations are in place, 
they are difficult to circumvent, as research on everyday trade practices at Attari-
Wagah showed. Even powerful actors with the ‘right’ connections struggled to extract 
individual benefits from the bureaucratic elite that upholds and perpetuates the state 
from the national capitals, Islamabad and New Delhi.  
The preponderant role of rules and regulations in shaping trade relations between 
India and Pakistan became apparent in February 2019, when things came to a head 
between these two neighbours following a suicide bombing in Indian-administered 
Kashmir, killing 40 Indian paramilitary officers and the perpetrator. The day after the 
attack in Pulwama, India’s Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced in a TV statement 
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that “the most favoured nation status which had been granted to Pakistan [in 1996] 
stands withdrawn” (“Pulwama Terror Attack: Centre Withdraws MFN Status from 
Pakistan” 2019). India and Pakistan went through a crisis, during which political 
concerns came to dominate economic relations. This shows that a crisis in one field 
can lead to a crisis in another field, as Bourdieu suggested in The Critical Moment 
(Bourdieu 1990, 159–93). 
In 1996, India had granted MFN status to Pakistan, thereby removing any 
country-specific restrictions on trade. Pakistan never reciprocated. Discussions during 
the Composite Dialogue Process on Economic and Commercial Cooperation focused 
on Pakistan extending MFN status to India. In 2011, Pakistan agreed to accord MFN 
status to India (Joint Statement CS 2011). However, a former President of the Lahore 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry explained that there was opposition to the 
nomenclature in Pakistan: 
Pakistan chewed on it and dragged its feet on the most favourite nation 
status and still has not given it to India. That is just due to the 
nomenclature as the ‘most favourite nation’, which we explained to 
everybody doesn’t mean that we are in favour of India. It is just a 
nomenclature by the World Bank so that you have certain agreements 
with the nation, which you call most favourite, and you do business with 
them. (Sohail Lashari (m), Lahore, 16.03.2017) 
Internal opposition to calling India the most favoured nation led Pakistan to rename 
the MFN status into Non-Discriminatory Market Access (NDMA) in 2014 (Joint 
Statement CM 2014). But Pakistan never extended MFN status/NDMA to India. In 
February 2019, India withdrew the MFN status from Pakistan. 
By withdrawing the MFN status from Pakistan on 15 February 2019, India was 
no longer bound by this GATT/WTO rule. The Indian Customs’ authority imposed 
duties of 200 per cent on “[a]ll goods originating in or exported from the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan” from February 16, thereby rendering imports from Pakistan 
unprofitable (Customs 2019). The Indian customs clearing agent Jaspal Singh 
explained that duties were now higher than the value of the goods themselves:  
A bag of Pakistani cement that costs between Rs 250-Rs 300 would now 
invite an import duty of Rs 800 each. Similarly, the duty on a truck load 
of dry date which was Rs 2.22 lakh earlier has now been hiked to Rs 32 
lakh, including the GST [Goods and Services Tax]. (quoted in Paul 
2019b).  
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With the withdrawal of the MFN status, the Indian government did not severe the trade 
links between India and Pakistan, but it raised the costs of trade, both material and 
immaterial, to such an extent that it was no longer feasible to do trade for most people. 
Upon the increase in duties, Indian importers refused to pay for the clearance of goods 
and even cancelled already placed orders (Mirza 2019; Anil Sharma 2019). By doing 
so, they hit their trade partners, who are often well-known to them and personal 
friends. Most of those trading through the land route are small and medium-sized 
traders who entered trade to take advantage of price differences between India and 
Pakistan and proximity to the neighbour to keep transportation costs low.  
Following the increase in tariffs, trade at the road and rail routes connecting India 
and Pakistan via the border villages Attari and Wagah came to a halt. While 19 rail 
wagons were exported to Pakistan on February 21, there have been no further exports 
since according to a news report published in the end of February 2019. Furthermore, 
Indian railway officials explained that 42 wagons loaded with chemicals, dyes, 
agricultural machinery and yarn destined for Pakistan are stuck at the railway station 
in Amritsar (Roy 2019). Likewise, trucks loaded with cement, gypsum, chemicals, dry 
dates and other products destined for India and Pakistan were stuck at Attari and 
Wagah, building long queues on the roads leading to the border crossing point 
(Business Today 2019; Mehmood 2019).  
As a result of the breakdown in trade, truck drivers struggled to make ends meet. 
Following a Pakistani news report, drivers had to sleep in their vehicles, were running 
out of money for food as they were waiting to deliver their products, and the rent for 
trucks was building up (Mehmood 2019), thus putting them under financial pressure. 
According to members of the Attari Border Truck Operators Association, they had 
about 500 trucks at their disposal (Utam Singh (m), Attari, 08.05.2017). But following 
the breakdown in bilateral trade, the number dwindled to about 250, according to 
Subeg Singh, the chief of the Attari Truck Union. Sukhdev Singh, a truck operator 
from the village Gharinda explained to the press that he had to sell three of his five 
trucks because he was unable to pay for the loan and quarterly tax returns (quoted in 
Bagga 2019). Not all drivers are registered with the Attari Border Truck Operators 
Association, indicating that even more drivers and their families are affected by the 
withdrawal of the MFN status. Furthermore, these numbers only take into account the 
drivers affected on the Indian side, the same is true on the Pakistani side of the border. 
Of course, the work of drivers is not restricted to trade with Pakistan, but bilateral trade 
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provides an important source of employment as the increase of members in the Attari 
Border Truck Operators Association from 60 in 2011 to about 500 in 2017 (Utam 
Singh (m), Attari, 08.05.2017) and the decrease to about 250 in 2019 indicate (quoted 
in Bagga 2019).  
The breakdown of trade also affected porters who manually load and unload 
trucks and railway wagons at the Integrated Check Post (ICP) Attari and the Land 
Freight Unit (LFU) Wagah and at the Lahore and the Amritsar railway stations 
respectively. Reflecting on the implications of the policy change on porters, Pardeep 
Sehgal, President of the Indo-Pak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, commented: 
India’s decision to hit the neighbouring country financially is good, but 
our government must also think about those who make their ends meet 
from the ICP [Integrated Check Post Attari]. Around 1,500 workers, 
including porters, work there. The government should arrange for their 
employment. (quoted in Sharma 2019) 
A former porter, who worked on the Indian side of the border from 1976, explained 
that the approximately 1,500 labourers from surrounding villages are divided in two 
groups of 750 each who work on alternate days, earning about INR 500 to 600 per day 
(US$ 7-8.5), depending on how many bags they have lifted. For each 50 kg bag they 
were paid INR 2 (US$ 0.02), which was increased to INR 2.5 (US$ 0.03) after strikes 
(Gaganjot Singh (m), Attari, 09.05.2017). The figures presented here obviously only 
relate to porters working at the ICP Attari. There are also labourers at the LFU Wagah, 
and at the Lahore and Amritsar railway stations that are affected by the breakdown in 
trade. They lost a key and often the only source of income, whereby the withdrawal of 
the MFN status also affected their families and thus everyday life. Most of the 
labourers are now jobless or picked up work elsewhere. As Amrik Singh from the 
village Bachiwind explained to the press, “They have now taken up odd jobs in the 
city while unregistered workers have returned to their families in UP [Uttar Pradesh] 
and Maharashtra” (quoted in Bagga 2019). 
The withdrawal of the MFN status by India in February 2019 was an 
unprecedented step that shows that trade between India and Pakistan was also shaped 
by crises. This crisis in relations between India and Pakistan led to the politicisation 
of trade and related practices. Now political concerns became primary and economic 
matters were subordinate to them. The politicisation of trade not only affected trade 
practices, but also the lives of all those who depend on trade for their survival. The 
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removal of the MFN status was an exceptional move to control cross-border trade. 
Everyday trade practices were also closely shaped by states. This is visible in everyday 
encounters between the state and businesspeople in India and Pakistan, as the 
following examples from India and Pakistan demonstrate. 
While India had accord the MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, and thereby 
eliminated any country-specific trade and tariff barriers on trade between India and 
Pakistan, India maintained lists of items for which import is banned/prohibited (e.g. 
tallow, fat, oils of animal origin), restricted (e.g. livestock, chemicals), and ‘canalised’ 
(e.g. some pharmaceuticals), that is importable only by government trading 
monopolies subject to cabinet approval, for all trade partners (see e.g. Eiss 2017, 201–
18; Eiss and Lezny 2018, 219–36). A document compiled and last modified by the 
Indian Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) in November 2011 identified 428 
items for which import is restricted (DGFT 2011), including life animals, animal 
products and chemicals, amongst others (DGFT 2017). Such restrictions do not mean 
that these goods cannot be imported, but that special permits for their import need to 
be obtained from the central government. To my knowledge, there has been only one 
case in which such a permit was issued for imports through the Attari-Wagah road 
route by the Indian government. In 2013, Punjab Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal 
imported 12 heads of cattle from Pakistan after obtaining clearances from all 
departments concerned and paying custom duties – a process that reportedly took about 
seven months (The Indian Express 2013). A former custom official at Attari explained 
that this was an exception and that it is not possible for ‘normal’ people to import live 
animals because there is no Animal Quarantine Station at Attari (Kavi Singh (m), 
Amritsar, 19.12.2015). This suggests that Mr Badal was able to use the symbolic 
capital associated with his position as Chief Minister of Punjab, and probably also his 
social capital, to make this possible. A similar case was reported in Pakistan, as 
discussed below.  
Pakistan never reciprocated India’s move to the MFN status and continued 
importing on the positive list approach until 2012, when Pakistan introduced a negative 
list which detailed only those 1,209 items that could not be imported from India (Joint 
Statement CS 2011). 95  This move from the positive to the negative list was a 
constructive step that opened another 6.000 items or so for trade, diversifying Indian 
 
95 For the ‘negative list’ see Annex G in Pakistan’s Import Policy Order 2013. 
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exports to Pakistan. From 2012-13 to 2016-17 the share of new commodities in India’s 
exports to Pakistan rose from 3 per cent to 12 per cent. In 2016-17, 753 new items 
were exported to Pakistan, mainly through the sea route, which accounted for 75 per 
cent of all new commodities traded, followed by rail (20 per cent), road and sea routes 
(3 per cent each) (Taneja, Bimal, and Sivaram 2018, 8–9). The small share of new 
commodities in trade through the road route can be attributed to the fact that the 
negative list only applies to Pakistani imports from India via sea, rail and air, but not 
by road. When Pakistan moved from the positive to the negative list in 2012, it 
maintained a small positive list of 137 items for imports via road, thereby significantly 
restricting the number of items that can be imported through this route.96 Reports have 
emerged that powerful Pakistani businessmen have been able to mobilise their 
personal contacts and positions in the economy to circumvent these rules. As Abdul 
Dhillon (m), a trader from Lahore, explained: 
I know a few people who wanted to import major machinery from India. 
It was not possible for them to get it through railway wagons, because 
these items are big and difficult to handle. So the land route was the only 
route available. It took more than six, seven months. And they are the real 
man with muscles. With political muscle. They too have to push very 
hard. (14.03.2017) 
The Lahori trader attributed the fact that the firm was able to import its machinery 
from India through the road route to the position of the company in the economic field 
and its relationship to Pakistan’s political elite, thus suggesting that the company’s 
economic and social capital were important for getting a certificate of exemption to 
import goods through the road route contrary to Pakistan’s import policy. This would 
support existing research on the Pakistani business elite, which suggests that powerful 
individuals are able to avert both the legal and informal costs imposed on them through 
rules and regulations of the state by forging close social ties with the bureaucratic, the 
political and the military elite by exchanging favours (Armytage 2015, esp. 458-461). 
However, the fact that it took the company six to seven months to get a certificate of 
exemption attests to the strong role of formal regulations in shaping trade through the 
road route: even actors who are seen to have the necessary resources to extract 
individual benefits “too have to push very hard” to be exempted from legal restrictions, 
 
96 For the positive list of items importable via road see Appendix G-1 of Pakistan’s Import Policy Order 
2013. 
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in the words of Abdul Dhillon. He and his brother Akif Ibrahim (m, Lahore, 
14.03.2017), by contrast, were not able to obtain a certificate of exemption to import 
goods through the road route. As they explained: 
Akif: When we suffered huge losses at the railway when we tried to 
import juices, we tried to get permission to import these juices through 
the land route so that the trade is done more smoothly and we suffer less 
losses. At the land port, on both sides, fork lifters are available. Trucks 
can come, we can offload, unstuff the Indian trucks, stuff our Pakistani 
trucks and send them off straight to the customers. So we went to the 
Pakistani ministry for the permission.  
Abdul: Only for one time permission.  
I: The ministry of commerce in Islamabad? 
Akif: Yes in Islamabad. We went to them. It took us around three months.  
I: Who did you speak to at the Ministry? 
Abdul: Mr […], the joint secretary. 
Akif: […] It took us around two months to get in touch with him. It was 
that difficult for us. When we got in touch with him, he took around one 
month just to tell us that we cannot allow you to import through land 
route. We were face to face, we asked him why he cannot allow that. He 
said this thing to our face: “Just to discourage…” 
Abdul: …“Import from India.” 
Akif: “Just to discourage people like you.” He said to our face. […] Then 
he said: “Not specifically you, but the people who trade with India.”  He 
said it to us. Just to discourage you guys. That’s why we are not going to 
allow import through the land route. You can go through the railway.”  
The traders highlight that bureaucrats in positions of power are not easily accessible 
for business people in Pakistan (see also Armytage 2015, 459–60). This points to the 
power of the state as an abstract and intangible entity. Even access to the bureaucratic 
elite does not guarantee that rules will or can be bent, as the above-described attempt 
suggests. While this may on one hand support Armytage's (2015, 458) conclusion that 
“the least connected individuals pay the highest prices in terms of delays and bribes 
from government officials,” it also attests to the preponderant role of rules and 
regulations in shaping bilateral trade relations, and thus the influence of states.  
The story of these traders suggests that it was at the discretion of a bureaucrat 
that the firm with muscle was able to import its furnace through the road route, but not 
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the juice importers. This suggests that elite bureaucrats can also use discretion in a 
range of ways, sometimes responding to individual interests at other times conflicting 
with them, as Lipsky's (2010 [1980]) showed with regard to street-level bureaucrats. 
At the same time, the effort and time it took the Pakistani company and also the Indian 
Punjab Chief Minister to get a certificate of exemption suggests that bureaucrats had 
little room for manoeuvre and that their work is constrained by formal rules and 
regulations, as Howe (1991) argued in a critique of Lipsky’s work. I contend with 
Evans and Harris (2004, 881) that discretion operates along a continuum within a set 
of rules and regulations. Policies gave bureaucrats the scope to issue a certificate of 
exemption to the Punjab Chief Minister and to the Pakistani company to import goods 
through the road route, while restricting the import of juices through trucks. While this 
may be understood in relation to the social capital of those seeking a certificate of 
exemption and thus power relations, the materiality of the goods that were imported 
may have played a role in influencing the decision of bureaucrats, suggesting that 
government officials may take their decisions keeping in mind the particular 
circumstances of their clients and cases. Due to their size, juices could be imported 
through the rail route, whereas a furnace would probably not have fit in the available 
wagons at the railway. For trade through the rail route, only one type of wagon is 
available that does not allow for the import of all types of goods. As Pardeep Sehgal 
(m), a trader from Amritsar, explained: 
[There are] no temperature controls, no wagons for liquids, no sensitive 
items. They just have one kind of wagon and you can transact only in 
those wagons. So sometimes for engineering goods the size is there. You 
can’t ship every kind of material. Previously, top open wagons were also 
allowed but I think since 2007/8, they have stopped that. Now, only 
closed box type wagons are available [at the rail route]. (Pardeep Sehgal 
(m), Amritsar, 10.12.2015) 
The state had exceptional influence on bilateral trade through Attari-Wagah, as the use 
of only one type of wagon at the railway is related to the bilateral Agreement Relating 
to Rail Communication (1976, Article III, para. 3), which stipulates that ‘“Standard 
Wagons” as mutually agreed upon shall be used for the interchange of goods traffic.’ 
This shows that the discretionary power of bureaucrats was curtailed by the state 
through rules and regulations.  
The preceding discussion has shown how international and unilateral policies at 
Attari and Wagah have shaped bilateral trade, both by virtually ending trade in 
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February 2019 but also by influencing individual bureaucratic decisions. As policies 
are made by the state, the section highlighted the role of the state in India and Pakistan 
in shaping everyday trade practices. It does so through rules and regulations, by 
creating distance to its clients, and through delaying individual processes. All of which 
serve to uphold the image of the state as a unitary actor, which it is not as the individual 
cases demonstrate.  
The cases of cattle import and furnace import from Pakistan and India show that 
the work of bureaucrats is highly scripted and that the discretionary power of state 
agents is limited by rules and regulations. At the same time, the examples 
demonstrated that government officials adapt to individual cases. While the Pakistani 
company was able to import furnace through the road route, the same was not true for 
juice traders. While this may on one hand be understood in relation to the social capital 
of the importers and thus power relations, the materiality of the goods imported may 
have been an important factor in shaping the bureaucrats’ decisions to allow the import 
of some goods through the road route while restricting that of others to the rail route. 
The issues faced by traders at the rail route point to the important role of infrastructure 
in shaping bilateral trade, which is the focus of the following section. 
8.4 MATERIALISING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN INFRASTRUCTURES 
States not only shape national economic fields through rules and regulations, but also 
through investments in infrastructure (Bourdieu 2005c, 12–13). The resulting 
infrastructure or physical space is “a social fabrication and projection of social space” 
(Bourdieu 2018, 109) by two states, which in turn shapes everyday practices, as I will 
explore in relation to the built environment at the Attari-Wagah border crossing point. 
Here, the (absence of) infrastructure is related to the positions taken by the custodians 
of the trade facilitation centres on India-Pakistan trade, supporting Bourdieu's (2018) 
observation that physical space articulates social space and shapes social interactions 
and vice versa. 
Neither Attari nor Wagah had adequate infrastructure to handle larger volumes 
of trade when Pakistan opened the road route for imports from India in 2005. In India, 
proposals for establishing Integrated Check Posts (ICP) along its international borders 
to facilitate an anticipated increase in foreign trade through land ports was mooted as 
early as 2003 (Standing Committee on Home Affairs 2010, 14). The foundation stone 
for the first Integrated Check Post at Attari was laid in February 2010 (MHA 2010, 
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34). Two years later, the construction was completed and the check post was 
operationalised in April 2012, replacing the old Land Customs Station at Attari (MHA 
2013, 39). The new Integrated Check Post Attari was equipped with two import 
warehouses, one export warehouse, five cold chambers, an area for loose cargo, two 
weighbridges, a holding and a paved parking area (CWC n.d.) as well as a plant 
quarantine station (own observations). This physical infrastructure “is an inhabited and 
appropriated space, that is, a social fabrication and projection of social space, a social 
structure in an objectified state […], the objectification and naturalization of past and 
present social relations” (Bourdieu 2018, 109). As the state contributes to the existence 
and persistence of the national economic fields and structures the relations of force 
within this field through investments in infrastructure (Bourdieu 2005c, 12–13), 
amongst others, the development of the ICP Attari can be interpreted as the Indian 
state’s support of stronger trade relations with Pakistan. However, at a border, 
infrastructure developments are not only shaped by one state, but by negotiations 
between states, as discussions during the Composite Dialogue Process on Economic 
and Commercial Cooperation highlight.  
After taking the decision to upgrade its land ports in 2003, India proposed “to 
convene a meeting of relevant technical level experts at the Attari-Wagah border to 
draw up proposals to upgrade infrastructure to facilitate trade” during the third round 
of Commerce Secretary-led talks on Economic and Commercial Cooperation between 
India and Pakistan in 2006 (Joint Statement CS 2006). During the next round of talks 
both sides made presentations on the state of development of infrastructure at Attari 
and Wagah (Joint Statement CS 2007). When the dialogue was resumed in 2011, they 
agreed to cooperate more closely to open a trade gate and to build separate roads for 
freight and passenger movement. For that purpose, they agreed to hold regular 
meetings by a Joint Technical Group for the promotion of travel and trade (Minutes 
CS 2011). The necessary infrastructure adjustments were made by India and Pakistan, 
and the Integrated Check Post Attari was linked to the Land Freight Unit (LFU) Wagah 
through a trade gate (see Image 8). The trade gate symbolises successful cooperation 
between India and Pakistan regarding infrastructure at the Attari-Wagah border 
crossing point. It represents the materialisation of international relations at that point 
in time.  
The infrastructural developments changed existing trade practices and thus 
social interaction. Earlier, trade took place through the Grand Trunk Road, together 
225 
 
with the movement of people. With the creation of a new Integrated Check Post at 
Attari and infrastructure adjustments at Wagah the cross-border movement of goods 
was separated from that of people through a wall, to ‘ensure sanitation’ (Teja Surwat 
(m), New Delhi, 16.05.2017; see Map 3). People still cross the border on the Grand 
Trunk Road where the daily border-closing ceremony is performed (see Chapter 1), 
whereas trucks now cross the border on dedicated trade roads. Trade processes were 
streamlined through updated Standard Operating Procedures. Infrastructure 
developments thus had a direct impact on everyday trade practices and consequently 
social interaction. 
   
 
Map 3: The Road Border Crossing Point Showing LFU Wagah (Left) and ICP Attari (Right) (Google Maps 2018) 
 
From the financial year 2011-12 to 2012-13, trade through the land route increased by 
105 per cent, followed by another increase of 13.4 per cent from 2012-13 to 2013-14 
(MHA 2017a, 55). This could be understood as the result of infrastructure 
developments. However, interviewees were sceptical of its effect. According to a 
former custom official working at Attari, the ICP did not make much of a difference 
except when it comes to trade in cement and gypsum (Kavir Singh (m), Amritsar, 
19.12.2015). Similarly, a joint statement issued by the Commerce Secretaries of India 
and Pakistan following the inauguration of the ICP Attari notes that “there is [a] need 
to further strengthen infrastructure on both sides” and that “[t]hey directed the customs 
and port authorities to” provide laboratory facilities, scanners, weigh bridges and cold 
chambers and to facilitate the containerised movement of goods (Joint Statement CS 
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2012). While the new ICP Attari was equipped with two import warehouses, one 
export warehouse, five cold chambers, an area for loose cargo, two weighbridges, a 
holding and a paved parking area (CWC n.d.) as well as a quarantine station (own 
observations), it does not have laboratory facilities nor full body truck scanning 
systems (FBTSS) that can help detect smuggled narcotics, weapons or gold in 
consignments. Both topics have been a bone of contention, the absence of scanners 
will be discussed here to illustrate the role of different agents in infrastructure 
developments.  
Since the inauguration of the ICP in 2012, the absence of scanners has been a 
point of conflict between traders, custom officials, security agents and politicians at 
Attari who have pledged for the installation of scanners through various fora, 
departments and representatives of the Land Ports of Authority of India in New Delhi. 
To date, consignments need to be checked manually by custom officials, which leads 
to delays and the damage of goods. This could be averted by installing scanners, which 
is the responsibility of the Land Ports Authority (LPAI) of India, a statutory body 
under the Department of Border Management in the Ministry of Home Affairs dealing 
with matters relating to internal security. According to The Land Ports Authority of 
India Act (2010,), the LPAI is responsible for “putting in place systems which address 
security imperatives and for the development and management of facilities for cross 
border movement of passengers and goods at designated points along the international 
borders of India” (see also Sinha et al. 2016, 101). However, in direct conflict with 
this act, people in positions of power at the LPAI seem reluctant to put up scanners. 
Asked why no scanners have been put up at Attari, a former member of the LPAI 
explained that full body truck scanners are only there for psychological reasons. He 
argued that they are not helpful because it is time consuming to put trucks through 
scanners, as it takes about 10-12 minutes to scan a single truck. He further added that 
the LPAI had published calls for tenders without receiving adequate offers (Teja 
Surwat (m), New Delhi, 16.05.2017). After years of conflict, the installation of 
scanners was announced in March 2017. However, there has been no headway in their 
installation to date, according to a news report (Paul 2019a). This suggests that on part 
of the LPAI there is resistance towards installing scanners and apathy regarding the 
development of further infrastructure at Attari. Traders and custom officials repeatedly 
stated that the Integrated Check Post should be brought under the authority of Customs, 
because they seek to facilitate trade whereas the Ministry of Home Affairs, to which 
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the LPAI is attached, is more concerned with security. This directly conflicts with the 
absence of scanners and the fact that this border crossing point is represented as a 
‘sensitive port’, which means that there are illegal things happening (Teja Surwat (m), 
New Delhi, 16.05.2017) and security should therefore be a priority. The absence of 
scanners at Attari must thus be understood in relation to a conflict between different 
agents working at the ICP, highlighting that the positions taken by actors are, through 
negotiations, translated into the physical environment. 
While Pakistan made some changes to its infrastructure at Wagah, most of these 
changes were minor and took place prior to the construction of the ICP in Attari. In 
2005, the Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz (PM, 2004-2007) tasked Pakistan’s 
National Logistics Cell (NLC), Pakistan’s main logistics and construction organisation 
(NLC n.d.), to build a modern border terminal at Wagah (as cited in Khan 2005, 15). 
The NLC set up a new border terminal at Wagah in 2008, also referred to as a Land 
Freight Unit (LFU) (National Logistics Cell n.d.). As the infrastructure at Attari was 
developed, Pakistan also upscaled the infrastructure at Wagah, according to a former 
Additional Secretary Commerce (Trade Diplomacy) from Pakistan who closely 
monitored this process (Robina Ather (f), Islamabad, 28.03.2017). However, traders 
from Pakistan and India contested that real improvements have been made with regard 
to the infrastructure at Wagah. According to a trader from Lahore: 
Infrastructure was not too much improved because there is a building and 
some cargo areas. There is not too much infrastructure at the Wagah 
border. Custom people have a building for passenger transit, they 
improved, yes. […]  But physically, I don’t think that something 
improved [in the trade area]. (Nabil Taqvi (m), Lahore, 12.04.2017) 
A trader from Amritsar also explained: 
Commensurate infrastructure for warehousing and for stocking, like the 
ICP here, has still to come up on that side of the border. And that may be 
one of the issues which are hampering the negative list to be applied here. 
(Kabir Singh (m), Amritsar, 08.12.2015) 
The lack of infrastructure at Wagah was translated into policy. When Pakistan moved 
from the positive to the negative list in 2012, it maintained a small positive list of 137 
items for imports via road with the argument that there was not sufficient infrastructure 
at Wagah to handle larger volumes of trade. As a former Additional Secretary 
Commerce (Trade Diplomacy) of Pakistan explained, one of the reasons why a 
positive list of 137 for road-based imports was maintained “was insufficient 
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infrastructure at Wagah. That was the main reason. Insufficient infrastructure at 
Wagah. And, of course, another reason was to restrict the trade” (Robina Ather (f), 
Islamabad, 28.03.2017). Similarly, the minutes (CS 2011) of the fifth round of bilateral 
talks between the Commerce Secretaries state that the “Pakistan side would remove its 
present restrictions on trade by land route as soon as the infrastructure to facilitate 
mutual trade is completed,” suggesting that the lack of infrastructure was indeed the 
main reason for maintaining a positive list for imports. The close relationship between 
policy and infrastructure are means of the state to regulate the economic field and 
foreign trade relations.97 
The lack of infrastructure developments at the Land Freight Unit Wagah needs 
to be understood in relation to the National Logistics Cell (NLC), the custodian of this 
port. Established in 1978, the NLC has evolved into Pakistan’s main logistics and 
construction organisation (NLC n.d.). It operates a freight service, is active in 
construction, manages dry ports for the movement of goods all over the country and 
has developed border terminals along the border with Iran, Afghanistan and China 
(NLC n.d.). In terms of the movement of containers/vehicles, the Wagah border 
terminal is the second busiest after Torkham at the border with Afghanistan (Planning 
Commission 2018, 174). This means that the NLC clearly has the capacity to upgrade 
the infrastructure at Wagah and to facilitate the movement of goods. The absence of 
infrastructure developments suggests a reluctance on part of the NLC to facilitate trade 
with India. This needs to be understood in relation to the Pakistan army, which has 
operational control over the NLC. 
The NLC is an attached department of the Ministry of Planning and 
Development. It works under the umbrella of the National Logistics Board, which is 
headed by the Minister for Planning and Development & Reform and comprises 
Secretaries of relevant ministries. However, operational control lies with the Quarter 
Master General of the Pakistan Army, who is the officer in charge of the NLC. The 
Director General of the Army is its Chief Executive (Planning Commission 2018, 171). 
The NLC is staffed with about 7,279 people, 2,549 of which are serving army 
personnel and the rest retired officers and civilians, demonstrating the strong influence 
 
97 To improve the border crossing point infrastructure and governance at Wagah, and Torkham and 
Chaman on the Afghan border, the Asian Development Bank started funding a Regional Improving 
Border Services Project with Pakistan under the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC) Program in 2015 (ADB n.d.). However, no infrastructure developments have taken place 
under this project to date. 
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of the army on this organisation (Siddiqa 2017, 134–35). The Wagah port is in the firm 
hands of the NLC, which has prevented private competitors from getting a share in the 
revenues generated through this port. As a former Additional Secretary Commerce 
(Trade Diplomacy) of Pakistan explained: 
There was a huge debate on whether the private sector should be allowed 
or not allowed [to operate at Wagah]. The Ministry of Commerce was 
very much in favour of allowing the private sector to provide services 
rather than the NLC, but that didn’t work out. It stays with the NLC. 
(Robina Ather (f), Islamabad, 28.03.2017) 
Opening up trade with India through Wagah would benefit the NLC economically, for 
it would increase the revenues generated at this port. This suggests that other reasons 
must prevent the NLC from developing the infrastructure at Wagah and further 
opening the road route for imports. Asked whether there are lobbies in Pakistan that 
are opposed to opening trade through the road route, a former Commerce Minister of 
Pakistan explained: 
I think, the main issue there is the apprehension of the Pakistan 
establishment.  They have to be taken on board.  They can be taken on 
board, actually. (Humayun Akhtar Khan (m), Islamabad, 11.04.2017) 
This understanding is shared by Dash (2013, 180, note 28), who suggests that: 
The Pakistani military establishment, which is a major economic 
stakeholder with substantial business ownership and control in the 
domestic market, shares the business community's assessment [that trade 
could threaten its economic viability] and opposes free trade with India 
on the further grounds of security concerns. 
This research did not further explore the military’s position on trade with India through 
Attari-Wagah, thus highlighting an opportunity for future research. 
The preceding analysis of infrastructure developments at the Attari-Wagah 
border crossing point has shown how states and interstate relations materialise in the 
physical space. The built environment thus becomes an important lens through which 
to study social interactions. This is true for the built environment as for the absence of 
infrastructure. Both reflect and shape social interactions, as conflict surrounding the 
installation of scanners and a change in everyday practices at Attari-Wagah following 
the inauguration of the ICP in 2012 demonstrate. The absence of infrastructure was 
also translated into policy, which limited trade through the road route.  
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8.5 NEGOTIATING STATE AUTHORITY IN THE EVERYDAY  
 
 
Image 9: Attari-Wagah Border Crossing Point  
 
Everyday truck drivers transport goods from all over India and Pakistan to the Land 
Freight Unit (LFU) Wagah in Pakistan and the Integrated Check Post (ICP) Attari in 
India, making them important actors in bilateral trade. They frequently have to wait 
until the LFU and the ICP open and space becomes available, leading to long queues 
along the road. Upon entering the trade facilitation centres, truck drivers proceed to 
designated export areas where goods and papers are examined by custom officials, 
who decide whether the paperwork is in order and goods can be exported (see Image 
9, numbers ① and ⑤). In the meantime, drivers have to obtain a Single Entry Permit 
for crossing the border, which is issued instead of a visa. Once all procedural steps 
have been taken, drivers can proceed to the Joint Check Post at the zero line where a 
custom official will note the details of the driver, truck and consignment in a register, 
before allowing the driver to cross the border into Pakistani territory, where this is 
repeated (see Image 9, number ②). Then the drivers can proceed to designated 
scanning areas, after which vehicles are weighed and can be driven to unloading areas, 
where goods and papers will be checked. Upon that, goods will be unloaded manually 
by labourers in the presence of the custodian of the port, (a representative of) the 
importer and the truck driver, rendering labourers central to trade processes (see Image 
① Entrance to ICP Attari ② Un-/Loading area  ③ Rummaging 
④ Joint Check Post  ⑤ Entrance to LFU Wagah ⑥ Retreat Ceremony 
Land Freight Unit Wagah Integrated Check Post Attari 
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9, numbers ③ and ④). Drivers have to return to their home country on the day of their 
arrival. In the meantime, goods and paperwork are examined by the custom officials 
and once cleared for import they can be loaded onto trucks and leave the trade 
facilitation centres for their destinations (Customs (Preventive) Commissionerate 
2018), which are mostly in Punjab or adjacent states and provinces. 
These processes were facilitated through agreements reached by high-level 
bureaucrats from India and Pakistan during negotiations in the framework of the 
Composite Dialogue Process on Economic and Commercial Cooperation that took 
place between 2004 and 2012. First, they led Pakistan to open the road route for trade 
through the Land Custom Station Attari-Wagah in 2005. Two years later, 
representatives from India and Pakistan agreed to permit the cross-border movement 
of trucks up to designated un-/loading areas (Joint Statement CS 2007; Joint Statement 
on Trade Facilitation 2007). Until then drivers could only drive up to 600 metres to 
the zero line in India and up to 200 metres to the zero line in Pakistan where they 
would park and wait for goods to be manually unloaded by labourers. Only when they 
transported frozen meat, reefer trucks were allowed to be driven up to the borderline 
(Taneja 2008, 103), never across until 2007. Infrastructure developments at Attari and 
Wagah, the construction of a new Integrated Check Post at Attari and the separation 
of passenger movement from trade in 2012 further eased the movement of goods (Joint 
Statement CS 2006; 2007; Minutes CS 2011; MHA 2013, 39). Infrastructure 
developments and agreements were translated into Standard Operation Procedures 
(SOP) at the LFU Wagah and the ICP Attari (Customs (Preventive) Commissionerate 
2018), through which states sought to streamline everyday practices. 
States shape bilateral trade through tariffs, trade and transport policies and 
agreements, investments in infrastructure and the like, but they delegate their authority 
to their officials for implementation. Street-level bureaucrats, like custom officials, 
have to turn policy into practice. While doing so, they interpret rules and regulations 
in their own work environment, against their personal goals and in interactions with 
traders, truck drivers and labourers. Such interactions are characterised by conflict and 
cooperation, both within India and Pakistan and across the border. They are never 
really interpersonal: interactions express objective relations of force through the 
habitus of actors (Bourdieu 1992b, 256–58), which links the situation to the position 
of actors in a field (or in fields), as I explore in this section. 
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Street-level bureaucrats have discretionary powers that allow them to directly 
shape bilateral trade through Attari-Wagah. On several occasions, traders alleged that 
members of the Plant Quarantine Authorities stopped consignments at the border for 
no justifiable reason, leading fresh fruit and vegetables to rot or being destroyed, as 
was the case in September 2017. According to Rajdeep Uppal, a trader and then 
President of the Confederation of International Chamber of Commerce, Amritsar: 
We are following the same set of international rules and specifications 
since the last 15 years but our goods are being rejected. This has been 
happening for some months now, and is a huge setback to the entire 
trading community of the region. Initially, some trucks would fail to get 
clearance, but now, almost all goods are rejected. (quoted in Divya 2017) 
Similarly, a senior custom official posted at Attari explained that: 
[a]ll clearances and formalities are carried out at Attari on the Indian side 
according to procedure, but once the perishable goods cross over to 
Pakistan, they are being held up at the quarantine department and not 
allowed to go further into the market (quoted in Divya 2017).  
This is not a one-way street, as Hina Saeed (f), the former executive director of the 
SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, explained in an interview: 
At the implementation level sometimes the plant quarantine people or the 
customs people they hold it [soya bean] for no specific reasons. […] And 
then small hurdles, like tomatoes coming from Wagah to Attari, they stop 
them there and if the same consignment goes via Karachi its accepted by 
them. So this creates additional costs and is tiresome. (Hina Saeed (f), 
Islamabad, 20.03.2017)  
Soya bean, chicken feed, vegetables and red chillies are among the main items 
exported from India to Pakistan through the road route, whereas dry fruits and dry 
dates are mainly imported by India from Pakistan (LPAI 2019). Both plant quarantine 
authorities and custom officials from India and Pakistan need to clear the goods for 
export and import, as I highlighted in the outline of the trade process in the beginning 
of this section. If one party does not sign off the goods, they cannot enter the country 
and traders record losses. However, interpersonal interaction between state officials 
and traders allowed the latter to influence this process.  
Traders from Lahore explained that they or their representatives sometimes 
payed ‘a tip’ or ‘speed money’ to custom officials ‘to oil things’ and to expedite the 
clearance of goods (Karim Mirwani (m), Wagah, 02.03.2017; Akif Ibrahim (m), 
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Lahore, 14.03.2017).98 Latif Jarral (m), a customs trading and forwarding agent from 
Lahore, explained: “When two people are sitting together and are interacting and there 
is something wrong in my application, I can offer money for it to be approved” 
(Lahore, 03.03.2017). Latif Jarral also reported of instances of tax evasion, where 
traders/custom clearing agents negotiated the tax for goods at the port rather than 
following the rules and regulations of the state. Following Raza Sangha (m, Lahore, 
13.03.2017), a former custom official (appraisal) working at the dry port Lahore and 
at Wagah: 
There have always been allegations against the tax collectors and the tax 
officials that, when somebody is going to interact with them, that there 
may be allegations of corruption, there may be allegations of 
malpractices. If there is a human guy who can decide to which channel to 
send it, to put a signature, he can either put it in well in time or delay it. 
[…] Personal preferences are there. 
The rules of the state are negotiated and reinterpreted every day in direct interaction 
between custom officials, custom clearing agents and traders. These negotiations are 
influenced by the economic resources available to traders/custom clearing agents as 
well as their personal connections, for not all custom officials will use the authority 
conferred upon then by the state (state capital) for personal gains.  
The discretionary powers of state officials was curtailed through the introduction 
of an electronic data processing mechanism in India and Pakistan, which removed 
interpersonal interaction from the custom clearance process.99 At the Attari road route, 
the computerised processing of shipping bills and bills of entry was introduced for 
exports under the Indian Customs Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) System in April 
2013, followed by imports from October 2014 (Customs (Preventive) 
Commissionerate 2018). In 2016, the Land Freight Unit Wagah also transferred from 
a manual system to the Web Based One Customs System (WeBOC) for imports and 
exports (Mehar 2016). A former custom collector (appraisal) from Lahore explained 
that: 
This WEBOC system is meant to do away with this file work, to do away 
with much interaction between the tax payer and the tax collector and to 
 
98 On bribing at Attari-Wagah see also (Taneja 2008, 96) 
99 Other reasons include the fixation of import and export prices, and the more frequent rotation of 
custom officials in key positions at the port.  
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base the system on risks assessments, not leaving much discretion to the 
customs officers. (Raza Sangha (m), Lahore, 13.03.2017) 
The aim of moving from the manual system to an electronic system was to reduce the 
dwell time, that is the time it takes for goods to be cleared, and corruption. According 
to a custom official based in Lahore, corruption has gone down significantly at the 
Wagah port since the introduction of WeBOC “because there is no interaction so there 
is no corruption” (Raza Sangha (m), Lahore, 13.03.2017). A gypsum and rock salt 
trader from Lahore added that WeBOC has successfully reduced tax evasion (Karim 
Mirwani (m), Wagah, 02.03.2017). Traders repeatedly referred to the ‘human element’ 
in the custom process, suggesting that humans are imperfect executers of state rules 
and regulations. The electronic system, by contrast, is represented as relatively fool 
proof as it limits direct interaction between people.  
The transfer to the online system led to the introduction of Risk Management 
Systems (RMS) in India and Pakistan. Once goods arrive at the port and documents 
are entered through WeBOC, consignments are allocated to green, yellow and red 
channels depending on the risk associated with the consignment and the trader. The 
channels determine whether goods are processed without further security checks and 
testing (green) or are examined to prevent undeclared goods, including contraband, 
and goods harmful for human, animal and plants from crossing the border (yellow and 
red). As the data fed into the system determines how goods are processed at the border, 
the data itself becomes the ‘non-human element’ that can be manipulated to suit those 
with the relevant knowledge (cultural capital) of the criteria determining this electronic 
selection process. These criteria are determined by officials in Karachi, where WeBOC 
is developed, not at the Attari-Wagah border crossing point, thereby further 
diminishing interaction at the border. However, not all consignments are filed 
electronically. This is because the online system requires traders to insert information 
on all items individually in the online system. When a consignment consists of several 
different items, it is more convenient for traders and custom agents to submit 
documents manually, which means that interpersonal interaction is still there and 
custom officials can continue to influence the goods clearance process.  
Custom officials emerged as the most dominant actors in the Punjab borderland 
space, as they were able to act in their own interest. Yet they were only relatively 
autonomous in their actions. Firstly, everyday practices were regulated through rules 
and regulations and Standard Operating Procedures drawn up by people higher up in 
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the state bureaucracy to streamline processes. Secondly, through the introduction of 
electronic data processing mechanisms, interpersonal contact between state officials 
and traders was largely removed from the trade process. Thirdly, by being positioned 
at a border crossing point, they depended on trade for revenues. This made them 
relatively dependent on labourers and truck drivers and their willingness to do their 
jobs. The latter regularly boycotted trade by going on strike, thereby gaining small 
advantages.  
Negotiations in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process led to 
changes in everyday trade practices and provoked conflicts among a range of actors, 
which is explored through a clash between labourers and truck drivers in 2007. Until 
the cross-border movement of trucks was permitted, “The workers from Pakistan used 
to carry the traded goods on their head. At the border, the goods would be passed on 
to the Indian workers,” explained Gaganjot Singh (m, Attari, 09.05.2017), a porter 
formerly employed at the Land Customs Station Attari. About 1,200 Indian porters 
were working at the Land Custom Station Attari at that time.100 They feared for their 
jobs when the cross-border movement of trucks was allowed in 2007. As Rajpal Singh, 
an Indian porter, explained to the press: “Once the border is opened for movement of 
trucks, our services will not be required at all and we will be left to starve” (The 
Tribune 2007a). This led to a clash between porters and truck drivers when the first 
truck of tomatoes crossed the zero line to Pakistan on the 1st of October 2007. Porters 
resorted to stone pelting and smashed the windowpanes of several trucks (Walia 2007). 
The next day, the police had to be deployed to protect the truck drivers (The Tribune 
2007b). However, such concerns were unfounded as trade increased in subsequent 
years, and therefore the need for workers. With the opening of the new Integrated 
Check Post Attari in 2012, optimism surged among porters. Following a news report, 
Balwinder Singh, a third-generation porter at Attari, explained that “It will bring in 
more employment opportunities for the local residents, besides increasing the volume 
of trade” (The Tribune 2012). Today, about 1,500 workers are employed at the ICP 
Attari, who work in two groups on alternate days, rendering them the largest group of 
employees at the border crossing point (Gaganjot Singh (m), Attari, 09.05.2017).101 
 
100 Between 2005 and 2007, around 1200 porters were employed on the Indian side, and about 300 on 
the Pakistani side. While the porters on the Indian side were split in two groups that worked on alternate 
days, porters on the Pakistani side assured that they had enough work by making it difficult for new 
people to get work as porters (Taneja 2008, 103–4). 
101 No equivalent numbers are available to me on the number of porters on the Pakistani side. 
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While the construction of the ICP has increased the need for labour, it also brought 
new problems. Now, cement could also be imported through the road route, which 
posed health risks to porters and created conflict with the custodian of the port, the 
Central Warehousing Corporation (CWC), over health and safety issues, the lack of 
permanent contracts and payment, which led to short strikes and breakdowns in trade 
in April 2013 (The Times of India 2013; Perneet Singh 2013a; 2013b), April 2014 (The 
Indian Express 2014), June 2016 (Bassi 2016; Rana 2016a), December 2016 (Rana 
2016b; 2016c), September 2017 (Rana 2017b) and November 2018 (Paul 2018a). 
These examples demonstrate how interstate relations are translated into the everyday, 
where they can create conflicts among a range of actors. These conflicts hampered 
trade but only for a short time as labourers depend on trade for their income and could 
therefore not sustain strikes for long. 
Many conflicts on one side of the border directly translate into India-Pakistan 
trade, as is exemplified here through a strike by truck drivers in July 2011. Each 
weekday, on average, between 136 (2012-13) and 184 (2014-15; 2018-19) vehicles 
crossed from India to Pakistan, whereas the number of vehicles bringing goods from 
Pakistan to India is much lower, between 11 (2018-19) and 182 (2013-14) vehicles per 
day.102 In July 2011, a conflict erupted between the Attari and Amritsar truck operator 
organisations over the question of who could lift goods coming from Pakistan. While 
Indian drivers continued to deliver goods to Pakistan and Pakistani drivers kept 
delivering goods to India as usual, Indian truck drivers of the Amritsar and the Attari 
truck unions refused to lift goods coming from Pakistan in an attempt to assure their 
monopoly. As a result, the storage areas filled up on the Indian side, leading Indian 
authorities to restrict the number of vehicles that could cross the border from Pakistan, 
thereby hampering trade for a few days (see e.g. Bassi 2011). The lower number of 
goods coming from Pakistan increased competition among truck drivers. As they are 
paid for the number of goods they lift, several truck drivers overloaded their trucks, 
thereby leaving less to other drivers. This led to conflict among different truck drivers 
in August 2011 and again in February 2017 (Jaiswar 2011; Paul 2017a, 2017b; Rana 
2017a), both of which hampered trade. This shows that conflicts on one side of the 
 
102 The Land Ports Authority of India provides information on the number of vehicles crossing over the 
border on an annual basis (LPAI 2019). I divided this number through 253 weekdays a year to arrive at 
these averages and indicated respectively the lowest and highest numbers between 2012-13 and 2018-
19. 
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border can translate into trade. However, trade was never interrupted for long, as 
Indian authorities intervened and mediated the conflict and truck drivers depend on 
this trade for their survival.  
These strikes added to the issues that people faced on a regular basis at the Attari-
Wagah border crossing point. These conflicts facilitate cooperation between 
authorities in India and in Pakistan and across the border. To address operational issues 
and hurdles to trade in India, bi-monthly meetings were held between seven relevant 
authorities at the ICP Attari since 2012. These include custom officials, BSF officers, 
representatives of different associations, like the Cement Importers Association, 
importers and exporters. An Indian cement importer from Amritsar suggested that 60-
70 per cent of all issues are solved in these meetings (Maninder Singh (m), Amritsar, 
09.12.2015). Custom officials from India and Pakistan also cooperated to resolve 
operational issues bilaterally. In 2011, this cooperation was formalised with the 
creation of a Custom Liaison Border Committee (CLBC) in the framework of the 
Composite Dialogue Process. Every other month custom officials met alternately in 
Amritsar and Lahore “to resolve any operational issue at the field level” (Minutes CS 
2011), even after the end of the Composite Dialogue Process in 2012. However, these 
bilateral meetings came to a standstill following attacks on the Pathankot Air Force 
Base in January 2016 (Rana 2018a), which were attributed to the Jaish-e-Mohammed, 
a Pakistan-based militant group. This suggests that cooperation at Attari-Wagah was 
relatively effective, but that it coexisted with conflicts over the clearance of goods, for 
instance. Through this incident and its effect on cooperation between the Indian and 
Pakistani customs services, the Punjab borderland was reproduced as crisis space, 
which influenced trade between India and Pakistan. 
The preceding analysis of interactions between street-level bureaucrats and 
traders, truck drivers and porters, has shown that we best understand public agents as 
mediators between the abstract rules and regulations that represent states and everyday 
trade practices. In Latour's (2005, 39) words, mediators are actors which “transform, 
translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.” 
They transform rules and regulations and tensions into the everyday and modify them 
against their personal interests and in interaction with traders, custom clearing agents, 
truck drives and labourers.  
Custom officials emerged as the most powerful actors at the border. They have 
been able to use the authority conferred upon them by the state to delay or expedite 
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the clearance of goods against a small payment. In order to reduce the ability of state 
agents to (mis-)use their authority, states moved to an electronic data processing 
mechanism. Through association rules between people, wealth, legal history, etc. the 
logic of pre-emption through algorithmic calculations has become part of everyday 
practices at Attari-Wagah. But the introduction of electronic processing mechanism 
did not fully replace interpersonal interaction in trade through Attari and Wagah, but 
significantly reduced the ability of custom officials to abuse their authority (statist 
capital) for personal gains. 
8.6 CONCLUSION  
Everyday trade practices at Attari and Wagah are closely shaped by two states through 
street-level bureaucrats, policies, agreements and infrastructure developments, as the 
preceding ethnography has shown. States not only shape their own economic field, as 
Bourdieu (2005, 12–13) already noted, but also trade relations with neighbouring 
states and their economic fields. This is because states only exist in relation to one 
another in the system of states, which translates into struggles over the borders of 
fields. These struggles were particularly apparent in economic transactions of India 
and Pakistan following partition, for they were formally part of one fragmented 
economic field during British colonial rule. However, such struggles continue to date 
as negotiations over the positive and the negative lists in Pakistan and bilaterally 
demonstrate.   
There is a close relationship between discussions held and agreements reached 
during the government-led Composite Dialogue Process and everyday trade practices 
at Attari and Wagah. This relationship is established through the dialogue on 
Economic and Commercial Cooperation itself, through the different working groups 
and technical level groups that met in the framework of this process. The content of 
discussions held in this process also linked everyday practices at Attari and Wagah to 
decisions taken in New Delhi and Islamabad, as the formalisation of a Customs Liaison 
Border Committee, for instance, demonstrates. At the same time, decisions and 
agreements reached during the Composite Dialogue Process shape everyday trade 
practices at the Attari-Wagah border crossing point, as was shown with regard to the 
opening of the road route for the cross-border movement of trucks, the 
positive/negative lists, the MFN status, etc.  
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The implementation of rules and regulations is delegated to street-level 
bureaucrats at Attari and Wagah, who reinterpret state policies and agreements every 
day in their own work environment, against their personal interests and in interaction 
with a host of actors. This is shaped by a lopsided relationship between all those 
involved in trade, including custom officials, custom clearing agents, traders, labourers 
and truck drivers, with custom officials (assessment) being at the top of this hierarchy. 
They ultimately take the decision to clear goods for onward transport, giving them 
power in relation to traders and custom clearing agents who are, at times, able to 
influence their decisions due to their economic resources and the social relations they 
maintain with those in positions of power. At the bottom of this hierarchy are porters 
and truck drivers, who are essential to everyday practices as becomes apparent when 
they go on strike. Their centrality to trade and their large number give these actors an 
edge in relation to traders, custom clearing agents and custom officials when they 
pursue their demands through collective action, as an increase of wages demonstrates. 
However, the power of collective action is limited through the high supply of casual 
labour. There always seems to be someone who does not join the protests out of fear 
for their jobs or a need for income to support their families. 
While state officials are the most powerful actors shaping everyday trade 
practices at the Attari-Wagah border crossing point, the rules and regulations that 
guide the practices of these state actors are made by people in New Delhi and 
Islamabad. However, when it comes to trade relations between India and Pakistan, 
businesspeople have been able to influence the decisions of state actors through 
business associations and chambers of commerce and industry. The latter build an 
important link between the private and the public sector and have gained influence in 
Pakistan compared to the 1970s, when they were heavily government-controlled and 
had little influence on policymaking (Kochanek 1984, 80–81, 122–39). Especially, 
sector-specific business associations have been able to carve out some space for 
themselves in shaping policymaking in Pakistan. However, chambers of commerce 
and industry also play an important role concerning policies relating to trade between 
India and Pakistan, for they are the only business organisations officially recognised 
by the two states during the Composite Dialogue Process. They have built an important 
link between businesspeople in India and Pakistan, which are institutionalised in 
Memoranda of Understanding, the Joint Business Forum and the India-Pakistan 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, amongst others. However, they have no unified 
240 
 
voice, with competition for trade via sea and land routes leading to competition 
between Karachi/Mumbai and Lahore/Amritsar. 
The role of government officials and businessmen in shaping bilateral relations 
through rules and regulations and everyday practices is contingent on the political 
environment in which trade takes place. While governments were favourable to closer 
ties between India and Pakistan, joint initiatives and bilateral trade could grow. 
However, imminent elections and a change of government in Pakistan (2013) and India 
(2014) brought about a different approach to interstate relations and ended the 
Composite Dialogue Process. It is widely believed that this is due to different personal 
interests by the political leadership, especially in India. In the face of increasing 
violence across the Line of Control, Prime Minister Modi has taken a much harsher 
approach to Pakistan than his predecessor – maybe in part because ceasefire violations 
were less frequent during Manmohan Singh’s Premiership, suggesting a concomitant 
change in Pakistan’s approach to India. A notable example of differences in their 
approach to bilateral trade relations includes the withdrawal of the MFN status from 
Pakistan by India in February 2019, following attacks on India’s security forces. The 
latter also precipitated an air strike two weeks later, highlighting that trade is but one 
area affected by political relations between India and Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION  
 
In February 2019, things again came to a head between India and Pakistan after an 
attack on India’s armed forces in Indian-administered Kashmir, known as the Pulwama 
attacks. They provoked airstrikes and the withdrawal of the Most Favoured Nation 
status by India, which led Pakistan to close its airspace for international travel till mid-
July 2019. On 5 August, the Indian government revoked article 370 of the Indian 
Constitution and set Jammu and Kashmir up as a Union Territory, separating it from 
Ladakh, which was to be ruled from the centre. The government thereby reduced the 
political autonomy of Indian-administered Kashmir, which had been granted to the 
state in 1949. Many Punjabis joined the resulting protests of Kashmiris, as they were 
reminded of their own struggle for greater autonomy from the centre, which was 
violently pursued through the Khalistan movement from the late-1970s to the mid-
1990s. Pakistan subsequently expelled the Indian ambassador from Islamabad and 
recalled its ambassador from New Delhi. Interstate relations were again high in 
tensions, after a period of relative calm and cross-border cooperation – a seemingly 
ever repeating cycle in India-Pakistan relations since their formal establishment as 
states in 1947. The repetition of crises between these two neighbours has rendered 
crises part of everyday life. They structure every decision at the government level but 
also in the lives of those living in the Punjab borderland. Here tensions are directly 
translated into everyday life – a breakdown in bilateral trade means that many lose 
their jobs, whereas more stringent security practices at the gates leading to fields 
beyond the fence prevent many from pursuing their agricultural activities and thus 
losing their source of livelihood.  
This thesis explored how relations between India and Pakistan were produced 
and reproduced through everyday economic and security practices in the Punjab 
borderland and related them to discussions held and agreements reached in the 
framework of the Composite Dialogue Process, led by different Secretaries of India 
and Pakistan. The latter have been discussed in academic literature, with a focus on 
the outcome of bilateral negotiations or the reasons for their interruption (see e.g. 
Misra 2010; Padder 2012; 2015). This dissertation analysed the processes and relations 
involved in this dialogue and their relationship to the everyday. This is an important 
link that has escaped scholarly attention on relations between India and Pakistan, as 
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academics paid little attention to the everyday. Above described recent events in 
Indian-administered Kashmir highlight the relevance of understanding the relationship 
between government-led processes and everyday practices in the Punjab borderland, 
which a Bourdieusian analysis allowed me to explore. 
Links between the Composite Dialogue Process and everyday practices were 
explored through four case studies that emerged from the thematic analysis of 
interviews conducted with over two hundred people during nine months of fieldwork 
in India and Pakistan: forced displacement of borderlanders during wars and crises 
between these two states (Chapter 5), violence and cross-border mobility during the 
Khalistan separatist movement (Chapter 6), everyday economic and security practices 
at the Indian border fence and in land beyond the fence (Chapter 7) and the role of 
states in regulating trade (Chapter 8). Across these four case studies, the following 
eight themes dominated discussions: (1) the creation of both external and internal 
borders in the state-making processes of India and Pakistan, (2) the constitution of 
Punjab as a social space structured around a common sense, (3) the development of 
the Punjab borderland as crisis space, (4) the use of physical and symbolic violence in 
these processes, (5) the relationship between violence and mobility, (6) the division of 
the social world into neat categories by the state, (7) the translation of policy into 
everyday practices and its relevance to policymaking, (8) the centrality of the 
borderland to international relations. These themes will be revisited in turn before 
revisiting the limitations of this study and outlining recommendations for future 
research. 
Relations between India and Pakistan officially began with their formal 
institution as states in 1947, though state-making already commenced in the colonial 
period (Chapter 4, Section 4.3). The states of India and Pakistan had to be constituted 
in two ways: externally, in relation to other states and notably in separation from each 
other, and against internal competition. Their formal establishment as states, led to the 
formation of multiple state borders, as states are ensembles of fields, each with its own 
borders (Chapter 3, Section 3.3). State borders were objectified in legal documents that 
determined the territorial extent of the state, they were materialised in the form of a 
fence in India (Chapter 7, Section 7.1) and in infrastructure at the Attari-Wagah border 
crossing point (Chapter 8, Section 8.4) and they were reflected in rules and regulations 
governing the practices of security forces (Chapter 6, Section 6.2; Chapter 7, Section 
7.2) and India-Pakistan trade (Chapter 8, Section 8.3). State borders were also 
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incorporated in the form of schemas of perception, thought and action, not least my 
own. As highlighted in Chapter 7, Section 7.3, the border between India and Pakistan 
is frequently described as sensitive by interviewees. In one person’s eyes this meant 
that there are illegal things happening. Others explained that there is a high presence 
of security forces and that there are more security checks. In my eyes, the border 
between India and Pakistan was so sensitive that I did not dare to visit border villages 
in Pakistan’s Punjab, to go all the way up to the fence in Indian Punjab, or to cross the 
border through the Attari-Wagah border crossing point because I was concerned that 
coming directly from ‘the other side’ might expose me to stronger security checks and 
make it more difficult for me to enter India and Pakistan. 
The multiplication of borders and their reproduction led to the hardening of some 
borders across time, while others became more permeable. The construction of a fence 
and changes in bordering practices since the Khalistan movement in Punjab, have 
made it more difficult for people and goods to cross the border illegally. The number 
of times contraband is intercepted has significantly declined since the end of the 
Khalistan movement. But the fence and border guarding practices were only an 
imperfect barrier to movement and drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal crossings 
by people remain regular in the Punjab borderland to date. As technologies were 
employed by border guards to control cross-border movement, smugglers and drug 
traffickers dug tunnels, put pipes through the fence, used drones and divers to move 
goods across the border. Sometimes, contraband is smuggled across the border in trains 
and trucks used for travel and trade across the Attari-Wagah border crossing point, 
showing the close relationship between cross-border movement of goods prohibited 
and permitted by the state (see Chapter 6, Sections 6.3 and 6.4; Chapter 7, Section 7.1).  
While the state in India and in Pakistan sought to restrict smuggling, it facilitated 
trade between India and Pakistan through the Attari-Wagah border crossing point, 
which required the opening of state borders. In the years following their formal 
establishment as states, India and Pakistan sought to unify their national economic 
spaces, which involved the creation of borders between their economic fields. Trade 
continued but decreased substantially and was officially banned from 1965 to 1976. 
However, from the 1990s, the liberalisation of their economies in the process of 
globalisation, followed by the opening of the road route through Attari-Wagah for 
trade by Pakistan in 2005, made these borders more permeable. At least until another 
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crisis in February 2019 virtually brought trade to a standstill again (Chapter 8, 
especially Sections 8.1 and 8.3).  
In this thesis I explored not only how India and Pakistan established their borders 
externally but also how the borders of different national fields were produced and 
reproduced internally. This took the form of a violent crackdown by India’s central 
armed forces and officers of the Punjab police on the Khalistan separatist movement 
in Indian Punjab, which was perceived and constructed as a challenge to state authority 
by the Indian government (Chapter 6, especially Section 6.2). It also took the shape of 
negotiation processes between bureaucrats and businesspeople in Pakistan in the 
framework of the Composite Dialogue Process. The latter suggested that the positions 
of domination and subordination of bureaucrats, military personnel and 
businesspeople in the state of Pakistan are changing, and that businesspeople, through 
commercial associations and chambers of commerce and industry, were able to use 
their economic and social capital to become more dominant actors. This was related to 
the opening of the economic space to private actors by the political elite from the 1990s 
onwards. This process needs to be understood in relation to changes in the international 
economic field, the spread of neoliberal ideas and rapprochement between India and 
Pakistan since 2004 (Chapter 8, Sections 8.1 and 8.2).  
This research has shown that border and state-making processes by India and 
Pakistan were associated with high levels of violence in the Punjab borderland. This 
was related to the constitution of Punjab as a shared social space in the time up to 
partition in 1947 and its perpetuation in the post-colonial period, outlined in Chapter 
4 (Sections 4.1 and 4.2). This social space was structured around a common sense of 
what constituted this space: a geographic area encompassing the interfluvial tracts 
between the five rivers that give the region its name; a common history, notably shaped 
through the Sikh Empire (1799-1849) and British colonial rule; a common language, 
Punjabi; cultural traditions, including Sufism; family networks and trade links. This 
common sense unified a space that was otherwise divided through: a turbulent history 
of invasions by Mughals, Pashtuns and the British associated with many forced 
conversions; people’s affiliation with different religions, notably Islam, Hinduism and 
Sikhism; the use of different scripts (Gurmukhi, Shahmukhi and Devanagari); 
differences in spoken Punjabi and the use of other languages, such as Saraiki in the 
south-western half of the province of Punjab in Pakistan; people’s association with 
different castes, biraderis and classes.  
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The consolidation of a shared social space made the division of Punjab, the 
creation of state borders and the unification of two new state spaces particularly 
difficult. The state and border-making processes of India and Pakistan culminated in 
extraordinary violence at partition, several military confrontations and the threat 
thereof, a separatist movement and challenges to state authority through the persistent 
illegal cross-border movement of goods and people and their interception. These 
historical events led to politicisation, securitisation and militarisation in the Punjab 
borderland and were conceptualised as crises based on Bourdieu's (1990, 159–93) 
model outlined in Section 3.2. Crises are moments in time when the routine, everyday 
ways of doing things are interrupted and when Bourdieu’s theory of practice may not 
apply (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 131). 
Through the repetition of crises across time, the Punjab borderland was 
constituted as crisis space. In interviews, borderlanders’ described it as a masculine 
crisis space dominated by men and fearless and strong women (Chapter 5, Section 
5.1). This crisis space was reproduced in everyday practices, narratives, official 
discourses and policies. According to the Border Area Development Programme, the 
area up to 10 kilometres from the de jure border between India and Pakistan constitutes 
the heart of this crisis space, whereas the borders of this space extend up to 50 
kilometres from the international boundary (Chapter 7, Section 7.3). 
The constitution of the Punjab borderland as crisis space was accompanied by 
the development of a crisis habitus among borderlanders. This crisis habitus was 
characterised by a sense of fear and insecurity. It was activated every time tensions 
increase between India and Pakistan, as was the case following ‘surgical strikes’ in 
2016. The crisis habitus also shaped everyday decisions, such as whether or not to 
build a house in the border area, whether to set up industrial units there or to invest in 
development more broadly. This linked crises to the everyday and rendered Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice relevant again (Chapter 5, Sections 5.1 and 5.3; Chapter 7, Section 
7.2).  
Crisis space and crisis habitus shaped everyday practices in the Punjab 
borderland for those living and working in this borderland, especially for landowners 
and agricultural labourers with fields beyond the fence (Chapter 7, Section 7.2), but 
also for those seeking to cross or to send goods across the international boundary 
through the Attari-Wagah border crossing point (Chapter 8, Section 8.3). 
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This research on crises in the Punjab borderland has shown how crises can be 
related across time and become part of field and habitus. By drawing attention to the 
role of fear and insecurity in shaping and triggering the crisis habitus, I have pointed 
to the role of emotions in relation to habitus. Bourdieu paid little attention to emotions, 
maybe with the exception of his work on taste (Bourdieu 1984), though it is certainly 
implicit in his conceptualisation of habitus. The role of emotions in shaping habitus 
has recently become the focus of scholarly debate (see e.g. Reed-Danahay 2005, 99–
128; Scheer 2012). This study has highlighted the need for further research on this 
topic. By showing how different crises can be related across time, I developed 
Bourdieu’s model for the analysis of a political crisis, which focused on a single 
historical event and its relationship to the everyday. I further extended Bourdieu’s 
model by showing how crises may not only lead to politicisation, as proposed by 
Bourdieu, but also to securitisation and militarisation. 
Crises in the Punjab borderland have been related to violence. Violence 
commenced with the partition of the British Punjab Province in 1949, which led to 
mass killings, rape, the destruction of property and the forced displacement of millions 
in Punjab. This process lasted roughly from March to September 1947, as is briefly 
explained in Chapter 4. However, only two months after partition mid-August 1947, 
India and Pakistan went to war for the first time. Another two wars followed in 1965 
and 1971, succeeded by several other military confrontations, conceptualised as crises 
– moments in time when everyday practices are interrupted and the practical sense 
ceases to operate. During these crises, borderlanders in Punjab were exposed to 
violence or the threat thereof and were temporarily displaced from their homes, with 
some being ordered to relocate permanently after the war in 1965, as outlined in 
Chapter 5.  
Violence not only shaped peoples’ lives during military confrontations, but also 
during the Khalistan separatist movement, when violence led to further violence, as 
the ethnographic study of the Khalistan movement in Chapter 6 showed. From the late-
1970s to the mid-1990s, the use of force by militants in Punjab provoked the use of 
violence by India’s state and central security forces, which in turn led to further 
violence by militants, especially after the attack on the Golden Temple in Amritsar in 
June 1984, further increasing the use of force by state actors. While the state reserves 
for itself the right to the legitimate use of physical force (Weber 2007, 78), the state’s 
use of violence in Punjab was heavily contested by many Sikh Punjabis and human 
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rights organisations as state actors used force to suppress demands for greater 
autonomy, were indiscriminate in their actions and acted outside the normal bounds of 
political procedures. Many Sikhs wearing turbans felt threatened, whether they were 
subject to physical force or not. This showed that violence cannot solely be understood 
as the use of force. It includes an assault on a person’s community and religious 
identity, conceptualised as symbolic violence by Bourdieu. As peoples’ perceptions of 
and reactions to the assault on the Golden Temple showed – many supported the 
Khalistan cause thereafter, some jointed the militant movement, others left jobs in 
politics, the military and the police, returned honours and awards in protest – symbolic 
violence gives physical force its power and meaning (Bourdieu 2014, 191). 
Violence also shaped everyday practices of people living in the borderland and 
of those owning and working on fields beyond the fence, as outlined in Chapter 6. 
Every time smugglers or drug traffickers were killed attempting to cross the 
international boundary between India or Pakistan, the gates to peoples’ fields beyond 
the fence remained closed and they could not pursue their agricultural work. They were 
thus physically hindered to make a living, which demonstrates the symbolic power of 
India’s border security guards. This was also reflected in thorough security checks 
people have to go through before they can tend their land and upon their return from 
their fields and in restrictions on the types of crops they can grow. Violence thus ranges 
from the use of physical force to the power that some actors have over others, and thus 
symbolic violence. This shows that violence is best understood as a continuum, as  
Scheper-Hughes (1996; 1997) and Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004, 19–22) 
proposed.  
Violence was closely related to mobility across the different chapters. Violence 
produced mobility for many borderlanders during military confrontations between 
India and Pakistan, which forcefully displaced people from their homes in the Punjab 
borderland temporarily. In this context, peoples’ mobility was directly shaped by 
kinship networks and the social capital they represented. The extent to which they 
could rely on their kinship networks depended on the economic resources attached to 
this social capital: mobile economic capital in the form of money was the most useful 
during crises, as it could quickly be converted into plane tickets, food or other items 
needed (Chapter 5, especially Sections 5.2 and 5.3). However, military confrontations 
and tensions between India and Pakistan also reduced cross-border movement for 
those who sought to trade or travel between these two countries through official 
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channels. As tensions escalated following attacks on a convoy of vehicles carrying 
Indian security personnel in Indian-administered Kashmir in February 2019, India 
withdrew the Most Favourite Nation status from Pakistan and the Indian customs 
increased taxes on goods coming from Pakistan by 200 per cent, thereby virtually 
ending imports from Pakistan (Chapter 8, especially Section 8.3). Mobility also 
produced violence, as the analysis of India’s responses to cross-border smuggling and 
drug trafficking and the movement of militants during the Khalistan movement 
highlighted (see Chapter 6, especially Section 6.2). State security actors’ use of 
violence to curb cross-border mobility during the Khalistan movement was translated 
into everyday border guarding practices. As I explored in Chapter 7, Section 7.2, 
attempts at crossing the border illegally were thwarted by India’s border guarding 
forces, regularly leading to the death of smugglers, drug traffickers and infiltrators. 
Border guarding practices reduced the mobility of borderlanders owning and working 
on the land beyond the fence. They were framed as potential threats and accomplices 
in smuggling and drug trafficking by India’s state agents, who used their authority to 
control access to the land beyond the fence, pointing to symbolic violence. 
The relationship between violence and mobility was mediated through the states’ 
use of authority articulated in the differentiation between good (trade, travel, 
migration) and bad movement (smuggling, infiltration, trafficking) and related 
practices. During the Khalistan movement, people and things increasingly crossed the 
border between India and Pakistan in Punjab. People often went in search of safety but 
also to smuggle goods. The Indian government constructed the cross-border movement 
of drugs, weapons, ammunition and people as ‘bad’ and ‘illegal’ activities to be 
contained and distinguished them from the ‘good’ and ‘legal’ movement of 
commodities and people through designated border crossing points to be facilitated. 
The formulation and incarnation of classifications point to states’ symbolic violence 
(Bourdieu 1994), through which analysts frequently misrecognise the social reality. 
As Abraham and Schendel (2005, 9) note, by constructing conceptual barriers between 
good and bad practices, the state “obscure[d] how these are often part of a single 
spectrum.” During the Khalistan movement, cross-border mobility was perceived to 
be facilitated by some Indian and Pakistani state officials (Chapter 6, Section 6.3). 
Border guards, some police officials and politicians are also perceived to be involved 
in cross-border smuggling and drug trafficking today. The trucks and railway wagons 
that are used for trade through official channels are also used for smuggling and drug 
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trafficking. The flows of goods and people thus weave in and out of legality and of 
states. They long preceded the formal establishment of India and Pakistan as states. 
Their formal establishment gave the movement of goods and people new shape, 
designating some as legal and others as illegal. 
The lines that divide legal from illegal practices are established in state capitals 
by government officials. While these borders are defined in state capitals where they 
are translated into policy, their implementation is delegated to street-level bureaucrats 
all over the state. Street-level bureaucrats interpret and translate rules and regulations 
in their own work environment, against their personal interest and in interaction with 
others and thereby renegotiate the borders between the legal and the illegal. This 
research has shown that some customs officials have used the power conferred upon 
them by the state to operate outside the rules and regulations of the same, by accepting 
bribes to speed up the clearance of goods at the Attari-Wagah border crossing point. 
Corruption was thereby established as a licit practice, which bureaucrats higher up in 
the state bureaucracy sought to curb by introducing an electronic data processing 
mechanism which reduced street-level bureaucrats’ discretionary powers (Chapter 8, 
Section 8.5).  
An insight of this research for policymaking is the interdependence between 
everyday practices and policymaking and the influence that each has on the other. 
Policymaking often happens in offices away from the places where they shape 
practices. This study suggests, for policies to have the desired effects, they must be 
informed through those who translate them into practice in their daily work, notably 
street-level bureaucrats, and thus everyday practices. Of course, even when taking the 
perspective of street-level bureaucrats and everyday practices into account, one cannot 
predict how policies will ultimately pan out. An insight from Pierre Bourdieu’s 
practice theory is that this depends on the situation in which practices take place, the 
habitus of actors and the structure of fields. 
By focusing on everyday practices in a borderland, this research contributed to 
a better understanding of border states influence on foreign policymaking. In contrast 
to existing literature on the role of border states on foreign policymaking in India (e.g. 
Blarel 2017; Blarel and van Willigen 2017; Dossani and Vijaykumar 2005; Hazarika 
2014; Jaganathan 2019; Jain and Maini 2017; Maini 2011; Pattanaik 2014; Wyatt 
2017), which remained confined to armchair analyses, this study explored this 
relationship ethnographically. It showed that everyday practices in places far away 
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from national capital can shape state policy and be thus central to international 
relations rather than marginal. By taking Bourdieu to the borderland, I contributed to 
literature on practices in international relations (see e.g. Adler-Nissen 2013a; Adler 
and Pouliot 2011b; Berling 2015; Bigo 2011), which has paid scant attention to 
borderlands. I also contribute to literature on International Relations, which remains 
focused on central governments. 
Cross-border smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorism and trade led India and 
Pakistan to cooperate. This cooperation was formalised in over 44 bilateral treaties 
signed between 1947 and 2017 (Tandon and Slobodchikoff 2019, 191),103 including 
the much-heralded Indus Waters Treaty (1960), the Simla Agreement (1972), an 
agreement on telecommunications (1974) and on the treatment of diplomatic personnel 
(1992), as well as a memorandum on drug trafficking (2011) (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.4). Cooperation was also institutionalised in the Composite Dialogue Process. In 
Chapter 6, Section 6.4 I explored the cooperative mechanisms set up between various 
security and government actors from India and Pakistan from the late 1980s. The focus 
was on strengthening social networks and through them to exchange information 
aimed at responding to threats emanating from cross-border terrorism, smuggling and 
drug trafficking. However, bilateral cooperation was short-lived for the most part and 
did not produce the desired results. Terrorist incidents continue to negatively affect 
relations between India and Pakistan and the cross-border smuggling of drugs has 
facilitated its consumption in Indian Punjab, where many youngsters are drug 
dependent. Indian government and security officials regularly focus on threats caused 
by cross-border drug trafficking, smuggling, the movement of people, militancy and 
the Khalistan movement, though attention shifted to Kashmir in the 1990s. 
In Chapter 8 I showed how cooperation was institutionalised in memoranda of 
understanding between chambers of commerce and industry in India and Pakistan and 
led to collaboration with regard to the organisation of trade fairs, the exchange of 
business delegations and policymaking. Cooperation between businesspeople from 
India and Pakistan was closely intertwined with inter-government relations and 
negotiations in the framework of the Composite Dialogue Process. The breakdown of 
the latter eventually led to the end of cooperation between businesspeople, as trade and 
 
103 The list presented by these two authors is not complete and the number of agreements reached is 
higher. 
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travel through official channels across national borders is contingent upon the support 
of states. While the two Punjabs, India and Pakistan may share a social space, the 
borders dissecting this space have become harder to cross with time.  
This research’s emphasis on cooperation between India and Pakistan, stands in 
contrast with much existing literature which has focused on crises in relations between 
these two neighbours. Relations between India and Pakistan have frequently been 
characterised as an ‘enduring rivalry’ (Misra 2010; Paul 2005b) or an ‘intractable 
conflict’ (Cohen 2013, 55). Through the analysis of everyday practices in the Punjab 
borderland, this research showed how politicisation, securitisation and militarisation 
may contribute to the repetition of crises.  
A major limitation of this research of borderlanders’ experiences and perceptions 
has been the absence of visits to border villages in Pakistan. Future research should fill 
this gap. If security concerns prevent visits to border villages, people from border 
villages could be interviewed in places like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. 
Photovoice could be a useful additional method to get a better understanding of 
everyday life in border villages.104 It can also help to bring policymakers closer to 
everyday life. Photovoice allows the researcher to get a feel for everyday life through 
the eyes of border residents while being physically removed from the borderland. It 
could be done with the assistance of people from different border villages, who would 
draw less attention to themselves than a white female researcher like myself and 
thereby reduce the impact on peoples’ lives. 
Another avenue for future research could be a comparative study of different 
borderlands between India and Pakistan. In this study of the Punjab borderland as crisis 
space, I already alluded to the fact that borderlanders’ experiences and practices varied 
across spaces, with crises more heavily and repeatedly affecting life along the Line of 
Control in Kashmir. While some scholars have done research on bordering practices 
in Kashmir (see e.g. Bouzas 2012; 2016; Sökefeld 2015; Zutshi 2010; 2015), other 
areas along the international boundary remain underexplored, including the border 
between Sindh and Rajasthan and Gujarat. 105  A comparative study of bordering 
 
104 I learned about this method through a research presentation on ‘Security on the Move – Remote 
Sensing, Remote Control and Ethnographic Representations’ by Jutta Bakonyi and Pete Chonka at a 
Workshop on ‘Ethnography as a Bridge: Between Anthropology and Political Sociology,’ held at 
Durham University on 21 May 2019. 
105  At Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi scholars are currently studying different Indian 
borderlands, including Rajasthan, as I learned through a research presentation on ‘Borders and 
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practices along different parts of the international boundary between India and 
Pakistan would allow us to get a better understanding of the relationship between 
interstate relations and everyday practices. Are there differences across 
provinces/states? What accounts for these differences? Is the Punjab borderland really 
different due to a common history, language and cultural identity, as I suggested 
throughout this thesis? 
Building on this research on mobilities in the Punjab borderland during military 
confrontations, future research could explore the translocal entanglements between 
different localities in the Punjab borderland and abroad. This research indicated that 
several borderlanders went to Europe and North America for work, studies or 
marriage. Preliminary observations suggest that these migration patterns are closely 
tied to marriage practices, kinship networks and economic capitals and that they are 
heavily gendered, with women primarily moving within the borderland while men are 
migrating abroad. Few studies have investigated these migration patterns in/from 
Punjab, a lacuna future research could fill (for exceptions see Azhar 2008; Talbot and 
Thandi 2004). As several people went to Europe, this research would tie in with 
existing studies on migration to/in/from the European Union, such as Katherine 
Charsley's (2013) study of marriage-migration from Pakistan to Britain and back or 
Kaveri Qureshi's (2012) research on labour migration from Pakistan to London. The 
contribution of such research would be a specific focus on the re-production of borders 
through migration practices. By drawing on Bourdieu’s practice theory, such a study 
would follow more recent work on translocality by Brickell and Datta (2011), for 
instance. 
  
 
Bordering Practices: Case study of Jaisalmer, India-Pakistan Border’ by Dr Krishnendra Meena at the 
Association for Borderlands Studies’ World Conference in Vienna/Budapest on 11 July 2018. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY  
1799-1849: Sikh Empire 
1799, formation of the Sikh Khalsa Army 
1801, April 12: Ranjit Singh is coronated as Maharaja of the Sikh Empire 
1845, December 11 – 9 March 9, 1846: First Anglo-Sikh War over Punjab 
1948, April 18 – March 30, 1849: Second Anglo-Sikh War over Punjab 
1849-1947: Punjab under British Rule 
1849, Punjab is annexed by the British East India Company 
1857, May 10 – November 1, 1858: Indian Rebellion  
1858, Punjab and the rest of British India come under direct rule of British Crown 
1886 – 1940: Nine Canal Colonies are established in Punjab 
1947, August 15/16: Partition - India and Pakistan formally become independent 
October 22: India and Pakistan go to war over Kashmir (1947-49) 
1949,  January 5: war ends with establishment of an UN-facilitated Ceasefire Line  
1965, India and Pakistan fight their second war over Kashmir: 
April 5: fighting begins in Kashmir 
April 8: fighting breaks out in the Runn of Kutch 
September 6: fighting ensues along the international boundary in Punjab 
1966, January 10: India and Pakistan sign the Tashkent Declaration, which sought to 
permanently settle their disputes  
1971, December 3-16: Indian and Pakistani military forces confront each other during 
East Pakistan’s war for independence, leading to the formation of Bangladesh 
1972, July 2: India and Pakistan sign the Shimla Agreement. The UN Ceasefire Line 
is renamed into Line of Control  
1974, May18: India detonates its first nuclear device, known as Pokhran-I 
1978, April 13: A clash between Khalsa Sikhs and Nirankari Sikhs marks the 
beginning of violence as part of the Khalistan movement in Indian Punjab 
1984, April 13: War over the Siachen Glacier begins with India’s Operation Meghdoot 
1984, June 1-8: Indian military attacks militant religious leader Jarnail Singh 
Bhindranwale and followers in Golden Temple in Amritsar, known as Operation 
Blue Star 
1984, October 31: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi assassinated by Sikh security guards 
1986, India launches military exercise Operation Brasstacks (1986-87) 
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1988, December 31: India and Pakistan sign an 'Agreement on the Prohibition of 
Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities'  
1987, militancy begins to rise in Indian-administered Kashmir 
1991, April 6: India and Pakistan sign an ‘Agreement on Prevention of Air Space 
Violations and for Permitting Over Flights and Landings by Military Aircraft’ 
1991, April 6: India and Pakistan sign an ‘Agreement on Advance Notice on Military 
Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements’ 
1994, January 19: the Pakistani Foreign Office submit two non-papers to India 
1996, January 1: India grants Most Favoured Nation Status to Pakistan 
1997, May 12: Prime Ministers Inder Kumar Gujral and Nawaz Sharif meet at the 
sidelines of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
summit in Male, Maldives, and agree to initiate a ‘composite dialogue’ 
 June, 19-23: Foreign Secretaries launch the Composite Dialogue Process 
1998, May 11-13: India carries out nuclear tests, known as Pokhran-II 
28-30 May: Pakistan carries out its own tests in response, known as Chagai-I/II 
1999, February 19: Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee undertakes historical 
bus trip to Lahore 
 February 21: India and Pakistan sign the Lahore Declaration and an MoU 
 February 21: The Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan, Shamshad Ahmad, and India, 
Krishnan Raghunath, signed an MoU to promote a peaceful environment 
1999, May 3 – July 26: India and Pakistan fight a brief but intense war on the LoC in 
the Kargil sector in Kashmir 
2001, July 14-16: General Pervez Musharraf and Atal Bihari Vajpayee hold a summit 
in Agra in India, which fails to achieve its goals 
December 13: militants attack the Indian parliament. India blames the Pakistan-
based Kashmiri separatist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad and 
mobilises its troops on the border. Pakistan follows suit. 
December 13 - June 10, 2002: military standoff along the border between India 
and Pakistan  
2003, November 23: Indian and Pakistani military commanders agreed to a 
ceasefire along their border 
2004, June: the Composite Dialogue Process is resumed 
2006, July 11: A series of bomb blasts in Mumbai kill 200 people 
September 16: General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
meet in Havana, Cuba 
2007, February 18: a bomb explodes on the Samjhauta Express train connecting 
Lahore with New Delhi in Diwana, Haryana, India 
2008, November 26-29: gunmen launch multiple attacks in Mumbai, killing 166 
people. India blames Pakistan-based LeT and breaks off the CDP with Pakistan 
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2010, April: Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousaf Raza Gillani meet at the 
sidelines of the 16th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) Summit in Thimphu, Bhutan, and agreed to resume the composite 
dialogue process 
2011, March 28-29: Home/Interior Secretaries meet in New Delhi, marking the 
resumption of the CDP 
2012, December 28: CDP ends with India-Pakistan Expert Level Dialogue on Nuclear 
CBMs in Islamabad, Pakistan 
2014, November 2: a suicide bombing takes place at Wagah border following daily 
border closing ceremony 
2015, July 10: Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif meet on sidelines of 
Shanghai Cooperation Summit in Ufa, Russia 
July 27, three gunmen attack the Dina Nagar police station in Gurdaspur district 
in Indian Punjab 
2016, January 2: an attack was launched on the Pathankot Air Force Station of the 
Western Air Command of the Indian Air Force 
 September 18: attack on Indian Army brigade headquarters near the Line of 
Control in Uri, Indian-administered Kashmir 
 September 28-29: in reaction to Uri attacks, India announced to have conducted 
‘surgical strikes’ on militant launch pads across the LoC in Pakistan 
2019, February 14: a convoy carrying Indian security personnel is attacked in Pulwama 
district in Indian-administered Kashmir, 40 members of the Central Reserve 
Police Force are killed 
 February 15: India withdraws Most Favoured Nation Status from Pakistan 
 February 26: Indian Air Force jets cross LoC and drops bombs in Balakot, 
Pakistan 
 February 27: Pakistan Air Force conducts airstrikes into Indian-administered 
Kashmir 
 August 5: India removes special status of Kashmir by revoking article 370 of the 
Indian Constitution.  
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APPENDIX 2: VILLAGE DATA OF INDIA CENSUS 2011106 
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106 Data has been compiled from the “Census” 2011 and the Directorate of Census Operations Punjab 
(2011a; 2011b). 
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW  GUIDELINE 
 
Introduction: 
I started interviews by introducing myself and, where applicable, research 
assistants/interpreters. Then I briefly explained the research project, what the interview 
shall be used for and how data shall be safeguarded. I then asked for oral consent to 
do the interview and to audio-record the interview. Only upon receiving such oral 
consent did I proceed with the interview. 
 
Background questions: 
Name, age, place of birth, place of residence, occupation, employment history. 
 
Employment: 
Interviewees were asked about their occupation and they were prompted to talk about 
everyday practices relating to their work. They were encouraged to talk about their 
employer or firm and their relationship to other actors and organisations.  
 
Historical events: 
Interviewees were asked to tell me about their life stories and their experience during 
military confrontations and other crises. When they did not bring them up themselves, 
I prompted interviewees to tell me about their experiences during and perceptions of 
particular events in history, adapted to their life trajectories: partition, India-Pakistan 
wars in 1947-49, 1965, 1971, the Khalistan movement, the construction of a fence by 
India, the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998, the Kargil crisis in 1999, the 
Agra Summit in 2001, attacks on the Indian Parliament, the military standoff in 2001-
2004, the Mumbai attacks in 2006, the Samjhauta Express train bombings in 2007, the 
Mumbai attacks in 2008, the suicide bombing at Wagah in 2014, the Pathankot attack 
in 2016 and ‘surgical strikes’ in 2016.  
 
Questions to security actors: 
How is the BSF / Rangers / Military organised? What is the role of BSF / Rangers / 
Military generally, and in the border area specifically? What do you mean by 
‘sensitive’? Is the military deployed in the Punjab borderland? What are the military’s 
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responsibilities there? What are your responsibilities? Can you tell me about your daily 
practices in general? What is the role of BSF / Rangers / Military at the Attari-Wagah 
border crossing point?  
 
Questions to borderlanders:  
Are people from your village employed at the ICP Attari? If so, how many? What is 
the main source of income of people in your village? Do you have/work on fields 
beyond the fence? What do you have to do to access your land? Are there times when 
you cannot access your land? Can you tell me about the time before the fence was 
built? Why was the fence built? Did the fence affect your daily practices? If so, how? 
What is your relationship to BSF officers? Can you tell me about drug trafficking and 
smuggling (in your village)? Does it have any effect on you?  
 
Questions to traders: 
When did you(r) / firm start trading with partners in Pakistan (PK) / India (IN)? What 
motivated you/your family to start cross-border trade? How did you find your business 
partners? How many business partners do you have in IN/PK? Where is/are your 
business partner/s based? What products do you trade? What has been your experience 
trading with people in IN/PK? Will you continue trading with people in IN/PK? Why? 
Why not? 
 
Questions on trade: 
How is trade organised? Where do goods come from and go to? Which actors are 
involved in trade? How do these actors facilitate/inhibit trade? What is the relationship 
between these different actors? Has something changed when it comes to trade with 
IN/PK if you compare the period prior to the attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001 
with the period after the ceasefire agreement in November 2003? If so, to what do you 
attribute this change (general situation, political leadership, bilateral talks and 
agreements, infrastructure developments, etc.)?  
 
Questions on CoCs / BAs:  
Are you/is your firm affiliated with a Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CoC) or 
another business association (BA)? If so, which ones? What does the 
chamber/association offer you? What does the CoC/BA do on India-Pakistan trade? 
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Has the CoC/BA been able to influence policymaking in your view? If so, can you 
give examples and explain how? How would you rank the different 
chambers/association in order of importance to India-Pakistan trade and to the IN/PK 
economy in general? 
 
Questions on interstate initiatives:  
Do you know of any government-to-government initiatives? Have you heard of 
meetings between people from India and Pakistan to discuss operational matters in 
relation to trade (prompt about CLBC)? If so, why were they set up, who is involved, 
and how effective are they at resolving issues? Have you heard of and can you tell me 
something about the Composite Dialogue Process? How is it organised? How does it 
work in practice (i.e. how are meetings organised, decisions taken, agreements 
written)? Who is involved? What are the hurdles and achievements? 
 
Questions on cross-border travel:  
Have you ever travelled to IN/PK? If no: Why not? If yes, how often have you travelled 
(per year) and for what purpose? Can you tell me about the first time you went there? 
Via which route/s did you travel? Are there any problems using these routes means? 
Have you ever been questioned at the border? Did/do you ever face difficulties at the 
checkpoint? If so, what kind of difficulties? Can you tell me about your stay in IN/PK? 
Have you ever faced problems on your return from IN/PK? Can you tell me about the 
visa procedure? Are you always granted a visa? If not, do you know why? 
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